Lessons from Antyodaya for the integrated rural development

Transcription

1 Lessons from Antyodaya for the integrated rural development Inderjit Khanna and Ashok Subramanian The paper reviews Antyodaya the programme of the Government of Rajasthan to raise the income of the poorest citizens. The analysis is based on a survey of 50 beneficiaries. The involvement of the village community in identifying the beneficiaries was a notable feature of the programme. However, like many such programmes, in this one too, quantitative targetry overshadowed solid achievement and the goal of economic self-reliance for the poorest. The implications of the Antyodaya experience for the Integrated Rural Development Programme of the Government of India, involving an annual expenditure of over a billion rupees, are sketched, and some suggestions for its more effective management made. Inderjit Khanna of Indian Administrative Services on deputation from the Rajasthan Government is a visiting faculty at the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad. Ashok Subramanian is a faculty member from the Public Systems Group at Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad. The Antyodaya programme was launched in the mid 70s in Rajasthan by the state government to assist the poorest families and lift them out of their state of abject poverty. As the name connotes, Antyodaya was the bottom man's programme. Most of the governmental programmes were being implemented in Rajasthan when Antyodaya was introduced. These included the Small Farmers' Development Agency (SFDA), the Marginal Farmers and Agricultural Labourers' (MFAL), tribal sub-plan, drought prone area and desert development programmes, and special animal husbandry programmes focussing on the 21 million rural population. A study of these various programmes had revealed the following deficiencies: 1. The SFDA and MFAL programmes had an uneven coverage. Six out of 26 districts had these projects, covering only one-third of the marginal and small farmers. The others felt discriminated against. 2. There were other categories of poor people such as artisans, non-agricultural labourers, and self-employed persons who were omitted from the above mentioned schemes. 3. The target groups, even in the areas of operation, were too large and the resource limited, with the result that the existing schemes were generally found to cover only the upper crust of the target groups. The poorest did not benefit from these schemes. The authors wish to thank Professor P. N. Khandwalla for his comments on the paper, and Mr. Raj Kataria for his contribution in the field study. Vol 7. No. 3, July-September,

2 4. The programmes covered only some activities in rural areas and a number of per sons who wanted economic benefits but were involved in other activities were deprived of the same. 5. There was considerable centralization in the existing schemes and the annual budgets of such schemes were approved by the central government. In June 1977, the new state government felt that the existing programmes were inadequate in terms of coverage, resources, and local participation, consequently the Antyodaya programme was launched in October In the words of the then Chief Minister, "It is a programme of social and economic uplift of the poorest of the poor... By Antyodaya we have inverted the process of development which only helped the rich becoming richer and poor getting poorer. Beginning with the last man we would reverse the path of development upward" (6b). The programme was to assist a group of five poor families every year in each village starting with the poorest, in order to ensure their means of livelihood and to enable them to cross the poverty line. It was to serve all the 33,000 odd villages in the state. Four special features marked the programme. 1. The family was to be identified ^locally in its village setting and helped. 2. Emphasis was to be given to the delivery of productive assets. 3. The administration was to perform an active outreach function rather than remain passive. 4. The identification criteria were to be strictly economic. The existing bureaucratic machinery from the state secretariat down to the Block Development Officer (BDO) and the Village Level Worker (VLW) was used for the execution of the programme. In order to strengthen coordination, a district level coordination committee; a state level inter-ministerial policy committee} and a state level inter-departmental committee of direction were set up. The interest of the political leadership generated a momentum for implementation in the administrative leadership (6a & b). Studies of the programmes of the 70s have pointed to problems in implementation at the field level (5a & b, 7). Some of the significant problems mentioned are: identification of beneficiaries, inadequate information available to them, corrupt practices among the various agents of developmental institutions, delays, etc. Action for their resolution would certainly improve the performance of future programmes. However, it may be argued that even implementation is made more effective, the performance of the programme will depend considerably on its design. In other words, strategic choices made by the planners with regard to the beneficiary (who is to be served), the type of service (what is to be offered to the beneficiary), and the means of provision of the service (the organizational form and process) are critical. Inappropriate strategic choices may handicap the management of the programme. Thus, while operational efficiency may be enhanced by improving implementation, the overall effectiveness may still not be accomplished. In this paper, therefore, we wish to identify the elements of design in the Antyodaya programme and understand its implications for this programme, in particular, and for other antipoverty measures like the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP,). The purpose of the paper is not to evaluate the implementation of Antyodaya in any definitive manner. The paper draws on data from a study of 50 families from two blocks of a district in Rajasthan who were interviewed in September 1981, almost four years after the introduction of Antyodaya. The sample included recipients of benefits from a relatively less developed and a relatively more developed block of the district. Along with the programme documents and other studies, a glimpse of a small sample of beneficiaries has encouraged us to suggest some propositions and also raise a few questions. 228 Vikalpa

