The End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit State Guarantees

Transcription

1 The Investor Expectations of Implicit State Guarantees Viral Acharya New York University World Bank, Virginia Tech A. Joseph Warburton Syracuse University

2 Motivation Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke (2013): If the crisis has taught a single lesson, it is that the too - big-tofail problem must be resolved The too-big-to-fail (TBTF) doctrine postulates that the government will not allow large financial institutions to fail if their failure would cause significant disruption to the financial system and economic activity. The guarantee is implicit as the authorities do not have any explicit, ex ante commitment to intervene. The possibility of a bailout may exist in theory but not reliably in practice, and as a result, market participants do not price implicit guarantees. The government s long-standing policy of constructive ambiguity (Freixas 1999; Mishkin 1999) is designed to encourage that uncertainty. This has led authorities to take a seemingly random approach to intervention, for instance by saving AIG but not Lehman Brothers, in order to make it hard for investors to rely on a bailout

3 Motivation Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke (2013): The subsidy is coming because of market expectations that the government would bail out these firms if they failed.i think we should get rid of it. American Bankers Association, The Clearing House, Financial Services Forum, Financial Services Roundtable, SIFMA (2013): Question the existence of a TBTF subsidy. The markets may even be imposing a funding penalty on large banking institutions. U.S. Senate: AMERICAN BANKER Senate Passes Bill to Require GAO Study on TBTF By Victoria Finkle Dec 22, :14am ET. WASHINGTON The Senate has passed a bill that would direct the GAO to examine the economic benefits large banks receive for being too big to fail..

4 Literature A line of literature examines whether the market can provide discipline against bank risk taking DeYoung et al. 2001; Jagtiani, Kaufman and Lemieux 2002; Jagtiani and Lemieux 2001; Allen, Jagtiani and Moser 2001; Morgan and Stiroh 2000 and 2001; Calomiris 1999; Levonian 2000; Federal Reserve Board 1999; and Flannery 1998 These studies do not consider potential price distortions arising from conjectural government support. Flannery and Sorescu (1996) & Sironi (2003) examine yield spreads on subordinated debt focusing on the FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 1991 and the impact of EU budget constraint respectively They find that as the implicit guarantee was diminished through policy and legislative changes, debt holders came to realize They do not distinguish TBTF banks Morgan and Stiroh (2005) & Balasubramnian and Cyree (2011) focus on the banks declared too big to fail by the Comptroller of the Currency in 1984, in order to differentiate TBTF banks from non-tbtf banks O Hara and Shaw (1990), Kane (2000), Brewer and Jagtiani (2007), Molyneux, Schaeck and Zhou (2010) examine equity prices and premiums paid in bank M&A activity

5 Questions Questions Do investors expect government support? How does it affect pricing of risk? What was the effect of Dodd-Frank and FDIC SPOE on TBTF expectations?.

6 Motivation & Findings Questions Do investors expect government support? How does it affect pricing of risk? What was the effect of Dodd-Frank and FDIC SPOE on TBTF expectations? Findings Bondholders expect public support for major financial institutions For most financial institutions, spreads are risk sensitive, but for the largest financial institutions, spreads lack risk sensitivity Implicit support constitutes a subsidy for these institutions Lowers funding costs by as much as 100 basis points. Recent regulations did not eliminate expectations of government support.

7 Motivation & Findings Methodology Spread = Bond Characteristics + Company Characteristics + Macro Controls + Systemic Importance Seniority Maturity Liquidity Leverage Roa B/M Maturity mismatch Ratings Risk (merton distanceto-default) AAA-BBB spread 10yr 3m spread Market return Spread = + Systemic Importance Risk

8 Motivation & Findings (Spreadi Bailout) (Spreadi No-Bailout) (Spreadi Bailout, Big Bank, Controls) (Spreadj Bailout, Small Bank, Controls) Two problems: Omitted Variables Endogeneity Identification: Before After Big Banks Big Corporates Small Banks Small Corporates Event: Lehman, TARP, Bear, etc.

