Incorporate Financial Frictions into a

Similar documents
Risk Shocks and Economic Fluctuations. Summary of work by Christiano, Motto and Rostagno

Fluctuations. Roberto Motto

Financial Frictions Under Asymmetric Information and Costly State Verification

Risk Shocks. Lawrence Christiano (Northwestern University), Roberto Motto (ECB) and Massimo Rostagno (ECB)

Financial Factors in Business Cycles

Notes on Financial Frictions Under Asymmetric Information and Costly State Verification. Lawrence Christiano

Discussion of: Financial Factors in Economic Fluctuations by Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno

Monetary Policy and a Stock Market Boom-Bust Cycle

Asymmetric Information and Costly State Verification. Lawrence Christiano

The Role of Investment Wedges in the Carlstrom-Fuerst Economy and Business Cycle Accounting

Notes on Financial Frictions Under Asymmetric Information and Costly State Verification. Lawrence Christiano

Notes for a Model With Banks and Net Worth Constraints

Remarks on Unconventional Monetary Policy

Boom-bust Cycles and Monetary Policy. Lawrence Christiano

Using VARs to Estimate a DSGE Model. Lawrence Christiano

Leverage Restrictions in a Business Cycle Model

MONETARY POLICY EXPECTATIONS AND BOOM-BUST CYCLES IN THE HOUSING MARKET*

A Model with Costly-State Verification

Leverage Restrictions in a Business Cycle Model

Leverage Restrictions in a Business Cycle Model. March 13-14, 2015, Macro Financial Modeling, NYU Stern.

Financial Frictions in Macroeconomics. Lawrence J. Christiano Northwestern University

Leverage Restrictions in a Business Cycle Model. Lawrence J. Christiano Daisuke Ikeda

... The Great Depression and the Friedman-Schwartz Hypothesis Lawrence J. Christiano, Roberto Motto and Massimo Rostagno

The Role of Investment Wedges in the Carlstrom-Fuerst Economy and Business Cycle Accounting

Monetary Economics. Financial Markets and the Business Cycle: The Bernanke and Gertler Model. Nicola Viegi. September 2010

Analysis of DSGE Models. Lawrence Christiano

... The Great Depression and the Friedman-Schwartz Hypothesis Lawrence J. Christiano, Roberto Motto and Massimo Rostagno

Intermediate Macroeconomics

in a Small Open Economy Model

Bank Capital, Agency Costs, and Monetary Policy. Césaire Meh Kevin Moran Department of Monetary and Financial Analysis Bank of Canada

Credit Frictions and Optimal Monetary Policy. Vasco Curdia (FRB New York) Michael Woodford (Columbia University)

Estimating Contract Indexation in a Financial Accelerator Model

Output Gap, Monetary Policy Trade-Offs and Financial Frictions

1 Explaining Labor Market Volatility

Comment on Risk Shocks by Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014)

Financial intermediaries in an estimated DSGE model for the UK

Discussion of Monetary Policy, the Financial Cycle, and Ultra-Low Interest Rates

Risky Mortgages in a DSGE Model

Involuntary (Unlucky) Unemployment and the Business Cycle. Lawrence Christiano Mathias Trabandt Karl Walentin

On the Merits of Conventional vs Unconventional Fiscal Policy

Financial Frictions in DSGE Models

Macroeconomics 2. Lecture 5 - Money February. Sciences Po

DSGE Models with Financial Frictions

Booms and Banking Crises

Delayed Capital Reallocation

The financial crisis dramatically demonstrated

Estimating Macroeconomic Models of Financial Crises: An Endogenous Regime-Switching Approach

Bernanke & Gertler (1989) - Agency Costs, Net Worth, & Business Fluctuations

The I Theory of Money

Business cycle fluctuations Part II

Idiosyncratic risk and the dynamics of aggregate consumption: a likelihood-based perspective

Advanced Modern Macroeconomics

Microeconomic Foundations of Incomplete Price Adjustment

Graduate Macro Theory II: The Basics of Financial Constraints

Real-Time DSGE Model Density Forecasts During the Great Recession - A Post Mortem

Utility Maximizing Entrepreneurs and the Financial Accelerator

Household income risk, nominal frictions, and incomplete markets 1

Collateralized capital and news-driven cycles. Abstract

Lecture 4. Extensions to the Open Economy. and. Emerging Market Crises

MONETARY POLICY IN A GLOBAL RECESSION

Econ590 Topics in Macroeconomics. Lecture 1 : Business Cycle Models : The Current Consensus (Part C)

