Booms and Banking Crises
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1 Booms and Banking Crises F. Boissay, F. Collard and F. Smets Macro Financial Modeling Conference Boston, 12 October 2013 MFM October 2013 Conference 1 /
2 Disclaimer The views expressed in this presentation are our own and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank or the Eurosystem MFM October 2013 Conference 2 /
3 Motivation/Objective Better understand the dynamics of financial and real business cycles A few features are common to financial recessions (i.e. recessions concomitant with banking crises): Fact #1: They are rare events Fact #2: They are deeper and last longer Fact #3: Unlike other types of recessions, financial recessions follow credit booms MFM October 2013 Conference 3 /
4 Motivation/Objective Financial recession statistics Recessions Financial Other Severe Mild Frequency (%) Duration (years) 2.32*** *** 1.25 Magnitude (%) -6.84*** *** Credit Boom % credit growth 2 years before peak (a) 4.56*** Credit Crunch % credit growth 2 years after peak (a) -3.59* Source: Schularik et al. (2011), data for 14 OECD countries, Crises defined as in Laeven and Valencia (2008); *,**,***: the difference is statistically significant at 10%, 5%, 1%; (a) HP filtered credit. MFM October 2013 Conference 4 /
5 Motivation/Objective In most DSGE models financial recessions are big negative shocks amplified Can explain Facts #1 & #2 Cannot explain Key Fact #3 crises are not random MFM October 2013 Conference 5 /
6 Our Framework Textbook stochastic optimal growth model (RBC) Heterogenous banks with intermediation and storage technologies Interbank market subject to MH and AI A banking crisis is an interbank market freeze Spill over and feedback effects between the interbank market, the retail corporate loan market, and the real economy MFM October 2013 Conference 6 /
7 Main Results 1 Normal times feature productivity driven business cycles with a small financial accelerator; a crisis every 42 years. MFM October 2013 Conference 7 /
8 Main Results 1 Normal times feature productivity driven business cycles with a small financial accelerator; a crisis every 42 years. 2 The typical banking crisis follows an unusually long sequence of small, positive, transitory productivity shocks No need for a large negative financial shock MFM October 2013 Conference 7 /
9 Main Results 1 Normal times feature productivity driven business cycles with a small financial accelerator; a crisis every 42 years. 2 The typical banking crisis follows an unusually long sequence of small, positive, transitory productivity shocks No need for a large negative financial shock 3 High productivity generates a credit boom and a ballooning banking sector MFM October 2013 Conference 7 /
10 Main Results 1 Normal times feature productivity driven business cycles with a small financial accelerator; a crisis every 42 years. 2 The typical banking crisis follows an unusually long sequence of small, positive, transitory productivity shocks No need for a large negative financial shock 3 High productivity generates a credit boom and a ballooning banking sector 4 As productivity gains peter out, excess savings arise ("saving glut") and interest rates fall; counterparty fears rise in the interbank market, which may lead to a freeze and banking crisis MFM October 2013 Conference 7 /
11 Main Results 1 Normal times feature productivity driven business cycles with a small financial accelerator; a crisis every 42 years. 2 The typical banking crisis follows an unusually long sequence of small, positive, transitory productivity shocks No need for a large negative financial shock 3 High productivity generates a credit boom and a ballooning banking sector 4 As productivity gains peter out, excess savings arise ("saving glut") and interest rates fall; counterparty fears rise in the interbank market, which may lead to a freeze and banking crisis 5 The subsequent financial recession is deep and long because of a credit crunch; credit to GDP ratio predicts financial recessions MFM October 2013 Conference 7 /
