IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA TF-10288) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 96.4 MILLION (US$150 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

Transcription

1 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA TF-10288) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 96.4 MILLION (US$150 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE PEOPLE S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH FOR AN EMPLOYMENT GENERATION PROGRAM FOR THE POOREST PROJECT Social Protection and Labor Global Practice South Asia Region December 15, 2014

2 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective October 31, 2014) Currency Unit = Bangladesh Taka BDT 1.00 = US$ US$1.00 = BDT FISCAL YEAR July 1 June 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CAS DDM DLI DMRD EGPP EMF IDA IPPF M&E MIS MOFDM MODMR MPC OSC PAD PDO RPF SNSP UP Country Assistance Strategy Department of Disaster Management Disbursement Linked Indicator Disaster Management and Relief Division Employment Generation Program for the Poorest Environmental Management Framework International Development Association Indigenous People s Planning Framework Monitoring and Evaluation Management Information System Ministry of Food and Disaster Management Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief Main Program Component Operational Support Component Project Appraisal Document Project Development Objective Resettlement Policy Framework Safety Net Systems for the Poorest Union Parishad Vice President: Country Director: Sector Manager: Project Team Leader: ICR Team Leader: Annette Dixon Johannes Z.M. Zutt Pablo Gottret Iffath Anwar Sharif Aneeka Rahman

3 BANGLADESH Employment Generation Program for the Poorest TABLE OF CONTENTS DATA SHEET... v 1. Project Context, Development Objectives, and Design Context at Appraisal Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators Revised PDO (As Approved by Original Approving Authority) and Key Indicators, and Reasons/Justification Main Beneficiaries Original Components Revised Components Other Significant Changes Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation, and Utilization Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance Post-completion Operation/Next Phase Assessment of Outcomes Relevance of Objectives, Design, and Implementation Achievement of Project Development Objectives Efficiency Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes, and Impacts Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance Bank Performance Borrower Performance Lessons Learned (Both Project-specific and of Wide General Application) Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower, Implementing Agencies, and Partners Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing Annex 2. Outputs by Component Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR Annex 8. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents Annex 10. Disbursement Linked Indicators (DLIs) for the Main Program Component.. 51 MAP... 54

4 TABLES Table 1. Revision in PDO Indicator Target Table 2. Sample of Subprojects Financed under EGPP Table 3. Comparison of Assumptions... 40

5 DATA SHEET A. Basic Information Country: Bangladesh Project Name: Bangladesh - Employment Generation Program for the Poorest Project ID: P L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-48330, TF ICR Date: 10/28/2014 ICR Type: Core ICR Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: Govt. of Bangladesh Original Total Commitment: Revised Amount: Environmental Category: B US$ million Disbursed Amount: US$ million US$ million Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Food and Disaster Management (currently Ministry of Disaster Management & Relief) Co-financiers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Process Date Process Original Date Revised/Actual Date(s) Concept Review: 10/15/2009 Effectiveness: 01/05/2011 Appraisal: 07/15/2010 Restructuring(s): 12/17/ /28/2014 Approval: 11/30/2010 Mid-term Review: 01/13/ /13/2013 Closing: 06/30/ /30/2014 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Risk to Development Outcome: Bank Performance: Borrower Performance: Satisfactory Moderate Satisfactory Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Highly Satisfactory

6 Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Overall Bank Performance: Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies: Overall Borrower Performance: Satisfactory Satisfactory C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Performance (if any) Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): DO rating before Closing/Inactive status: No No Highly Satisfactory Quality at Entry (QEA): Quality of Supervision (QSA): None None Rating D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Other social services Public administration - Other social services 4 4 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Improving labor markets Social safety nets E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Annette Dixon Isabel M. Guerrero Country Director: Johannes C.M. Zutt Ellen A. Goldstein Practice Manager/Manager: Pablo Gottret Mansoora Rashid Project Team Leader: Iffath Anwar Sharif Maitreyi Das ICR Team Leader: ICR Primary Author: Aneeka Rahman Hjalte S. A. Sederlof F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)

7 The Project Development Objective was to provide short-term employment on community subprojects to enable households to better cope with vulnerability, while strengthening program implementation. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The Project Development Objective was not revised during implementation. (a) PDO Indicator(s) Indicator Indicator 1: Baseline Value Original Target Values (from approval documents) Value 2 million beneficiaries 600,000 per phase (Quantitative or were registered during the N.A. (33% female) Qualitative) 100-day Program. Formally Revised Target Values Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years Number of individuals participating in short-term employment created by the program (male/female). Average of 716,135 (33% women) per phase Range: 616, ,472 Date achieved 10/27/ /30/ /30/ /28/2014 Comments (incl. % The target was 100% achieved. achievement) Indicator 2: Number of person-days of short-term employment generated. Value 90 million person-days (Quantitative or during the 100-day Qualitative) Program 60 million persondays per year 48 million person-days per FY FY11: 55.8 million FY12: 49.4 million FY13: 59.1 million FY14 (Phase 1): 36.3 million Date achieved 10/27/ /30/ /30/ /28/2014 Comments (incl. % achievement) The target was revised in May 2014 to reflect changes in program design (increased wage rate leading to fewer person-days of employment). The target was 100% achieved. The last FY included only one phase. (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Indicator Indicator 1: Value (Quantitative or Qualitative) Baseline Value Original Target Values (from approval documents) Formally Revised Target Values Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years Percentage of wage costs allocated to the high poverty density Upazilas with 35% or higher poverty rates. 60% of resources 45% of FY11: 55% allocated to resources FY12: 60% None Upazilas with allocated to FY13: 60% extreme poverty Upazilas with FY14 (phase 1): rates 35% and poverty rates 45%

8 higher 40% and higher Date achieved 10/27/ /30/ /17/ /28/2014 Comments (incl. % achievement) Indicator 2: Value (Quantitative or Qualitative) The target was revised in November 2013 to align the geographic targeting formula with the follow-on Safety Net Systems for the Poorest (Credit No BD), which was based on updated poverty maps (2010). The target was 100% achieved. Percentage of households of EGPP beneficiaries are from households owning less than 0.5 acres of land and are engaged in manual labor. In the 100-day Program that preceded the EGPP, 94% met the land criterion, and 73% the manual labor criterion. At least 80% of beneficiary households meet both criteria FY11: land 90%; labor 95% FY12: 83%; 83% FY13: 90%; 84% FY14 (phase 1): 94%; 100% Date achieved 10/27/ /30/ /28/2014 Comments (incl. % The target was 100% achieved. achievement) Indicator 3: Percentage of EGPP participants who are women The percentage of Value 10% of participants in the women was to rise (Quantitative 100-day Program were to at least 33% by 36% or Qualitative) women. the end of the project. Date achieved 10/27/ /30/ /28/2014 Comments (incl. % The target was 100% achieved. achievement) Indicator 4: Percentage of subprojects that have signboards at work sites and publicly available beneficiary lists. Value (Quantitative or Qualitative) 75% of There were no subprojects meet requirements for the indicator signboards or publicly requirements by available beneficiary lists. the end of the project. 72% at the end of the project Date achieved 10/27/ /30/ /28/2014 Comments (incl. % The actual achievement corresponded to 96% of the target value. achievement) Indicator 5: Percentage of EGPP participants receiving payments through formal financial channels. Payments through formal financial Payments through Value channels in 95% formal financial (Quantitative None of Union channels in 100% or Qualitative) Parishads (UPs) of UPs since in the final project

9 year. Date achieved 10/27/ /30/ /28/2014 Comments (incl. % The target was 100% achieved. achievement) Indicator 6: Number of contracted Field Supervisors in Upazilas with poverty rates of 21% or higher. Value (Quantitative or Qualitative) There were no field supervisor positions. 90% of field supervisor positions are filled during each phase. From 2011, 100% of field supervisor positions have been filled. Date achieved 10/27/ /30/ /28/2014 Comments (incl. % The target was 100% achieved. achievement) Indicator 7: Percentage of subprojects using 10 20% of project resources for non-wage costs. Over the final two In the final project phases of the year, 75% of Value No provision for nonwage costs under the % of subprojects project, on average, subprojects used (Quantitative 10 20% of project or Qualitative) day program. used 10 20% of resources for nonwage costs. project resources for non-wage costs. Date achieved 10/27/ /30/ /28/2014 Comments (incl. % The target was 100% achieved. achievement) Indicator 8: Percentage of Upazilas where grievance redress systems are functioning. Value (Quantitative or Qualitative) No grievance redress systems. Grievance redress systems function in 75% of Upazilas. 100% of Upazilas had a functioning grievance redress system at the end of the project. Date achieved 10/27/ /30/ /28/2014 Comments (incl. % The target was 100% achieved and exceeded. achievement) Indicator 9: Percentage of community subprojects whose progress reports were prepared using standardized monitoring formats for each program phase. 90% of 100% of community Value community subprojects use (Quantitative None subprojects use standardized or Qualitative) standardized monitoring monitoring formats. formats. Date achieved 10/27/ /30/ /28/2014 Comments (incl. % The target was 100% achieved and exceeded.

