Borrower Distress and Debt Relief: Evidence From A Natural Experiment

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1 Borrower Distress and Debt Relief: Evidence From A Natural Experiment Krishnamurthy Subramanian a Prasanna Tantri a Saptarshi Mukherjee b (a) Indian School of Business (b) Stern School of Business, NYU August, 2017

2 Motivation: Historical Debt relief for distressed borrowers advocated through the ages: If any one owe a debt for a loan, and a storm prostrates the grain, or the harvest fail, or the grain does not growth for lack of water, in that year he need not give his creditor any grain, he washes his debt-tablet in water and pays no rent for this year - 48th provision of Code of Hammurabi, 1772 BC One of the first legal codes understood the importance of debt relief to distressed borrowers. From 1775 to 1850, many American states passed laws that provided for debt moratoria. During the Great Depression, states passed laws for debt moratoria of farm mortgages.

3 Motivation: Developed countries in recent times In recent times, bankruptcy represents the primary mechanism for debt relief in developed countries. In 2010, over 10 percent of all U.S. households filed for personal bankruptcy and received nearly $0.5 trillion in debt relief.

4 Motivation: Developing countries such as India - 1 In emerging economies such as India, a large proportion of the households engage in agriculture. Such households are not only poor but also remain vulnerable to income shocks. This vulnerability results from: the income stream from agriculture is highly uncertain (Deaton (2016), Deaton (1989)). weather shocks create significant risks and lead to permanent, high level of distress among farmers (Jacoby (1997), Datt (2003), Burgess (2011)) and use of agricultural insurance is limited (Cole (2013)) According to a U.N. report, farmer suicides originating from debt traps represent an important concern in developing countries. 1 1 Source: farmers_relief.pdf

5 Motivation: Developing countries such as India - 2 Given these vulnerabilities, governments may feel the political pressure to alleviate agricultural distress (Dietrich (2015), Beslev (1994), Bolton and Rosenthal (2002) and Rucker (1987)). Apart from the Indian debt waiver program that we study, recent examples of such interventions include: The US $2.9 billion bailout for farmers in Thailand and The rescheduling of about US $10 billion of agricultural debt in Brazil.

6 Motivation: Debt relief may get exploited Debt relief may however be exploited by undeserving borrowers. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act passed in the U.S. in 2005 to stop the abuse of the bankruptcy system by debtors who could pay their debts but instead opted to file for bankruptcy protection Concerns about strategic behaviour by borrowers are well founded: Mayer, Morrison, Piskorski, and Gupta (2011) Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2013) To enhance the efficacy of debt relief, important to understand its impact on distressed and non-distressed borrowers separately.

7 Motivation: Conceptual tension Governments in emerging economies employ scarce fiscal resources to serve their narrow political interests (Cole (2009), Khwaja (2005)). Some existing studies suggest that debt relief programs are ineffective (Kanz (2015), Gine and Kanz (2016)). Yet, theoretical studies advocate the need for such ex-post interventions to alleviate borrower distress. Bolton and Rosenthal (2002) contend that debt contracts are highly incomplete as they do not provide for contingencies arising from an adverse state that is beyond the borrowers control. Therefore, adverse shocks can lead to inefficient foreclosures and thereby create significant deadweight costs. Political intervention in the form of debt moratoria can avoid inefficient foreclosures and the resultant deadweight costs (Bolton and Rosenthal (2002), Rucker (1987)).

8 Our study: Key findings We study the causal effect of debt relief on the loan performance of distressed and non-distressed borrowers Utilize $14.4 bn debt waiver announced by Indian government in February Waiver beneficiaries, on average, default about 13.8 to 19.4 % more than non-beneficiaries. Broadly consistent with Kanz (2015) and Gine and Kanz (2016). Distressed beneficiaries default 16.2 to 22.3 % less than comparable distressed defaulters that did not get the waiver. Non-distressed waiver beneficiaries under-perform comparable non-beneficiaries by 11.5 to 29.5 %.

9 Data Detailed loan-level data over six years (May 2005 February 2012). Provided by a Public Sector Bank The period includes 3 years before and after the 2008 debt waiver. Accounts spread over 14 branches across nine districts of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. All loans in the sample were crop loans of one year maturity (for rice production)

10 Proxy for loan performance Use status of loan (current or default) as the main dependent variable. All agricultural crop loans in our sample have a maturity of one year. A loan outstanding for more than 365 days is considered to be in default.

11 Proxy for distress Burgess et al. (2011) use deficient rainfall to measure adverse weather. Adverse weather causes significant distress among Indian farmers Following Burgess et al. (2011), create a standardized variable for rainfall in the kharif season: r kt = r kt r k σ(r k ), r kt equals the actual rainfall in Mandal b in year t r k and σ(r k ) equal the long-term average and standard deviation of rainfall in the kharif season in Mandal b

12 Key aspects of the 2008 debt waiver All agricultural loans in default as of 31 Dec 2007 (and continued to be in default as of 28 Feb 2008) qualified for the debt waiver: The program did not differentiate between distressed and non-distressed defaulters The loan waiver was unanticipated. The previous national level waiver was in (after a national election) This was the first time that a large scale waiver was announced a year before a scheduled election.

