Escaping the Great Recession 1
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1 Escaping the Great Recession 1 Francesco Bianchi Duke University Leonardo Melosi FRB Chicago ECB workshop on Non-Standard Monetary Policy Measures 1 The views in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or any other person associated with the Federal Reserve System.
2 The Great Recession and policy interventions The recent recession has induced: 1 Significant changes in the conduct of monetary policy, with interest rates stuck at the zero lower bound 2 A debate on the best way to mitigate the consequences of a recession when at the zero-lower-bound: Robust fiscal intervention combined with a reduced emphasis on inflation stabilization Reluctance to explicitly abandon macroeconomic policies that have been successful before the recession
3 Model setup We model an economy in which: 1 Recurrent large negative demand shocks can force the economy to the zero lower bound 2 Two policy combinations characterize policy makers behavior: Monetary-led policy mix: The fiscal authority strongly reacts to debt and the monetary policy rule satisfies the Taylor principle Fiscally-led policy mix: The fiscal authority disregards the level of debt and the Taylor principle does not hold Agents are aware of the possibility of zero lower bound episodes, 2...changes in policy makers behavior, 3...and the link between the two
4 Main results 1 Out of the zero bound the monetary-led regime leads to a stable macroeconomic environment 2 At the zero bound the policy makers dilemma arises, the monetary-led policy mix would exacerbate the recession while keeping the long-run macroeconomic volatility low the fiscally-led policy mix would mitigate the recession while raising the long-run macroeconomic volatility 3 This dilemma could be resolved by committing to inflate away only the portion of debt resulting from the recession itself 4 High uncertainty is an inherent implication of entering the zero lower bound, whereas deflation is not
5 Related literature Zero-Lower-Bound literature: Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001, 2002), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Eggertsson (2006), Eichenbaum et al. (2011), Correia et al. (2012), Farhi and Werning (2012) Zero-Lower-Bound in DSGE: Aruoba and Schorfheide (2013), Gust, Lopez-Salido, and Smith (2013) Monetary/fiscal policy interaction: Sargent and Wallace (1981), Leeper (1991), Sims (1994, 2011), Woodford (1994, 1995, 2001), Cochrane (1998, 2001), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2000)
6 Households and firms Details Linearized Euler Equation: y t = Ẽ t (y t+1 ) ( R t Ẽ t (π t+1 ) ) + d t Ẽ t (d t+1 ) (1) Expectation augmented Phillips curve: π t = βẽ t (π t+1 ) + κ(y t z t ) (2) Stochastic processes of the shocks: d t = d ξ d t (3) z t = ρ z z t 1 + σ z ɛ z,t (4) where ɛ z,t N (0, 1), and the preference shock d ξ d t can assume two values, high or low (d h and d l ). ξ d t evolves according to the transition matrix H d : [ ] H d p = hh 1 p ll 1 p hh p ll
7 Policy makers Details Linearized government budget constraint: b t = β 1 b t 1 + bβ 1 (R t 1 π t y t ) s t Fiscal rule (net lump-sum taxes): Monetary rule: s t = δ b,ξ p t b t 1 + δ y (y t z t ) + σ x x t x t = ρ x x t 1 + ɛ x,t, ɛ x,t N (0, 1) 1 Out of the zero lower bound (ξ d t = h): ( ) R t = ρ R R t 1 + (1 ρ R ) ψ π,ξ p π t t + ψ y [y t z t ] + σ R ɛ R,t 2 At the zero lower bound (ξ d t = l): R t = log (R)
8 Policy Regime Changes Back Monetary-led policy mix (Ricardian): ) ψ π (ξ p t = M; ξ d t = h = ψ M π = 2 > 1 ) δ b (ξ p t = M; ξ d t = h = δ M b =.03 > β 1 1 Fiscally-led policy mix (NonRicardian): ) ψ π (ξ p t = F ; ξ d t = h = ψ F π =.8 < 1 ) δ b (ξ p t = F ; ξ d t = h = δ F b = 0 < β 1 1 Zero-lower-bound (ZLB) Regime : ( ξd t = l ) R t = log (R) δ b ξ d t = l = δ F b = 0 < β 1 1
9 Information Set Agents observe the history of endogenous variables and the history of shocks It is assumed that agents do not directly observe the policy mix ξ p t {M, F } = Out of the ZLB, agents infer the policy mix ξ p t = At the ZLB, agents cannot observe the policy mix ξ p t that would have occurred if the demand shock was not realized In a sense, the central bank is forced to the ZLB regime, which looks like a radical fiscally-led policy mix
10 Parameter Calibration Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value ψ M π 0.80 ψ y σ R 0.20 ψ F π 2.00 ρ R σ x 0.50 δ M b 0.03 δ y σ z 0.70 δ F b 0 ρ z σ d 0 Z M, Z F 0 ρ x 0.90 d h 0 Z Z 1 b 1.00 d l.1 p MM 99% κ p hh 98% p FF 99% β p ll 80%
11 Road map We will illustrate... 1 why policy makers might favor the monetary-led regime when out of the ZLB 2 why policy makers may be induced to abandon the monetary-led regime at the ZLB Policy makers dilemma 3 a possible resolution of the policy makers dilemma
12 Out of the ZLB - Primary Deficit Shocks 2 Output GAP 7 Inflation Monetary Led Fiscally Led FFR 30 B/GDP
13 Std. Std. Out of the ZLB - Macroeconomic Volatility 2.5 Output GAP 8 Inflation FFR 8 6 B/GDP Monetary Led Fiscally Led Horizon Horizon
14 Effects of Policies at the ZLB Assume that the economy enters the ZLB with an above-steady-state stock of debt and consider three strategies: 1 Announcing that the monetary-led policy will be preserved 2 Announcing that the monetary-led policy will be abandoned 3 No announcement is made and agents attach equal probabilities to the two exit strategies above
