Trade and Technology Asian Miracles and WTO Anti-Miracles

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Trade and Technology Asian Miracles and WTO Anti-Miracles Guillermo Ordoñez UCLA March 6, 2007

Motivation Trade is considered an important source of technology diffusion...but trade also shapes the incentives to adopt technology How did WTO policies affect both diffusion and adoption? In particular, how does WTO pressures against tariff escalation matter for technology diffusion and adoption? I will argue that WTO efforts in de-escalating tariffs at the time of trade liberalization may have been harmful to countries.

What this paper IS about Empirical Contribution We show that, ironically enough, the positive effects of trade on TFP decreased dramatically (and even became negative) after WTO started to be actively involved in liberalization processes. Theoretical Contribution We introduce complementarities, vertical linkages and technology adoption decisions in a trade model. Quantitative Contribution We argue non de-escalating efforts would have increased TFP by around 17% for countries that liberalized the last decade.

What this paper IS NOT about This is NOT about the welfare effects of trade. This is NOT an argument in favor of protectionism. This is NOT an argument against ALL WTO recommendations.

What is the WTO? The WTO (former GATT) is an international organization that establishes rules for international trade and guide liberalization processes through consensus among its member states. The WTO was created after the Uruguay Round (1986). Unlike GATT, the WTO has a substantial institutional structure.

Trade liberalization before 1986 (Uruguay Rounds) Trade Liberalization experiences before 1986 (Uruguay rounds), Y/L and TFP TFP log chang 0.50 Mauritius Barbados 0.40 Ireland Korea 0.30 Israel Malaysia Chile Indonesia 0.20 Ghana 0.10 0.00-0.60-0.40-0.20 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.40-0.10-0.20-0.30-0.40 Y/L log change after a decade

-0.30-0.40 Y/L log change after a decade Trade liberalization after 1986 (Uruguay Rounds) ALL Trade Liberalization experiences, Y/L and TFP 0.50 0.40 0.30 TFP log chang 0.20 0.10 0.00-0.60-0.40-0.20 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.40-0.10 Kenya Argentina Uruguay Brazil Sri Lanka Turkey South Africa Mali -0.20 Cameroon -0.30 Peru -0.40 Mexico Y/L log change after a decade

WTO - Tariff escalation An important WTO guiding principle for tariff reform after the Uruguay Round has been the concertina theorem. This idea is very related with tariffs de-escalation. A very important point in negotiations in the last decade has been the application of lower and more uniform tariffs.

Recent tariff escalation in countries pre WTO Income Country Year Tariffs Industrial goods Ratio of tariffs final goods to Group Liberalization (2000, in %) tariffs intermediate goods Intermediates Final Industrial Agriculture 1 Ghana 1985 12.9 18.4 1.43 1.03 2 Barbados 1966 6.2 14.9 2.40 2.97 2 Chile 1976 6.0 5.9 0.98 1.00 2 Indonesia 1970 6.1 8.0 1.31 2.24 2 Malaysia 1963 7.6 3.2 0.42 1.32 2 Mauritius 1968 6.2 27.3 4.40 1.72 3 Israel 1966 2.7 6.1 2.26 5.32 4 Korea, Rep. 1968 6.1 7.0 1.15 0.34 Average countries liberalized before 1986 (8) 6.7 11.4 1.69 1.99 Income Country Year Tariffs Industrial goods Ratio of tariffs final goods to Group Liberalization (2000, in %) tariffs intermediate goods Intermediates Final Industrial Agriculture 1 Cameroon 1993 14.2 19.6 1.38 1.09 1 Kenya 1993 16.0 17.5 1.09 1.02 1 Mali Guillermo Ordoñez 1988 UCLA Trade 7.4and Technology 12.8 Asian Miracles and 1.73 WTO Anti-Miracles 1.18

