Published in French in: Revue d Economie du Développement, Vol.3, (1995), pp HOUSEHOLD MODELING FOR THE DESIGN OF POVERTY ALLEVIATION
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1 Published in French in: Revue d Economie du Développement, Vol.3, (1995), pp HOUSEHOLD MODELING FOR THE DESIGN OF POVERTY ALLEVIATION STRATEGIES 1 by Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet University o Caliornia at Berkeley Abstract Insuicient access to assets is the main determinant o poverty. We analyze the role o access to assets in explaining household labor allocation strategies, sources o income, levels o income achieved, and poverty headcount ratios among classes o Mexican rural households. To assess the gains rom asset redistribution, we both measure the direct income eects rom redistribution and simulate the general equilibrium eects o redistribution in a computable non-separable household model. Results show that land redistribution allows to achieve both equity and eiciency gains. However, there are economies o scale in sel-employment in microenterprise, human capital assets or labor market participation, and social capital or international migration, implying conlicts between equity gains and social eiciency in redistributing these assets towards those with lower endowments. I. Assets and poverty Insuicient asset entitlements is the main determinant o poverty. For rural households, who typically pursue multiple sources o income, assets that determine the choice o income earning strategies and the levels o income achieved are quite diverse. In agriculture, they include land, irrigation, productive capital, and livestock or direct production and organizational capital or the reduction o transactions costs in accessing markets. For wage earnings on the labor market, they include the number o adults in the household who can participate the labor market and the level o human capital embodied in each. For sel-employment in microenterprise activities, they include 1 Paper submitted or presentation at the European Association o Agricultural Economists VIII Congress, Edinburgh, Scotland, September 3-7,
2 ixed capital committed to these activities. And or migration, they include the stock o migration capital constituted by the existing network o individuals with migratory experience to which household members have access or inormation and support. Entitlement ailures in all o these assets is near certain poverty, and welare rises as claims over one or several o these assets increase. In designing rural poverty alleviation strategies, policy makers need to deal with both the high degree o heterogeneity that characterizes rural populations and the broad array o types o assets that could be transerred as instruments to reduce poverty among speciic groups o households. The problem is thus highly multidimensional and requires careul empirical analysis to disentangle the many dimensions involved and anticipate the expected impact o targeted resource transers, both in terms o direct (irst round) eects as well as total eects through resource reallocation in the household as a consequence o the transers. Methodologically, this calls upon a detailed characterization o existing poverty in relation to asset entitlements, and construction o simulation models to anticipate the household-level general equilibrium eects o the transers. In this paper, we use a national survey o Mexican rural households to conduct this type o analysis. We irst analyze the role o access to assets in determining household income strategies, levels o income achieved, and incidence o poverty among dierent groups. We do this by constructing a typology o households where asset entitlement is the discriminating actor. We then build a household model that is based on the role o dierent categories o assets in explaining behavior. Speciication o the role o assets and the dierential tradability o particular products and actors is developed by close analogy with Computable General Equilibrium models or small open economies. We then proceed to quantiy this model and use it to simulate the consequences o improvement in speciic asset entitlements across household groups. This allows us to measure the expected income, equity, and social eiciency eects o alternative targeting o assets transers. It also allows to contrast the magnitude o irst round and general equilibrium eects o these transers, and hence identiy the role o dierential lexibility in resource reallocation across households in taking advantage o the transers. Most particularly, the results allow to identiy 2
3 transers or which there are diseconomies o scale, and hence where objectives o equity and social eiciency are reconciled. II. An assets-based household typology The data we use are rom a 1994 national survey o households in the Mexican ejido (land reorm) sector. It consists in 1,377 observations in 250 ejidos. Typical o smallholders, these households are engaged in crops and livestock production, wage labor on local labor markets, selemployment in microenterprise activities, domestic migration, and international migration. In Table 1, households are categorized by their current control over the three types o assets which are the main determinants o time allocation strategies and levels o income achieved. They are: - Agricultural assets, measured in hectares o national rained equivalent (hare) or corn production, with a threshold o 4 hare or high assets. - Labor