When Does a Central Bank s Balance Sheet Require Fiscal Support?

Transcription

1 When Does a Central Bank s Balance Sheet Require Fiscal Support? Marco Del Negro Federal Reserve Bank of New York Christopher A. Sims Princeton University ECB Public Finance Conference, December 214 Disclaimer: The views expressed are ours and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System

2 Yet another balance sheet simulation? Hall and Reis (213), Carpenter et al. (213), Greenlaw et al. (213), Christensen et al. (213) examine likely scenarios, based on historically normal behavior of interest rates and demand for central bank liabilities None of these papers uses a model where inflation and interest rates are endogenously determined We use a complete, though simplified, economic model to study why a central bank s balance sheet matters at all and the consequences of a lack of fiscal backing for the central bank Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 2 / 29

3 Yet another balance sheet simulation? Hall and Reis (213), Carpenter et al. (213), Greenlaw et al. (213), Christensen et al. (213) examine likely scenarios, based on historically normal behavior of interest rates and demand for central bank liabilities None of these papers uses a model where inflation and interest rates are endogenously determined We use a complete, though simplified, economic model to study why a central bank s balance sheet matters at all and the consequences of a lack of fiscal backing for the central bank We show that a large, long-duration central bank balance sheet, together with lack of fiscal support, can impair the central bank s ability to control inflation Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 2 / 29

4 Contribution In our model, interest rates, inflation, and seigniorage are endogenous, hence we can answer questions such as: 1 Under what conditions does the central bank need fiscal support? The central bank has one quasi-fiscal resource: seigniorage. Seigniorage is quantitatively important (its PDV is very large in our baseline calibration )... but is endogenous CB s ability to maintain policy commitments without support from the fiscal authority depends on whether seigniorage increases (hedge) or decreases in scenarios where the value of CB s assets drops. Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 3 / 29

5 Contribution 2 Can self-fulfilling solvency crises arise when the CB holds (a lot of) long-duration assets? If the CB cannot rely on fiscal backing has to rely on seigniorage ( higher inflation) if the value of its assets were to fall below the value of reserves... an equilibrium may arise where the public s high interest rates/inflation expectations become self-fulfilling: future interest rates value of long-duration assets balance sheet gap that needs to filled with future seigniorage Multiplicity arises depending on 1) size/duration of balance sheet, 2) properties of currency demand function. Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 4 / 29

6 How could a central bank be insolvent? Can t it always print money? CB has of course no problem paying nominal liabilities but can t do that and control inflation (follow the Taylor rule) Can t CB run a Ponzi scheme? That is, continue following Taylor rule and issue an ever-increasing amount of reserves? No. Private sector transversality condition is violated Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 5 / 29

7 The model Simple, perfect-foresight, non-linear, continuous-time model Exogenous real interest rate ρ and income Y Flexible prices All uncertainty is revealed at time Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 6 / 29

8 Households Households/private sector maximize subject to e β log C dt C(1 + ψ(v)) + Ḟ + V + Ṁ + qḃp P = Y τ + ρf + r V + (χ + δ qδ)bp P P F : storage/foreign assets paying an exogenous real rate ρ V : overnight reserves paying nominal rate r. M: currency B P : Woodford (21)-style bond (depreciates at rates δ, coupon δ + χ, duration δ 1 ) All assets pay same real return Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 7 / 29

9 Households Households/private sector maximize subject to e β log C dt C(1 + ψ(v)) + Ḟ + V + Ṁ + qḃp P = Y τ + ρf + r V + (χ + δ qδ)bp P P F : storage/foreign assets paying an exogenous real rate ρ V : overnight reserves paying nominal rate r. M: currency B P : Woodford (21)-style bond (depreciates at rates δ, coupon δ + χ, duration δ 1 ) All assets pay same real return Population growth n and productivity growth γ (omitted) Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 7 / 29

10 Transactions technology v = PC M ; ψ(v) = ψ e ψ 1/v Elasticity of money demand goes to zero as r (Mulligan & Sala-i-Martin 2, Alvarez and Lippi 29). Real balances go to zero for r > ψ ψ 1 Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 8 / 29