9 Methodology Too Big To Fail Size: a significant driver of systemic importance (e.g., Adrian and Brunnermeier 2011; Dodd-Frank) Size: Size (log assets) relative to industry Size90: Top 90 th percentile by size SizeTop10: Top 10 institution by size Other measures of Systemic importance CoVaR SRISK Yield Spreads Controls: Risk Profile, Firm, Bond, Macro (e.g., Flannery and Sorescu 1996; Sironi 2003).

10 Methodology Too Big To Fail Size: a significant driver of systemic importance (e.g., Adrian and Brunnermeier 2011; Dodd-Frank) Size: Size (log assets) relative to industry Size90: Top 90 th percentile by size SizeTop10: Top 10 institution by size Systemic risk CoVaR SRISK Yield Spreads Controls: Risk Profile, Firm, Bond, Macro (e.g., Flannery and Sorescu 1996; Sironi 2003) Data & Sample US financial institutions over the period Bond data (monthly) Lehman Fixed Income Database (1990 to 1998) NAIC Database (1998 to 2006) TRACE Database (2006 to 2012) FISD (bond descriptions) Accounting and stock data: COMPUSTAT and CRSP 567 unique financial institutions and over 45,000 observations.

11 Findings Larger Institutions have lower spreads No relationship between size and risk

12 TBTF Spread Regressions (1) (2) VARIABLES spread spread ttm ** (0.007) (0.004) seniority ** (0.127) (0.082) leverage t *** (0.870) (1.906) roa t * (4.037) (1.356) mb t ** *** (0.082) (0.044) mismatch t *** (0.319) (0.362) def *** *** (0.200) (0.080) term *** (0.047) (0.023) mkt *** (0.516) (0.211) mertondd t *** *** (0.050) (0.020) size t *** ** (0.065) (0.084) Firm FE N Y Year FE Y Y Rating Dummies Y Y Observations 39,164 39,125 R

13 TBTF Spread Regressions (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) VARIABLES spread spread spread spread spread spread size90 t ** (0.148) (0.120) size_top_10 t ** (0.148) covar t ** (3.625) srisk t ** (0.005) size t-1 bank dummy ** (0.183) size t-1 insurance dummy (0.334) size t-1 broker dummy (0.209) financial t ** (0.181) size90 t-1 financial t ** (0.128) constant *** *** *** (1.032) (1.033) (1.043) (0.619) Firm FE N N N N Year FE Y Y Y Y Rating Dummies Y Y Y Y Observations 39,164 39,164 39, ,127 R

14 TBTF Risk Interaction VARIABLES (1) spread ttm 0.021*** (0.007) seniority (0.123) leverage t *** (0.649) roa t (3.361) mb t * (0.077) mismatch t (0.341) def 1.567*** (0.196) term (0.042) mkt (0.519) size90 t *** (0.568) mertondd t *** (0.082) size90 t-1 * mertondd t *** (0.091) Year FE Y Rating Dummies Y Observations 39,125 R-squared For the largest FIs, spreads are less sensitive to risk

15 TBTF Risk Interaction (2) VARIABLES spread size90 t *** (0.495) size60 t (0.821) size30 t (0.972) mertondd t *** (0.080) size90 t-1 mertondd t *** (0.083) size60 t-1 mertondd t (0.135) size30 t-1 mertondd t (0.164) constant *** (0.929) Year FE Y Rating Dummies Y Controls Y Observations 39,125 R One standard deviation increase in distance-to-default reduces spread by 60 bps The effect of distance-to-default is 75% lower for financial institutions in the top 90 th percentile. It s only 7% lower for institutions between the 60 th and 90 th percentiles in size and statistically insignificant Similar results using accounting based measures, volatility and adjusted distance-to-default measures