10 achievement) Indicator 10: Value (Quantitative or Qualitative) Number of participating Upazilas that have entered beneficiary lists into an electronic beneficiary level database. All Upazilas making payments 82% of Upazilas No beneficiary through banks have an electronic information digitized. have an electronic beneficiary beneficiary database. database. Date achieved 10/27/ /30/ /28/2014 Comments The actual achievement corresponded to 82% of the target value, reflecting (incl. % delays in MIS procurement. achievement) Indicator 11: Annual household surveys conducted for a representative sample of households (Y/N) Value (Quantitative N Y Y or Qualitative) Date achieved 10/27/ /30/ /28/2014 Comments (incl. % achievement) The target was 100% achieved with three household surveys carried out between 2011 and This intermediate indicator was not included in the project's results framework as the activities were carried out using Bank-executed Trust Fund (BETF) resources (TF097673). Indicator 12: Number of UPs where independent process documentation activities took place. Value (Quantitative or Qualitative) Comments (incl. % achievement) Date achieved 10/27/ /30/ /28/2014 The target was 100% achieved. Process assessments were conducted on 20 random UPs in six phases of the program. Data from the assessments was used to improve program management and design. This intermediate indicator was not included in the project's results framework as the activities were carried out using BETF resources (TF and TF098475). G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs No. Date ISR Archived DO IP Actual Disbursements (US$, millions) 1 06/27/2011 Highly Satisfactory Highly Satisfactory /24/2012 Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory /22/2012 Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory /24/2013 Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory 92.14

11 5 01/27/2014 Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory /25/2014 Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory H. Restructuring (if any) Restructuring Date(s) Board Approved PDO Change ISR Ratings at Restructuring DO IP Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in US$, millions 11/05/2013 N HS S /09/2014 N HS S Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made The restructuring was to amend the Disbursement Linked Indicator (DLI) target for 2013 for geographic targeting to ensure that the provisions under EGPP Financing and the followon Safety Net Systems for the Poorest (Credit No BD) (P132634) were aligned. The change was a technical amendment and did not change the originally agreed principle of the DLI. Under the revision, 45% of program resources would be allocated to Upazilas with poverty rate 40% or higher. The restructuring was to amend the results framework to reflect design changes (increased wage rate and decreased employment days) and set a revised PDOlevel target pertaining to PDO indicator 2. The original PDO target for the number of person-days of short-term employment created was 60 million person-days per year for each year of implementation. This was revised to 48 million person-days per year of implementation. In addition, PDO targets 1 and 2 for only phase 1 of the fourth year of implementation have been included since the original Results Framework did not include the fourth year of implementation covering only phase 1 of FY14. There were no changes to the

12 I. Disbursement Profile course of implementation as a result of these changes.

13 1. PROJECT CONTEXT, DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES, AND DESIGN 1.1 CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL At the time of appraisal, in July 2010, Bangladesh had experienced a steady long-term decline in poverty, which had gone hand-in-hand with improving human development indicators, and the country was making good progress toward achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Still, poverty remained widespread, and some 47 million people (31.5 percent of the population) were classified as poor in 2010; of these, 26 million were considered extremely poor. Rural households that were engaged in casual labor were particularly vulnerable, and their situation was aggravated by recurring natural disasters and strong seasonal variations in food production farmers typically face two lean seasons, one before harvest and another before planting that rendered them temporarily unemployed. During these lean seasons many male casual farm laborers migrate to cities looking for work leaving their families behind. This brings about an added vulnerability for these temporary female-headed households in rural areas. Female employment has been traditionally low, and in rural areas it is primarily confined to unpaid housework. Bangladesh has a long history of implementing a wide spectrum of social safety net programs that include both cash and in-kind programs, as part of its social protection system. Early efforts in social protection were rolled out as emergency relief measures in response to a cyclone or a famine crisis. These efforts instilled a culture of experimentation and innovation: the nature of the crisis determined the nature of instruments. The structure of Bangladesh s social protection landscape, which consists of a large number of fragmented food transfer programs, was largely determined by these initial conditions. Workfare programs have historically been the Government s main response to poverty and vulnerability and stems from the need to rebuild community infrastructure while providing a safety net in the aftermath of the famines and catastrophic natural disasters Bangladesh faced in the 70s and 80s. Over time some programs retained their emphasis on infrastructure development, while others focused on the safety net function. Building on this tradition of crisis response, the Government introduced a 100-day Emergency Employment Program in 2008 to cushion the poor against the immediate impact of rising food prices. Low levels of food stock availability in the Public Food Distribution System (PFDS) 1 in the wake of the global food crisis prompted the Government to introduce the country s first cash based emergency workfare program. Since 2009 the program underwent multiple iterations of design changes based on rapid assessments, and eventually evolved into the more permanent Government flagship Employment Generation Program for the Poorest (EGPP) aimed at providing cash for 1 The major safety net programs are food based (Food for Works, Test Relief, Vulnerable Group Feeding, Vulnerable Group Development) and used to rotate food stocks in the PFDS. 13

14 work during the two annual lean seasons, and continued to maintain its primary focus on its safety net function rather than on building community infrastructure. The willingness of the Government to evaluate and modify the design of the program provided an opportunity for the Bank to bring in global best practice on workfare programs through the IDA-funded EGPP Project. This first major engagement on safety nets was in response to a Government request to the Bank for financial and technical assistance to increase the effectiveness of the Government s EGPP Program, 2 which by that time had lost much of its focus as a public works program and had assumed the informal local name as Olosh Bhata or lazy allowance. The Project was aligned with the Bank s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for the period of FY , which envisaged supporting Bangladesh in building up safety nets while emphasizing the needs of women and the extremely poor. 1.2 ORIGINAL PROJECT DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES (PDO) AND KEY INDICATORS The project development objective (PDO) was to provide short-term employment on community subprojects to enable households to better cope with vulnerability, while strengthening program implementation. The PDO was to be achieved by (i) ensuring that program benefits were targeted at the poorest areas and households; (ii) improving governance through better transparency and accountability; and (iii) improving capacity for monitoring and evaluation. Based on the results framework, the key PDO indicators were associated with short-term employment. These were (i) the number of individuals participating in short-term employment created by the program (male/female); and (ii) the number of person-days of short-term employment generated. Indicators relating to vulnerability were to draw on results of an Impact Evaluation. A set of Intermediate PDO Indicators were defined for areas to be strengthened for better program implementation (that is, focus areas see below on project description). 1.3 REVISED PDO (AS APPROVED BY ORIGINAL APPROVING AUTHORITY) AND KEY INDICATORS, AND REASONS/JUSTIFICATION The PDO was not revised during project implementation. A level-two restructuring was approved on May 09, 2014, to retroactively adjust the quantitative milestones for PDOindicator 2 (number of person-days of short-term employment generated) for each of the phases in FY , and correcting the end-of-project target (phase 1 of FY2014) from the initial 60 million person-days per year to 48 million person-days per year. The adjustment reflected a change in the parameters underlying the number of person-days of employment: in FY2011, the Program s daily wage rate was revised upward on par with 2 The EGPP Program and the EGPP Project are used interchangeably in the text, reflecting the fact that the Project is an integral part of the public works Program. IDA support to the Program was in the form of financing wage costs to a maximum of $ million, but not exceeding 70 percent of wages paid, over the three-year period ( ). Disbursements were linked to results aimed at improving the Program s efficiency, accountability and transparency, and were monitored through indicators which applied for the entire Program. 14

15 inflation, which prompted the Government to reduce the number of working days per FY from 100 to 80 in order to mitigate the effects on the budget. Since this was expected to occur and did occur in subsequent fiscal years, each time affecting the milestones and target indicators, the Bank team decided that rather than restructuring each time, it would do so only once towards the end of the project period. 3 In addition to the modification in PDO-indicator targets, a quantitative target was introduced for the each of the PDO indicators (number of individuals participating in short-term employment and number of person-days of short-term employment) for the first phase of FY2014, as the original design had not included this possibly due to an oversight. The new targets were the same as those retroactively adjusted for the previous fiscal years. 1.4 MAIN BENEFICIARIES The main beneficiaries of the project were households in extreme poverty. Households where the household head was a day laborer and the household had less than half an acre of land were eligible for EGPP jobs. 4 In addition, a minimum of 33 percent of participating workers under the program were to be women. Secondary beneficiaries were (i) the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief (MODMR), 5 whose capacity to oversee program implementation was enhanced at both central and local levels; and (ii) local authorities local Upazila (sub-district) and community UP officials who benefited from their involvement in the day-to-day implementation of EGPP activities, notably from the more structured processes that were introduced for the subproject cycle. 1.5 ORIGINAL COMPONENTS The project had two components: (i) a main program component that helped finance workers wages, with disbursements linked to progress made in three focus areas of Program reform 6 - targeting, governance, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E); and (ii) an operational support component that financed inputs necessary to achieve the targets in the three focus areas of the main component. 3 The initial daily wage rate was BDT 150 (US$1.96), which was raised to BDT 175 (US$2.24) in FY2011and to BDT 200 (US$2.56) in FY These two variables are highly correlated with poverty in Bangladesh. 5 At the time of approval, the implementing ministry was the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management (MOFDM), which was later reorganized as Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief (MODMR). At the same time, the implementing arm, Disaster Management and Relief Division, was reclassified as Department of Disaster Management. The ICR will refer to the current organizational structure MODMR. 6 The focus areas of Program reform were designed to address the challenges and constraints faced by the sector, as highlighted in the Government s draft National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction II (NSAPR II) and also took into account the lessons and experience from the precursor 100-day Employment Program. 15

16 Component 1, the Main Program Component (MPC), had a total estimated cost of US$ million (IDA US$ million) at appraisal; actual costs were US$ million (IDA US$ million). The component was to finance wage and non-wage costs of small-scale public works selected by local government and community entities. IDA financed a little less than a third of the wage costs of the public works schemes. Disbursement of IDA funds was triggered by progress made on reforms to the overall EGPP Program in the three focus areas, determined by a schedule of disbursement linked indicators (DLIs) that applied to each year of implementation. With all disbursement conditions for a year being met as planned, there were seven disbursements altogether (corresponding to two lean seasons per year, but only one in the final FY of the project) over the Project implementation period, financing a share of workers wages over FY The DLI schedule is outlined in Annex 10. The three focus areas of Program reform were as follows: Focus area 1: Targeting. The project was to introduce revisions to the existing targeting system to increase its coverage of very poor households, while reducing leakages to the non-poor. The targeting system included geographic, household and gender level targeting. Changes were to be introduced to cut-off points for geographic targeting which grouped Upazilas into high, moderate, and low extreme-poverty density and the related formula for allocating project budgets between the three categories. These changes were to increase the emphasis of spending in the high and moderate extremepoverty density Upazilas. At the household level, targeting was to be made more rigorous by introducing self-targeting through a below-market wage. In addition since oversubscription for the program was expected, specific criteria for eligibility the household head would have to be a day laborer, and the household had to own less than half an acre of land was also introduced to help ration the EGPP job cards among the total eligible population. Finally, the share of women participating in the EGPP was to progressively increase to 33 percent by the final project year. Focus area 2: Governance. The project was to improve program governance by articulating clearer rules for the Program and introducing greater transparency in its implementation. Measures were to include public disclosure (at the community level) of upcoming public works schemes, their budgets, and the beneficiary selection process; guidelines on the provision of non-wage costs; better payment systems to reduce fiduciary risk, including payment through banks or other formal financial channels as well as piloting innovative payment solutions for remote areas and effective worksite monitoring; effective dissemination of information on any changes to the program; and enhancing the capacity of MODMR s field officers by introducing Field Supervisors to support program implementation, including the provision of training and logistical support. 7 The financing of wages was done retroactively: Government expenditure for these wages was reimbursed upon verification of DLI achievement through field-level expenditure reports. Reimbursements flowed directly to the Government s Consolidated Fund, while financing of Component 2 (Operational Support Component) was disbursed directly to the implementing Ministry s Designated Account. 16