Land-Price Dynamics and Macroeconomic Fluctuations

Credit Risk and the Macroeconomy

The Real Business Cycle Model

Intermediate Macroeconomics: Economics 301 Exam 1. October 4, 2012 B. Daniel

Assessing the Spillover Effects of Changes in Bank Capital Regulation Using BoC-GEM-Fin: A Non-Technical Description

Return to Capital in a Real Business Cycle Model

Essays on Money, Credit Constraints and Asset Prices

Asset Prices, Collateral and Unconventional Monetary Policy in a DSGE model

Financial Frictions in Macroeconomics. Lawrence J. Christiano Northwestern University

The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy I

Limited Nominal Indexation of Optimal Financial Contracts 1

DSGE Models: A User Guide for Policymakers. Lawrence J. Christiano

Quantitative Significance of Collateral Constraints as an Amplification Mechanism

Week 5. Remainder of chapter 9: the complete real model Chapter 10: money Copyright 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

Part III. Cycles and Growth:

1. Money in the utility function (continued)

MONETARY ECONOMICS Objective: Overview of Theoretical, Empirical and Policy Issues in Modern Monetary Economics

Unemployment (Fears), Precautionary Savings, and Aggregate Demand

Real Business Cycle Theory

Samba: Stochastic Analytical Model with a Bayesian Approach. DSGE Model Project for Brazil s economy

A Policy Model for Analyzing Macroprudential and Monetary Policies

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT ALBANY Department of Economics. Ph. D. Preliminary Examination: Macroeconomics Fall, 2009

crisis: an estimated DSGE model

Taxing Firms Facing Financial Frictions

A Real Intertemporal Model with Investment Copyright 2014 Pearson Education, Inc.

1 Dynamic programming

Collateral and Amplification

The Zero Bound and Fiscal Policy

Inflation Dynamics During the Financial Crisis

Exploding Bubbles In a Macroeconomic Model. Narayana Kocherlakota

Final Exam II ECON 4310, Fall 2014

Banking Globalization and International Business Cycles

Please choose the most correct answer. You can choose only ONE answer for every question.

Country Risk, Exchange Rates and Economic Fluctuations in Emerging Economies

Inflation Dynamics During the Financial Crisis

Credit Disruptions and the Spillover Effects between the Household and Business Sectors

Fiscal Multipliers and Financial Crises

The Bank Lending Channel and Monetary Policy Transmission When Banks are Risk-Averse

Topic 3, continued. RBCs

Transcription:

Incorporate Financial Frictions into a Business Cycle Model General idea: Standard model assumes borrowers and lenders are the same people..no conflict of interest Financial friction models suppose borrowers and lenders aredifferent people, with conflicting interests Financial frictions: features of the relationship between borrowers and lenders adopted to mitigate conflict of interest.

Standard Model consumption Firms Investment goods Supply labor Rent capital Households Backyard capital accumulation: K t 1 1 K t G I t,i t 1 1 k r u c,t E t u t 1 c,t 1 1 P k,t 1 P k,t Savers and investors are the same: NO FRICTIONS!

Frictions in Financing of Physical Capital Money Savers Have money, but no ideas Investors ( entrepreneurs ) Have ideas, but not enough money.

Frictions in Financing of Physical Capital Money Savers Have money, but no ideas Investors ( entrepreneurs ) Problem: stuff happens. Incentive of entrepreneurs to under report earnings

A Very Simple Two Period Model to Get at the Basic Idea Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999, The financial accelerator in a quantitative business cycle framework, in: Taylor, J.B., Woodford, M. (Eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, Vol. 1C. North Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 1341 1393. Also, Christiano, Motto, Rostagno, 2003, The Great Depression and the Friedman Schwartz Hypothesis.

Period 1 No uncertainty Households face leisure work choice and buy bonds from a bank, with state non contingent interest. Entrepreneurs own equal share of capital, k, in first period, and apply income and loans from bank to buy capital for use in period 2. Experience an idiosyncratic productivity shock. Period 2 Aggregate uncertainty Entrepreneurs pay back loans from banks, which repay households.

Households Household preferences U c,l U c h,l h 1 U c l,l l. Budget constraints Euler equations: U l U c c B wl, c h w h l h RB, c l w l l l RB. w, U h l h U c 1 U c h U c w h, U l l l U c 1 U c l U c R, w l

Technology: Goods producing firms y F k,l y h F h K,l h y l F l K,l l, Competition ensures: w F l k,l, w h F l h K,l h, w l F l l K,l l r F k k,l, r h F h k K,l h, r l F l k K,l l,

Entrepreneurs In period 1, each owns equal share of capital stock, k Net worth at end of period, N=rk (100% k depreciation) Entrepreneurs borrow K N from banks at end of period 1, and banks get the money by issuing bonds, B, to households.