16 TBTF Risk Interaction (2) (3) VARIABLES spread spread size90 t *** 0.876*** (0.401) (0.256) zscore t *** (0.082) size90 t-1 * zscore t ** (0.115) volatility t *** (1.106) size90 t-1 * volatility t *** (0.824) Year FE Y Y Rating Dummies Y Y Observations 37,856 39,125 R-squared (4) (5) (6) VARIABLES spread spread spread financial t * (0.598) (0.407) (0.313) financial t-1 * size90 t ** ** 0.721* (0.746) (0.579) (0.377) financial t-1 * mertondd t (0.091) financial t-1 * mertondd t-1* size90 t ** (0.113) financial t-1 * zscore t (0.101) financial t-1 * zscore t-1 *size90 t ** (0.171) financial t-1 * volatility t *** (1.057) financial t-1 * volatility t-1 *size90 t ** (1.310) Year FE Y Y Y Rating Dummies Y Y Y Observations 104, , ,267 R-squared

17 Risk Shifting (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) VARIABLES Δ D/V Δ D/V Δ D/V Δ D/V Δ IPP Δ IPP Δ IPP Δ IPP Δ asset vol *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** (0.070) (0.318) (0.074) (0.028) (0.016) (0.072) (0.017) (0.009) size t (0.001) (0.001) Δ asset vol size t *** *** (0.031) (0.007) size90 t * (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) Δ asset vol size90 t ** *** *** (0.148) (0.089) (0.060) (0.040) financial t * *** (0.002) (0.001) financial t-1 Δ asset vol *** (0.079) (0.041) financial t-1 size90 t (0.004) (0.003) financial t-1 size90 t-1 Δ asset vol * (0.173) (0.275) Constant * *** *** * *** *** (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.000) Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Observations 2,131 2,131 2,131 12,817 2,131 2,131 2,131 12,817 R

18 Summary Main Findings TBTF institutions have lower spreads than other institutions TBTF institutions have spreads that are less sensitive to risk Robustness Size is not related to risk Size Spread? Risk

19 Robustness: TBTF Risk Relationship (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES mertondd mertondd mertondd mertondd def *** *** *** *** (6.431) (6.195) (2.203) (2.325) term *** *** (3.033) (3.076) (1.294) (1.333) mkt *** 0.120** (0.155) (0.156) (0.058) (0.060) roa 6.268*** 6.324*** 8.187*** 9.083*** (1.241) (1.053) (0.678) (0.714) mb 0.088** ** 0.007** (0.038) (0.040) (0.003) (0.003) std roa ** ** *** *** (4.466) (5.725) (0.847) (0.999) leverage *** ** *** *** (0.560) (0.599) (0.305) (0.311) mismatch ** * (0.281) (0.324) (0.132) (0.145) size t *** 0.508*** (0.047) (0.031) size90 t *** (0.154) (0.133) financial t *** 0.543*** (0.515) (0.123) financial t-1 * size t *** (0.052) financial t-1 * size90 t ** (0.219) Year FE Y Y Y Y Rating Dummies Y Y Y Y Observations 10,762 10,762 88,213 88,182 R-squared Large FIs are not less risky

20 Robustness: TBTF Risk Relationship (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES mertondd mertondd mertondd mertondd def *** *** *** *** (6.431) (6.195) (2.203) (2.325) term *** *** (3.033) (3.076) (1.294) (1.333) mkt *** 0.120** (0.155) (0.156) (0.058) (0.060) roa 6.268*** 6.324*** 8.187*** 9.083*** (1.241) (1.053) (0.678) (0.714) mb 0.088** ** 0.007** (0.038) (0.040) (0.003) (0.003) std roa ** ** *** *** (4.466) (5.725) (0.847) (0.999) leverage *** ** *** *** (0.560) (0.599) (0.305) (0.311) mismatch ** * (0.281) (0.324) (0.132) (0.145) size t *** 0.508*** (0.047) (0.031) size90 t *** (0.154) (0.133) financial t *** 0.543*** (0.515) (0.123) financial t-1 * size t *** (0.052) financial t-1 * size90 t ** (0.219) Year FE Y Y Y Y Rating Dummies Y Y Y Y Observations 10,762 10,762 88,213 88,182 R-squared Large FIs are not less risky

21 Summary Main Findings TBTF institutions have lower spreads than other institutions TBTF institutions have spreads that are less sensitive to risk Robustness Alternative proxies for TBTF status Size is not related to risk Ratings as exogenous measures of risk and implicit support