13 Regression Discontinuity (RD) Design - 1 Use a sharp RD design to study the causal effects of debt relief. As Lee (2010) argue citing Hahn (2001): RD designs require seemingly mild assumptions compared to those needed for other non-experimental approaches. Waiver was awarded to only those borrowers who defaulted on a loan on or before 31 st Dec 2007 and continued to be in default until 29 th Feb Borrowers who defaulted on the their loans just before the cut-off date of 31 st Dec 2007 form our treatment group. Borrowers who defaulted just after the cut-off date form our control group. 31 st Dec 2007: cut-off date for implementing the sharp RD design.

14 Regression Discontinuity (RD) Design - 2 Crucially, borrowers on both sides of the cut-off are defaulters separated by an artificial cut-off date. Similar in all dimensions except receiving or nor receiving a waiver. 31 st Dec has no significance for agricultural production in India. Borrowers who defaulted on their loans on or before 31 st Dec 2007 borrowed their loan before 31 st Dec months before the announcement of the waiver. Concerns about self-selection into the program are low.

15 Regression Setup Regression equation Y ikt = β 0 + β t + β k + t β k + Γ X kt + β 1Beneficiary i + β 2Distressed ikt + β 3Beneficiary i Distressed ikt + ε ikt Y ikt indicates whether the loan is in default or not β 3 = ( Y Waiver Beneficiaries Y Non-beneficiaries ) Distress before the waiver (Y Waiver Beneficiaries Y Non-beneficiaries ) No Distress before the waiver In all our tests, we include fixed effects for each (branch, year) pair. Omitted variable has to: Correlate with the Distress dummy (based on the exogenous cut-off), and Vary at a level more granular than (branch, year) Any time-invarying or time-varying confounding factors that affect distress at the branch level cannot affect our results.

16 Table 2: Effect of Adverse Weather on Default Dependent Variable: Probability of Default Sample: Pre-Waiver Sample: Full (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Standardized Kharif Rainfall *** *** *** (4.29) (4.37) (3.22) Standardized Yearly Rainfall *** (3.27) Drought 0.563*** 0.563*** (8.29) (13.56) Log Loan Amount 0.071*** 0.075*** 0.036*** 0.054*** 0.030*** (3.69) (3.26) (5.33) (4.46) (5.70) Observations 23,723 23,723 23,723 23,723 38,990 38,990 R-squared Branch x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

17 Figure 1 - Ex-post Loan Performance - Distressed Borrowers

18 Figure 1 - Ex-post Loan Performance - Non-Distressed Borrowers

19 Figure 1 - Ex-post Loan Performance - All Borrowers

20 Table 3: RD Design: Probability of Default (Drought Measure) - Distressed Borrowers Dependent Variable: Post Program Probability of Default (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Treatment = * *** ** *** ** (-1.80) (-3.00) (-2.35) (-2.71) (-2.14) Log Loan Amount 0.019** 0.019** 0.018** 0.018** (2.20) (2.19) (2.07) (2.02) Standardized Kharif Rainfall *** *** (-9.99) (-10.01) Drought 0.472*** 0.472*** (14.60) (14.62) Observations 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,869 R-squared Forcing Polynomial Order Branch x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

21 Table 3: RD Design: Probability of Default (Drought Measure) - Non Distressed Borrowers Dependent Variable: Post Program Probability of Default (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Treatment = *** 0.295*** 0.223*** 0.179*** 0.115* (5.07) (5.35) (3.37) (3.89) (1.91) Log Loan Amount 0.027* 0.028** 0.020* 0.021* (1.89) (1.97) (1.87) (1.93) Standardized Kharif Rainfall (-1.30) (-1.26) Drought 0.604*** 0.603*** (21.72) (21.72) Observations 1,279 1,279 1,279 1,279 1,279 R-squared Forcing Polynomial Order Branch x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

22 Table 3: RD Design: Probability of Default (Drought Measure) - All Borrowers Dependent Variable: Post Program Probability of Default (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Treatment = *** 0.194*** 0.139*** 0.138*** 0.145** (5.40) (5.39) (2.62) (4.62) (2.17) Log Loan Amount 0.020** 0.020** 0.015** 0.015** (2.55) (2.58) (2.14) (2.13) Standardized Kharif Rainfall *** *** (-7.65) (-7.63) Drought 0.534*** 0.534*** (22.83) (22.87) Observations 4,148 4,148 4,148 4,148 4,148 R-squared Forcing Polynomial Order Branch x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

