Leverage Restrictions in a Business Cycle Model
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- Dwayne Phelps
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1 Leverage Restrictions in a Business Cycle Model Lawrence J. Christiano Daisuke Ikeda Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Japan.
2 Background
3 Background Increasing interest in the following sorts of questions: What restrictions should be placed on bank leverage?
4 Background Increasing interest in the following sorts of questions: What restrictions should be placed on bank leverage? How should those restrictions be varied over the business cycle?
5 Background Increasing interest in the following sorts of questions: What restrictions should be placed on bank leverage? How should those restrictions be varied over the business cycle? How should monetary policy react to bank leverage, if at all?
6 Background Increasing interest in the following sorts of questions: What restrictions should be placed on bank leverage? How should those restrictions be varied over the business cycle? How should monetary policy react to bank leverage, if at all?
7 What We Do
8 What We Do Modify a standard medium-sized DSGE model to include a banking sector. Assets Loans and other securities Liabilities Deposits Banker net worth
9 What We Do Modify a standard medium-sized DSGE model to include a banking sector. Assets Loans and other securities Liabilities Deposits Banker net worth Job of bankers is to identify and finance good investment projects. doing this requires exerting costly effort.
10 What We Do Modify a standard medium-sized DSGE model to include a banking sector. Assets Loans and other securities Liabilities Deposits Banker net worth Job of bankers is to identify and finance good investment projects. doing this requires exerting costly effort. Agency problem between bank and its creditors: banker effort is not observable.
11 What We Do Modify a standard medium-sized DSGE model to include a banking sector. Assets Loans and other securities Liabilities Deposits Banker net worth Job of bankers is to identify and finance good investment projects. doing this requires exerting costly effort. Agency problem between bank and its creditors: banker effort is not observable. Consequence: leverage restrictions on banks generate a very substantial welfare gain in steady state.
12 What We Do Modify a standard medium-sized DSGE model to include a banking sector. Assets Loans and other securities Liabilities Deposits Banker net worth Job of bankers is to identify and finance good investment projects. doing this requires exerting costly effort. Agency problem between bank and its creditors: banker effort is not observable. Consequence: leverage restrictions on banks generate a very substantial welfare gain in steady state. Explore some of the dynamic implications of the models.
13 Outline Model first, without leverage restriction observable effort benchmark unobservable case then, with leverage restriction
14 Outline Model first, without leverage restriction observable effort benchmark unobservable case then, with leverage restriction Steady state properties of leverage restrictions
15 Outline Model first, without leverage restriction observable effort benchmark unobservable case then, with leverage restriction Steady state properties of leverage restrictions Implications for dynamic effects of shocks
16 Standard Model L Firms Labor market household
17 Standard Model L Firms K Labor market Market for Physical Capital household
18 Standard Model L Firms K Labor market C I Market for Physical Capital household
19 Standard Model with Banking L Firms K K, ~F, t Labor market Entrepreneurs household
20 Standard Model with Banking L Firms Labor market C I Capital Producers 1 K Entrepreneurs household Entrepreneur pays everything to the bank and has nothing.
21 Standard Model with Banking Firms Labor market Capital Producers Entrepreneurs household banks Mutual funds
22 Entrepreneurs
23 Entrepreneurs After goods production in period t : Purchase raw capital from capital producers, for price P k,t.
24 Entrepreneurs After goods production in period t : Purchase raw capital from capital producers, for price P k,t. entrepreneurs have no resources of their own and must obtain financing from banks.
25 Entrepreneurs After goods production in period t : Purchase raw capital from capital producers, for price P k,t. entrepreneurs have no resources of their own and must obtain financing from banks. Entrepreneurs convert raw capital into effective capital.
26 Entrepreneurs After goods production in period t : Purchase raw capital from capital producers, for price P k,t. entrepreneurs have no resources of their own and must obtain financing from banks. Entrepreneurs convert raw capital into effective capital. Some are good at it and some are bad.
27 Entrepreneurs After goods production in period t : Purchase raw capital from capital producers, for price P k,t. entrepreneurs have no resources of their own and must obtain financing from banks. Entrepreneurs convert raw capital into effective capital. Some are good at it and some are bad. In period t + 1 :
28 Entrepreneurs After goods production in period t : Purchase raw capital from capital producers, for price P k,t. entrepreneurs have no resources of their own and must obtain financing from banks. Entrepreneurs convert raw capital into effective capital. Some are good at it and some are bad. In period t + 1 : entrepreneurs rent capital to goods-producers in competitive markets, at rental rate, r t+1.