22 Support Ratings (1) (2) (3) VARIABLES spread spread spread Excludes external support Includes external support Lower number indicates better rating ttm ** (0.010) (0.021) (0.020) seniority ** (0.105) (0.216) (0.216) leverage t *** (1.997) (3.829) (4.288) roa t *** *** *** (10.843) (11.292) (11.410) mb t *** 0.526*** 0.465*** (0.105) (0.161) (0.164) mismatch t *** 2.492** 2.385** (0.423) (1.110) (1.097) def 1.344*** 1.309*** 1.298*** (0.106) (0.181) (0.178) term (0.038) (0.054) (0.055) mkt (0.369) (0.439) (0.427) mertondd t *** *** *** (0.040) (0.046) (0.059) stand-alone rating t * (0.055) (0.147) issuer rating t *** 0.340*** (0.071) (0.107) Year FE Y Y Y Observations 16,127 16,120 16,107 R-squared

23 Robustness: Ratings Size affects issuer but not stand alone ratings (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES issuer rating issuer rating stand-alone rating stand-alone rating leverage t ** *** (8.490) (6.312) (5.209) (4.786) roa * (18.217) (21.865) (15.001) (15.519) mb * * (0.220) (0.246) (0.130) (0.134) mismatch t ** 3.106** * (1.337) (1.281) (0.676) (0.642) size t *** (0.151) (0.107) size90 t *** (0.439) (0.299) constant *** *** (7.237) (5.780) (4.558) (4.400) Year FE Y Y Y Y Observations 16,120 16,120 16,127 16,127 R-squared

24 Summary Main Findings TBTF institutions have lower spreads than other institutions TBTF institutions have spreads that are less sensitive to risk Robustness Alternative proxies for TBTF status Size is not related to risk Ratings as exogenous measures of risk and implicit support Bondholders price risk based on expectations of government support, not standalone credit rating

25 Summary Main Findings TBTF institutions have lower spreads than other institutions TBTF institutions have spreads that are less sensitive to risk Robustness Alternative proxies for TBTF status Size is not related to risk Ratings as exogenous measures of risk and implicit support Shocks to investor expectations of support Event studies of contrasting shocks

26 Robustness: Event Study size90 t-1 size90 t-1 size90 t-1 mertondd t-1 Event Date Event size90 t-1 post mertondd t-1 post financial t-1 post financial t-1*post 07/11/08 Paulson requests government funds for ** * Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (0.106) (0.091) (0.110) (0.093) 03/13/08 Bear Stearns bailout *** 0.251** *** 0.401** (0.224) (0.103) (0.228) (0.182) 09/20/08 Paulson submits TARP proposal *** *** (0.308) (0.352) (0.309) (0.356) 10/03/08 TARP passes the U.S. House of Representatives *** 1.951*** *** 2.186*** (0.292) (0.420) (0.363) (0.439) 10/06/08 The Term Auction Facility is increased to $900bn ** 0.808*** ** 1.063*** (0.278) (0.310) (0.357) (0.340) 10/14/08 Treasury announces $250 billion capital injections ** * (0.362) (0.281) (0.382) (0.291) 02/02/09 The Federal Reserve announces it is prepared to * 0.462*** increase TALF to $1 trillion (0.086) (0.109) (0.162) (0.176) 11/13/08 Paulson indicates that TARP will be used to buy equity ** 0.925** * 0.901** instead of troubled assets (0.272) (0.403) (0.316) (0.429) 09/15/08 Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy 1.005*** *** 1.086*** *** (0.329) (0.293) (0.436) (0.184) 06/29/10 The House and the Senate conference committees * 0.039* reconcile the Dodd-Frank bill (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) 07/21/10 The Dodd-Frank bill passes the U.S. House of Representatives 0.027* (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015) 12/10/12 The FDIC and the Bank of England release a white paper 0.037*** ** 0.030** ** and press release describing SPOE (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 5 day window around event