17 Focus area 3: Monitoring and evaluation. The project was to refine the monitoring strategy of the EGPP by developing monitoring capacity in MODMR at the central and Upazila levels. This would involve the development of a set of standardized summary indicators and monitoring reports on inputs, outputs, and intermediate outcomes, and compliance with program rules. To ensure that the data collected on the monitoring indicators would be available for real-time decision-making, the project was to set up Management Information System (MIS) at the central and Upazila levels, and provide related training for key staff. Independent assessments were to be undertaken, including third-party validation of program targeting and processes. Further quantitative analysis based on household surveys was to be complemented by qualitative beneficiary assessments. Component 2, the Operational Support Component, had an estimated total cost of US$5.21 million at appraisal; actual costs were also US$5.21 million. It was fully financed by IDA. This component was to finance activities relating to the focus areas, including the purchase of hardware and software for the MIS, consultant services, training and vehicles for field staff, and operating and maintenance costs for the program 1.6 REVISED COMPONENTS The components were not revised during implementation, although Bank-executed Trust Funds were introduced and utilized to support the monitoring and evaluation activities under component 2 by means of third party assessments and verification; and pilot workplace attendance and payment systems (Section 2.2). 1.7 OTHER SIGNIFICANT CHANGES On October 5, 2011, the Government of Bangladesh requested a change in the geographic allocation of program resources to provide larger allocations to Upazilas with higher poverty rates, and reduce allocations in less poor areas. Based on its own assessments of program performance, attesting to lower enrolment of beneficiaries in lower poverty areas and a greater propensity for irregularities in such areas, the Bank agreed to the change. This decision was conveyed to the Government through a management letter dated January 11, This change was formalized in the EGPP Program Guidelines, given that the allocations per work phase were to be made according to these Guidelines. This minor technical modification was not processed as restructuring as per advice from the Bank s legal team. Since then, OPCS and LEG policy has highlighted that any change in legal agreements requires restructuring, including minor changes. In light of this guidance, a level two restructuring was approved on November 5, 2013 for a subsequent change in the geographic resource allocation formula. It included the revision of the associated DLI target for 2013 which was warranted to maintain consistency between the EGPP Project and a new IDA-funded Safety Net Systems for the Poorest (SNSP) Project (approved in June 2013) for which an updated geographic targeting formula, based on a new national poverty map, had been introduced. A second level-two restructuring was approved on May 9, 2014 to retroactively adjust the 17

18 quantitative targets for PDO-level indicator 2 and introduce PDO-level indicator targets for phase 1 of FY2014. Details of the restructuring are noted in section KEY FACTORS AFFECTING IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOMES 2.1 PROJECT PREPARATION, DESIGN, AND QUALITY AT ENTRY Project preparation. At the time that the project was being considered, the Bank was not engaged in a lending operation to support safety nets in the country. However, a dialogue between the MOFDM and the Bank based on analytical work gradually shaped a common platform that led to the Government s request for assistance in strengthening the EGPP Program. In addition to this dialogue, the Bank was also able to draw on the experience and lessons of the 100 Day Employment Program that preceded the EGPP, as well as earlier Bank assessments of public works programs in Bangladesh, and on its own wider international experience in public works schemes. Lessons from the 100 Day Program that would inform the design of the project included an emphasis on selftargeting and a concern for ensuring a degree of women s participation in public works schemes; the importance of community consultation and awareness raising to increase the relevance and sense of ownership of subprojects; the importance of well-articulated rules and guidelines, and accountability arrangements; an accessible payments system, preferably one that could draw on existing electronic beneficiary databases for payments through banks; and an effective M&E process to provide a valid evidence-basis for pursuing the program. A thorough risk assessment was undertaken, and is detailed in the PAD (pp ). It drew attention to a series of institutional risks that might constrain implementation: oversight arrangements; payment and grievance processes; safeguard and fiduciary arrangements, especially unfamiliarity with Bank procedures; and human resource constraints. These risks were addressed in the project design and selectively included in the DLI framework. Design. Project design was directly relevant to achieving the immediate objective of reducing vulnerability among the very poor through the provision of temporary jobs, and to the more permanent one of building institutions that would strengthen the EGPP during the project period and beyond. The Project financed part of the Program over a three-year period, including a share of wages (an estimated 31 percent of the Program s wage bill over the Project period), and the cost of necessary technical assistance. Under the Program (and the Project), each participant had access to two phases of seasonal employment of 40 days each during the two lean seasons of April-May and October- November. Participants were required to do physical work on rural community infrastructure chosen by the local community and local government bodies. To facilitate women s participation, works were mainly focused on lighter schemes, often repair and maintenance of existing infrastructures in close proximity to local communities. To achieve project objectives, Program reforms were grouped into the three key focus areas of targeting, governance, and M&E, and a results-based approach was applied, as expressed in the DLI framework. Annual disbursements from the IDA credit were contingent on meeting milestones for the relevant year. Performance targets were defined 18

19 for each focus area, including baselines and annual milestones for each fiscal year ( ), and detailed in the Data Sheet. The other key features of design that would determine performance and achievement of objectives included the following: (i) consistent application of a geographic targeting mechanism that favored the poorest areas and of household-level poverty indicators that strongly correlated with extreme poverty and (ii) requirements on women s participation through the introduction of minimum quotas. These features were underpinned by (iii) a payment system for workers wages that delinked resource management from payment of wages, reducing the risk of irregularities in the payment process; (iv) an effective M&E system that allowed timely adjustment to processes when challenges arose; (v) enhanced capacity for oversight and management of implementation processes at the central Ministry and local levels; (vi) a focus on community engagement that would facilitate reporting on performance; and (vii) the introduction of a percent non-wage cost requirement to broaden the subproject menu from simple earth works and reduce the risk of wage funds being diverted to non-wage spending. Non-wage subproject costs were to be financed by the Government. The MPC, which supported expansion of and reforms to the existing Program through the three focus areas, was coupled with the OSC, which provided direct support to the implementing agency for implementation support and capacity strengthening based on needs. Therefore, the MPC could be viewed as a component that reimbursed the Government for results, while the OSC was the financing instrument for the inputs needed to achieve the results indicated in the MPC. Institutional arrangements consisted of an oversight agency, the MODMR, and a project implementation team created specifically for the Project. The implementation team included a project director, a deputy director, and fiduciary, MIS, and training expertise. Field Supervisors were to be contracted to support the MODMR field officers in monitoring the Program and supporting its implementation. Sub-district Upazila committees were given responsibility for program implementation and community-level UP committees for subprojects. A national steering committee was to be set up to oversee the work of the implementation team. A grievance redressal system was to be established to handle complaints, and a database was to be developed for recording, monitoring, and following up on procurement activities. Third-party validation of compliance with program guidelines was also introduced. Training on safeguards and fiduciary requirements was to be provided to central and Upazila-level staff. The Quality Assurance Group did not review the project for quality at entry. 2.2 IMPLEMENTATION The Project was rated Satisfactory throughout project implementation, and this is reflected in its overall performance, averaging over 700,000 participants, over 90 percent of whom were extremely poor, including about 33 percent women, and generating almost 28 million person-days of employment per phase, throughout the Project period. During implementation, a number of adjustments were made: (i) the geographic targeting approach was sharpened: early on, it was recognized that targeting results were weaker in lower poverty areas where potential beneficiaries were fewer, and the allocation formula 19

20 was adjusted accordingly; (ii) field-level monitoring was strengthened: when capacity constraints appeared in field-level monitoring and supervision, so-called Labor Leaders were introduced to support Field Supervisors, with the former chosen from among participating workers to ensure day-to-day monitoring of individual work sites; (iii) governance was enhanced: the payment process was adjusted noting difficulties related to paying beneficiaries located far from banks, the findings prompted the team to seek Trust Fund resources 8 to finance a worksite attendance and payment pilot for electronic payment delivery via cash cards and mobile phones adjustments to the payment process based on the pilot results are currently being considered in the follow on the SNSP; (iv) transparency was strengthened: a practice of placing signboards at upcoming worksites was introduced, informing about the subproject and the number of beneficiaries; (v) attendance: difficulties in recording attendance, and in particular avoiding ghost workers, prompted the payments pilot to also focus on linking payments to electronic work attendance. The pilots not only informed about more effective monitoring of attendance, and easier payments for all public works programs under the SNSP project, but they have also informed the design of the payments solution being adopted under the proposed Income Support Program for the Poorest (P146520) scheduled for Board presentation on December 16, 2014; (vi) third party monitoring: due to delays in the development of the MIS, Bank-executed TF resources 9 were used to conduct a qualitative evaluation and regular spot checks in each phase of the Project to provide feedback on the three focus areas of expected reforms in the overall EGPP Program. These spot checks were also used as an independent validation of the DLIs. Beneficiary surveys were included as part of this third party monitoring exercise and feedback from the surveys is summarized in Annex 5. Throughout the Project period, concerns were expressed about the danger of political capture, notably through fraudulent worker rolls with a large presence of ghost workers, and collection of informal entry fees from the participating workers. However, the household survey results conducted annually over the course of the project indicated that this was a diminishing problem as implementation practices became more established, information about the program more widespread, and local level monitoring more rigorous. Implementation encountered challenges mainly in three areas: (i) procurement, with difficulties related to limited capacity at the national level, and unexpected turnovers in procurement expertise, and minor mis-procurement; (ii) the timing of work seasons; and (iii) women s participation. The first challenge is discussed in the section on Safeguards and Fiduciary Compliance. The second challenge came to light during the process evaluations: the EGPP spring season officially covers the months of March and April; however, administrative lags between the allocation of funds and subproject start-up would, in some instances, push the start of work into late March or even late April. This 8 Rapid Social Response (RSR) Grant Bangladesh (TF and TF010004): Improving the Payment and Monitoring System in the Employment Generation Program for the Poorest. 9 Gender Trust Fund (TF098475): Women's Labor Market Participation and Economic Empowerment through Bangladesh s EGPP. 20