11 Fiscal policy Fiscal Authority budget constraint: g + (χ + δ δq) B P = τ + τ C + q Ḃ P B = B P + B C (bonds are held either by the public or the CB) τ C remittances from CB Passive fiscal policy (except for discussion of fiscal backing ): τ = ξ + ξ 1 q B P, ξ 1 > ρ Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 9 / 29

12 Conventional and unconventional monetary policy Reaction function for interest on reserves r: ( ) ṙ = θ r r + θ π (Ṗ P π) r, r r Unconventional monetary policy: path for B C (Treasuries held by CB) The central bank budget constraint is: q ḂC P V + Ṁ P = (χ + δ δq) BC P r V P τ C Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 1 / 29

13 Equilibrium Fisher eq. + Taylor rule yield a solution for interest rates: r t = e (θπ 1)θr s θ r (θ π ρ t+s ( r θ π π)) ds + κe (θπ 1)θr t κ: This source of multiplicity (Cochrane 211) is not the only one in this model Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 11 / 29

14 Equilibrium Fisher eq. + Taylor rule yield a solution for interest rates: r t = e (θπ 1)θr s θ r (θ π ρ t+s ( r θ π π)) ds + κe (θπ 1)θr t κ: This source of multiplicity (Cochrane 211) is not the only one in this model v 2 t ψ (v t ) = r t, v t = P tc t, defines money demand seigniorage M t CB determines the size of the balance sheet (B C ) and r, but its composition between interest-bearing liabilities (V ) and currency (M) is determined by the private sector Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 11 / 29

15 A present value take on CB solvency and remittances q BC V + P P }{{ } Mkt value of assts - reserves Ṁ t t ρs ds dt e P } t {{} PDV seigniorage = τt C e t ρs ds dt }{{} PDV remittances if LHS > CB is solvent : it can continue to follow the Taylor rule without requiring fiscal support CB budget constraint irrelevant for equilibrium (like gvmt s with passive fiscal policy) See also Hall and Reis (213), Bassetto and Messer (213)... As long at τ C, rule for remittances does not matter for equilibrium Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 12 / 29

16 Three levels of CB balance sheet problems Level 1: Accounting capital (book value of B C V M) < Common for several CBs (see Stella). For Fed, rule for remittances implies τ C = for some periods. No fiscal support (τ C < ) required Level 2: qb C V < : Market value of assets < interest-bearing liabilities Ṁ No fiscal support required as long as t e t ρ s ds dt > V qb C P t PDV of seigniorage provides a hedge against drops in q Level 3: qb C V Ṁ t + e t ρs ds dt < P P t τt C e t ρs ds dt < τt C < for some t fiscal support required to continue following Taylor rule Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 13 / 29

17 Backing vs. support What we ve discussed so far is support transfers of resources from the fiscal authority to the central bank. The fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) implies that fiscal backing, which is something different (active fiscal policy), can produce a uniquely determined price level Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 14 / 29

18 Does seigniorage provide fiscal backing? FTPL off the CB budget constraint? No. PDV of seigniorage in real terms is endogenous Seigniorage depends on inflation policy A central bank that is seen as ready to change policy so as to increase seigniorage if necessary to avoid asking for fiscal backing can create indeterminacy Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 15 / 29

19 Simulations Baseline: real rate path (ρ) chosen so that r path roughly matches Carpenter et al./current FFR expectations Scenarios (time surprise, perfect foresight afterwards) 1 Exogenous shocks Question: Can the CB stick to the Taylor rule (control inflation) without violating solvency? Higher rates Carpenter et al. scenario (Exogenous) inflation scare Explosive paths (hyperinflations) 2 Self-fulfilling crises Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 16 / 29

20 Parameters normalization, foreign assets Y G = 1 F = discount rate, reversion to st.st., population and productivity growth β =.1 γ =.1 n =.75 monetary policy θ π = 2 θ r = 1 π =.2 Assets (par value), reserves, and currency as of Jan B C V P =.327 P =.27 M P =.14 bonds: duration and coupon δ 1 = 6.8 money demand χ =.34 ψ =.63 ψ 1 = Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 17 / 29