2 Indonesia 1970 6.1 8.0 1.31 2.24 Introduction 2 Malaysia Data 1963Model 7.6 Quantitative 3.2 Results 0.42 1.32 Conclusions 2 Mauritius 1968 6.2 27.3 4.40 1.72 3 Israel 1966 2.7 6.1 2.26 5.32 4 Korea, Rep. 1968 6.1 7.0 1.15 0.34 Recent tariff escalation in countries post WTO Average countries liberalized before 1986 (8) 6.7 11.4 1.69 1.99 Income Country Year Tariffs Industrial goods Ratio of tariffs final goods to Group Liberalization (2000, in %) tariffs intermediate goods Intermediates Final Industrial Agriculture 1 Cameroon 1993 14.2 19.6 1.38 1.09 1 Kenya 1993 16.0 17.5 1.09 1.02 1 Mali 1988 7.4 12.8 1.73 1.18 1 Nepal 1991 12.3 15.4 1.25 1.53 1 Uganda 1988 8.5 8.2 0.96 1.01 1 Zambia 1993 8.9 15.9 1.79 1.09 2 Argentina 1991 10.1 13.3 1.32 1.12 2 Brazil 1991 8.7 13.2 1.52 1.13 2 Colombia 1986 9.8 11.9 1.21 1.38 2 Costa Rica 1986 4.3 6.5 1.51 1.80 2 Ecuador 1991 9.4 12.0 1.28 1.28 2 El Salvador 1989 5.6 7.7 1.38 1.38 2 Guatemala 1988 4.5 7.0 1.56 1.77 2 Honduras 1991 4.3 6.3 1.47 1.61 2 Jamaica 1989 1.2 9.0 7.50 1.88 2 Mexico 1986 12.2 16.7 1.37 1.42 2 Paraguay 1986 8.6 9.6 1.12 1.07 2 Peru 1991 9.2 9.3 1.01 1.23 2 Philippines 1988 5.2 8.0 1.54 1.03 2 South Africa 1991 5.0 7.3 1.46 2.07 2 Sri Lanka 1991 3.2 9.8 3.06 1.17 2 Turkey 1989 6.3 4.5 0.71 2.03 2 Uruguay 1990 10.3 12.7 1.23 1.09 4 New Zealand 1986 2.1 5.4 2.57 1.04 Average countries liberalized after 1986 (24) 7.8 10.8 1.39 1.35

BUT..This is now. How it was before? Asian tariffs to final goods were 400% higher than tariffs to intermediate goods in the 70 s and 80 s (IMF) Korean liberalization was characterized by very low and strategic tariffs to inputs and high protection to final goods (Panagariya, 04). Non-tariff barriers decreased in Asia from 30% before 1986 to 3% after the formation of WTO. (WTO Trade Policy Review). An alternative way to measure protection is import composition at the time of liberalization. 10% of asian imports were final goods (IMF - WB). 60% of latin american imports were final goods (IADB).

Model: Preliminaries Trade model Heterogeneous firms in two production sectors: Final goods Intermediate inputs What s Technology in this paper? A more advanced technology in the production of final goods is characterized by a greater range of intermediate goods and, hence, a higher degree of specialization.

Model: Relation with the literature This paper is related to two strands of the literature The effects of trade on productivity, Melitz (03), BEJK (03), Ghironi and Melitz (05) My model introduces vertical linkages, complementarities and decisions on technology adoption. The determinants of firm-level technology (as specialization). Ethier (82), Romer (90), Acemoglu et al.(06), My model introduces this technology decision in an open economy.

Households Inelastic supply of 1 unit of labor Utility (love for variety) [ U = ω Ω ] σ q(ω) σ 1 σ 1 σ dω (1) hence ( pf (ω) q(ω) = Q [ P F = P F ) σ p F (ω) 1 σ dω ω Ω ] 1 1 σ

Final good producers Continuum of firms (mass N), each one producing a different variety q(ω) = z F [ J 0 γ 1 γ xj d j ] γ γ 1 (2) where x j denotes the input j and z F is the firm efficiency in the use of inputs, distributed g(z F ) over (0, ) γ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two inputs J is the level of technology. It requires a payment of C(J) to coordinate inputs and deal with many suppliers, where C(J) is twice continuously differentiable, C (J) > 0 and C (J) 0 for all J > 0

Final good producers Pricing Rule: p F = σ σ 1 MC(z F, J) A more productive firm (higher z F ) will be bigger, charge a lower price and earn higher profits than a less productive one Firms die each period with a probability δ. Entrants pay f EF up front and then they learn their productivity z F (Hopenhayn, 92)

Intermediate good producers Continuum of firms (mass M), each one producing a different variety Production only requires labor x j : l = f I + x j z I (3) where f I is the same for all firms but z I vary and is distributed g(z I ) over (0, ) Pricing Rule: p I (z I ) = γ z I (γ 1). (we will assume hereafter w = 1) A more productive firm (higher z I ) will be bigger, charge a lower price and earn higher profits than a less productive one The process of entry and exit of firms is the same than for final producers.