29 Entrepreneurs After goods production in period t : Purchase raw capital from capital producers, for price P k,t. entrepreneurs have no resources of their own and must obtain financing from banks. Entrepreneurs convert raw capital into effective capital. Some are good at it and some are bad. In period t + 1 : entrepreneurs rent capital to goods-producers in competitive markets, at rental rate, r t+1. after production, sell undepreciated capital back to capital producers at price, P k,t+1.
30 Entrepreneurs After goods production in period t : Purchase raw capital from capital producers, for price P k,t. entrepreneurs have no resources of their own and must obtain financing from banks. Entrepreneurs convert raw capital into effective capital. Some are good at it and some are bad. In period t + 1 : entrepreneurs rent capital to goods-producers in competitive markets, at rental rate, r t+1. after production, sell undepreciated capital back to capital producers at price, P k,t+1. entrepreneurs pay all earnings to bank at end of t + 1, keeping nothing.
31 Entrepreneurs After goods production in period t : Purchase raw capital from capital producers, for price P k,t. entrepreneurs have no resources of their own and must obtain financing from banks. Entrepreneurs convert raw capital into effective capital. Some are good at it and some are bad. In period t + 1 : entrepreneurs rent capital to goods-producers in competitive markets, at rental rate, r t+1. after production, sell undepreciated capital back to capital producers at price, P k,t+1. entrepreneurs pay all earnings to bank at end of t + 1, keeping nothing. no agency problems between entrepreneurs and banks.
32 Earnings of Entrepreneurs
33 Earnings of Entrepreneurs there are good entrepreneurs and bad entrepreneurs.
34 Earnings of Entrepreneurs there are good entrepreneurs and bad entrepreneurs. bad: 1 unit, raw capital e b t units, effective capital
35 Earnings of Entrepreneurs there are good entrepreneurs and bad entrepreneurs. bad: 1 unit, raw capital e b t units, effective capital good: 1 unit, raw capital e g t units, effective capital
36 Earnings of Entrepreneurs there are good entrepreneurs and bad entrepreneurs. bad: 1 unit, raw capital e b t units, effective capital good: 1 unit, raw capital e g t units, effective capital return to capital enjoyed by entrepreneurs: R g t+1 = eg t R k t+1, Rb t+1 = eb t R k t+1
37 Earnings of Entrepreneurs there are good entrepreneurs and bad entrepreneurs. bad: 1 unit, raw capital e b t units, effective capital good: 1 unit, raw capital e g t units, effective capital return to capital enjoyed by entrepreneurs: R g t+1 = eg t R k t+1, Rb t+1 = eb t R k t+1 R k t+1 rk t+1 P t+1 + (1 δ) P k,t+1 P k t
38 Earnings of Entrepreneurs there are good entrepreneurs and bad entrepreneurs. bad: 1 unit, raw capital e b t units, effective capital good: 1 unit, raw capital e g t units, effective capital return to capital enjoyed by entrepreneurs: R g t+1 = eg t R k t+1, Rb t+1 = eb t R k t+1 R k t+1 rk t+1 P t+1 + (1 δ) P k,t+1 P k t In effect, entrepreneurs operate linear investment technologies, R g t+1 > Rb t+1
39 Bankers
40 each has net worth, N t. Bankers
41 Bankers each has net worth, N t. a banker can only invest in one entrepreneur (asset side of banker balance sheet is risky).