23 Table 4: RD Robustness [-10,10] [-15,15] [-20,20] [-25,25] (1) (2) (3) (4) Panel A : Full Sample Treatment = *** 0.096* 0.113*** 0.119*** (2.20) (1.86) (2.76) (3.15) Observations 1,010 1,516 2,321 3,223 R-squared Panel B : Distressed Borrowers Treatment = *** ** *** *** (-3.32) (-2.51) (-3.46) (-3.44) Observations ,548 2,208 R-squared Panel C : Non-Distressed Borrowers Treatment = ** 0.105** 0.169*** 0.145*** (1.98) (1.98) (3.24) (2.82) Observations ,015 R-squared Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Branch x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes

24 Figure 3 - Distribution of Waiver for Alternate Cutoff Dates - 1

25 Figure 3 - Distribution of Waiver for Alternate Cutoff Dates - 2

26 Table 5: Falsification Tests based on Different Cutoff Dates Dependent Variable: Post Program Probability of Default Cutoff Date 30 Nov Jan Feb 2008 Panel A : All Borrowers Treatment = (0.31) (-0.84) (-0.04) Observations 3,795 2,476 1,706 R-squared Panel B : Distressed Borrowers Treatment = (0.71) (-1.48) (0.19) Observations 2,574 1,689 1,104 R-squared Panel C : Non Distressed Borrowers Treatment = (0.33) (0.99) (-0.41) Observations 1, R-squared Forcing Polynomial Order Branch x Year FE Yes Yes Yes

27 Table 7: Pre-Waiver Performance: RD Analysis Borrower Category Distressed Non-Distressed Distress Measure Drought Drought Rainfall Drought Drought Rainfall (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Treatment = (1.37) (0.52) (0.51) (1.21) (1.08) (1.28) Log Loan Amount 0.032*** 0.029*** 0.030*** (3.27) (3.02) (2.78) (1.26) (1.29) (1.63) Standardized Kharif Rainfall *** *** *** *** (-14.47) (-14.48) (-8.49) (-8.56) Observations 1,416 1,416 1, R-squared Branch x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

28 Figure 5 - Ex-Post Credit Rationing

29 Policy implications - 1 Our study suggests policy implications that are more nuanced than those suggested by the existing empirical studies. First, a debt waiver that is granted to all borrowers without considering whether they are indeed distressed or not, not only wastes scarce fiscal resources but also is counter-productive because it increases loan defaults

30 Policy implications - 2 Second, our results consistent with the theoretical arguments in Bolton and Rosenthal (2002) that debt relief targeted at distressed beneficiaries is likely to improve loan performance. Thus, governments may not necessarily be wasting scarce fiscal resources to serve their narrow political interests underlineprovided a debt waiver is targeted towards distressed borrowers. Though the economic environment we study comprises agricultural loans in an emerging country, our findings and the attendant policy implications are similar to those in Mian and Sufi (2014). They contend that the lack of debt forgiveness on housing loans exacerbated the Great Recession.

31 Summary First study to provide evidence of both costs and benefits of debt relief Post waiver loan repayment performance improves for distressed beneficiaries The loan performance of non-distressed beneficiaries worsens after the waiver Study provides policy implications that are more nuanced than those obtained from existing studies.

32 Review of Literature - 1 Our main finding: Distressed beneficiaries benefit significantly from debt relief Overall costs from the program were high as benefits were cornered by non-distressed (possibly non-deserving) beneficiaries The program we examine is unique because the waiver did not distinguish between distressed and non-distressed borrowers unlike the HAMP program that Agarwal et al (2016) examine Therefore, we can disentangle the effect of the waiver on (ex-ante) distressed and non-distressed borrowers. To our knowledge, first study to do so.

33 Review of Literature - 2 Several studies have examined the costs and benefits of debt relief through bankruptcy Dobbie and Song (2013); Athreya (2002); Chatterjee and Gordon (2012); White et al. (1998); White (2007) However, a borrower chooses to declare bankruptcy The decision to file for bankruptcy is also significantly influenced by credit market conditions Cohen-Cole et al (2009) Difficult to disentangle the impact of debt relief and the endogenous borrower circumstances or endogenous market conditions.

34 Review of Literature - 3 Several studies examine large scale government debt relief programs granted during harsh economic circumstances Rucker and Alston (1987); Agarwal et al (2016) Some studies find modest benefits Hembre (2014); Agarwal et al (2016) Others have shown that such programs induce moral hazard and do not lead to any improvements in real outcomes Kanz (2015); Gine and Kanz (2016) These studies focus either on the benefits of debt relief to distressed borrowers. Bolton and Rosenthal (2002) or the costs created by strategic borrowers Mayer et al (2011); Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2013)

35 Review of Literature - 4 Gine and Kanz (2013) examine the same program as we do They find waiver leads to no benefit However, our analysis shows that waiver can benefit distressed borrowers substantially

Borrower Distress and Debt Relief: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Borrower Distress and Debt Relief: Evidence from a Natural Experiment Saptarshi Mukherjee NYU Stern, Krishnamurthy Subramanian Indian School of Business This Version: March 2017 Prasanna Tantri Indian