Technology Adoption Each final firm maximizes profits max x j,j J = p F (z F, J)q(z F, J) x j p Ij (z Ij )dj C(J) f F 0 Demand for each intermediate is standard. ( ) γ p(zi ) x(z I ) = X (4) P I where [ P I = ] 1 p 1 γ 1 γ 1 Ij dj = M 1 γ pi ( z I )

Technology Adoption FOC for J is γ γ 1 z F P F Q 1 σ x( zi )J 1 γ 1 = x( zi )p I ( z I ) + C (J) (5) Assumption The elasticity of the marginal cost curve is big enough: JC (J) C (J) > 1 γ 1 > 0 FOC can also be expressed as γ γ 1 z F P F Q 1 σ J 1 γ 1 = PI M 1 γ 1 + C (J)M γ γ 1 X

Technology Adoption Given these assumptions, under partial equilibrium Technology depends positively on The firm s productivity ( J z F > 0) The price index of final goods ( J P F > 0) The size of the market ( J Q > 0) Technology depends negatively on The price index of intermediate goods ( J P I < 0) The average productivity of intermediaries ( J ez I < 0)

Technology Adoption Given these assumptions, under partial equilibrium Technology depends positively on The firm s productivity ( J z F > 0) The price index of final goods ( J P F > 0) The size of the market ( J Q > 0) Technology depends negatively on The price index of intermediate goods ( J P I < 0) The average productivity of intermediaries ( J ez I < 0)

Measure of TFP in this economy Intermediate goods Final goods TFP I = z I (6) TFP F = z F J( z F ) 1 γ 1 (7) The increase in technology of the average firm J( z F ), increases the TFP in final goods.

Equilibrium in a closed economy Intermediate goods Cutoff productivity z I is determined by π I (z I ) = 0 Free entry: Average profits is eπ I = π(ez I ) = Final goods δf EI 1 G(z I ) Cutoff productivity z F is determined by π F (z F ) = 0 Free entry: Average productivity is eπ F = π(ez F ) = δf EF 1 G(z F )

Aggregation Key general equilibrium interaction comes from the competition of producers for the scarce resource, labor L Each of M intermediate firms use 1 unit of labor to produce f I units of labor to cover fixed costs Each of N final firms use C(J) units of labor to manage the technology (coordinate inputs) f F units of labor to cover fixed costs Each of δm intermediate entrants use f EI units of labor Each of δn final entrants use f EF units of labor This determines N and M = N J

Open economy - Preliminaries Trade among n countries that are identical as the one described. Tariffs are introduced as iceberg per-unit trade costs, τ I > 1 and τ F > 1. Intermediate and final firms can export to all countries but paying a fixed per period investment cost of f xi and f xf respectively.

Open economy - Preliminaries Average productivity with trade for final and intermediate producers z Ft = [ 1 [ 1 N z σ 1 F + nn x (τ 1 F N z xf ) σ 1]] σ 1 t z It = [ 1 [ 1 M z γ 1 I + nm x (τ 1 I z xi ) γ 1]] γ 1 M t where N t = N + N x being N x = 1 G(z xf ) 1 G(z F ) N and M t = M + M x being M x = 1 G(z xi ) 1 G(z I M ) Export status Final firms: z xf is determined by π xf (z xf ) = 0 Intermediate firms: z xi is determined by π xi (z xi ) = 0

Open economy - Technology Adoption Technology adoption by exporters (1 + nτ 1 σ F ) γ γ 1 z F P F Q 1 σ x( zi )J 1 γ 1 = x( zi )p I ( z I ) + C (J) Everything else constant, exporters will adopt a better technology since (1 + nτ 1 σ F ) > 1

Decrease in τ F Reduction of final goods Price Index P F (caused by reduction of average prices p F ( z Ft ) and increase in the number of varieties N t ). The marginal benefit of the technology decreases. For a given z F Non exporters would adopt less technology Exporters will adopt depending on the trade off between higher demand (Qnτ 1 σ F ) and lower price index (P F ).