42 Bankers each has net worth, N t. a banker can only invest in one entrepreneur (asset side of banker balance sheet is risky). by exerting effort, e t, a banker finds a good entrepreneur with probability p : p (e t ) = ā + be t
43 Bankers each has net worth, N t. a banker can only invest in one entrepreneur (asset side of banker balance sheet is risky). by exerting effort, e t, a banker finds a good entrepreneur with probability p : p (e t ) = ā + be t in t, bankers seek to optimize: [ ] E t λ t+1 {p (e t ) R g t+1 (N t + d t ) R d g,t+1 d t [ ] + (1 p (e t )) R b t+1 (N t + d t ) R d b,t+1 d t } 1 2 e2 t
44 Bankers each has net worth, N t. a banker can only invest in one entrepreneur (asset side of banker balance sheet is risky). by exerting effort, e t, a banker finds a good entrepreneur with probability p : p (e t ) = ā + be t in t, bankers seek to optimize: [ ] E t λ t+1 {p (e t ) R g t+1 (N t + d t ) R d g,t+1 d t [ ] + (1 p (e t )) R b t+1 (N t + d t ) R d b,t+1 d t } 1 2 e2 t Bankers have a cash constraint: R b t+1 (N t + d t ) R d b,t+1 d t
45 Bankers and their Creditors Bankers and Mutual Funds interact in competitive markets for loan contracts: ( ) d t, e t, R d g,t+1, Rd b,t+1
46 Bankers and their Creditors Bankers and Mutual Funds interact in competitive markets for loan contracts: ( ) d t, e t, R d g,t+1, Rd b,t+1 Free entry and competition among mutual funds implies: p (e t ) R d g,t+1 + (1 p (e t)) R d b,t+1 = R t
47 Bankers and their Creditors Bankers and Mutual Funds interact in competitive markets for loan contracts: ( ) d t, e t, R d g,t+1, Rd b,t+1 Free entry and competition among mutual funds implies: p (e t ) R d g,t+1 + (1 p (e t)) R d b,t+1 = R t Two scenarios: banker effort, e t, is observed by mutual fund
48 Bankers and their Creditors Bankers and Mutual Funds interact in competitive markets for loan contracts: ( ) d t, e t, R d g,t+1, Rd b,t+1 Free entry and competition among mutual funds implies: p (e t ) R d g,t+1 + (1 p (e t)) R d b,t+1 = R t Two scenarios: banker effort, e t, is observed by mutual fund banker effort, e t, is unobserved.
49 Observed Effort Benchmark Set ( of contracts available ) to bankers is the d t, e t, R d g,t+1, Rd b,t+1 s that satisfy MF zero profits : p (e t ) R d g,t+1 + (1 p (e t)) R d b,t+1 = R t, cash constraint : R b t+1 (N t + d t ) R d b,t+1 d t
50 Observed Effort Benchmark Set ( of contracts available ) to bankers is the d t, e t, R d g,t+1, Rd b,t+1 s that satisfy MF zero profits : p (e t ) R d g,t+1 + (1 p (e t)) R d b,t+1 = R t, cash constraint : R b t+1 (N t + d t ) R d b,t+1 d t Each banker chooses the most preferred contract from the menu.
51 Observed Effort Benchmark Set ( of contracts available ) to bankers is the d t, e t, R d g,t+1, Rd b,t+1 s that satisfy MF zero profits : p (e t ) R d g,t+1 + (1 p (e t)) R d b,t+1 = R t, cash constraint : R b t+1 (N t + d t ) R d b,t+1 d t Each banker chooses the most preferred contract from the menu. Key feature of observed effort equilibrium: ( ) e t = E t λ t+1 p t (e t+1 ) R g t+1 Rb t+1 (N t + d t )
52 Unobserved Effort In this case, banker always sets e t to its privately optimal level, whatever e t is specified in the loan contract: ( ) incentive : e t = E t λ t+1 p t (e t ) [ R g t+1 Rb t+1 (N t + d t ) ( ) R d g,t+1 Rd b,t+1 d t ].
53 Unobserved Effort In this case, banker always sets e t to its privately optimal level, whatever e t is specified in the loan contract: ( ) incentive : e t = E t λ t+1 p t (e t ) [ R g t+1 Rb t+1 (N t + d t ) ( ) R d g,t+1 Rd b,t+1 d t ]. Set ( of contracts available ) to bankers is the d t, e t, R d g,t+1, Rd b,t+1 s that satisfy incentive in addition to: MF zero profits : p (e t ) R d g,t+1 + (1 p (e t)) R d b,t+1 = R t, cash constraint : R b t+1 (N t + d t ) R d b,t+1 d t
54 Unobserved Effort In this case, banker always sets e t to its privately optimal level, whatever e t is specified in the loan contract: ( ) incentive : e t = E t λ t+1 p t (e t ) [ R g t+1 Rb t+1 (N t + d t ) ( ) R d g,t+1 Rd b,t+1 d t ]. Set ( of contracts available ) to bankers is the d t, e t, R d g,t+1, Rd b,t+1 s that satisfy incentive in addition to: MF zero profits : p (e t ) R d g,t+1 + (1 p (e t)) R d b,t+1 = R t, cash constraint : R b t+1 (N t + d t ) R d b,t+1 d t Two factors can make e t ineffi ciently low: R d g,t+1 > Rd b,t+1 N t + d t low.
