Subnational Public Debt in Europe Subnational Public Debt in a Fiscally Sustainable Europe September 24 to 26, 2014, Eisenstadt

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Subnational Public Debt in Europe Subnational Public Debt in a Fiscally Sustainable Europe September 24 to 26, 2014, Eisenstadt Governor Ewald Nowotny Oesterreichische Nationalbank

Strong Increase in General Government Debt in Euro Area Public debt in selected EU countries, CH and the US % of GDP 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 EA BE DE IE GR ES FR IT NL AT PT FI UK CH* US* 2007 2013 * Data of non-eu countries is in most cases not comparable with that of EU countries due to different definitions of debt and of government Source: European Commission (EA, UK), OECD quarterly public sector debt (CH, US). 2007: 66% of GDP 2013: 95% of GDP Due to: Working of automatic stabilizers => increase in public deficits Financial aid to the banking sector (particularly in IE, ES, SI) EU crisis management (EFSF, ESM...) - 2 -

EU Reaction to (Unsustainable) High Debt Levels: Reform of SGP and Fiscal Compact Reform of Stability and Growth Pact (implemented in late 2011): Strengthening of preventive arm: Significant increase in automaticity (strengthening of European Commission) Improvement in measurement of progress toward MTO by defining an expenditure rule Strengthening of corrective arm: Operationalization of debt criterion: If debt is above 60%, it has to be reduced by 1/20 of the difference between 60% and the actual debt level p.a. Fiscal Compact (2012): Countries have to implement rules on structural balance into national legislation including an automatic correction mechanism in case of deviations ( debt brake ) Further increase in automaticity of corrective arm of SGP: countries commit to following the European Commission s recommendations (breaches of the deficit criterion only) - 3 -

EU Fiscal Rules EU fiscal rules refer to general government i.e. central government + social security funds + provinces + municipalities + extra-budgetary units rough idea: cover everything which is (in the end) mainly financed by taxes EU communicates with central government but wants (almost) all information on general government real time information on subcentral government levels usually not available difficult to project, in particular expenditure developments - 4 -

(Offical) Government Debt Mostly at Central Government Level Government debt in selected EA countries 2013 values in % of GDP 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 Statistically only 4 EU countries are counted as federal states (BE, DE, ES, AT) Subcentral debt looks relatively small compared to central government debt only in DE and ES > 20% of GDP AT 9% of GDP 20 0 BE DE IE GR ES FR IT NL AT PT FI Municipalites States Central gov. + social security => No problem at all? Quelle: Source: ECB (SDW). - 5 -

SCG Financial Liabilities and Debt-Bearing Capacities Gross financial liabilities Ratio of debt to own tax revenue, by level of government, 2011 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 EL IE PT IT ES FR BE DE AT NL SK SI FI LU EE Central State Local Source: extract from OECD (2014). Debt-bearing capacities are lower in subcentral governments OECD indicator: particularly high in AT provinces and NL local governments due to low tax revenues Masks variation within SCG; in DE, for example, ratio in the most indebted land is about 4.5 times higher than in the least indebted land. - 6 -

National Fiscal Rules to Increase Debt Sustainability the Internal Stability Pact in Austria I first informal arrangement in 1996 law since 1999, negotiated between all levels of government sets deficit limits for all levels of government 2012 Austrian Stability Pact sets nominal targets up to 2016: ÖStP 2012: Required budget balance in % of GDP 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Central government 2.45 1.75 1.29 0.58 0.19 States 0.54 0.44 0.29 0.14 0.01 Local governments balanced budget per state Source: ÖStP 2012. from 2017 onward: structural balance targets central government: -0.35% of GDP provinces and local governments: -0.1% of GDP in case of noncompliance: sanctions are possible - 7 -

National Fiscal Rules to Increase Debt Sustainability the Internal Stability Pact in Austria II Public debt in Austria by subsector in % of GDP 1995 2000 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Central gov + social security 68.2 66.2 64.2 60.2 63.8 69.2 72.5 73.1 74.4 74.5 State government 3.1 2.3 3.0 3.4 3.8 4.8 6.1 6.3 6.1 5.5 Local government 6.6 2.7 2.0 1.8 1.9 2.2 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.1 Source: ECB. Strong decrease of local government debt since 1995 significantly due to outsourcing Subcentral governments also hit by crisis (2009-2010) In 2009-2010 suspension of the targets of the pact due to exceptional economic circumstances. - 8 -

Conclusions Remaining Challenges National fiscal rules can help increase subcentral government debt sustainability, but challenges remain: enforceability of rules credible limitations room for maneuver for subcentral governments while central (and provincial) governments typically provide public goods and redistribute income, municipalities typically provide all kinds of services to citizens, which cannot be changed in the short term problem with ESA-based debt data as the separation between public and private sector debt is not always clear-cut. Implicit liabilities like provincial guarantees might exceed debt-bearing capacities of subcentral governments Costly bail-out by central government Workshops and further research are needed to explore avenues for making subcentral government debt more sustainable. - 9 -