21 timing of works coincided with the planting season, the rains, or when farm jobs became available, and earthworks, which were a major feature of many public works schemes, could not be undertaken. A partial solution was found by increasing the work program from five to six days per week to finish works earlier and allow workers to seek jobs during the active farming season. However, the team recognized that a longer term solution had to do with managing local level politicians who had consistently attempted to capture program implementation and cause delays in the starting of the public works. These discussions are part of the ongoing dialogue with the Government under the SNSP. The third challenge, women s participation, was addressed through subproject designs that required lighter workloads essentially repair and maintenance works in close by locations. This also offered opportunities to other physically less-able members of the labor force. Toward the end of Project implementation, geographic targeting formulas were adjusted at the Government s request, following updated poverty mapping. The adjustment also brought consistency to the formulas in the EGPP and the SNSP. 2.3 MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, AND UTILIZATION M&E design. The project was to use the MODMR s regular program monitoring system, appropriately streamlined under the Project s focus area 3 to include a set of standardized indicators and monitoring reports that would facilitate data collection, reporting, and realtime decision-making. A new element was to be the introduction of a digitized MIS at the Upazila level, as well as connectivity that would allow information to be transferred electronically from local levels to the center. This was to be complemented by independent third-party validation of program processes, including spot checks and impact evaluations to determine the effectiveness of targeting and the effects of the program on household incomes and coping strategies in response to shocks. Qualitative assessments were also to be undertaken to seek beneficiary views on how well the program was working. The M&E design was likely to provide adequate information to monitor progress toward the PDO. M&E implementation. Contrary to expectations, data collection and reporting did not benefit from the new MIS, which was put in place only toward the end of the project due to delays in the procurement process. Instead, the regular program monitoring system was used, appropriately streamlined with redesigned monitoring forms and reports to facilitate monitoring of inputs, outputs, intermediate outcomes, and compliance with program guidelines. It was complemented with third-party validations (including qualitative assessments, spot checks, process evaluations and beneficiary focus group discussions) that were implemented at each phase, and analysis from three household surveys a 2010 baseline, a 2011 midline and a 2012 endline survey These surveys were supported by the following Trust Fund resources: US$200,000 from the Trust Fund for Environmentally & Socially Sustainable Development (TFESSD ) and US$50,000 from Gender Trust Funds (GEN-TF098475). 21

22 M&E utilization. The information flowing out of the M&E system was a key input in adjusting design during implementation, and in developing the design for the follow-up SNSP project. Feedback processes generated changes that are indicated in the section on Implementation. For instance, the regular spot checks as well as the household surveys found that beneficiaries were only utilizing their EGPP bank accounts to receive payments, and were not aware that these were proper checking and saving accounts. A decision was then made to require a small portion of their wages to be retained as savings. This change in design increased the interest of beneficiaries in owning their EGPP bank accounts. The introduction of worksite supervisors or Labor Leaders and increasing the authority of the Field Supervisors hired under the Project were all small design changes, introduced as a result of the assessments, which had a large impact in the implementation of the overall EGPP program. The adjusted M&E implementation plan was also critical in underpinning the assessment of PDO achievement by the Project, as well as disbursement decisions relating to the DLIs. Both the survey analysis as well as the regular third party monitoring proved to be particularly useful in measuring, monitoring, and verifying results and, as highlighted earlier, informing and motivating relevant adjustments to Program design. In addition, the team utilized results from additional survey based evaluations conducted by IFPRI, one in August 2011 and a second one in August The timing of these surveys was fortuitously in the same periods as that of the Bank s midline and endline surveys, thereby allowing the Bank team to triangulate the results coming from three sets of analysis. 11 The Bank team noted that the three sets of assessments were consistently pointing to four results: (i) the self-targeting feature of the Program was working well, and the EGPP was among the best targeted program among all of the major safety nets; (ii) leakage in benefit amount had reduced; (iii) a third of the Program participants were women; and (iv) a change in the branding of the Program had occurred at the community level from being previously known as lazy allowance (Olosh bhata) to 40-day employment program (Chollish diner kormo shuchi). The 2011 IFPRI evaluation was commissioned by the Government and its positive feedback on the performance of the EGPP prompted the Government to increase its allocation in FY13 from BDT 1000 billion to BDT 1200 billion (the highest increase received among all of the 95 programs under the social protection budget). Subsequently, the program allocation has increased to BDT1400 billion in FY14 and is currently proposed as BDT 1500 billion in FY SAFEGUARD AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE Safeguards. The project triggered safeguard policies on the environment, involuntary resettlement and indigenous peoples. a) Environment. The majority of the EGPP s approximately 37,000 small-scale subprojects were earthworks, and environmental issues were likely to be minor. However, the Bank s Operational Policy on Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01) was triggered, 11 A workshop with key stakeholders from the Government, development partners, media, research think tanks and NGOs was held by the Bank team on September 25,

23 and the project was identified as category B. The implementing agency already had an Environmental Management Framework (EMF) with screening tools, procedures for mitigating potentially adverse impacts, a monitoring mechanism, and procedures for disclosure. All subprojects were subject to a prior environmental screening. The project s independent third-party assessments included a brief environmental audit. b) Involuntary resettlement and Indigenous Peoples. No private land acquisition or large-scale displacement was expected under the program. However, the safeguards policy on involuntary resettlement (OP4.12) was triggered, as was the safeguards policy for Indigenous Peoples (OP 4.10). A Social Management Framework was developed, including a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF), and an Indigenous Peoples Planning Framework (IPPF). There were no deviations or waivers from the Bank s safeguard policies, nor did any issues arise during implementation. Financial management (FM). A financial management assessment of the EGPP was carried out during project preparation in accordance with OP/BP While it determined the project s FM risk as substantial, it noted that important mitigating measures were incorporated into project design, and that existing FM arrangements could be maintained for the project. Overall, financial performance was Satisfactory, albeit moderated by delays in the timeliness of disbursements under component 2 and reporting on spending on both components. For the external audit, the program s financial statements (wages and operational support) were audited annually by the Comptroller and Auditor General of Bangladesh. Audit reports signaled no material weaknesses, although the audited financial statements for FYs 2011 and 2012 initially remained beyond audit assurance in the absence of an audit of expenditures under component 1. This component, which was being executed under a revenue budget program, fell outside the scope of the auditor s remit. The outstanding issues were in the process of being resolved during the preparation of the ICR. Procurement. Project design had envisaged including procurement expertise to support the implementation team, but rapid turnover of procurement specialists three during implementation delayed contracting of goods and services. This particularly affected the contracting of an IT firm to develop MIS software, and delayed a DLI efficient record-keeping mechanism which required that testing of the MIS be completed. The testing was subsequently completed and funds were disbursed. Mis-procurement did arise in FY2012 on three contracts totaling US$17,450. This was discovered during a postreview conducted in FY2014 (report was finalized in June 2014) and the Government was informed in July Another two contracts, one in FY2012 and another in FY2013, totaling US$10,527, were also found to have been mis-procured. As all contracts had already been issued and the project closing day elapsed, the respective funds were cancelled. These funds are in process of being returned to the Bank. 2.5 POST-COMPLETION OPERATION/NEXT PHASE The EGPP Project introduced new and innovative processes into safety net design, which had a significant impact on efficiency and effectiveness with which the overall EGPP Program was being implemented, and that are reflected in the results (see Assessment of Objectives below). This was the case in all three focus areas: the introduction of a 23

24 rigorous targeting methodology, and increased transparency in selection and payment of participants, underpinned by improved monitoring and evaluation, including in particular continuous third party evaluation of processes. Encouraged by the performance of the EGPP, the Government is introducing these elements into other ongoing public safety net programs in the country, while it is embarking on a broad effort to raise the performance of the system as a whole. It is also committed to developing a national poverty database with the intention of gradually adopting proxy means-testing to further improve the targeting efficiency of safety net programs. Such developments are also expected to encourage other sectors to introduce similar reforms. The success of the EGPP Project has also deepened the Bank s engagement in this new phase of safety net development. The SNSP, approved in June 2013, is helping to strengthen the analytical and institutional base of major safety net programs, drawing on lessons learned in the EGPP Project. 3. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES 3.1 RELEVANCE OF OBJECTIVES, DESIGN, AND IMPLEMENTATION The overall relevance of the Project is satisfactory. Relevance of objectives. The PDO was highly relevant to the Government s poverty reduction strategy and the Bank s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) at project approval, and remains so today. It supports the Government s aim of developing a coherent social protection system, where an effective public works component is expected to provide a versatile safety net instrument, in particular one that can be flexibly applied to address seasonal vulnerabilities that are part and parcel of rural life in Bangladesh. It is aligned with the Bank s social protection strategy in Bangladesh, which seeks to harmonize and increase effectiveness of a diverse set of safety net instruments with a particular focus on moving from food based to cash based instruments that over time would broaden and deepen coverage of the poor. A direct focus area of Strategic Objective 1.3 in the CAS (FY ) is strengthening the social protection system to reduce vulnerability. Relevance of design. Project design was consistent with the development objective. It utilized a cash-based workfare program to provide short-term employment on rural community infrastructure projects to help very poor households cope during the annual lean seasons. The lighter workload of the projects (that is, primarily maintenance work of small roads and bridges) and their proximity to local communities enabled female participation and, more generally, participation from members of the community who otherwise might not, for physical reasons, have been able to migrate to cities during lean seasons as is customary in many parts of the country.. A particular focus on self-targeting and governance sought to ensure that wages primarily reached the intended extremely poor beneficiaries, and that female and male participants received the same wage rate. A rigorous M&E system, including third-party assessments, provided the necessary elements to strengthen project design during implementation. The introduction of results-based lending through rigorously applied DLIs provided a unifying framework that facilitated implementation. The joint formulation of indicators, targets, and protocols created common ground for recognizing the importance of shaping a path for reform in program design that could be defined, implemented and monitored, 24