55 Law of Motion of Net Worth Bankers live in a large representative household, with workers (as in Gertler-Karadi, Gertler-Kiyotaki). Bankers pool their net worth at the end of each period (we avoid worrying about banker heterogeneity)
56 Law of Motion of Net Worth Bankers live in a large representative household, with workers (as in Gertler-Karadi, Gertler-Kiyotaki). Bankers pool their net worth at the end of each period (we avoid worrying about banker heterogeneity) Law of motion of banker net worth profits when bank assets good {[ }} ]{ N t+1 = γ t+1 {p (e t ) R g t+1 (N t + d t ) R d g,t+1 d t profits when bank assets are bad {[ }} ]{ + (1 p (e t )) R b t+1 (N t + d t ) R d b,t+1 d t } + lump sum transfer, households to their bankers {}}{ T t+1
57 Law of Motion of Net Worth Bankers live in a large representative household, with workers (as in Gertler-Karadi, Gertler-Kiyotaki). Bankers pool their net worth at the end of each period (we avoid worrying about banker heterogeneity) Law of motion of banker net worth profits when bank assets good {[ }} ]{ N t+1 = γ t+1 {p (e t ) R g t+1 (N t + d t ) R d g,t+1 d t profits when bank assets are bad {[ }} ]{ + (1 p (e t )) R b t+1 (N t + d t ) R d b,t+1 d t } + lump sum transfer, households to their bankers {}}{ T t+1
58 The model assumes that when bankers want funds, issuing equity is not an option. 800 Borrowing by Private Depository Institutions (Table F.109, Flow of Funds) billions of dollars open market paper, bonds, other loans, deposits This shows how major debt instruments were used at 9 private 8 depository institutions in the wake of the crisis. billions of dollars 7 Equity as a source of funds, Private Depository Institutions (F.109, F of F)
59 The model assumes that when bankers want funds, issuing equity is not an option. 800 Borrowing by Private Depository Institutions (Table F.109, Flow of Funds) billions of dollars open market paper, bonds, other loans, deposits Equity as a source of funds, Private Depository Institutions (F.109, F of F) billions of dollars
60 Crisis Suppose something makes banker net worth, N t, drop.
61 Crisis Suppose something makes banker net worth, N t, drop. For given d t, bank cash constraint gets tighter: R b t+1 (N t + d t ) R d b,t+1 d t.
62 Crisis Suppose something makes banker net worth, N t, drop. For given d t, bank cash constraint gets tighter: R b t+1 (N t + d t ) R d b,t+1 d t. So, R d b,t+1 has to be low
63 Crisis Suppose something makes banker net worth, N t, drop. For given d t, bank cash constraint gets tighter: R b t+1 (N t + d t ) R d b,t+1 d t. So, R d b,t+1 has to be low when N t is low, banks with bad assets cannot cover their own losses and creditors must share in losses.
64 Crisis Suppose something makes banker net worth, N t, drop. For given d t, bank cash constraint gets tighter: R b t+1 (N t + d t ) R d b,t+1 d t. So, R d b,t+1 has to be low when N t is low, banks with bad assets cannot cover their own losses and creditors must share in losses. then, creditors require R d g,t+1 high
65 Crisis Suppose something makes banker net worth, N t, drop. For given d t, bank cash constraint gets tighter: R b t+1 (N t + d t ) R d b,t+1 d t. So, R d b,t+1 has to be low when N t is low, banks with bad assets cannot cover their own losses and creditors must share in losses. then, creditors require R d g,t+1 high So, interest rate spread, R d g,t+1 R t, high, banker effort low.
66 Crisis Suppose something makes banker net worth, N t, drop. For given d t, bank cash constraint gets tighter: R b t+1 (N t + d t ) R d b,t+1 d t. So, R d b,t+1 has to be low when N t is low, banks with bad assets cannot cover their own losses and creditors must share in losses. then, creditors require R d g,t+1 high So, interest rate spread, R d g,t+1 R t, high, banker effort low. Banks get riskier (cross sectional mean return down, standard deviation up).
67 Leverage Restrictions Banks face the following restriction: L t N t + d t N t.
68 Leverage Restrictions Banks face the following restriction: L t N t + d t N t. What is the consequence of this restriction?