15 Recession and Zero Lower Bound Output GAP Inflation Uncertainty Fiscally led Monetary led FFR B/GDP
16 Macroeconomic Volatility at the Zero Lower Bound
17 Addressing the Policymaker s Dilemma Commitment to inflate away only the portion of debt resulting from demand shocks that lead to large recessions Denote the debt and inflation of a shadow economy in which demand shocks are shut down as b c t and πc t Write the policy rules as s t = δ M b bc t 1 + δf b ( bt 1 bt 1 c ) + δy (y t yt n ) + x t ( ) R t = (1 ρ R ) ψ M π πc t + ψ F π (π t π c t ) +... Compare with outcomes when policymakers always behave according to the monetary-led regime out of the ZLB
18 Alternative Strategy IRF learning IRF Perf Info Output GAP Inflation FFR B/GDP Escaping high debt Escaping low debt Benchmark
19 Escaping the Great Recession IRF learning IRF Perf Info
20 Why Does This Strategy Work? 1 Automatic stabilizer: This behavior determines an increase in short run expected inflation exactly when necessary i.e., when the negative demand shock hits the economy 2 Macroeconomic stability is retained after the recession Agents understand that the fiscally-led policy mix occurs only in response to shocks leading to extraordinary recessions
21 Summary of the results 1 A DSGE model with recurrent ZLB events 2 The model highlights why policy makers... are reluctant to abandon fiscal discipline might be tempted to do so to escape deep recessions 3 Possible resolution of this policy dilemma: Inflate away only debt accumulated because of the recession 4 Uncertainty is an implication of entering the ZLB; deflation is not 5 Methodological contribution: Modeling the ZLB while keeping the DSGE model tractable
22 Details about linearization Back Markov switching process for d t represents a non-gaussian shock 1 Compute the ergodic steady state d ss for the demand shock d t 2 Verify that the ZLB is not binding at d ss 3 Linearize/loglinearize around the steady state 4 Use a VAR and a vector of dummy variables to model the Markov-switching process: [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] e1,t p = hh 1 p ll e1,t 1 v1,t + e 2,t 1 p hh p ll e 2,t 1 v 2,t where e t {[1; 0], [0; 1]} v t {[1 p hh ; p hh 1], [ p hh ; p hh ], [p ll ; p ll ], [p ll 1; 1 p ll ]}
23 Shock-Specific Policy Rules Problem Suppose the fiscal authority does not commit to repay the fraction of public debt resulting from preference shocks We would like to write the Taylor Rule as follows: s t = δ M b b c t 1 + δ F b b nc t 1 + δ y (y t y n t ) + x t where bt c denotes debt due to all shocks but preference shocks and bt nc is debt only due to preference shocks BUT what is the law of motion for the two targets bt c bt nc? and
24 Shock-Specific Policy Rules Solution Conjecture that the ZLB is not binding = the model is linear Model linearity leads to three useful results: 1 In equilibrium, b t = s=0 φ s Ls ε t and b c t = s=0 φ s L s ε t, where φ s (i d ) = 0 for all s 2 φ s (j) = φ s (i) if j = i and j = i d 3 b nc t = s=0 (φ s φ s ) L s ε t = b t b c t It follows that bt c is the public debt of a shadow economy in which preference shocks are shut down The fiscal rule in the actual economy s t = δ M b bc t 1 + δf b ( bt 1 bt 1 c ) + δy (y t yt n ) + x t ( ) R t = (1 ρ R ) ψ M π πc t + ψ F π (π t π c t ) +...
25 Monetary/Fiscal Policy Mix Back Following Leeper (1991) we can distinguish four cases: Active Fiscal (AF) Passive Fiscal (PF) Active Monetary (AM) No Solution Determinacy Passive Monetary (PM) Determinacy Indeterminacy Active Monetary Policy: Taylor principle is satisfied (ψ π,ξ p t > 1) Passive Fiscal Policy: Taxes react strongly to debt (δ b,ξ p t > β 1 1 β 1 δ b,ξ p t < 1)
26 Contradictory announcements Policy makers signals can be contradictory We assume that the economy enters the ZLB with an above steady state stock of debt and we consider three different scenarios: 1 Policy makers announce that the monetary-led regime will be abandoned 2 Fiscal authority fiscal discipline will be abandoned Monetary authority inflation stability will be preserved 1 Conflict and agents expect fiscal authority to prevail 2 Conflict and agents expect monetary authority to prevail
27 Contradictory announcements Output GAP Inflation FFR B/GDP Contrad. >F Contrad. >M Coord. >F
28 Contradictory announcements
29 Policymakers Dilemma and Volatility at the ZLB 1 Announcing that monetary-led regime will prevail 1 Recession and deflation in line with traditional view of the ZLB 2 Post-crisis volatility goes back to the pre-crisis levels 2 Announcing that fiscally-led regime will prevail 1 Inflation goes up and mitigates the recession Debt accumulated during the crisis likely to be inflated away 2 Post-crisis level of volatility rises as As the recession is over, Taylor principle not satisfied and macroeconomy not insulated from fiscal shocks 3 Uncertainty regime leads to predictions in line with the data Still no deflation at the ZLB Higher volatility due to policy uncertainty and large macroeconomic effects of fiscal shocks Backer, Bloom, and Davis (2013) and Kitsul and Wright (2013)
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