3 A glimpse from below The first two rounds of the Antyodaya were implemented in and with some changes made in the second round, learning from the experience gained in the first. The beneficiary families were identified at a gathering of the gram sabha (village meeting). The active involvement of the potential beneficiary groups and the community at large in identifying the Antyodaya families was a significant feature of the programme. Revenue camps were then held along with the gram sabha to distribute benefits such as land and pension. Similarly, credit camps were held to ensure distribution of credit to the beneficiaries. By March 1979, nearly 200,000 families were assisted by the programme (6b). Though in these schemes the beneficiaries were selected irrespective of their religion, caste, etc., an analysis showed that 58 per cent of the identified persons in the first round, and 53 per cent in the second round belonged to the scheduled castes/tribes communities. Assistance was extended in the form of the following benefits: 1) pension; 2) land and credit to be used for land improvement; 3) selfemployment through animal husbandry or the setting up of community services such as shops; and 4) wage employment. The assistance package was enlarged from time to time depending on the beneficiaries. It consisted of a social security benefit of Rs. 40 per month for the old and those unable to undertake any economic activity. The allotment of agricultural land for cultivation, though an important scheme, was one which would diminish with time. Subsidized loan assistance was provided for farm development, farm forestry; animal husbandry activities such as dairy, poultry, fish and pig rearing; service occupations like tailoring, blacksmithy, carpentry, shoe making, bullock and camel carts for transportation, and pottery. Loans for manufacturing activities like soap and salt making, handicrafts, mining, and for taking up small time rural vocations like cycle repairing, and running pan and tea shops, were also found to be in demand. The All India Khadi and Village Industries Commission was also harnessed to help the selected families through its activities. Preferential employment was given to these families in public works. The type of assistance given depended largely on the preference indicated by the beneficiaries. Some other social benefits like provision of school books to children of Antyodaya families, reservation of 10 per cent seats in hostels run by the social welfare department, and free supply of uniforms to children of such families were extended. Land as a benefit. Of the 50 families interviewed, 29 were allotted land, 15 sanctioned credit for self-employment, and 6 were given pension. Land, an attractive benefit, was chosen because either the beneficiaries were small landholders or agricultural labourers and desired land of their own. The use of land seems to have varied between the less and more developed parts of the district. Altogether, 6 of the 29 land beneficiaries did not get actual possession of the land. Of the rest, 15 were cultivating it and obtaining returns of 1 to 2.5 quintals of maize per year, one found the land unfit for cultivation, and 7 had started improvements on it. On the whole, those who also got credit for land improvement managed to make more productive use of the land. In the more developed block, the beneficiaries in the villages near the main road and close to the only large town in the district retained the land. Although unproductive at present, it was nevertheless an asset with the potential of future appreciation in value. Those near the municipality octroi post had some alternative employment possibilities due to the truck queue at the post. In addition, the fact that the village was included in the urban master plan of the nearby town, seemed to have motivated 'holding' the land rather than using it. Complaints of poor quality of land, lack of other inputs, distance, availability of alternative employment, and poor yield were the major factors responsible for non-use of land. Land was thus in demand because of the security and social status associated with it. However, it did not seem to have contributed Vol. 7, No. 3, July-September,