Idiosyncratic uncertainty After purchasing K, entrepreneurs experience idiosyncratic shock: K K, ~F, E 1. Standard debt contract h pay hr h K to bank h pay r h K to bank, bank pays r h K in monitoring costs

Standard Debt Contract, cnt d l pay lr l K to bank l pay r l K to bank, bank pays r l K in monitoring costs Parameters of Standard Debt Contract: h, l and K

Determination of Parameters of Standard ddebt Contract Expected utility of entrepreneur at start of contract: share of gross entrepreneurial earnings in state h kept by entrepreneur 1 Γ h r h K 1 1 Γ l r l K, share of gross earnings of entrepreneur taken by bank Γ h Γ 0 df h df h df h df Γ l l df l df 0 l

Contract Competition among banks ensures zero profits for the banks. Zero profit condition represents a menu of contracts, with different interest rates and loan amounts. Contract twhich h trades in equilibrium i is the one entrepreneurs most prefer. max 1 s,k Γh r h K 1 1 Γ l r l K h Γ h G h r h K K N R l Γ l G l r l K K N R, s G s f d. 0

Characterizing Equilibrium Contract First order condition for K (K N is loan amount) 1 Γ h r h 1 1 Γ l r l h Γ h G h r h R l Γ l G l r l R First order condition for h and l : h Γ h Γ h G G h 1 1 Γ l l 1 1 Γ l Γ l G l.

Equations Characterizing Contract: Optimality: 1 Γ h r h 1 1 Γ l r l Γ h Γ h Γ h G h Γh G h r h R 1 1 Γ l Γ l G l Γ l G l r l R Competition (i.e., zero profits) Γ h G h r h K K N R Γ l G l r l K K N R.

Equilibrium Three equations for loan contract (optimality and competition) Resource constraints: household consumption c h resources used in monitoring G h r h K entrepreneur consumption 1 Γ h r h K c K F k,l F K,l h c l G l r l K 1 Γ l r l K F K,l l Household and firm first order conditions: U l U c F l k,l, U l U h U c 1 U c h U c h F l h K,l h, U l U l 1 U c R, U c l U c l F l l K,l l

Equilibrium Ten equations in 10 unknowns: l,l h,l l,c,c h,c l,k, h, l,r

Incorporating BGG Financial Friction into a Monetary Model dl

V t 1 real earnings on capital (rent plus capital gains) t i l t f it t nominal rateof interest t 1 t real debt to banks t 1 e Net Worth t 1 V t 1 W t 1 e 1 W t 1

Prediction of financial friction model: Shocks that drive output and price in the same direction ( demand ) accelerated by financial frictions. Fisher and earnings effects reinforce each other. Shocks that drive output and price in opposite directions ( supply ) ppy not much affected by financial frictions. Fisher and earnings effects cancel each other.

Model with Financial Frictions L Firms K Labor market C I Capital Producers Entrepreneurs household

Model with Financial Frictions Firms Labor market Capital Producers K Entrepreneurs household banks Loans

The equations of the financial friction model dl Net addition of two equations to consensus model: Subtract the household intertemporal equation for capital. Addthreeequationspertaining equations to theentrepreneurs entrepreneurs

Three equations pertaining to entrepreneur Law of motion o of net worth ot Zero profit conditions of banks revenues from non-bankrupt entrepreneurs quantity of non-bankrupt entrepreneurs receipts from bankrupt entrepreneurs net of bankruptcy costs payment obligations on bank debt to households Optimality condition associated with entrepreneur s choice of contract.

Empirical Analysis of Financial Friction Model dl Christiano Motto Rostagno i (2008), based on Bernanke Gertler Gilchrist (1999) model of financial i fi frictions. i

Risk Shock and News Assume iid i i t i ti t t 1 t 1 iid, univariate innovation to t ut Agents have advance information i about pieces of u t u t 0 1 8 t t 1... t 8 i t i i ~iid, E t i 2 2 i i t i ~piece of u t observed at time t i

Estimation EA and US data covering 1985Q1 2007Q2 Δ log N t 1 P t X t t log per capita hours t per capita credit t P t Δ log p p t Δ log per capita GDP t Δ log Wt P t Δ log per capita I t Δ log Δ log per capita M1t P t per capita M3t P t Δ log per capita consumption t Et ExternalFinance Premium t R t long R t e R t e Δ logp I,t Δ logreal oil price t, Δ log per capita Bank Reserves t P t Standard Bayesian methods We remove sample means from data and set steady state of X to zero in estimation.