27 Robustness: Event Study size90 t-1 size90 t-1 size90 t-1 mertondd t-1 Event Date Event size90 t-1 post mertondd t-1 post financial t-1 post financial t-1*post 07/11/08 Paulson requests government funds for ** * Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (0.106) (0.091) (0.110) (0.093) 03/13/08 Bear Stearns bailout *** 0.251** *** 0.401** (0.224) (0.103) (0.228) (0.182) 09/20/08 Paulson submits TARP proposal *** *** (0.308) (0.352) (0.309) (0.356) 10/03/08 TARP passes the U.S. House of Representatives *** 1.951*** *** 2.186*** (0.292) (0.420) (0.363) (0.439) 10/06/08 The Term Auction Facility is increased to $900bn ** 0.808*** ** 1.063*** (0.278) (0.310) (0.357) (0.340) 10/14/08 Treasury announces $250 billion capital injections ** * (0.362) (0.281) (0.382) (0.291) 02/02/09 The Federal Reserve announces it is prepared to * 0.462*** increase TALF to $1 trillion (0.086) (0.109) (0.162) (0.176) 11/13/08 Paulson indicates that TARP will be used to buy equity ** 0.925** * 0.901** instead of troubled assets (0.272) (0.403) (0.316) (0.429) 09/15/08 Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy 1.005*** *** 1.086*** *** (0.329) (0.293) (0.436) (0.184) 06/29/10 The House and the Senate conference committees * 0.039* reconcile the Dodd-Frank bill (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) 07/21/10 The Dodd-Frank bill passes the U.S. House of Representatives 0.027* (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015) 12/10/12 The FDIC and the Bank of England release a white paper 0.037*** ** 0.030** ** and press release describing SPOE (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)

28 Robustness: Event Study size90 t-1 size90 t-1 size90 t-1 mertondd t-1 Event Date Event size90 t-1 post mertondd t-1 post financial t-1 post financial t-1*post 07/11/08 Paulson requests government funds for ** * Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (0.106) (0.091) (0.110) (0.093) 03/13/08 Bear Stearns bailout *** 0.251** *** 0.401** (0.224) (0.103) (0.228) (0.182) 09/20/08 Paulson submits TARP proposal *** *** (0.308) (0.352) (0.309) (0.356) 10/03/08 TARP passes the U.S. House of Representatives *** 1.951*** *** 2.186*** (0.292) (0.420) (0.363) (0.439) 10/06/08 The Term Auction Facility is increased to $900bn ** 0.808*** ** 1.063*** (0.278) (0.310) (0.357) (0.340) 10/14/08 Treasury announces $250 billion capital injections ** * (0.362) (0.281) (0.382) (0.291) 02/02/09 The Federal Reserve announces it is prepared to * 0.462*** increase TALF to $1 trillion (0.086) (0.109) (0.162) (0.176) 11/13/08 Paulson indicates that TARP will be used to buy equity ** 0.925** * 0.901** instead of troubled assets (0.272) (0.403) (0.316) (0.429) 09/15/08 Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy 1.005*** *** 1.086*** *** (0.329) (0.293) (0.436) (0.184) 06/29/10 The House and the Senate conference committees * 0.039* reconcile the Dodd-Frank bill (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) 07/21/10 The Dodd-Frank bill passes the U.S. House of Representatives 0.027* (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015) 12/10/12 The FDIC and the Bank of England release a white paper 0.037*** ** 0.030** ** and press release describing SPOE (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)

29 Robustness: Event Study size90 t-1 size90 t-1 size90 t-1 mertondd t-1 Event Date Event size90 t-1 post mertondd t-1 post financial t-1 post financial t-1*post 07/11/08 Paulson requests government funds for ** * Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (0.106) (0.091) (0.110) (0.093) 03/13/08 Bear Stearns bailout *** 0.251** *** 0.401** (0.224) (0.103) (0.228) (0.182) 09/20/08 Paulson submits TARP proposal *** *** (0.308) (0.352) (0.309) (0.356) 10/03/08 TARP passes the U.S. House of Representatives *** 1.951*** *** 2.186*** (0.292) (0.420) (0.363) (0.439) 10/06/08 The Term Auction Facility is increased to $900bn ** 0.808*** ** 1.063*** (0.278) (0.310) (0.357) (0.340) 10/14/08 Treasury announces $250 billion capital injections ** * (0.362) (0.281) (0.382) (0.291) 02/02/09 The Federal Reserve announces it is prepared to * 0.462*** increase TALF to $1 trillion (0.086) (0.109) (0.162) (0.176) 11/13/08 Paulson indicates that TARP will be used to buy equity ** 0.925** * 0.901** instead of troubled assets (0.272) (0.403) (0.316) (0.429) 09/15/08 Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy 1.005*** *** 1.086*** *** (0.329) (0.293) (0.436) (0.184) 06/29/10 The House and the Senate conference committees * 0.039* reconcile the Dodd-Frank bill (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) 07/21/10 The Dodd-Frank bill passes the U.S. House of Representatives 0.027* (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015) 12/10/12 The FDIC and the Bank of England release a white paper 0.037*** ** 0.030** ** and press release describing SPOE (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)