4 significantly to an enhancement of economic status because much of the land given was of poor quality. Hence making it a valuable proposition required the extension to the beneficiaries of a variety of agricultural inputs such as bullocks, plough, seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, etc. The new farmer would also need to be educated about crop patterns, etc. Credit for self-employment. Self-employment benefit was of two kinds credit for animal husbandry, and for setting up a community service. Of the 15 such beneficiaries, 2 had gained a firm footing and had crossed the poverty line. One of these, a non-tribal, who had got a buffalo through the programme, seemed to have gained from it and earned enough to cross the poverty line. He had cleared his loan in three years and obtained another for a second buffalo. He was also collecting and selling the milk of his village in a pilgrim centre, some 7 kilometres away. At the time of the study, he was diversifying into other lines on his milk sale visits by procuring vegetables to sell in his own village. The second beneficiary was helped to set up a cycle shop in the more developed block. He was earning Rs. 3,000 a year from the shop which considerably supplemented his family's income. If one were to identify a single factor that contributed to the success of the enterprise, it was a set of very favourable circumstances in the environment. People from the village which had the cycle shop commuted to the town for work; a number of industrial units had come up on the way to the town; and a large educational complex was in existence and was growing. These factors created the demand for repairs and hiring of cycles. The competing transportation modes, the autorickshaw, tonga, and bus were too expensive, infrequent, or time consuming for a trip to the town. In the town itself, the bus services were on limited routes and frequency. Thus the cycle was the ideal mode of transport to and within the town. There was also the case of another beneficiary who was helped to cross the poverty line in the first year of the programme. He used the credit to buy a Tonga and in the first year was earning up to Rs. 4,000 from it. However, the entry of tempos in the area adversly affected his business and he sold the tonga by the third year. Pension Special efforts were made through the programme to make this benefit available to all destitutes and the disabled. Unlike the other benefits, this did not involve the extension of a diverse set of inputs and linkages. After identification of the beneficiary the only task was to maintain a steady flow of the pension amount every month. Of the 6 such beneficiaries interviewed, five were receiving pension regularly. The findings from the field study suggest that about 50 per cent of the beneficiaries interviewed had actually received the benefits, an equal number perceived an improvement in their social status, and nearly two-thirds of those who had taken loans were repaying them. There were also only a few complaints regarding the pension benefit. Four years may be too short a time to assess the impact of an ambitious programme on the scale of Antyodaya. This was, anyway, not the objective of one study. Due to the change of government in 1980, it is quite likely that there was a declaration in the pace of the programme. However, it seems to us that some questions can still be raised about the design of such a programme. Some learnings and questions The objective of the programme was to raise the level of income of selected poorest families above the poverty line of Rs. 3,300 a year. This was to be accomplished by enabling the families to obtain assets or employment. The family being the unit of attention was offered various services such as: 1) sharing of information about the programme; 2) assistance in the choice of benefit; and 3) financial assistance to enable receipt of the benefit. Thus the choice of the beneficiary and the services for him, were clearly in the design of the programme. There were several positive elements of the 230 Vikalpa

5 programme. As mentioned earlier it had the support of political leadership. For any programme of the magnitude of Antyodaya, such support is critical and fulfils a necessary condition for its successful implementation. Second, linkages such as the coordination committees were created within the bureaucracy for efficient functioning. The process of implementation also showed some favourable elements. For example, the identification process, done in public, in the presence of all concerned officials, was surely an outcome of the experience of the earlier target group programmes like the SFDA and the MFAL. In the latter programmes, the identification pursued 'through records and official machinery was found to be unsatisfactory. It is, therefore, apparent that organizational learning is occurring within the development bureaucracy. In terms of the impact of Antoydaya, the social gains which accrue when a person gets a plot of land in the rural area, or when a beneficiary grows in his capabilities to handle organized institutions such as banks, cannot really be assessed. It is, however, to the primary objective of raising the income level to which we shall return, which brings us to questions regarding the design of the programme. The first question that comes up is whether the services planned had taken into consideration all the attributes of the intended beneficiary. The study suggests that it is the oredit for land and for self-employment that had some potential for lifting the beneficiary family upwards in economic status. Not all linkages required to make land productive and to market the produce were available, though some did obtain credit for land improvement. The programme did not plan to provide for marketing assistance but it must be remembered that the Antyodaya families would hardly have been in a position to organize the necessary resources themselves. As regards self-employment, there were only two beneficiaries among those contacted whose income stream was above Rs. 3,300 a year in They needed just a little support from the programme in order to seize the opportunities of a very favourable market. In both these cases, it was the individual's entrepreneurship and the favourable environment which really sustained him through these years, for the programme benefits had provided only the initial support. In some cases, the so-called benefit may even turn out to be a liability in the absence of all the necessary inputs. Thus, milch cattle without access to feed and fodder, and health services will, over time, turn out to be unproductive. The 'tonga case' takes the argument further. Changes in the environment forced the owner of the tonga to sell it after a year or so of productive use. Thus, even if the beneficiary was initially assisted to evolve a productive and beneficial activities, there were no mechanisms to monitor the utilization of the benefit given. The design of the programme was, perhaps, over-optimistic about the beneficiary being able to organize his enterprise adequately and convert the 'benefit' extended land', or credit for an asset or for self-employment into an activity producing a steady cash flow over the years. This suggests three propositions: 1. Those who are able to establish the necessary input and market linkages on their own can use such a programme as a support. 2. Services for which the environment provides favourable conditions have a good chance of yielding reasonable gains. 3. Even if a right fit between an activity and the market is initially established, a changing environment requires a dynamic man agerial response if the benefit is to be sustained. The second question relates to the organization. The administrative structure, from the state secretariat down to the VLW was used. In the past, the experience with this structure has been that it is inadequate for developmental functions which require sustained long term follow-up action (1). The indication from the study is that a service which Vol. 7, No. 3, July-September,