Summary of Empirical Results With Risk shocks: Financial i Fiti Frictions important source of fluctuations. news on the risk shock important The Fisher debt deflation channel lhas a substantial impact on propagation. Money demand dand mechanism of producing inside id money: relatively unimportant as a source of shocks modest contribution to forecast ability Model accounts or substantial fraction of fluctuations in term structure. Out of Sample RMSEs of the model perform well compared with BVAR and simpler models.

Risk Shocks are Important Actual data versus what actual data would have been if there were only risk Shocks: Note: (1) as suggested by the picture, risk shocks are relatively important at the lower frequencies (2) We find that they are the single most important source of low frequency fluctuation in the EA, and a close second (after permanent tech shocks) in the US

Table: Variance Decomposition, HP filtered data, EA shock output consumption investment hours inflation labor productivity interest rate f 15.02 23.05 2.63 16.37 35.74 1.40 20.46 x b 0.59 1.29 0.02 0.44 0.52 1.44 0.24 0.32 0.01 0.12 0.18 0.08 0.01 0.04 Markup Banking tech Capital tech 0.32 0.01 0.12 0.18 0.08 0.01 0.04 Money demand 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 Government g 3.26 3.11 0.00 3.34 0.87 0.21 0.48 Permanent tech z 3.72 1.16 0.24 1.42 1.07 10.29 0.72 Gamma shock 0.43 0.0606 0.92 0.80 0.24 1.52 0.30 Temporary tech Monetary policy Risk, contemp 10.54 21.68 0.49 7.46 16.10 27.52 8.56 policy 6.22 11.27 1.01 4.14 5.40 0.10 33.15 2.88 0.19 5.11 6.57 0.88 13.17 1.08 20 09 1 81 38 09 15 96 9 22 38 24 9 80 Signals on risk ik signal 20.09 1.81 38.09 15.96 9.22 38.24 9.80 Risk and signals Discount rate Marginal eff of I and signal 22.96 2.00 43.20 22.53 10.09 51.41 10.88 c 11.68 32.75 0.15 12.20 11.26 0.83 10.15 i 24.57 1.72 51.14 30.69 10.17 5.22 11.56 Price of oil oil 0.42 1.39 0.03 0.24 2.21 0.04 1.32 Long rate error long 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 measurement error 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.26 inflation target 0.24 0.43 0.05 0.16 6.23 0.01 0.87 all shocks 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 x

Table: Variance Decomposition, HP filtered data, EA shock output consumption investment hours inflation labor productivity interest rate f 15.02 23.05 2.63 16.37 35.74 1.40 20.46 x b 0.59 1.29 0.02 0.44 0.52 1.44 0.24 0.32 0.01 0.12 0.18 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 g 3.26 3.11 0.00 3.34 0.87 0.21 0.48 z 3.72 1.16 0.24 1.42 1.07 10.29 0.72 0.43 0.0606 0.92 0.80 0.24 1.52 0.30 10.54 21.68 0.49 7.46 16.10 27.52 8.56 policy 6.22 11.27 1.01 4.14 5.40 0.10 33.15 2.88 0.19 5.11 6.57 0.88 13.17 1.08 20 09 1 81 38 09 15 96 9 22 38 24 9 80 and signal 22.96 2.00 43.20 22.53 10.09 51.41 10.88 c 11.68 32.75 0.15 12.20 11.26 0.83 10.15 i 24.57 1.72 51.14 30.69 10.17 5.22 11.56 oil 0.42 1.39 0.03 0.24 2.21 0.04 1.32 long 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 measurement error 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.26 inflation target 0.24 0.43 0.05 0.16 6.23 0.01 0.87 all shocks 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 It s the signal 20.09 1.81 38.09 15.96 9.22 38.24 9.80 signals! x