12 Related literature Kiyotaki-Moore (1997), Bernanke-Gertler-Gilchrist (1999), Christiano-Motto-Rostagno (2013), Gertler-Kiyotaki (2009), Gertler-Karadi (2010): = Full equilibrium non-linearities, such as sudden bank runs Bianchi (2009), Bianchi-Mendoza (2010): = Endogenous interest rates play a key role Brunnermeier-Sannikov (2012), He-Krishnamurthy (2012): = Typical crisis follows a rare, long sequence of positive TFP shocks = Typical crisis identified as a bank run, not as a binding borrowing constraint Gertler-Kiyotaki (2012) = Bank run is market based and rationally expected MFM October 2013 Conference 8 /
13 Model setup Overview MFM October 2013 Conference 9 /
14 Representative Household and Firm Firm: max {kt,h t } π t = F (k t, h t ; z t ) + (1 δ)k t R t k t w t h t Household: max E t {a t+τ+1,c t+τ,h t+τ } β τ u (c t+τ, h t+τ ) τ=0 τ=0 subject to budget constraint c t + a t+1 = r t a t + w t h t + π t + χ t Notice that r t R t (spread) and k t a t (credit crunch) MFM October 2013 Conference 10 /
15 The Banking Sector Banks are atomistic, competitive, and price takers Continuum of heterogeneous 1 period banks p, with cdf µ(p) over (0, 1) Bank p s net return per unit of corporate loan is pr t It is beneficial to relocate funds, but relocation is impaired due to: MFM October 2013 Conference 11 /
16 The Banking Sector Banks are atomistic, competitive, and price takers Continuum of heterogeneous 1 period banks p, with cdf µ(p) over (0, 1) Bank p s net return per unit of corporate loan is pr t It is beneficial to relocate funds, but relocation is impaired due to: Asymmetric information: p is private information MFM October 2013 Conference 11 /
17 The Banking Sector Banks are atomistic, competitive, and price takers Continuum of heterogeneous 1 period banks p, with cdf µ(p) over (0, 1) Bank p s net return per unit of corporate loan is pr t It is beneficial to relocate funds, but relocation is impaired due to: Asymmetric information: p is private information Moral hazard: bank p may borrow φ t and walk away ("diversion") MFM October 2013 Conference 11 /
18 The Banking Sector Bank p has 4 options: 1. Lend to other banks on the interbank market = ρ t 2. Store goods = γ 3. Raise funds φ t from interbank market and lend to firm = pr t (1 + φ t ) ρ t φ t 4. Raise funds φ t from interbank market and walk away = γ (1 + θφ t ) Incentives to divert depend on the corporate loan rate: the lower R t, the higher these incentives, and the more counterparty fears on the interbank market MFM October 2013 Conference 12 /
19 The Borrowing Bank s Problem Borrowing bank p solves: max r t (p) pr t (1 + φ φ t ) ρ t φ t t PC : pr t (1 + φ t ) ρ t φ t ρ t p p t ρ t /R t IC : γ (1 + θφ t ) ρ t φ t = (ρ t γ)/θγ Profits are fully distributed to household: r t 1 0 r t (p) dµ (p) MFM October 2013 Conference 13 /
20 Interbank Market Equilibrium Interbank market clearing condition Supply (+) {}}{ µ (p t ) = Demand bends backward (+ or ) { }} { (1 µ (p t )) }{{} "extensive margin" ( ) φ }{{} t "intensive margin" (+) with p t ρ t /R t and φ t = (ρ t γ)/θγ MFM October 2013 Conference 14 /
21 Interbank Market Equilibrium The interbank market freezes when the retail corporate loan rate is below a threshold MFM October 2013 Conference 15 /
22 Interbank Market Equilibrium The interbank market freezes when the retail corporate loan rate is below a threshold MFM October 2013 Conference 16 /
23 Interbank Market Equilibrium The interbank market freezes when the retail corporate loan rate is below a threshold MFM October 2013 Conference 17 /
24 Absorption Capacity and Market Freeze Proposition (Interbank loan market freeze): The interbank loan market is at work if and only if a t a t fk 1 (R + δ 1; z t ), and freezes otherwise. The interbank market improves effi ciency but freezes when R t < R In general equilibrium, R t is driven by savings (a t ) and technology (z t ). Hence the interbank market freezes when a t > a(z t ) Threshold a(z t ) is the banking sector s "absorption capacity" MFM October 2013 Conference 18 /
25 Quantitative Analysis Calibration Calibration of the real side is standard Financial sector (γ, θ, µ(.)) is calibrated so that: Crisis probability is 2.3% Average interest rate spread is 1.7% Average corporate loan rate of 4.4% The model is solved numerically by a collocation method MFM October 2013 Conference 19 /