orce assets, measured in number o unskilled equivalent adults (UEA) in the household, with a threshold o 6 UEA or high assets. For each adult in the household, UEA is deined as: 1.06 i or i 6, 1.06 i 1.12 i-6 or 6 < i 12, and or i > 12, where i is the number o years o schooling, a scale based on the role o education in labor market earnings estimated by T.P. Schultz (1993). - Migration assets, measured as the sum o the number o permanent migrants rom the extended amily (brothers and sisters o the head o household), members o the household who have migrated in the past either seasonally or permanently, and members o the household who are currently engaged in migration minus one (since this is the migration capital or one migrant in the household). The threshold is migration assets greater than zero. In Table 1, households are classiied in eight groups according to their endowments in these assets, rom those who are below the threshold or all three assets (group 1), to those with one asset above threshold (groups 2, 3, and 4), two assets above threshold (groups 5, 6, and 7), and all three assets above the threshold (group 8). Ownership o these assets represents the potential which 3
4 households have in designing income earning strategies that capitalize on these assets, not the actual income strategies, and the potential which they have in reaching higher income levels as asset ownership increases, not the actual income levels achieved. I the typology has predictive power, these potentials are translated in contrasted income earning strategies that speciically correspond to asset ownership. In addition, income level should rise as asset endowments place households above the threshold in a larger number o asset categories. These expected regularities provide us with a test o the validity o the proposed assets approach to the characterization o household behavior. The income data or the seven groups o households show that assets do indeed matter on incomes levels achieved: households with zero assets achieve 22% o the income achieved by those with all three assets, while those with one asset achieve between 46 and 56%, and those with two assets 59 and 92% o that level. The poverty headcount ratio also alls regularly as the number o assets owned increases, rom 76% with zero assets, to between 54 and 44% with one, between 39 and 25% with two, and 23% with three. The predictive power o assets on income and poverty is thus very strong. The predictive power o assets on income strategy is also strong. Households with: - Only agricultural assets (group 3) derive 68% o their income rom crops and livestock. - Only labor market assets (group 4) derive 57% o their total income rom wage labor. - Only migration assets (group 2) derive 44% o their income rom remittances. Among households with two types o assets: - Those with agricultural and migration assets (group 6) derive 81% o their income rom crops, livestock, and remittances. - Those with agricultural and labor market assets (group 7) derive 83% o their income rom crops, livestock, and wage earnings. - Those with labor market and migration assets (group 5) derive 74% o their income rom wage earnings and remittances. 4
5 Finally, households with the three types o assets (group 8) derive 85% o their income rom crops, livestock, wage earnings, and remittances. Household labor allocation parallels the relative importance o the various sources o income in response to asset ownership. These remarkable regularities allow us to proceed with the construction and calibration o a household model that will serve to predict how households adjust their labor allocation strategies to changing levels o asset ownership. This in turn allows to predict what is the poverty reduction value and the social eiciency gain or cost o policies that target asset transers to speciic classes o households. III. A household model with several categories o eective labor The household allocates its total amily time endowment E l to a set o productive activities both on arm and o arm, as well as to home time (leisure). The activities that compete or amily labor are agriculture, sel-employment in household-based microenterprises, labor market employment, domestic migration, and international migration. Each o these activities uses speciic assets z i owned by the household. For instance, agriculture uses land and ixed agricultural capital assets (z a ); microenterprises uses (non-observable) implements and a stock o accumulated experience in crats or trade; labor market employment uses human capital assets composed o both the number o household workers and their educational levels; and migration uses social capital assets under the orm o the accumulated stock o kin with migratory experience (migration capital). For agriculture, labor may be hired and inputs purchased. This allocation can be summarized as ollows: 5