69 Leverage Restrictions Banks face the following restriction: L t N t + d t N t. What is the consequence of this restriction? With less d t, banks with bad assets more able to cover losses
70 Leverage Restrictions Banks face the following restriction: L t N t + d t N t. What is the consequence of this restriction? With less d t, banks with bad assets more able to cover losses interest rate spread, R d R, falls, so banker effort rises. b
71 Leverage Restrictions Banks face the following restriction: L t N t + d t N t. What is the consequence of this restriction? With less d t, banks with bad assets more able to cover losses interest rate spread, R d R, falls, so banker effort rises. b Second effect of leverage restriction,
72 Leverage Restrictions Banks face the following restriction: L t N t + d t N t. What is the consequence of this restriction? With less d t, banks with bad assets more able to cover losses interest rate spread, R d R, falls, so banker effort rises. b Second effect of leverage restriction, leverage restriction in effect implements collusion among bankers
73 Leverage Restrictions Banks face the following restriction: L t N t + d t N t. What is the consequence of this restriction? With less d t, banks with bad assets more able to cover losses interest rate spread, R d R, falls, so banker effort rises. b Second effect of leverage restriction, leverage restriction in effect implements collusion among bankers allows them to behave as monopsonists
74 Leverage Restrictions Banks face the following restriction: L t N t + d t N t. What is the consequence of this restriction? With less d t, banks with bad assets more able to cover losses interest rate spread, R d R, falls, so banker effort rises. b Second effect of leverage restriction, leverage restriction in effect implements collusion among bankers allows them to behave as monopsonists make profits on demand deposits...lots of profits: big {}}{ [ ( p (e t ) R g ) ( t+1 Rd g,t+1 + (1 p (e t )) R b )] t+1 Rd d t b,t+1 N t
75 Leverage Restrictions Banks face the following restriction: L t N t + d t N t. What is the consequence of this restriction? With less d t, banks with bad assets more able to cover losses interest rate spread, R d R, falls, so banker effort rises. b Second effect of leverage restriction, leverage restriction in effect implements collusion among bankers allows them to behave as monopsonists make profits on demand deposits...lots of profits: big {}}{ [ ( p (e t ) R g ) ( t+1 Rd g,t+1 + (1 p (e t )) R b )] t+1 Rd d t b,t+1 N t makes N t grow, offseting incentive effects of decline in d t.
76 Macro Model Sticky wages and prices Investment adjustment costs Habit persistence in consumption Monetary policy rule
77 Calibration targets Table 2: Steady state calibration targets for baseline model Variable meaning variable name magnitude Cross-sectional standard deviation of quarterly non-financial firm equity returns s b 0.20 Fnancial firm interest rate spreads (APR) 400 Rg d R 0.60 Financial firm leverage L Allocative efficiency of the banking system p e e g 1 p e e b 1 Profits of intermediate good producers (controled by fixed cost, ) 0 Government consumption relative to GDP (controlled by g ) 0.20 Growth rate of per capita GDP (APR) 400 z Rate of decline in real price of capital (APR)
78 Data behind calibration targets Figure 1: Cross-section standard deviation financial firm quarterly return on equity, HP-filtered US real GDP Cross section volatility (left scale) Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q quarterly data
79 Data behind calibration targets Figure 1: Cross-section standard deviation financial firm quarterly return on equity, HP-filtered US real GDP Cross section volatility (left scale) HP filtered GDP (right scale) Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q quarterly data
80 Parameter Values Table 1: Baseline Model Parameter Values Meaning Name Value Panel A: financial parameters bad entrepreneur b return parameter, return parameter, good entrepreneur g 0.00 constant, effort function ā 0.83 slope, effort function b 0.30 lump-sum transfer from households to bankers T 0.38 fraction of banker net worth that stays with bankers 0.85 Panel B: Parameters that do not affect steady state inflation (APR) 400 steady state Taylor rule weight on inflation 1.50 Taylor rule weight on output growth Δy 0.50 smoothing parameter in Taylor rule p 0.80 curvature on investment adjustment costs S 5.00 Calvo sticky price parameter p 0.75 Calvo sticky wage parameter w 0.75 Panel C: Nonfinancial parameters steady state gdp growth (APR) 1.65 z steady state rate of decline in investment good price (APR) 1.69 capital depreciation rate 0.03 production fixed cost 0.89 capital share 0.40 steady state markup, intermediate good producers f 1.20 habit parameter bu 0.74 household discount rate steady state markup, workers w 1.05 Frisch labor supply elasticity 1/ L 1.00 weight on labor disutility L 1.00 steady state scaled government spending g 0.89
81 Steady State Calculations Next study steady state impact of leverage Quantify role of hidden effort in the analysis (essential!)
82 Table 3: Steady State Properties of the Model Variable meaning Variable name Unobserved Effort Observed Effort Leverage Restriction Leverage Restriction non-binding binding non-binding binding Spread 400 R d g R NA NA scaled consumption c labor h scaled capital stock k bank assets N d bank net worth N bank deposits d bank leverage N d /N bank return on equity (APR) g p et R t 1 1 p et Rb t 1 Nt dt Rtdt Nt fraction of firms with good balance sheets p e Benefit of leverage (in c units) 100 NA 1.19 NA Benefitofmakingeffortobservable(inc units) 100 NA NA Note: (i) NA, not applicable, indicates that the number is not defined. (ii) All calculations based on a single set of parameter values, reported in Table 1.