25 and is results-oriented. Furthermore, supporting the results-based component with technical assistance allowed for effective implementation by strengthening capacity and providing the means for achieving results. This proved particularly valuable in strengthening government and implementing agency buy-in, underlining the importance of recognizing capacity constraints and institutional weaknesses, and fine-tuning implementation accordingly. The results framework did not include indicators on changes in households ability to cope with vulnerability, an outcome which was considered too complex to be measured by one or two indicators. Instead, household surveys were introduced to measure the well-being of participating households, which allowed assessments of whether the Project indeed was able to target the eligible vulnerable populations. Ensuring employment during lean seasons was provided and that wages did reach beneficiaries would imply that the Project objective of reducing vulnerability was achieved as designed (section 3.2). A set of intermediate outcome indicators were associated with strengthening program implementation, addressing three focus areas for intervention (described in section 1.5). In addition, a set of DLIs mostly milestones for achievements over time was used to incentivize results-based project implementation of component 1. Relevance of implementation. Implementation was relevant. The project was responsive to changing needs as reflected through two restructurings conducted to accommodate a sharper focus on poverty targeting and ensuring that wages were being adjusted for rising inflation to help maintain the adequacy of the transfer and remained important to achieving country and Bank objectives on poverty reduction. Third-party process monitoring was also able to flag issues early and facilitated the introduction of incremental improvements in program design throughout implementation. That, and the measures that already had been introduced during Project design to address institutional risks, proved largely sufficient to allow smooth execution. 3.2 ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES The project objective - [to provide] short-term employment to reduce household vulnerability while strengthening program implementation had three sub-objectives: (i) provide short-term employment; (ii) reduce household vulnerability; and (iii) strengthen program implementation. All three sub-objectives were achieved. Sub-objective 1: provide short-term employment. The short-term employment objective was met. On average, over 700,000 individuals participated in each of the seven phases of the works (against an original target of 600,000 per phase), for a total of 3.02 million participants (an individual could only participate in two phases) with a total of 195 million person-days of employment generated over the Project period. The revised annual target of generating 48 million person-days of employment was met and exceeded. Of these, 33 percent of participants were women. Sub-objective 2: reduce household vulnerability. The reduction in household vulnerability was met, albeit with some shortcomings in measurement of results. On average, over 90 percent of beneficiaries came from households that met the characteristics for extremely poor, exceeding the 80 percent target. There was also a low level of leakage, with beneficiaries receiving some 97 percent of the value of their 25

26 entitled payments. 12 That participation in the EGPP helped to provide an additional source of income during the lean seasons indicated that there was a reduction in household vulnerability during those periods. Analysis based on the household surveys also showed significant differences in household consumption between the EGPP and non-egpp households, 13 the cross-sectional nature of the surveys suggest caveats to these results as the analyses are not able to control for unobservable factors that could explain the differences between the two groups. Sub-objective 3: strengthen program implementation. The strengthening of program implementation was successful. It was strengthened through incremental actions in the three focus areas of targeting, governance, and monitoring and evaluation. Milestones and targets had been defined in the DLI framework (Annex 10), which also served as a means of monitoring progress on reforms. As indicated above in section 2.1 on Design, annual IDA disbursements were triggered by meeting the milestones. By the end of the Project, all the targets had been met according to schedule without interruptions in disbursements. Likewise, all targets for each of the focus areas had been achieved, with the exception of one, relating to signboards and publicly available beneficiary lists at work sites, which was 96 percent achieved. Moreover, the Project produced spillover effects by leveraging IDA financing of less than one-third of Program costs to generate reform and efficiencies across the entire Program. Achievement on the focus areas was as follows: a) Targeting. i. Geographic targeting. To strengthen geographic targeting, program guidelines had been adjusted to favor Upazilas with extreme poverty rates of 35 percent and over. The percentage of wage costs allocated to such Upazilas had exceeded the target of 45 percent of resources allocated in each of the three full fiscal years , achieving 55 percent, 60 percent and 60 percent, respectively. For phase 1 of fiscal year 2014 (the last phase under the project), 45 percent of extremely poor Upazilas had been reached. ii. Household targeting. Household targeting had been strengthened with the introduction of eligibility criteria that households should own less than In a country where leakage rates can be as high as 14 percent, this is a favorable outcome. However, there were regional variations, with some areas having consistently higher leakage. The payments pilot focused on one such area to determine underlying factors, finding that leakage was largely driven by political capture of the program. This challenge is currently being addressed under the SNSP through increased use of technology in program administration, which is expected to insulate program implementation from local politics. 13 Male-headed EGPP households had a significantly larger level of non-food expenditure than non-egpp households, drawing on the analysis used in the baseline survey; while female-headed EGPP households had a significantly larger level of non-food expenditure than non-egpp households when the data from the endline survey is used. 26

27 acres of land and the household head be engaged in manual labor. The target of 80 percent of beneficiary households meeting these criteria was exceeded in each full project fiscal year and in the first phase of fiscal year 2014, meeting 90 percent and 95 percent, respectively, of the land and labor criteria in FY2011; 83 percent for both in FY2012; 90 percent and 84 percent, respectively, in FY2013; and 94 percent and 100 percent, respectively, for the first phase of FY2014. iii. Gender targeting. The target of at least 33 percent of the EGPP participants being women by the end of the Project was exceeded, with the share of women at 36 percent. b) Governance. i. To improve public disclosure at the community level of the details of workfare schemes, signboards and publicly available beneficiary lists were to be set up for at least 75 percent of subprojects. The target was partially met, as such information was provided in 72 percent of cases. In some locations, signboards caught on only slowly, but once they did do so, they were viewed favorably by the communities. ii. iii. To strengthen the wage payment mechanism, including reducing leakage and improving the timeliness of payments, a target was set to transfer 95 percent of all wage payments through formal financial channels by the end of the Project. At Project closing, all wage payments were being made through formal financial channels. This contributed to a significant reduction in leakage, including the use of ghost workers (as determined by third party field audits). The introduction of a defined share of non-wage costs also reduced the incentives for leakage. During implementation, a pilot was also introduced to explore means of improving financial access in remote locations, using cash cards and mobile phones. Initial results of the pilot indicate that the new mechanisms that were being tested were an improvement, based on beneficiary interviews. Grievance redressal systems were introduced and functional in all Upazilas. Strengthening of the monitoring and evaluation system contributed to stronger governance by providing greater transparency to the overall process. c) Monitoring and evaluation. Monitoring and evaluation capacity was successfully built up to provide the information necessary for targeting and governance elements, and more broadly the results-based system with DLIs, to be successfully implemented. The management information system that initially was to be the key to real-time decision-making was delayed and put in place only towards the end of the Project. Consequently, by the end of the Project, 82 percent of Upazilas had set up an electronic beneficiary database, instead of the targeted 100 percent. Instead, available monitoring mechanisms were adapted to accommodate information needs, and subprojects were strengthened with field level and worksite monitors. Field-level 27

28 monitoring was further complemented by third party validation of program processes related to the three focus areas of the DLIs. To support sub-objective 2, annual household surveys were conducted, feeding into the Project s Impact Evaluation. 3.3 EFFICIENCY The overall efficiency of the project is rated satisfactory. The economic analysis in the PAD presented conservative estimates of the cost effectiveness of the Program. It also noted that the fiscal impact of the EGPP was consistent with the fiscal costs of safety net programs in countries with comparable levels of income, including other countries in the region. The ICR applies a cost-effectiveness analysis similar to the PAD, and compares the results of the two. Due to the different nature of the EGPP Program and its predecessor, the 100-day Employment Generation Program, in particular, when it comes to targeting criteria and consequently the beneficiary pool, cost effectiveness comparisons were not made between that Program and the EGPP. The analysis in the PAD and the ICR quantifies the impact of the EGPP on poverty and estimates how cost-effective the workfare program is in raising incomes of the poor when compared to a counterfactual program where each household receives a uniform transfer. The analysis is detailed in Annex 3. In a conservative scenario, the cost-effectiveness ratio is between , without including any indirect effects from community assets. Estimates have also been made on the assumption of a modest impact on well-being as a result of the works, resulting in cost effectiveness ratios of between 0.76 and Both sets of estimates exceed the poverty rate of the population (0.32), and consequently, it can be concluded that the Program is a more cost-effective mechanism for reaching the poor than the counterfactual of a transfer to all households. The cost-effectiveness ratio compares with estimates ranging from 0.33 to 0.38 and 0.63 to 0.76, respectively, in the PAD. In addition the EGPP is fiscally sustainable. The Program absorbs 12 percent of the government budget for social protection, which in turn claims a 14 percent share of the overall government budget (2013). The project generates no apparent additional fiscal commitments apart from those generated by future increases in the wage rate, which can be expected to keep pace with inflation. The country s macroeconomic outlook is expected to be able to cope with any additional commitments. 3.4 JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING Rating before restructuring: Satisfactory Rating after restructuring: Satisfactory Overall rating: Satisfactory Based on the disbursement-weighted rating to take into account the revision in the PDO indicator target (see Table 1), the achievement of project objectives is rated Satisfactory. 28