26 Quantitative Analysis Optimal savings rule: exogenous versus endogenous crises Variety of crises: shock driven (S) and credit boom driven (U) History suggests that credit boom driven crises prevail MFM October 2013 Conference 20 /
27 Quantitative Analysis Typical path to crisis MFM October 2013 Conference 21 /
28 Quantitative Analysis Typical path to crisis MFM October 2013 Conference 22 /
29 Quantitative Analysis Typical path to crisis MFM October 2013 Conference 23 /
30 Quantitative Analysis Intuition 1 At the beginning, a positive shock brings TFP above its mean Credit demand rises. Return on savings goes up. The household accumulates assets for consumption smoothing 2 TFP goes down back to mean but remains above it for a long time Credit demand decreases, while the household keeps on accumulating savings; interest rates go down 3 As the probability of a crisis increases, the household maintains savings to hedge against a more likely loss of revenue, which works to reduce interest rates and to raise the likelihood of a crisis even further saving glut externality 4 A crisis breaks out as the corporate loan R t rate crosses threshold R MFM October 2013 Conference 24 /
31 Quantitative Assessment Financial recession statistics Recessions Financial Other Severe Mild Frequency (%) Duration (years) Magnitude (%) Credit Boom % credit growth 2 years before peak (a) Credit Crunch % credit growth 2 years after peak (a) (a) HP filtered credit. MFM October 2013 Conference 25 /
32 Welfare %-Loss in permanent consumption Financial frictions Deficient institutions Externalities Fin. under-development FBA DEA FBA CEA CEA DEA DEA NIM FBA: Fist Best Allocation; DEA: Decentralized Equilibrium Allocation CEA: Constrained Effi cient Allocation; NIM: No Interbank Market MFM October 2013 Conference 26 /
33 Concluding Remarks Develop a simple quantitative macro-model with banking crises, where crises are not caused by large, negative, financial shocks but rather by long sequences of small, positive, productivity shocks Credit booms are conducive to crises Highlight the role of consumption smoothing and saving glut externalities From a policy making perspective: Framework for both crisis management and crisis prevention DSGE-based probability of a crisis MFM October 2013 Conference 27 /
34 THANK YOU MFM October 2013 Conference 28 /
35 Return on Deposits and Corporate Loan Supply Return on deposits: r t = R t 1 p t p dµ(p) 1 µ(p t ) ( ( ) R γ t R t µ γ Rt Corporate loan supply, if an equilibrium with trade exists + 1 γ Rt ) p dµ (p), otherwise. a t, if an equilibrium with trade exists kt s = ( ( )) 1 µ γ a Rt t, otherwise MFM October 2013 Conference 29 /
36 Interest Rates Endogenous and exogenous sources of instability MFM October 2013 Conference 30 /
37 Optimal Decision Rules MFM October 2013 Conference 31 /
38 Quantitative Analysis Two counter factual experiments Typical paths to crisis without smoothing or externality MFM October 2013 Conference 32 /
39 Quantitative Assessment Dynamics of output and credit gaps around recessions MFM October 2013 Conference 33 /
40 Quantitative Assessment Dynamics of output and credit gaps around recessions MFM October 2013 Conference 34 /
41 Crisis Prediction Type I and Type II errors Model Probability regressions Logit Probability (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (benchmark) z a (a, z) K /Y K /Y R F-Test Type-I errors (%) Type-II errors (%) N. warnings 30, ,020 30,439 29,911 31,089 N. crises 11,739 11,739 11,739 11,739 11,739 11,739 N. obs (simul.) 468, , , , , ,769 MFM October 2013 Conference 35 /
42 Sensitivity Analysis Financial recession statistics Baseline σ ν θ λ σ z ρ z Altern TFP Frequency (%) Duration (years) Magnitude (%) MFM October 2013 Conference 36 /
43 Endogenous Cycles Two deterministic versions of the model (constant TFP) MFM October 2013 Conference 37 /
44 Model With Both TFP and Financial Shocks Typical path to crisis MFM October 2013 Conference 38 /
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