83 Table 3: Steady State Properties of the Model Variable meaning Variable name Unobserved Effort Observed Effort Leverage Restriction Leverage Restriction non-binding binding non-binding binding Spread 400 R d g R NA NA scaled consumption c labor h scaled capital stock k bank assets N d bank net worth N bank deposits d bank leverage N d /N bank return on equity (APR) g p et R t 1 1 p et Rb t 1 Nt dt Rtdt Nt fraction of firms with good balance sheets p e Benefit of leverage (in c units) 100 NA 1.19 NA Benefitofmakingeffortobservable(inc units) 100 NA NA Note: (i) NA, not applicable, indicates that the number is not defined. (ii) All calculations based on a single set of parameter values, reported in Table 1.
84 Table 3: Steady State Properties of the Model Variable meaning Variable name Unobserved Effort Observed Effort Leverage Restriction Leverage Restriction non-binding binding non-binding binding Spread 400 R d g R NA NA scaled consumption c labor h scaled capital stock k bank assets N d bank net worth N bank deposits d bank leverage N d /N bank return on equity (APR) g p et R t 1 1 p et Rb t 1 Nt dt Rtdt Nt fraction of firms with good balance sheets p e Benefit of leverage (in c units) 100 NA 1.19 NA Benefitofmakingeffortobservable(inc units) 100 NA NA Note: (i) NA, not applicable, indicates that the number is not defined. (ii) All calculations based on a single set of parameter values, reported in Table 1.
85 Table 3: Steady State Properties of the Model Variable meaning Variable name Unobserved Effort Observed Effort Leverage Restriction Leverage Restriction non-binding binding non-binding binding Spread 400 R d g R NA NA scaled consumption c labor h scaled capital stock k bank assets N d bank net worth N bank deposits d bank leverage N d /N bank return on equity (APR) g p et R t 1 1 p et Rb t 1 Nt dt Rtdt Nt fraction of firms with good balance sheets p e Benefit of leverage (in c units) 100 NA 1.19 NA Benefitofmakingeffortobservable(inc units) 100 NA NA Note: (i) NA, not applicable, indicates that the number is not defined. (ii) All calculations based on a single set of parameter values, reported in Table 1. Making effort observable makes things a lot better, equivalent to a 6% permanent jump in consumption! Interestingly, leverage goes up.
86 Table 3: Steady State Properties of the Model Variable meaning Variable name Unobserved Effort Observed Effort Leverage Restriction Leverage Restriction non-binding binding non-binding binding Spread 400 R d g R NA NA scaled consumption c labor h scaled capital stock k bank assets N d bank net worth N bank deposits d bank leverage N d /N bank return on equity (APR) g p et R t 1 1 p et Rb t 1 Nt dt Rtdt Nt fraction of firms with good balance sheets p e Benefit of leverage (in c units) 100 NA 1.19 NA Benefitofmakingeffortobservable(inc units) 100 NA NA Note: (i) NA, not applicable, indicates that the number is not defined. (ii) All calculations based on a single set of parameter values, reported in Table 1. Making effort observable makes things a lot better, equivalent to a 6% permanent jump in consumption! Interestingly, leverage goes up.
87 Table 3: Steady State Properties of the Model Variable meaning Variable name Unobserved Effort Observed Effort Leverage Restriction Leverage Restriction non-binding binding non-binding binding Spread 400 R d g R NA NA scaled consumption c labor h scaled capital stock k bank assets N d bank net worth N bank deposits d bank leverage N d /N bank return on equity (APR) g p et R t 1 1 p et Rb t 1 Nt dt Rtdt Nt fraction of firms with good balance sheets p e Benefit of leverage (in c units) 100 NA 1.19 NA Benefitofmakingeffortobservable(inc units) 100 NA NA Note: (i) NA, not applicable, indicates that the number is not defined. (ii) All calculations based on a single set of parameter values, reported in Table 1. Cut in leverage in the unobserved effort economy moves things towards observed effort.