6 Activities Fixed Household Hired Purchased assets time labor inputs Agriculture z a l a {-q a } {-q a } Microenterprises z na l na Labor market z w l w Domestic migration z dm l dm International migrationz im l im Home time c l Total household time E l 2.1. Household productive activities depend on technological speciications as ollows: i) Agricultural production technology, with imperect substitution between amily and hired labor: g qj, la, z a = 0, where { } q j > 0 or agricultural commodities produced, q j < 0 or purchased variable inputs, including hired labor. ii) Other activities: amily labor-based microenterprise production, labor market employment, domestic migration, and international migration: q = q( l, z ), i = na, w, dm, im. i i i i In these equations, l i is measured in units o amily labor time with an opportunity cost w equal to the marginal productivity o labor in agriculture. q i is measured in eective units o amily labor in the corresponding activity, with a price equal to the hourly income in that activity. For example, i the activity is international migration, z i is migration capital, l i is amily labor time allocated to international migration, and q i are units o migrant time with a wage p i > w equal to the hourly income o migrants Household consumption is a vector c that includes ood consumed, purchased goods, and home time. 6
7 2.3. The price regime includes both price bands on ood markets and shadow prices or nontradables as ollows: i) Prices are equal to market prices p k or tradables (T). Products and actors under this price regime are: b - Food bought by the household at a price p s Food sold by the household at a price p - Prices or hired labor in agriculture, labor sold on the labor market, migration wages, and purchased inputs. We denote by {T*} this set o commodities. For these commodities, the prices are p = p, k T. k ii) Prices are equal to shadow prices or non-tradables (NT). This includes: - Food, i the household is sel-suicient in ood. In this case, the shadow price o ood, p, is determined by q = c.. - Family labor allocated across activities under the time constraint l + c = E, i = a, na, w, dm, im, i i l l k which determines the shadow wage w. This shadow wage will be measured as the eective unitary amily labor cost in agriculture (see below). Family labor is thus treated as homogenous, measured in number o adults, with an opportunity cost w. Total labor time E l is allocated to the various activities l a, l i (i = na, w, dm, im). Through the specialized assets z i and the transormation unctions q = q( l, z ), this homogenous labor is i i i i transormed into units o eective sel-employed (na), wage (w), and migrant (dm, im) labor with activity speciic prices p i (i = na, w, dm, im). Note that, under this system o labor accounting, the wage received on the labor market does not determine the opportunity cost o adult amily labor, since this wage applies to units o amily labor l w transormed into units o eective wage labor q w through the transormation unction q q l, z. Units o eective labor receive dierent = ( ) w w w w remunerations in the activities na, w, dm, im. However, the household cannot specialize in 7
8 the most proitable o these activities because it has limited given endowments in each o the corresponding assets z i Cash constraint: p( q + E c )+ S = 0, where i T i i i i E i are changes in stocks S are exogenous cash transers For a given status o participation to the ood market, and given household characteristics z h, the household s problem is to: (1a) Max uc (, z h ) cql,, subject to the ollowing constraints: (1b) p( q + E c ) + S = 0, cash constraint, i T i i i i (1c) g({ qj}, la, za) = 0, production technology or agriculture, j Α, (1d) qi = qi( li, zi), production technology in non-agricultural activities, i NA = {na, w, dm, im}, (1e) p = p, k T, exogenous eective market prices or tradables, k k k k (1) q c = 0, k NT, equilibrium conditions or ood i household is ood selsuicient, which establishes the shadow price o ood p, (1g) l + c = E, equilibrium conditions or amily labor, i {a, NA}, which i i l l establishes the shadow price o amily labor w. I the household is sel-suicient in ood, T = {T } and NT = {}; I the household is either a buyer or seller o ood, T = {T, } and NT = {0}. Solving the irst-order conditions, the reduced orm o the model can be written as ollows. Agricultural production decisions regarding all products and inputs (including amily labor) are represented by a system o supply and actor demand unctions in the decision prices p and the shadow wage or amily labor w : 8
9 (2a) q = q({ p }, w, z ) j j a l = l ({ p }, w, z ), j A. a a j a The household thus behaves as i it were maximizing proit using w and p as prices. Optimum levels o products and actors yield maximum agricultural proit: (2b) π a = pq j j wl a, j A. Allocation o amily time to the other activities equalizes the marginal productivity o labor to the shadow wage w : (2c) p q l i i = i w q = q ( l, z ), i NA, i i i i, which yield the maximum non-agricultural activity proits: (2d) π i = pq i i wl i, i NA. On the demand side, decisions are also made in terms o the w and p prices. Using (1b), (1e), (1), (1g), (2b), and (2d), the ull-income constraint in w and p prices is written: (2e) pc + wc = π + π + we + S= y, k k l a i k { T, NT} i NA and the demand system is: l (2) c = c(p, w, y, z h ). On the consumption side, the household thus behaves as i it were maximizing utility using w and the p prices. Decision on the ood market regime is made as ollows: i the shadow price o ood, p, is lower than the market sale price, the household opts or the seller regime; i p is greater than the purchase price, it chooses the buyer regime; and i p lies between the two market prices, it remains sel-suicient: 9