30 Robustness: Event Study size90 t-1 size90 t-1 size90 t-1 mertondd t-1 Event Date Event size90 t-1 post mertondd t-1 post financial t-1 post financial t-1*post 07/11/08 Paulson requests government funds for ** * Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (0.106) (0.091) (0.110) (0.093) 03/13/08 Bear Stearns bailout *** 0.251** *** 0.401** (0.224) (0.103) (0.228) (0.182) 09/20/08 Paulson submits TARP proposal *** *** (0.308) (0.352) (0.309) (0.356) 10/03/08 TARP passes the U.S. House of Representatives *** 1.951*** *** 2.186*** (0.292) (0.420) (0.363) (0.439) 10/06/08 The Term Auction Facility is increased to $900bn ** 0.808*** ** 1.063*** (0.278) (0.310) (0.357) (0.340) 10/14/08 Treasury announces $250 billion capital injections ** * (0.362) (0.281) (0.382) (0.291) 02/02/09 The Federal Reserve announces it is prepared to * 0.462*** increase TALF to $1 trillion (0.086) (0.109) (0.162) (0.176) 11/13/08 Paulson indicates that TARP will be used to buy equity ** 0.925** * 0.901** instead of troubled assets (0.272) (0.403) (0.316) (0.429) 09/15/08 Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy 1.005*** *** 1.086*** *** (0.329) (0.293) (0.436) (0.184) 06/29/10 The House and the Senate conference committees * 0.039* reconcile the Dodd-Frank bill (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) 07/21/10 The Dodd-Frank bill passes the U.S. House of Representatives 0.027* (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015) 12/10/12 The FDIC and the Bank of England release a white paper 0.037*** ** 0.030** ** and press release describing SPOE (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)

31 Robustness: Event Study size90 t-1 size90 t-1 size90 t-1 mertondd t-1 Event Date Event size90 t-1 post mertondd t-1 post financial t-1 post financial t-1*post 07/11/08 Paulson requests government funds for ** * Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (0.106) (0.091) (0.110) (0.093) 03/13/08 Bear Stearns bailout *** 0.251** *** 0.401** (0.224) (0.103) (0.228) (0.182) 09/20/08 Paulson submits TARP proposal *** *** (0.308) (0.352) (0.309) (0.356) 10/03/08 TARP passes the U.S. House of Representatives *** 1.951*** *** 2.186*** (0.292) (0.420) (0.363) (0.439) 10/06/08 The Term Auction Facility is increased to $900bn ** 0.808*** ** 1.063*** (0.278) (0.310) (0.357) (0.340) 10/14/08 Treasury announces $250 billion capital injections ** * (0.362) (0.281) (0.382) (0.291) 02/02/09 The Federal Reserve announces it is prepared to * 0.462*** increase TALF to $1 trillion (0.086) (0.109) (0.162) (0.176) 11/13/08 Paulson indicates that TARP will be used to buy equity ** 0.925** * 0.901** instead of troubled assets (0.272) (0.403) (0.316) (0.429) 09/15/08 Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy 1.005*** *** 1.086*** *** (0.329) (0.293) (0.436) (0.184) 06/29/10 The House and the Senate conference committees * 0.039* reconcile the Dodd-Frank bill (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) 07/21/10 The Dodd-Frank bill passes the U.S. House of Representatives 0.027* (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015) 12/10/12 The FDIC and the Bank of England release a white paper 0.037*** ** 0.030** ** and press release describing SPOE (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)