21 Money demand and the Laffer curve.18 Short term interest rates and M/PC.7 Laffer Curve M/PC Model pre 1959 data post 1959 data Seigniorage r pi ss Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 18 / 29

22 Baseline and Higher Rates scenario 5 Nominal 3 Real rbaseline 2.5 Higher rates ρ Baseline Higher rates Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 19 / 29

23 Balance sheet implications qb/p V /P PDV seigniorage (1)+(2) q B/B Baseline scenario At steady state PDV of seigniorage (Ṁt + n) M t e t (ρs n)ds dt is M t P t ( π + γ + n) m given by. Numerator in our calibration (.27) is lower (β n) than historical average (.47), but denominator β n is very small! Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 2 / 29

24 Balance sheet implications qb/p V /P PDV seigniorage (1)+(2) q B/B Baseline scenario Higher rates (β) Higher rates (γ) Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 2 / 29

25 Self-fulfilling CB solvency crises Can multiple equilibria arise in absence of fiscal support? If τ C t for all t, then the CB must rely on seigniorage if qb V < Allow for a time-varying inflation target π t, and assume that the central bank chooses at time the future time path for π t (and it can commit to this target from time onward). The central bank s objective function consists in minimizing deviations of inflation from 2%: min πt e βt (π t.2) 2 dt subject to the private sector equilibrium conditions, and the constraint τ C t all t. Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 21 / 29

26 Self-fulfilling CB solvency crises Can multiple equilibria arise in absence of fiscal support? If τ C t for all t, then the CB must rely on seigniorage if qb V < Allow for a time-varying inflation target π t, and assume that the central bank chooses at time the future time path for π t (and it can commit to this target from time onward). The central bank s objective function consists in minimizing deviations of inflation from 2%: min πt e βt (π t.2) 2 dt subject to the private sector equilibrium conditions, and the constraint τ C t all t. π t =.2, all t, is one equilibrium (in which the τt C is not binding) constraint Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 21 / 29

27 Find solutions of Self-fulfilling CB solvency crises q ( π t )B C V P ( π t ) + PDVS ( π t ) = CB cannot deviate as long as π t < π t implies a violation of solovency constraint Specifically, we consider equilibria where the central bank will change its inflation target to π > 2% for a period Multiplicity here is related to, but very different from, that arising with nominal government debt (Calvo 1988,.., Corsetti and Dedola 213, Aguiar et al. 213) Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 22 / 29

28 r 7 For what level of B C are self-fulfilling crises possible? Interest Rate Path Threshold Balance Sheet Limit fraction of current B Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 23 / 29

29 r 7 For what level of B C are self-fulfilling crises possible? θr (θπ 1)t κ < in r t = stable solution + κe Interest Rate Path Threshold Balance Sheet Limit fraction of current B Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 24 / 29

30 Conclusions CB solvency would become an issue only under rather extreme scenarios, for current balance sheet size These conclusions hinge on the properties of currency demand and seigniorage... on which there is considerable uncertainty Implications: Fiscal support for the CB allows it to pursue its mandate without being concerned about its balance sheet... and such support seems unlikely to be needed in equilibrium on the basis of our model Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 25 / 29

31 PDV seigniorage self-fulfilling equilibria κ = κ < Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 26 / 29

32 Seigniorage and M/PC M/PCE left axis Data x S/Y right axis.1 8 M/PC left axis Model x Seigniorage right axis Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 27 / 29

33 Rule for remittances As long at τ C, rule for remittances does not matter for equilibrium Two principles: i) remittances cannot be negative, ii) whenever positive, remittances are such that the central bank capital measured at historical costs remains constant over time: K = ( qb C V M ) e nt = constant. where q evolves according to { yielding q = (q q) max {, ḂC B C + δ } τ C = max, (χ δ( q 1)) BC P ( ) (ḂC + q (q q) + (δ + n) BC B C P ) r V P } I { K K} }{{} Deferred Asset Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 28 / 29

34 Paths for remittances 11 x Del Negro, Sims Central bank s balance sheet FRBSF 29 / 29