10 (2g) s p p then T and p = p, s c p < p < p then NT, c p p then T and p = p. s c IV. Measurement problems To calculate the shadow wage w o amily labor in agriculture, we proceed as ollows. For each crop, region, and technological level, we know the total labor cost w a l rom a study by Matus (1994). This is equivalent to technical coeicients in units o hired labor equivalent. These coeicients can be used to derive the total labor cost that would be incurred by each household in the survey, given its crop mix, region, and technological level in each crop. From the survey, we also know, or each household, the share o amily labor in total labor. This gives us the amily labor cost wl a. Using the observed amily labor availability or agriculture, l a, (and not the labor time spent arming) we derive the shadow wage o amily labor w. This shadow wage measures the average labor return per unit o amily labor in agriculture. It is lower than the agricultural wage w a since there is considerable hidden unemployment among amily members in agriculture. At an equilibrium point, the marginal productivity o amily labor in all activities is equal to this shadow wage. These values or each household category are given in Table 3. The non-agricultural activities only use amily labor. Hence, gross revenue rom the activity is distributed over amily labor and the corresponding ixed asset as: pq = w l + rz. i i i i i At equilibrium allocation o amily labor across activities, MP z i = r. Hence, we can measure i the marginal productivity o the asset z i as: 1 MPz i = ri = ( pq i i w li), using observations on z i, p i q i, l i, and the measured w. The z i values or asset income (r i z i ) and the marginal productivity o assets ( MP zi ) are given in Table 3 or the dierent household categories. 10
11 For sel-employment in microenterprises, z na is not directly observable. In this case, we measure z na as the dierence between income received in this activity and the cost o amily labor used in this activity measured at its opportunity cost: zna rnazna = pnaqna w lna, where z na has a return o one. The proit unction or agriculture is speciied as a Generalized Leontie. The parameters o the derived system o supply and actor demand, or the average arm, are derived rom best guess price elasticities derived rom Sullivan et al. (1988), calibrated to satisy the homogeneity and symmetry constraints. They are scaled or dierent arm size groups based on the proit share o each commodity or actor in that arm group relative to the average arm (see de Janvry, Sadoulet, Fachamps, and Raki, 1992). Non-agricultural activities respond to a CES transormation unction, with elasticity o substitution σ and share parameter α. Starting rom given values o σ and the elasticities o price response, the share parameters can be derived. The consumption system is derived rom a Translog indirect utility unction in ood, purchased goods, and home time. The parameters are derived rom prior estimates o price and income elasticities, calibrated to satisy the additivity and symmetry constraints. The household model is thus identical to a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model or a small open economy with both tradables and non-tradables, and with a multimarket speciication o the agricultural sector (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1992), an approach which we reerred to as Computable Nonseparable Household (CNH) models (de Janvry, Sadoulet, Fachamps, and Raki). This particular CNH model has ive sectors (agriculture, microenterprises, wage labor, domestic migration, and international migration), tradables (ood when sold or bought, and other products and actors bought and sold), and nontradables (ood when ully home consumed and amily labor). V. Asset transers and poverty 11
12 I assets z i > 0 are transerred to a household, this induces two adjustment eects: irst, additional assets z i increase the number o eective units q i or a given amount o amily labor l i allocated to this activity; second, amily labor time is reallocated toward this activity as it becomes relatively more proitable, increasing urther the level q i o this activity. We have seen that the structure o asset ownership is a powerul determinant o the income strategy ollowed and o the levels o income achieved. Poverty reduction strategies can thus eectively ocus on improving access to assets or dierent categories o households. In comparing the impact o this asset transer across households, two measures can be used: i) The absolute income eect created by transer o one unit o a particular asset. This gives us a measure o the social value o asset use by dierent groups. O particular interest is whether the marginal unit o this asset creates a higher income gain among those who have relatively lower or higher initial endowments o that asset. I the ormer, there are diseconomies o scale in the use o the asset, and a progressive redistribution o the asset is also socially eicient. I the latter, there are economies o scale in the use o the asset, creating a tradeo between equity and eiciency: a progressive redistribution o the asset is at the cost o a global eiciency loss. ii) The percentage gain in income or each household category created by transer o one unit o a particular asset. This gives us a measure o the welare enhancement value o the asset or each household category. There are two measures o impact o the asset transer on household income which we can use and contrast: i) We have seen that we can measure the marginal productivity o each asset ( MP zi ) in each household category. This gives us the direct contribution to agricultural proit and to net income in each activity o the marginal asset transer, without taking into account resource reallocation in production and consumption. ii) Through solution o the CNH model, we can measure the change in income induced by the asset transer, ater ull reallocation o resources in production and consumption has occurred. 12