29 Table 1. Revision in PDO Indicator Target Before restructuring - against initial PDO indicator targets At project closing - against formally revised PDO indicator targets and new indicator Overall Rating S S S Rating value 5 5 S Weight (% disbursed) 72% 28% 100% Weighted value Final rating S This rating reflects the successful implementation of the Project, its strategic relevance, and innovative nature, as described in sections 3.1 and 3.2. The Project objectives were in line with the Government s national social protection strategy and the Bank s CAS for Bangladesh. The design focused on reducing the vulnerability of the extremely poor during lean seasons of the year, while introducing innovations into key processes targeting, encouraging female participation, reducing leakages and political capture, and improving monitoring and evaluation. These are being drawn on as the Government (and the Bank) expands reforms into other areas of social protection. In most instances, innovations in design resulted in improved outcomes and improved efficiency, as noted in sections 3.2 and 3.3. Some challenges were encountered, as reflected in two restructurings to accommodate a sharper poverty targeting and the effects of inflation on wages; and in technical adjustments in processes during implementation. Shortcomings were observed in the methodology for the household surveys, which gives some uncertainty to the achievement of the vulnerability objective; and in the results framework, where PDO indicators were included only for the first sub-objective shortterm employment. 3.5 OVERARCHING THEMES, OTHER OUTCOMES, AND IMPACTS (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development Poverty impact. The project had a strong focus on the very poor, limiting mis-targeting to an estimated 2.8 percent of beneficiaries, the leakages essentially reflecting the recording of ghost workers on a few work sites. These are expected to be bettercontrolled as the lessons of the pilot on worker attendance begin to be applied in the follow on SNSP. The effect on the well-being of families was significant, as wages provided income to those least likely to have sources of income during the lean seasons. External reviews indicated that participating households displayed significantly higher consumption during lean periods than comparator groups. 29

30 Gender and social development. As a workfare safety net program that focused on small-scale maintenance and repair, the EGPP was successful in extending coverage to segments of the labor force that had earlier tended to be marginalized in works schemes, including women. Female participation exceeded the project target of 33 percent during the implementation period, albeit with significant variation by location. Participation was particularly low in wealthier communities and more conservative ones. In practice, the EGPP has evolved into a flagship safety net program for the Government. According to third-party assessments, it is strongly entrenched in local community life, with lean-season interventions keenly awaited by the most vulnerable among the rural poor. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening The project brought about significant institutional and process changes as discussed in section 2. They are being retained and strengthened, including under the SNSP project. In addition, as noted in section 3.2, the Project triggered institutional strengthening measures which positively affected the entire Program. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (Positive or Negative) Guidelines for subproject design emphasized relatively simple interventions with lighter workload demands, for example, workfare schemes with a greater than usual emphasis on repairs and maintenance. This encouraged women s participation, and it also made it easier to draw in other more fragile segments of the labor force that under other circumstances might have been marginalized in works schemes. Moreover, the emphasis on repairs and maintenance also came to include rural infrastructure needs that otherwise were likely to be bypassed because of their modest size. Administrative lags at the district level between the approval and start of works would often postpone the start of works into the harvesting season, when the EGPP beneficiaries normally sought job opportunities. In addition, the rainy season made it difficult to do earthworks, which were a major type of work under the project. As indicated in section 2.2, this was partly solved by extending the work week from five to six days in anticipation of harvesting. 3.6 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF BENEFICIARY SURVEY AND/OR STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOPS Focus group discussions were carried out with beneficiaries as part of third party assessment activities and a summary has been provided in Annex 5. Overall findings indicate there was sufficient information provided regarding the Program preceding each phase, albeit from various sources, ranging from the local political administration to the sub-district Upazila administrative officers; the majority of the beneficiaries stated that the subprojects comprised useful activities that benefit the general population of the area, and almost all beneficiaries appreciated the use of Labor Leaders, who were invaluable in 30

31 providing information and supervisory support. Areas that required further strengthening included the need for increased publicity measures during beneficiary selection; providing more awareness on grievance redress procedures and addressing the difficulties associated with high cost and time incurred in traveling to the bank, particularly for those beneficiaries who were more remotely located. These issues were taken on board both during the implementation of the Project as well as in informing the preparation of the SNSP. 4. ASSESSMENT OF RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME Rating: Moderate The PAD rated the risk to the development outcome achievement as Substantial, based on low program-implementation capacity, notably with regard to targeting and benefits payment; and lack of experience in working with the Bank. It did not flag policy shortcomings as a risk. The risk to the sustainability of the project achievements after EGPP project closing is moderate. While a program like the EGPP will always depend on political will and adequate resources being made available through the Government budget, it is likely that the EGPP will continue to have strong Government support. It is already deemed a flagship program for the Government, and this is reflected in the fact that increased budget resources were allocated to it throughout Project implementation, amounting to an overall 40 percent increase over the Project period. Still, there is some risk attached as the country moves forward in its efforts to harmonize social protection programs, including through the SNSP. While implementation of the EGPP Project was administered from a Project Implementation Office in MODMR, the continued Program implementation was mainstreamed under MODMR s regular implementing arm the Department of Disaster Management (DDM) following the close of the project in December The DDM is also responsible for implementing four other safety nets and the expanded responsibility of EGPP implementation may put a strain on its resources, although one year into the implementation of SNSP, there is little indication of this risk. 5. ASSESSMENT OF BANK AND BORROWER PERFORMANCE 5.1 BANK PERFORMANCE (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Satisfactory The Bank team brought a wealth of international experience in reforming safety net programs, including public works schemes, and it drew on lessons from the 100-day Employment Program that had preceded the EGPP. Working closely with the Government on developing the results framework and defining the DLIs, it shaped a 31

32 Project that was strategically relevant in focusing on both immediate relief and institution building, with a design that addressed key challenges with broad application to better safety net performance generally improved targeting, better governance, and rigorous monitoring and evaluation. Emphasis was placed on smoothing incomes for extremely poor households and on facilitating women s access to the Program through its design features and by introducing quotas; and it engaged communities in the process by giving them a role in beneficiary selection and subproject choice. M&E mechanisms allowed learning-by-doing and incremental improvements to cope with teething problems as new processes were introduced. While risk was initially assessed as being substantial, mitigating measures were introduced during implementation, which, in most instances, were successful. Local implementation capacity was to some extent overestimated, and had to be strengthened during implementation; and more weight would have to be given to non-wage costs to avoid leakages from wage funds. Moreover, no outcome indicators were included to underpin the PDO outcomes beyond ones for temporary job creation; and an inadvertent omission was the initial absence of targets for FY2014 in the original results framework. Finally, the methodology for the household surveys could have been more closely considered early on. Instead, it now lends some uncertainty to achievement of addressing the vulnerability sub-objective. (b) Quality of Supervision (Including Fiduciary and Safeguards Policies) Rating: Satisfactory A field-based Bank team that combined solid technical skills and policy understanding provided continuous monitoring of project implementation, as well as undertaking formal supervision missions. Timely interventions ensured that IDA disbursements took place on schedule, and that the Project was completed on time with satisfactory results. The robustness of the reforms and strengthened institutional features that were introduced under the Project, as indicated in section 3.2, ensured that these could credibly begin to be applied in the broader reform of the social protection system on which the Government was embarking. The supervision team was able to quickly engage with the Government to address challenges when they arose: adjusting geographic targeting weights to emphasize poorer Upazilas; removing bottlenecks in field-level monitoring of work sites before they threatened work programs and wage payments; recognizing the need for better payment mechanisms for remotely located workers, and better work attendance monitoring, and initiating pilots to find solutions to these issues; promoting the use of signboards to inform about worksites and eligible workers; and introducing the missing quantitative targets for the first phase of FY2014. When faced with unexpected delays in setting up the MIS for the Program (see section 2.4 on Procurement), the team found alternative solutions, drawing on existing, streamlined, information mechanisms. Otherwise, fiduciary and safeguard policies were correctly applied. While the level-two restructuring (section 1.3) could have been undertaken earlier, or each time, as necessary, the decision to postpone formal restructuring towards the end of the Project, was a pragmatic one. The one concern regarding supervision performance relates to the household surveys, where concerns with the methodology might have been tackled at the latest during implementation. While the quality of supervision might justify a highly satisfactory rating, the ICR nevertheless conservatively rates it satisfactory. 32

33 (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Satisfactory Taking into account the ratings of satisfactory on both ensuring quality at entry and supervision, overall Bank performance is rated satisfactory. 5.2 BORROWER PERFORMANCE (a) Government Performance Rating: Highly Satisfactory The Government, as the financial authority and policy-making body, had already taken full ownership of the Program prior to seeking Bank assistance for improving it, and remained fully committed to it throughout implementation. By displaying a high level of policy engagement, involving in particular the Ministries of Finance and of Food and Disaster Management 14 (the latter would also house the project management team), it facilitated continuous improvements in operations, including strengthening the Program s poverty focus, and saw to it that adequate budget resources were available while at the same time ensuring that the Program would remain within a reasonable budget envelope. The latter is illustrated by the reduction in the scope of the Program early on (from 100 days to 80 days) to ensure its fiscal feasibility. The Government demonstrated commendable foresight to see the EGPP Project as a stepping stone to broader reform in social protection. The engagement with the Bank was therefore not only a financial one, but also a means of seeking technical support for systemic social protection reforms. The level of commitment continued through three government changes, none of which adversely affected Program implementation, and is evidenced through the increased budget allocation to the Program over the course of implementation. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Satisfactory The MODMR implemented the Project through the Office of the EGPP Project Director, which was supported by a project implementation team with the necessary fiduciary expertise and technical skills to undertake implementation. The team was able to monitor implementation, and it collaborated well with the Bank team in reacting in a timely manner to field-level challenges as signaled through the monitoring and evaluation processes. It was able to maintain a full contingent of Field Supervisors despite resignations, especially towards the end of the Project; and it initiated workshops to disseminate learnings on the Project for field level officials and other line ministries staff. 14 Subsequently the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief (MODMR). 33