88 Table 3: Steady State Properties of the Model Variable meaning Variable name Unobserved Effort Observed Effort Leverage Restriction Leverage Restriction non-binding binding non-binding binding Spread 400 R d g R NA NA scaled consumption c labor h scaled capital stock k bank assets N d bank net worth N bank deposits d bank leverage N d /N bank return on equity (APR) g p et R t 1 1 p et Rb t 1 Nt dt Rtdt Nt fraction of firms with good balance sheets p e Benefit of leverage (in c units) 100 NA 1.19 NA Benefitofmakingeffortobservable(inc units) 100 NA NA Note: (i) NA, not applicable, indicates that the number is not defined. (ii) All calculations based on a single set of parameter values, reported in Table 1. Hidden effort assumption is essential. Otherwise, leverage restriction reduces utility.
89 Dynamics Here, we consider the dynamic effects of two shocks shock to monetary policy lump sum shock to net worth
90 % dev from ss p R t 0.80R t t 1 0.5g y,t t p 0 25 annual basis points GDP Consumption Investment Inflation (APR) % dev from ss % dev from ss level % points dev from ss Risk free rate (APR) Bank net worth (N) level Interest rate spread (APR) Leverage (N+d)/N level Prob of success quarterly, level Contractionary M policy shock: fall in: c, i, y, bank net worth, N, inflation 0.2 Cross-section std dev, Bank return on equity Rise in: leverage cross sectional dispersion of bank performance
91 % dev from ss p R t 0.80R t t 1 0.5g y,t t p 0 25 annual basis points GDP Consumption Investment Inflation (APR) % dev from ss % dev from ss level % points dev from ss Risk free rate (APR) Bank net worth (N) level Interest rate spread (APR) Leverage (N+d)/N level Prob of success quarterly, level Contractionary M policy shock: fall in: c, i, y, bank net worth, N, inflation 0.2 Cross-section std dev, Bank return on equity Rise in: leverage cross sectional dispersion of bank performance
92 % dev from ss p R t 0.80R t t 1 0.5g y,t t p 0 25 annual basis points GDP Consumption Investment Inflation (APR) % dev from ss % dev from ss level % points dev from ss Risk free rate (APR) Bank net worth (N) level Interest rate spread (APR) Leverage (N+d)/N level Prob of success quarterly, level Contractionary M policy shock: fall in: c, i, y, bank net worth, N, inflation 0.2 Cross-section std dev, Bank return on equity Rise in: leverage cross sectional dispersion of bank performance
93 % dev from ss p R t 0.80R t t 1 0.5g y,t t p 0 25 annual basis points GDP Consumption Investment Inflation (APR) % dev from ss % dev from ss level % points dev from ss Risk free rate (APR) Bank net worth (N) level Interest rate spread (APR) Leverage (N+d)/N level Prob of success quarterly, level Contractionary M policy shock: fall in: c, i, y, bank net worth, N, inflation 0.2 Cross-section std dev, Bank return on equity Rise in: leverage cross sectional dispersion of bank performance
94 % dev from ss GDP log % dev from ss T t 0.95log T T Consumption % dev from ss T t 1 T Investment t T Inflation (APR) % points dev from ss level Risk free rate (APR) Bank net worth (N) level Interest rate spread (APR) Leverage (N+d)/N level Prob of success quarterly, level Cross-section std dev, Bank return on equity Negative shock to bank net worth: fall in: c, i, y, bank net worth, N, inflation Rise in: leverage cross sectional dispersion of bank performance
95 % dev from ss GDP log % dev from ss T t 0.95log T T Consumption % dev from ss T t 1 T Investment t T Inflation (APR) % points dev from ss level Risk free rate (APR) Bank net worth (N) level Interest rate spread (APR) Leverage (N+d)/N level Prob of success quarterly, level Cross-section std dev, Bank return on equity Negative shock to bank net worth: fall in: c, i, y, bank net worth, N, inflation Rise in: leverage cross sectional dispersion of bank performance
96 % dev from ss GDP log % dev from ss T t 0.95log T T Consumption % dev from ss T t 1 T Investment t T Inflation (APR) % points dev from ss level Risk free rate (APR) Bank net worth (N) level Interest rate spread (APR) Leverage (N+d)/N level Prob of success quarterly, level Cross-section std dev, Bank return on equity Negative shock to bank net worth: fall in: c, i, y, bank net worth, N, inflation Rise in: leverage cross sectional dispersion of bank performance
97 % dev from ss GDP log % dev from ss T t 0.95log T T Consumption % dev from ss T t 1 T Investment t T Inflation (APR) % points dev from ss level Risk free rate (APR) Bank net worth (N) level Interest rate spread (APR) Leverage (N+d)/N level Prob of success quarterly, level Cross-section std dev, Bank return on equity Negative shock to bank net worth: fall in: c, i, y, bank net worth, N, inflation Rise in: leverage cross sectional dispersion of bank performance
98 Cyclicality of Leverage The model appears to imply countercyclical leverage.
99 Cyclicality of Leverage The model appears to imply countercyclical leverage. We took data from the Flow of Funds accounts to measure leverage.