13 The dierence between marginal productivity and ull income eects gives a measure o the degree o lexibility in adjusting to the change, and hence in deriving greater beneit rom the transer. We simulate the transer o ixed amounts o each o the assets to the dierent household classes. For all our transers, the results in Table 4 and in Figure 1 show that asset redistribution is progressive: or one unit o asset transer, the percentage gain is income is larger or the poorer than or the richer households. From an equity standpoint, asset redistribution is thus an eective way o improving the distribution o income. Comparing the marginal productivity and total income eects shows that lexibility in resource reallocation is important or agricultural assets. In this case, the total income eect is less inversely related to the level o household income than the marginal eect, indicating that high income households have more lexibility in reallocating resources to accommodate a change in arm size than poor households. The absolute eect o a change in assets has more surprises. Agricultural assets displays the expected inverse relation between income (both marginal productivity and total income) and arm size. There are thus diseconomies o scale in arm size which justiy redistributive land reorm, whereby land is redistributed rom large to small arms. Land redistribution is thus both progressive and socially eicient. However, greater lexibility in resource reallocation on larger arms diminishes somewhat, without erasing it, the inverse relation. This greater lexibility comes rom the act that large arms use the labor market more expensively, and hence have more lexibility in adjusting the labor orce to changing arm size. There are clear economies o scale in human capital assets, at least to the scale o 9 unskilled adult equivalent. This includes both amily size and educational level. A larger amily is better or resource reallocation. And there are increasing returns to education up to 12 years o schooling. In this case, educating those with low education is progressive, but it is not socially eicient: it is better to concentrate resources to bring to 12 years o education those who are being educated. In microenterprise activities, higher lexibility in resource reallocation among those with higher levels o microenterprise assets also creates strong economies o scale. Here also, 13
14 distributing microenterprise assets toward those with low asset levels is progressive but not socially eicient. Finally, the marginal eect o migration capital is neutral to scale, but not the second round eects in resource reallocation which create increasing returns to scale. Allowing or resource reallocation, migration is thus a cumulative phenomenon: the accumulation o migration in an extended amily system makes a marginal unit o this capital increasingly proitable. This observation conirms the role o migration assets in migration as described by many analysts o migration (Durand and Massey, 1992). VI. Conclusions Insuicient access to assets is a undamental determinant o poverty. Understanding the equity and social eiciency eects o redistributing assets toward the poor is thus important or the design o poverty alleviation programs. We analyzed both the directly measured irst round eects o assets transers and simulated the general equilibrium eects o these transers in a computable non-separable household model. Results show that asset redistribution toward the poor is always progressive in that it generates a larger percentage income gain or those with lower income levels. However, the absolute income gains may not be largest among those with low assets levels, particularly when resource reallocation eects are taken into account. For land, equity and eiciency are compatible as there exists an inverse relation between the income eect o an additional unit o land and arm size. Redistributive land reorm thus remains a undamental instrument o an assets-based poverty reduction program. This is not the case or the other assets: there are economies o scale in human capital assets, microenterprise assets, and migration capital, implying a tradeo between equity and eiciency gains. Deriving ull social beneits rom education thus requires extending educational investments through seven years o schooling. Through the accumulation o social capital, migration is also a cumulative process that explains why successul migration breeds more migration. 14
15 The gap between marginal productivity and total income eects indicate the importance o lexibility in resource reallocation in taking maximum advantage o assets transers. In particular, a larger amily size allows greater lexibility in resource reallocation. Greater participation to the labor market as employers also gives a lexibility advantage to the larger arms. Increasing lexibility in resource reallocation among the poor is thus undamental in helping them derive ull beneit rom programs o assets transers. 15