34 It did however generate minor instances of mis-procurement and encounter difficulties in larger procurement, in particular, contracting for the MIS, primarily due to the gaps created by the rapid turnover in procurement expertise, which would threaten disbursement of IDA funds and the effectiveness of information flows. This was managed through intensive proactivity on the part of the project team to facilitate MIS development once contracting issues had been resolved and allowed for the achievement of all DLI targets and full disbursement under component 1. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Satisfactory Taking into account the ratings of Highly Satisfactory on the part of the Government and Satisfactory on the part of the Implementing Agency, overall Borrower performance is rated satisfactory. 6. LESSONS LEARNED (BOTH PROJECT-SPECIFIC AND OF WIDE GENERAL APPLICATION) Strategic entry point and focused program. The EGPP Project served as a strategic entry point for the Bank on its policy dialogue in the social protection arena and, by enabling incremental and positive changes to the Program, it led to strong collaboration between the Bank and the Government and established the Bank as a credible partner in bringing relevant international good practice in building sound social protection systems in Bangladesh. This has resulted in a longer term programmatic engagement and continued dialogue on improving the design, implementation and monitoring of safety net programs. As such, it was important to keep the overall program simple and focused on a few critical reforms. The instrument design with DLI financing to leverage policy changes and technical assistance to motivate institutions to implement policies proved to be effective in achieving the intended results. Further details on the choice of instrument are below. Use of results-based lending through DLIs was a suitable instrument to help drive specific policy changes through budget support. The instrument, coupled with technical assistance, was an effective way to build capacity to sustain such policy changes. However, this form of lending can also be a complex instrument and considerable thought should be given to the nature of targets (that is, whether to fix them to a specific date, failing which the Borrower will not be able to request disbursement of the financing amount allocated to that DLI, or keep them floating, whereby the Borrower can request disbursement against the achievement of the DLI at any point after the achievement has been formally verified) and in setting a realistic schedule of targets so that risks of slippage are minimized. Defining the results framework. The DLI-based instrument allowed the dialogue with counterparts to focus more on outputs, outcomes, and results, thereby helping to promote continuity in politically difficult, governance-oriented reforms. However, there must be a 34

35 clear articulation of linkages in formulating indicators, targets, and protocols to ensure that the DLIs are helping in the achievement of project objectives. Independent verification through third party monitoring. Although no external validation mechanism was put in place under the Project to measure and monitor results, the Bank team utilized Trust Fund resources to conduct independent spot-checks and operational assessments during each phase of the Program which enabled a positive feedback loop by identifying areas that required remedial measures and course correction, and thus informed necessary changes and updates to Program guidelines. Creating opportunities for marginal groups and addressing the needs of the community. The design of workfare subprojects had a favorable effect on job opportunities for community members who are often sidelined in the job market. In the EGPP, the lighter workload of the public workfare schemes (primarily maintenance work) and their proximity to local communities facilitated women s participation. At the same time, it also had the effect of extending coverage to other, more fragile, segments of the labor force that had earlier tended to be marginalized in works schemes. Although generating community assets was not the primary objective of the Program, independent assessments confirmed that the subprojects implemented addressed the maintenance needs of existing infrastructure, which is an overlooked aspect of rural infrastructure in Bangladesh. Use of smart technology to address administrative challenges. Operational assessments highlighted two potential areas of weakness in program administration, namely irregularities in recording attendance at work sites and payment mismanagement. An innovative pilot using mobile phones and Bangladesh Post Office cash cards for attendance verification and payment solutions demonstrated that while there may be initial hurdles, as would be expected with introducing any new technology, once beneficiaries understand how a new solution helps them directly (reduced processing time, greater transparency, etc.), there will be greater effort on their part to learn it more proactively. At the same time, the solution must adopt a customer-centric approach to start with and design appropriate tools and processes with the intended users in mind. Using lessons from the initial pilot, further innovations, such as the use of biometric technology, is being considered under the follow-on SNSP operation. 7. COMMENTS ON ISSUES RAISED BY BORROWER, IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES, AND PARTNERS (a) Borrower/implementing agencies None (b) Co-financiers None (c) Other partners and stakeholders 35

36 None 36

37 ANNEX 1. PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING (a) Project Cost by Component (in US$ Million Equivalent) Components Appraisal Estimate (US$, millions) Actual/Latest Estimate (US$, millions) Percentage of Appraisal Main Component Operational Support Component Total Baseline Cost Physical Contingencies Price Contingencies Total Project Costs (b) Financing Source of Funds Type of Co-financing Appraisal Estimate (US$, millions) Actual/Latest Estimate (US$, millions) Percentage of Appraisal Borrower Direct International Development Association (IDA)

38 ANNEX 2. OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT The main project component (component 1) paid wages amounting to US$ million to 3.02 million beneficiaries for million person-days of employment. Altogether, 106,700 subprojects were completed. Based on a sample audit of twenty districts across the country, Table 2 shows the type of subprojects that were typically undertaken: Table 2. Sample of Subprojects Financed under EGPP Type of Work as % of total Canal Dredging 3 Canal Repair 1 Drain and Road Repair 2 Drain Repair 1 Earth Filling 8 Embankment Repair 2 Mosque/Pagoda/Temple Development 0.4 Road and Embankment Repair 2 Road Repair 77 Road Repair and Earth Filling 4 School Development 0.3 Other 0.3 The operational support component (component 2) provided the resources for: installation of an automated MIS for program administration, monitoring, and evaluation; financing of the project implementation team, including a project director and deputy director, and specialists in MIS, training, financial management, and procurement; financing of Field Supervisors and related transportation; and training for the beneficiary targeting and enrollment process. In addition, Bank-executed Trust Fund resources provided for M&E mechanism, including: o One baseline (2010), one midline (2011), and one end-line (2012) household survey o One impact evaluation based on the household surveys (2013) o Four spot checks and process assessments ( ) o One qualitative evaluation based on focus group discussions on recall of worker experience (2013) o One external operational assessment 38

39 ANNEX 3. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS The economic analysis applies a cost effectiveness analysis to the program. It follows the analysis used in the PAD that draws on an approach suggested in Ravallion (1998) for appraising workfare programs. It determines how cost effective the EGPP is in raising incomes of the poor compared to a counterfactual where every household in the population receives a uniform transfer. This analysis compares the assumptions in the PAD and calculates cost effectiveness ratios based on actual results under the project. It considers (i) the extent to which the program reaches the beneficiary population; (ii) program benefits as measured by net income transfers to poor households; and (iii) the value of community assets created under the program for poor households. Welfare benefits arising from avoiding negative coping behaviors are not considered. In the analysis, the proportion of public expenditure on the program accruing as net income gains to the poor is restructured to include the following components: a) Government spending. All financing comes from general revenues, in line with the assumption in the PAD b) Labor intensity, that is the wage costs as a share of total operating costs, averaged 91 percent, compared with a PAD estimate of between 80 and 90 percent, assuming non-wage costs of percent. c) Targeting performance, that is the share of wages that went to the intended beneficiaries, was 94 percent, compared with a PAD estimate of 80 percent. d) The net wage gain, that is household income with participation minus income in the absence of participation, was conservatively estimated between 51 percent and 60 percent in the PAD. These estimates have been retained in the analysis. e) Indirect benefits. The benefit from assets use two alternatives, one where no indirect benefits accrue (reflected in current gains per unit of spending); and the other assuming a 35 percent benefit accruing to the extremely poor - assuming that indirect benefits accrue proportionately to the extremely poor and others in the community, reflecting the poverty rate in the community. Here, the analysis envisages two scenarios: one that looks at current values, assuming that benefits only accrue in the future; and another that includes future indirect benefits to the poor. Table 3 sets out the results of the analysis. The current earnings gain per dollar of program spending is 0.38 or 0.45, depending on the estimate of net earnings gain. It also means that it takes US$2.63 or US$2.22, respectively, to transfer US$1 to the beneficiary. A similar analysis indicates that the earnings gain per dollar of program spending when indirect benefits are included is 0.76 or 0.83, respectively, depending on the estimate of net earnings gain. It also means that it takes US$1.32 or US$1.20, respectively, to transfer US$1 to the beneficiary. 39

40 In both instances, current and current and future gains exceed the poverty rate 31.5 percent indicating that the EGPP outperforms the counterfactual of a uniform allocation of the budget to the population in terms of poverty reduction. Table 3. Comparison of Assumptions Categories EGPP - PAD EGPP - ICR Budget leverage Labor intensity Targeting Net wage gain Indirect benefits Benefit-cost ratio Current gains per unit of spending / / Cost of unit gained US$2.60 $3.10 US$2.63 US$2.22 Current + future gains per unit of spending Cost of unit gained US$1.30 US$1.60 US$1.32 US$

41 ANNEX 4. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION PROCESSES (a) Task Team members Lending Names Title Unit Maitreyi B. Das Senior Social Protection Specialist SASSP Shaikh Shamsuddin Ahmed Senior Economist SASSP Oleksij Sluchinskyy Senior Economist SASSP Jay Pascual Consultant/Counsel LEGES Thao Le Nguyen Senior Finance Officer CTRFC Chau-Ching Shen Senior Finance Officer CTRFC Hassan Zaman Lead Economist PRMPR Burhanuddin Ahmed Senior Financial Management Specialist SARFM Furquan Ahmad Saleem Senior Financial Specialist SARFM Tanvir Hossain Procurement Specialist SARPS Shakil A. Ferdausi Environmental Specialist SASDI Jessica Leino Young professional/economist SASHD Gertrude Cooper Program Assistant SASSP Md. Mahtab Alam Program Assistant SASSP Sandra X. Alborta Program Assistant SASSP Ashiq Aziz ETC/Operations Analyst SASSP Nadia Shamin ETC/Environmental Specialist SASDI Sabah Moyeen ETC/Social Development Analyst SASDS Denis Nikitin ETC/Research Analyst SASSP Nadia Sharmin ETC/Environmental Analyst SASDI Pravesh Kumar Consultant/Economist SASHD Ashish Joshi Consultant/MIS Payment System SASHD Shirin Jahangeer Consultant SASDS Joost Gorter Supervision/ICR Consultant/M&E Iffath Sharif Program Leader and TTL SACBA Aneeka Rahman TTL (ICR) GSPDR Ashiq Aziz Operations Analyst GSPDR Pravesh Kumar Social Protection Specialist GSPDR M.R. Ashish Joshi Consultant GSPDR 41