32 Robustness: Event Study size90 t-1 size90 t-1 size90 t-1 mertondd t-1 Event Date Event size90 t-1 post mertondd t-1 post financial t-1 post financial t-1*post 07/11/08 Paulson requests government funds for ** * Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (0.106) (0.091) (0.110) (0.093) 03/13/08 Bear Stearns bailout *** 0.251** *** 0.401** (0.224) (0.103) (0.228) (0.182) 09/20/08 Paulson submits TARP proposal *** *** (0.308) (0.352) (0.309) (0.356) 10/03/08 TARP passes the U.S. House of Representatives *** 1.951*** *** 2.186*** (0.292) (0.420) (0.363) (0.439) 10/06/08 The Term Auction Facility is increased to $900bn ** 0.808*** ** 1.063*** (0.278) (0.310) (0.357) (0.340) 10/14/08 Treasury announces $250 billion capital injections ** * (0.362) (0.281) (0.382) (0.291) 02/02/09 The Federal Reserve announces it is prepared to * 0.462*** increase TALF to $1 trillion (0.086) (0.109) (0.162) (0.176) 11/13/08 Paulson indicates that TARP will be used to buy equity ** 0.925** * 0.901** instead of troubled assets (0.272) (0.403) (0.316) (0.429) 09/15/08 Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy 1.005*** *** 1.086*** *** (0.329) (0.293) (0.436) (0.184) 06/29/10 The House and the Senate conference committees * 0.039* reconcile the Dodd-Frank bill (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) 07/21/10 The Dodd-Frank bill passes the U.S. House of Representatives 0.027* (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015) 12/10/12 The FDIC and the Bank of England release a white paper 0.037*** ** 0.030** ** and press release describing SPOE (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)

33 Robustness: Event Study size90 t-1 size90 t-1 size90 t-1 mertondd t-1 Event Date Event size90 t-1 post mertondd t-1 post financial t-1 post financial t-1*post 07/11/08 Paulson requests government funds for ** * Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (0.106) (0.091) (0.110) (0.093) 03/13/08 Bear Stearns bailout *** 0.251** *** 0.401** (0.224) (0.103) (0.228) (0.182) 09/20/08 Paulson submits TARP proposal *** *** (0.308) (0.352) (0.309) (0.356) 10/03/08 TARP passes the U.S. House of Representatives *** 1.951*** *** 2.186*** (0.292) (0.420) (0.363) (0.439) 10/06/08 The Term Auction Facility is increased to $900bn ** 0.808*** ** 1.063*** (0.278) (0.310) (0.357) (0.340) 10/14/08 Treasury announces $250 billion capital injections ** * (0.362) (0.281) (0.382) (0.291) 02/02/09 The Federal Reserve announces it is prepared to * 0.462*** increase TALF to $1 trillion (0.086) (0.109) (0.162) (0.176) 11/13/08 Paulson indicates that TARP will be used to buy equity ** 0.925** * 0.901** instead of troubled assets (0.272) (0.403) (0.316) (0.429) 09/15/08 Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy 1.005*** *** 1.086*** *** (0.329) (0.293) (0.436) (0.184) 06/29/10 The House and the Senate conference committees * 0.039* reconcile the Dodd-Frank bill (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) 07/21/10 The Dodd-Frank bill passes the U.S. House of Representatives 0.027* (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015) 12/10/12 The FDIC and the Bank of England release a white paper 0.037*** ** 0.030** ** and press release describing SPOE (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)

34 Dodd- Frank 6 month window (1) (2) VARIABLES spread spread mertondd t (0.111) (0.179) sizeg90 t *** ** (0.130) (0.191) post ** *** (0.102) (0.217) sizeg90 t-1* post * (0.094) (0.276) mertondd t-1* post 0.237* (0.123) sizeg90 t-1* mertondd t-1 *post * (0.187) Constant 1.939** 2.130*** (0.755) (0.701) Firm FE Y Y Year FE Y Y Rating Dummies Y Y Observations 1,810 1,810 R-squared