Decrease in τ I Reduction of intermediates Price Index P I (caused by reduction of average prices p I ( z It ) and increase in the number of varieties M t ). The marginal cost of the technology decreases. As a second round effect, the reduction in costs reduce the Price Index of final goods and may lead to a decrease in adoption benefits.

Calibration - Environment To solve the model we parameterize the distribution of productivity draws G(z), assuming z F is distributed Pareto with lower bound z min F and shape parameter k F > σ 1. We assume the same for z I We assume the cost of technology adoption is given by C(J) = θj φ with θ > 0 and φ > 1. L is normalized to 1.

Calibration - Intermediate Goods Value Source δ 0.1 Job destruction per year γ 3.8 BEJK(03) z min I ; f E,I 1 Normalization k I 3.4 sd (US logsales) = 1.67 = 1 k I γ+1 f I f x,i k δf I γ+1 E,I γ 1 zi = zi min w/o Openness 0.235 1 βδ β(1 δ) f E,I + f I Match 21% Exports

Calibration - Final Goods Value Source δ 0.1 Job destruction per year σ 3.8 BEJK(03) z min F ; f E,F 1 Normalization k F 3.4 sd (US logsales) = 1.67 = 1 k F σ+1 f F f x,f δf E,F k F σ+1 σ 1 0.7 1 βδ β(1 δ) f E,I + f I z F = zmin F w/o Openness Match 21% Exports θ 0.4 Match M=N (Basu, 95 and Jones, 06) φ 1.8 Match average TFP growth pre WTO

Trade liberalization before WTO Tariffs Ratio Final goods Price Index Intermediate Final Varieties Average price Final Intermediate 7.8 10.8 1.4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 7.8 15.6 2.0 0.91 1.05 1.08 0.99 7.8 23.4 3.0 0.80 1.11 1.20 0.97 7.8 31.2 4.0 0.66 1.22 1.41 0.96 7.8 39.0 5.0 0.58 1.23 1.49 0.95 Tariffs Ratio Average Final Goods TFP Intermediate Final Productivity Technology TFP All economy Intermediates 7.8 39 5.0 1.27 2.11 1.33 1.30 10 39 3.9 1.22 1.88 1.27 1.24 20 39 2.0 1.05 1.59 1.18 1.12 30 39 1.3 1.02 1.49 1.15 1.08 39 39 1.0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Tariffs Ratio Intermediate goods Price Index Intermediate Final Varieties Average Price Final Intermediate 7.8 39 5.0 1.40 0.91 0.94 0.80 10 39 3.9 1.38 0.91 0.94 0.82 20 39 2.0 1.26 0.95 0.96 0.88 30 39 1.3 1.19 0.98 1.00 0.92 39 39 1.0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Tariffs Ratio Average Final Goods TFP

Introduction 7.8 Data 10.8 1.4 Model1.00 1.00 Quantitative Results 1.00 1.00 Conclusions 7.8 15.6 2.0 0.91 1.05 1.08 0.99 7.8 23.4 3.0 0.80 1.11 1.20 0.97 7.8 31.2 4.0 0.66 1.22 1.41 0.96 7.8 39.0 5.0 0.58 1.23 1.49 0.95 Trade liberalization before WTO Tariffs Ratio Average Technology TFP Intermediate Final Productivity Final Intermediates 7.8 39 5.0 1.10 1.83 1.30 10 39 3.9 1.09 1.78 1.29 20 39 2.0 1.05 1.59 1.20 30 39 1.3 1.02 1.49 1.16 39 39 1.0 1.00 1.00 1.00 Tariffs Ratio Intermediate goods Price Index Intermediate Final Varieties Average Price Final Intermediate 7.8 39 5.0 1.40 0.91 0.94 0.80 10 39 3.9 1.38 0.91 0.94 0.82 20 39 2.0 1.26 0.95 0.96 0.88 30 39 1.3 1.19 0.98 1.00 0.92 39 39 1.0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Tariffs Ratio Average Average Technology TFP Intermediate Final Productivity Productivity Final Intermediates Final 7.8 10.8 1.4 1.10 1.05 1.14 1.06 10 17 1.7 1.09 1.04 1.13 1.07 20 25 1.3 1.05 1.02 1.11 1.04 30 33 1.1 1.02 1.00 1.05 1.00 39 39 1.0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