42 Names Title Unit Hjalte Sederlof Consultant (ICR) GSPDR Nushin Subhan Consultant GSPDR Mohammad Sayeed Consultant GSPDR Md. Mahtab Alam Program Assistant GSPDR Sandra Alborta Program Assistant GSPDR Mohammad Khalid Khan Program Assistant GSPDR Burhanuddin Ahmed Senior Financial Management GGODR Specialist Mohammed Atikuzzaman Financial Management Specialist GGODR Tanvir Hossain Senior Procurement Specialist GGODR Farhat Jahan Chowdhury Environment Consultant GENDR Sabah Moyeen Social Development Specialist GURDR (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks US$, thousands (including travel and consultant costs) Lending , Supervision/ICR , Total 840,

43 ANNEX 5. BENEFICIARY SURVEY RESULTS Summary of Focus Groups Discussions with Beneficiaries 15 Information dissemination In most areas, information on the EGPP was disseminated through meetings among UP project committee and local communities. Information circulation began days prior to the EGPP work start date. In some areas where poverty rate is higher and employment opportunities are more sought after, awareness on the project was built through word-of- mouth. Nevertheless, procedural details about the program were provided by the UP members and Chairmen. Local political leaders also played an active role in spreading awareness about the EGPP. Information on the project was provided through television broadcast which proved to be quite effective in building awareness on the EGPP in some areas. UP committees organized miking in local markets to spread information on the EGPP. In some areas UP Chairmen, UP members, Tag Officers and chowkidars were responsible for information dissemination. Overall, information that was provided through different methods was considered to be adequate by the beneficiaries. Knowledge on responsible body for project implementation The general idea among the beneficiaries was that UP Chairmen and members would be responsible for the implementation of the program. Tag Officers along with Union Project committees were considered to be the responsible bodies for project implementation in some areas. In some areas political leaders were considered to be responsible for project implementation. Beneficiary selection process and mobilization In some areas UP project committee had to take the help of a local influential person to mobilize workers because the wage rate was lower than the existing market rate. In some areas beneficiaries were under the impression that local political leaders were in charge of beneficiary selection. Local political leaders did play a significant role in assisting the Project Committee in the selection of beneficiaries in most targeted areas. Overall, local politicians were not able to manipulate the process of beneficiary selection but in some areas beneficiaries were not sure about who was responsible 15 Taken from assessments conducted by Power and Participation Research Centre (Employment Generation Program for the Poorest [EGPP]: A Qualitative Assessment [ ]) under the Project. 43

44 for beneficiary selection. More than 40 percent of the beneficiaries who participated in the FGDs reported that they were selected in the Program by UP Chairmen and members. Level of awareness on eligibility criteria Almost all beneficiaries who participated in the FGDs were aware that the main objective of the EGPP program was to create short-term employment for the poorest people in their respective areas. All participants of these FGDs were aware that this program would target both male and female able workers who were poor and unemployed. Transparency in selection of beneficiaries percent of the participants reported that the selection was done mainly in presence of the Union Council by the UP Chairmen along with the UP members and the process was transparent. However, local politicians were reported to have some influence on the selection process but all poor from the targeted communities were included in the list of beneficiaries. In a few reported cases participants had to pay some amount of money to be included in the list. Some also agreed to have provided bribe to certain elite members of their society to open respective beneficiary bank accounts and to receive their Job cards percent of beneficiaries who attended these FGDs reported to have been chosen as beneficiaries in both phases in a year. Job card distribution and knowledge of its service 70 percent of participants reported to have received their job cards before the work week started. Most of these beneficiaries were aware that the job cards were required to open a bank account and receive their wages. Some beneficiaries admitted that for safe keeping they kept their respective job cards with the PIC Chairmen, Labor Leaders and the UP Secretaries until payday. Beneficiaries informed that they did not face any difficulty while trying to open bank accounts. However, they did complain about distance travelled and expenses that occurred to get to the banks. Participants could provide all personal documentation required to open accounts. They received clear instructions from their local government authorities and leaders. Access to information 50 percent of the participants informed that signboards with information on daily wage rate number of working days and LS allocation were places a week before work week. 100 percent participants appreciate these signboards as they are an easy access to important information about the project. In some worksites signboards were never put up. In order to increase transparency at the worksites these signboards are strongly requested by the participants. 44

45 Role of Labor Leaders Majority of the participants reported that the Labor Leaders were responsible for managing and maintaining the attendance register as well as the master roll. 85 percent of the participants reported that they relied on the Labor Leaders for work plan and supervisory support. Most of the beneficiaries rely on Labor Leaders for their assistance during receipt of wages as well as for maintenance of job cards and check books. Types of projects preferred by beneficiaries 90 percent of beneficiaries suggested projects to be undertaken that would help in construction/reconstruction of roads, bridges and embankments. 65 percent of participants reported that in their areas drainage facilities need to be developed. To better facilitate travel between two villages more connecting roads should be built. In order to cope with water crisis in some areas, beneficiaries strongly suggested building of canals. Male vs. Female workers percent of the participants reported that there is no difference between the type of work undertaken by male and female laborers. In some cases it was reported that it was difficult for female workers to till the soil, and therefore, they are thought to be more efficient in carrying the soil from one place to another. Wage disbursement process On average, Program participants work 5 days a week for 8 hours a day. 75 percent of participants reported that they receive their wages from banks upon showing their job cards/slip vouchers. Some beneficiaries reported that they encountered difficulties in opening accounts at the banks. Above 80 percent of participants have valid bank accounts which they are maintaining from the beginning of the project. Beneficiaries also informed that banks are putting BDT 25 per day from their daily wages aside as savings. Participants appreciated this initiative as they realize that by the end of a month they have more money at their disposal which can help them in times of need economic crisis. Some beneficiaries complained of the transport fare that they had to pay each time in order to collect their wages from the banks. Grievance redress system 100 percent of beneficiary reported that complaints were verbally lodged to the UP Chairmen and members; the Project Implementation Committee Chair, and Field Supervisors. 45

46 Participants were unaware of any formal channel/forms for placing complaints. Some participants informed that they were provided with a phone number at the Upazila Project Implementation Office to report complaints to the tag officer, field officers and UP Chairmen. These complaints were addressed at meetings which were every fortnight. Monitoring & Evaluation 80 percent of participants reported that Project Implementation Committee Chairmen and members and Field Supervisors make regular monitoring visits to project sites. These officers ensure workers attendance, ensure quality of work and report on progress of work. 70 percent of participants reported that more visits by senior, Upazila-level officers would help in improving the transparency of the project. Suggestions 90 percent of the participants reported that there should be an increase in the number of beneficiaries targeted. Majority of beneficiaries requested the wage rate to be more than the markets rate. Beneficiaries also suggested that a system should be developed where no political influence or manipulation in beneficiary selection can take place. 50 percent of participants requested an increase in the number of working days. Incentivize the UP Chairmen and members in order to improve the monitoring and accountability system. 46

47 ANNEX 6. STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOP REPORT AND RESULTS N.A. 47

48 ANNEX 7. SUMMARY OF BORROWER'S ICR AND/OR COMMENTS ON DRAFT ICR 48

49 ANNEX 8. COMMENTS OF CO-FINANCIERS AND OTHER PARTNERS/STAKEHOLDERS N.A. 49

50 ANNEX 9. LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS EGPP Project documents EGPP Project Appraisal Report, Report No: BD, October 27, 2010 Implementation Status and Results Reports, Sequence Numbers 1 6 EGPP Operating Manual Restructuring Paper of the EGPP, Report No: RES11745, November 5, 2013 Report on Procurement (Post) Review of World Bank Funded Project Employment Generation Program for the Poorest (EGPP) (Credit Number 4833-BD), Conducted by: ACNABIN, Chartered Accountants, June 2014 EGPP: An Analysis of the Baseline Survey Data, 3/24/2012 EGPP: The Evolution from Baseline to End-line, 6/3/2013 EGPP: A Qualitative Assessment EGPP: Spot checks EGPP: Card-based Pilot Evaluation Report, April 2013 EGPP: Mobile-based Pilot Evaluation Report, April

51 ANNEX 10. DISBURSEMENT LINKED INDICATORS (DLIS) FOR THE MAIN PROGRAM COMPONENT 51

52 52

53 53

54 The DLI target for geographic targeting was amended on November 5, 2013 to reflect updated poverty statistics and ensure that the provisions under the EGPP and the SNSP were aligned. The changes were as follows: Target for Disbursement Previous Actual allocation from Ministry to Upazilas as follows: Upazila Poverty Rate % of Program Resources 35% and higher 60% 21% to 34% 35% 20% and lower 5% And a minimum of 45% of actual expenditures on wage costs in each phase going to Upazilas with extreme poverty rates 35% and higher Revision Actual allocation from Ministry to Upazilas as follows: Upazila Poverty Rate % of Program Resources 40% and higher 45% 29% to 39% 25% 19% to 28% 20% 18% and lower 10% And a minimum of 45% of actual expenditures on wage costs in each phase going to Upazilas with extreme poverty rates 35% and higher The updated geographic targeting formula would apply to the first phase of the program in FY2014. The change is a technical one. It requires no modification of the category to which its linked disbursement pertains, in the evidence required for disbursement, or in the verification mechanisms that the Bank would employ. 54

55 55