100 Cyclicality of Leverage The model appears to imply countercyclical leverage. We took data from the Flow of Funds accounts to measure leverage. Problem: only report financial assets (a f ) and liabilities (l f ) af L f = a f l f
101 Cyclicality of Leverage The model appears to imply countercyclical leverage. We took data from the Flow of Funds accounts to measure leverage. Problem: only report financial assets (a f ) and liabilities (l f ) L f = af a f l f This measure of leverage can be negative or gigantic.
102 Cyclicality of Leverage The model appears to imply countercyclical leverage. We took data from the Flow of Funds accounts to measure leverage. Problem: only report financial assets (a f ) and liabilities (l f ) L f = af a f l f This measure of leverage can be negative or gigantic. We took measures of L f for three components of financial business, over a period for which L f does not behave strangely, the 2000s.
103 Holding Companies (L.128) liability growth - asset growth (yoy) Private Depository Institutions (L.109) liability growth - asset growth (yoy) Security Brokers and Dealers (L.127) liability growth - asset growth (yoy) liability growth - S&P500 growth (yoy) liability growth - S&P500 growth (yoy) liability growth - S&P500 growth (yoy)
104 Holding Companies (L.128) liability growth - asset growth (yoy) Private Depository Institutions (L.109) liability growth - asset growth (yoy) Security Brokers and Dealers (L.127) liability growth - asset growth (yoy) liability growth - S&P500 growth (yoy) liability growth - S&P500 growth (yoy) liability growth - S&P500 growth (yoy)
105 Holding Companies (L.128) liability growth - asset growth (yoy) Private Depository Institutions (L.109) liability growth - asset growth (yoy) Security Brokers and Dealers (L.127) liability growth - asset growth (yoy) liability growth - S&P500 growth (yoy) liability growth - S&P500 growth (yoy) liability growth - S&P500 growth (yoy)
106 Conclusion Described a model in which there is a problem that is mitigated by the introduction of leverage restrictions. Described some loose tests of the model by looking at its dynamic implications. Plan to study implications of the model for a broader class of leverage rules.
107 Bankers and their Creditors
108 Bankers and their Creditors Assets Liabilities Loans and other securities Deposits, d t N t + d t Banker net worth, N t No agency problems on asset side of bank balance sheet.
109 Bankers and their Creditors Assets Liabilities Loans and other securities Deposits, d t N t + d t Banker net worth, N t No agency problems on asset side of bank balance sheet. Problems are on liability side.
110 Bankers and their Creditors Assets Liabilities Loans and other securities Deposits, d t N t + d t Banker net worth, N t No agency problems on asset side of bank balance sheet. Problems are on liability side. Bankers receive credit, d t, from mutual funds.
111 Bankers and their Creditors Assets Liabilities Loans and other securities Deposits, d t N t + d t Banker net worth, N t No agency problems on asset side of bank balance sheet. Problems are on liability side. Bankers receive credit, d t, from mutual funds. Mutual funds deal with households.
112 Risky Bankers Funded By Mutual Funds Household banker Household Household Diversified, competitive mutual funds banker banker banker
113 L e t = dl e t = = a f t a f t lf t da f t a f ( ) t a f l f ( a f l f ) da f 2 t dlf t a f a f l f âf t a f ( t ( a f l f ) 2 ˆL e t = â f t 1 ( a f l f a f â f t lfˆlf t l = f ) (ˆlf t âf t f f a f â f t lfˆlf t ) )
114 L t = LˆL t = ˆL t = = = a nf t a nf t + a f t + a f t lf t a nf a nf + a f l f ânf t + a nf + a f ( a nf + a f l f ) 2 a nf a nf + a f ânf [ a nf a nf + a f [ a nf a nf + a f t + af a f a nf + a f l f âf t ( a nf â nf t + a f â f t lfˆlf t a nf + a f âf t 1 ( ) a nf + a f l f a nf â nf t + a f â f t lfˆlf t ] [ ] a nf a nf + a f l f â nf a t + f a a nf + a f f a nf + a f l f â a nf a nf + a f l f ] â nf t ) l f ( a nf + a f l f ) ( a nf + a f )af â l = f a ( nf a nf + a f ) ( l a nf + a f l f )ânf t f a ( f a nf + a f ) ( a nf + a f l f )âf t
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