16 Reerences de Janvry, A., M. Fachamps, M. Raki, and E. Sadoulet. Structural adjustment and the peasantry in Morocco: a computable household model. European Journal o Agricultural Economics, 19 (1992): Durand, Jorge, and Douglas Massey. Mexican Migration to the United States: A Critical Review. Latin American Research Review, 27 (1992): Matus, Jaime. Competitiveness o crops under trade liberalization. Unpublished study. Postgraduate College, University o Chapingo, Texcoco, Mexico, Sadoulet, Elisabeth and Alain de Janvry Agricultural Trade Liberalization and the Low Income Countries: A General Equilibrium-Multimarket Approach. American Journal o Agricultural Economics 74 (1992): Schultz, T. Paul. Investments in the Schooling and Health o Women and Men: Quantities and Returns. Yale University, Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 702, August Sullivan, John, John Wainio, and Vernon Roningen A Data Base or Trade Liberalization Studies. Washington, D.C.: USDA, Economic Research Service, Agriculture and Trade Division. 16
17 Table 1 - Typology o households by asset ownership Household classes Zero assets One asset Two assets Three assets Agricultural assets low low high low low high high high Labor market assets low low low high high low high high All Migration assets none yes none none yes yes none yes households Number o observations Percent o households Agricultural assets Land Total (ha) Share in irrigated (%) Crop land (adjusted ha)** Livestock (cattle heads) Human capital assets Family size Education Microenterprise (% o households) Migration assets to Mexico to USA High agricultural assets is more than 4 ha o rained equivalent. High labor orce (education) assets is more than 6 unskilled equivalent adult. ** Area adjusted or quality by agroecological zone and irrigation status, in national average rained equivalent hectares. Education capital or each member over 14 years o age (see text or deinition). Migration asset = permanent migrants rom extended amily and rom household + (current migrants rom household 1). 17
18 Table 2. Households assets and income Household classes Zero assets One asset Two assets Three assets Agricultural assets low low high low low high high high Labor market assets low low low high high low high high All Migration assets none yes none none yes yes none yes households Percent o households Labor allocation (number o adults) Total in household Main activity On-arm Sel employed O-arm Migration in Mexico to the USA Sources o income by activity (percent) Crops Livestock Sel-employment in non-ag Wage labor Remittances rom Hh member in Mexico Hh member in US Non hh member Other sources Total income (pesos) per household 4,840 12,669 11,664 10,253 13,262 19,124 20,625 22,526 12,844 per capita 1,061 2,516 2,685 1,452 1,953 4,094 3,069 3,036 2,459 Poverty (headcount ratio in %)
19 Table 3 - Asset incomes Household classes Zero assets One asset Two assets Three assets Agricultural assets low low high low low high high high Labor orce assets low high low low high low high high All Migration assets none none none yes yes yes none yes households Percent o households Shadow wage o amily labor (pesos) Asset income (pesos) Agriculture Sel-employment O arm labor Migration to Mexico Migration to the United States Marginal productivity o assets (pesos) Agriculture (with adjustment or purchased inputs) O arm labor Migration to Mexico Migration to the United States
20 Table 4 - Simulation o income eects o assets transers Household classes Zero assets One asset Two assets Three assets Agricultural assets low low high low low high high high Labor orce assets low high low low high low high high All Migration assets none none none yes yes yes none yes households Percent o households Increase in agricultural asset by 1 ha NRE Marginal productivity eect (pesos) Marginal productivity eect (% o income) Total income eect (pesos) Total income eect (% o income) Increase in microenterprise asset by 60 eective pesos Marginal productivity eect (pesos) Marginal productivity eect (% o income) Total income eect (pesos) Total income eect (% o income) Increase in labor orce asset by 1 unskilled adult equivalent Marginal productivity eect (pesos) Marginal productivity eect (% o income) Total income eect (pesos) Total income eect (% o income) Increase in US migration assets by 1 migrant Marginal productivity eect (pesos) Marginal productivity eect (% o income) Total income eect (pesos) Total income eect (% o income)
21 Figure 1. Simulation o assets transers Pesos Return to agricultural assets Marginal eect Total income eect 200 Ha NRE % change in income Return to agricultural assets Marginal 10 5 Total 0 0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 Income per household Pesos Return to microenterprise assets Total Marginal Microenterprise asset % change in income Return to microenterprise assets Total 1 Marginal Income per household 0 0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25, Pesos Return to to human capital assets Total Marginal Marginal Unskilled adult equivalent % change in income Return to human capital assets Total Marginal Income per household 0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25, Pesos Return to migration assets Total Marginal 900 Number o persons % change in income Return to migration assets Total 8 6 Marginal 4 2 Income per household
22 22
Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS DIVISION OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY W ORKING PAPER NO. 787 HOUSEHOLD MODELING FOR THE DESIGN OF POVERTY
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