Introduction Intermediate Data Final Model Productivity Technology Quantitative Results TFP All economy Conclusions Intermediates 7.8 39 5.0 1.27 2.11 1.33 1.30 10 39 3.9 1.22 1.88 1.27 1.24 20 39 2.0 1.05 1.59 1.18 1.12 30 39 1.3 1.02 1.49 1.15 1.08 What the 39 model 39 predicts 1.0 after 1.00 tariff 1.00 de-escalation? 1.00 1.00 Tariffs Ratio Intermediate goods Price Index Intermediate Final Varieties Average Price Final Intermediate 7.8 39 5.0 1.40 0.91 0.94 0.80 10 39 3.9 1.38 0.91 0.94 0.82 20 39 2.0 1.26 0.95 0.96 0.88 30 39 1.3 1.19 0.98 1.00 0.92 39 39 1.0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Tariffs Ratio Average Final Goods TFP Intermediate Final Productivity Average Technology TFP Total Intermediates Productivity 7.8 10.8 1.4 1.10 1.05 0.55 0.84 0.97 10 17 1.7 1.09 1.04 0.63 0.88 0.99 20 25 1.3 1.05 1.02 0.81 0.94 1.00 30 33 1.1 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 39 39 1.0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

Introduction 2 El Salvador 1989 5.6 7.7 1.38 1.38 Data Model Quantitative Results Conclusions 2 Guatemala 1988 4.5 7.0 1.56 1.77 2 Honduras 1991 4.3 6.3 1.47 1.61 2 Jamaica 1989 1.2 9.0 7.50 1.88 2 Mexico 1986 12.2 16.7 1.37 1.42 2 Paraguay 1986 8.6 9.6 1.12 1.07 2 Peru 1991 9.2 9.3 1.01 1.23 What would 2 Philippines have happened 1988 without 5.2 tariff 8.0 de-escalation? 1.54 1.03 2 South Africa 1991 5.0 7.3 1.46 2.07 2 Sri Lanka 1991 3.2 9.8 3.06 1.17 2 Turkey 1989 6.3 4.5 0.71 2.03 2 Uruguay 1990 10.3 12.7 1.23 1.09 4 New Zealand 1986 2.1 5.4 2.57 1.04 Average countries liberalized after 1986 (24) 7.8 10.8 1.39 1.35 Tariffs Ratio Final Goods TFP Intermediate Final Average Technology TFP All economy Productivity 7.8 10.8 1.4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 7.8 15.6 2.0 0.99 1.15 1.04 1.02 7.8 23.4 3.0 0.97 1.35 1.08 1.04 7.8 31.2 4.0 0.96 2.02 1.24 1.12 7.8 39.0 5.0 0.96 2.53 1.33 1.17

What would have happened without tariff de-escalation? Tariffs Ratio Final goods Price Index Intermediate Final Varieties Average price Final Intermediate 7.8 10.8 1.4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 7.8 15.6 2.0 0.91 1.05 1.08 0.99 7.8 23.4 3.0 0.80 1.11 1.20 0.97 7.8 31.2 4.0 0.66 1.22 1.41 0.96 7.8 39.0 5.0 0.58 1.23 1.49 0.95 Tariffs Ratio Average Technology TFP Intermediate Final Productivity Final Intermediates 7.8 39 5.0 1.10 1.83 1.30 10 39 3.9 1.09 1.78 1.29 20 39 2.0 1.05 1.59 1.20 30 39 1.3 1.02 1.49 1.16 39 39 1.0 1.00 1.00 1.00

Conclusions After WTO started to set guidelines, the positive effects of trade liberalization on TFP seem to have disappeared. More than asian miracles we seem to have experienced WTO non-miracles. More focus should be placed on generating a more flexible trading system to less developed countries. Not surprisingly, timing matters.