35 Summary Main Findings TBTF institutions have lower spreads than other institutions TBTF institutions have spreads that are less sensitive to risk Robustness Alternative proxies for TBTF status Size is not related to risk Ratings as exogenous measures of risk and implicit support Shocks to investor expectations of support Comparison to debt explicitly guaranteed under FDIC Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Prog. FDIC-guaranteed bonds had lower spreads than similar non-guaranteed bonds issued by same firm Spread differential reduced upon Dodd-Frank Implicitly-guaranteed debt became more like explicitly-guaranteed debt

36 FDIC Guarantee Estimated FDIC guarantee premium: Spread i,b,t = +β 1 Bond Controls i,b,t + β 2 Gurantee i,b,t + Firm FE + ε i,b,t. FDIC guaranteed non-guaranteed spread

37 FDIC Guarantee (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES spread spread spread spread fixed rate *** *** *** *** (0.095) (0.047) (0.194) (0.181) seniority * * ** ** (0.099) (0.103) (0.099) (0.104) puttable * (0.187) (0.198) (0.151) (0.141) redeemable * (0.160) (0.082) (0.166) (0.126) ttm 0.090*** 0.085*** 0.087*** 0.083*** (0.015) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) exchangeable 1.450*** 1.431*** (0.231) (0.217) non-guarantee 1.780*** 2.712*** 1.413*** 2.190*** (0.227) (0.181) (0.202) (0.129) non-guarantee * post *** ** ** (0.022) (0.259) (0.065) (0.129) mertondd t-1 * non-guarantee *** *** (0.220) (0.181) mertondd t-1 * non-guarantee * post 0.604** 0.387** (0.206) (0.124) Constant 1.617*** 1.675*** 1.125*** 1.062*** (0.227) (0.174) (0.284) (0.277) Issue * Trading Day FE Y Y Y Y Event days Observations 2,537 2,090 31,338 30,011 R-squared

38 Summary Main Findings TBTF institutions have lower spreads than other institutions TBTF institutions have spreads that are less sensitive to risk Robustness Alternative proxies for TBTF status Size is not related to risk Ratings as exogenous measures of risk and implicit support Shocks to investor expectations of support Comparison to debt explicitly guaranteed under FDIC Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Prog Liquidity Control for bond liquidity

39 Liquidity (1) (2) VARIABLES spread spread ttm 0.009* 0.019*** (0.005) (0.006) seniority ** (0.117) (0.112) leverage t *** 1.268*** (0.180) (0.454) roa ** (4.102) (5.653) mb ** (0.043) (0.112) mismatch t (0.199) (0.473) def 1.653*** 1.776*** (0.110) (0.014) term 0.079*** 0.194*** (0.025) (0.04) mkt 0.370** (0.155) (0.333) mertondd t *** *** (0.019) (0.019) size90 t ** ** (0.067) (0.145) liquidity t *** (0.027) turnover t *** (0.020) Observations 46,308 14,003 R-squared After controlling for liquidity

40 Summary Main Findings TBTF institutions have lower spreads than other institutions TBTF institutions have spreads that are less sensitive to risk Robustness Alternative proxies for TBTF status Size is not related to risk Ratings as exogenous measures of risk and implicit support Shocks to investor expectations of support Comparison to debt explicitly guaranteed under FDIC Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Prog. Non-Financial and Liquidity controls Quantification of the Implicit Subsidy

41 Value of the Implicit Subsidy

42 Summary Main Findings TBTF institutions have lower spreads than other institutions TBTF institutions have spreads that are less sensitive to risk Robustness Alternative proxies for TBTF status Size is not related to risk Ratings as exogenous measures of risk and implicit support Shocks to investor expectations of support Comparison to debt explicitly guaranteed under FDIC Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Prog. Quantification of the Implicit Subsidy Policy Implications Public accounting and disclosure Feedback and pushback Internalize the subsidy by imposing a corrective tax or insurance premium Creates a level playing field Aligns risk and return Promotes a stable and efficient financial system Consistent with recommendations on systemic risk