Markup Banking tech Capital tech Money demand Government Permanent tech Table: Variance Decomposition, HP filtered data, EA x shock stock market credit spread term structure real M1 real M3 f 1.83 13.15 0.16 12.36 44.28 1.82 x b 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.10 5.04 42.39 0.18 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.17 22.63 g 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.44 0.02 z 0.17 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.42 1.29 Gamma shock 5.37 25.82 1.86 0.33 0.13 0.15 Temporary tech 0.10 4.06 0.00 3.40 9.89 0.61 Monetary policy policy 4.89 1.81 0.99 25.76 13.15 1.58 Risk, contemp 13.94 5.07 20.58 0.97 1.39 0.76 Signals on risk Risk and signals Discount rate signal 68.29 44.23 75.90 6.79 5.98 6.20 and signal 82.22 49.30 96.48 7.76 7.38 6.96 c 0.02 1.72 0.02 3.99 2.46 15.40 1 90 2 54 0 27 8 77 1 18 6 17 Marginal eff of I i 1.90 2.54 0.27 8.77 1.18 6.17 Price of oil oil 0.14 0.94 0.05 0.56 1.87 0.15 Error in long rate long 0.00 0.00 0.00 36.05 0.00 0.00 measurement error 2.89 0.19 0.02 0.32 0.21 0.02 inflation target 0.24 0.10 0.05 0.34 0.35 0.80 all shocks 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

Markup Banking tech Capital tech Money demand Government Permanent tech Table: Variance Decomposition, HP filtered data, EA x shock stock market credit spread term structure real M1 real M3 f 1.83 13.15 0.16 12.36 44.28 1.82 x b 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.10 5.04 42.39 0.18 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.17 22.63 g 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.44 0.02 z 0.17 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.42 1.29 Gamma shock 5.37 25.82 1.86 0.33 0.13 0.15 Temporary tech 0.10 4.06 0.00 3.40 9.89 0.61 Monetary policy policy 4.89 1.81 0.99 25.76 13.15 1.58 Risk, contemp 13.94 5.07 20.58 0.97 1.39 0.76 Signals on risk Risk and signals Discount rate signal 68.29 44.23 75.90 6.79 5.98 6.20 and signal 82.22 49.30 96.48 7.76 7.38 6.96 c 0.02 1.72 0.02 3.99 2.46 15.40 1 90 2 54 0 27 8 77 1 18 6 17 Marginal eff of I i 1.90 2.54 0.27 8.77 1.18 6.17 Price of oil oil 0.14 0.94 0.05 0.56 1.87 0.15 Error in long rate Signal matters! long 0.00 0.00 0.00 36.05 0.00 0.00 measurement error 2.89 0.19 0.02 0.32 0.21 0.02 inflation target 0.24 0.10 0.05 0.34 0.35 0.80 all shocks 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

Importance of Risk Signals News Specification on Risk and Marginal Likelihood (EA data) 0 1 2 p 0 1 2 t 1 t 1 t 0 t 1 t 2... t p p log, marginal likelihood odds ( exp(difference in log likelihood from baseline)) 8 (baseline) 4397.487 1 6 4394.025 31 1 4325.584

Why is Risk Shock so Important? According to the model, external finance premium is primarily risk shock. To look kfor evidence that risk ikmight ihbe important, look at dynamics of external finance premium and gdp. E lfi i i i l di External finance premium is a negative leading indicator

Why is Risk Shock so Important?: A second reason Our data set includes the stock market Output, stock market, investment allprocyclical (surge together in late 1990s) This is predicted by risk shock.

Impact of Financial Frictions on Propagation Effects of monetary shocks on gdp amplified by BGG financial frictions because P and Y go in same direction. Effects of technology shocks on gdp mitigated by BGG financial i frictions fiti because P and Y go in opposite directions.

Baseline model with no Fisher Effect Baseline model Blue line: baseline model with no financial frictions

Out of Sample RMSEs There is not a loss of forecasting power with the additional complications of the model. The model does well on everything, except the risk ikpremium.

Models with Financial Frictions Can be Used to Address Important Policy Questions When there is an increase in risk spreads, how should monetary policy respond? How should monetary policy react to credit variables and the stock market? Does monetary policy cause excess asset price volatility? Taylor: deviations from Taylor rule may cause asset price volatility Christiano Ilut Motto Rostagno: Taylor rule may cause asset price volatility

How Should Policy Respond to the Risk Spread? Taylor s recommendation: R t e t y t Risky rate t Risk free rate t 1 Evaluate this proposal by comparing performance of economy with 1 and against Ramsey optimal benchmark. 0

Get a recession, just like in earlier graph

Taylor suggestion creates a boom Is it too much?

Taylor s suggestion overstimulates

Conclusion of Empirical Analysis with Financial i Fi Frictionsi Incorporating financial frictions changes inference about the sources of shocks and of propagation p risk shock. Fisher debt deflation Opens a range of interesting questions that can be addressed