6 involved one-shot action without need for follow-up, such as pension distribution, was perhaps relatively more successful. Similarly distribution of a benefit such as credit was pursued with good results. But where follow-up and action for sustaining the benefits distributed were required, there were difficulties. A PEG study (5b) of the first year's programme hints at the absence of technical and marketing linkages. Mukherjee and Sengupta's (3) case study showed an inappropriate choice of benefit: ten carts were sanctioned to a village which already had many. In a related context, another study (2) reviewing the activities of the IRDP experiment, emphasized follow-up, and sustenance of activities on the part of the beneficiary, rather than mere statistics of coverage. The "After distribution, what?" issue seemed to have received little attention in the design of the programme. For instance, the participation of non-governmental local organizations such as voluntary agencies did not figure in the design. It was only a year after implementation that the follow-up question came up for discussion and action. It is quite likely that the objective of the programme changed implicity from one of raising families above the poverty line to that of distributing a set of benefits and achieving arithmetical targets. For this, one could take a look at the compulsions of the three actors, viz., the political leadership, administrative machinery, and the people. For the first it was a race against time they had to prove themselves before they went to the electorate again in five years time. For the administrative machinery, already under stress in terms of existing workload, it was easiest to follow a one-shot operation to meet such targets, rather than a process of monitoring, follow-up, and nurturing of beneficiaries on a case by case basis. The people, who should be forming demand groups, are, however, apprehensive about the government machinery. Therefore, though they may see faults in the programme, they probably choose to remain silent spectators since they are anyway recipients of some benefits due to a push from above. Lessons for IRDP It is in this context that planning for IRDP becomes critical. As brought out in the Sixth Plan, the IRDP, on the lines of Antyodaya is to assist those "possessing little or virtually no assets... to acquire productive assets and/ or appropriate skills and vocational opportunities and then (be) backed effectively with services to increase production and productivity. If through special programmes of specific beneficiary oriented assistance, this group could be brought above the poverty line, a major impact would have been secured" (4, p. 170). The programme, initiated in a small way in 1978 has, since 1980, spread to cover all the 5,000 blocks throughout the country. While the objective remains that of raising the economic levels of "poorest deciles" above the poverty line, targets have again been set to cover 600 families per year from each block. The government is providing Rs. 8 lakh per block towards subsidy for such families. While this is roughly one-third of the cost of the economic asset given, the remaining two-thirds is to come from bank loans. In a year, therefore, throughout the country, the IRDP would involve an investment of nearly Rs. 1,200 crore, of which Rs. 400 crore would be in the form of subsidy from government and Rs. 800 crore as loan from banks. An investment of Rs. 6,000 crore, during the Sixth Plan period ( ), on a programme is reason enough for one to ponder over its design, structure and process. The features of Antyodaya, in terms of diversity of the beneficiaries and the range of services, are reflected in the IRDP. While provision of the inputs and linkages in an integrated fashion for all the activities conceived of under the IRDP would be very desirable, the feasibility of the district level agency being able to execute this needs a careful examination, case by case, especially in view of the household focus. There is a need for urgent consideration of the fact that in the light of 232 Vikalpa

7 the complexity of the necessary linkages, the programme may degenerate to mere distribution of benefits, rather than raising the income earning capability of the beneficiary. In this connection, it is useful to underline the role of credit as an adjunct rather than as the main- "stay in any programme (8), otherwise commercial institutions can too easily become the whipping boys for unsatisfactory performance. Attempts to provide a one-shot service are bound to miss the objective even while being efficient. At the same time, attempts to take on an overload of diverse tasks and functions is also likely to be ineffective and inefficient. Thus the Planning Commission's call for IRDP to provide not only economic benefits to the poorest but also to provide social services such as health and education to beneficiaries, would impose far too great a burden on the local administrative structures and agencies (4, p. 171). Creating such an overload may deter the IRDP agency from pursuing its already onerous responsibilities and objectives. On the basis of our experience with Antyodaya, it may be advisable for a programme like IRDP to consider options for reducing the diversity of functions and activities, and the consequent overload on the organization. For instance: 1. While political pressures may not gener ally encourage limitations on size, it may be possible in certain areas to limit the activities to selected homogeneous beneficiary groups over a given period so that necessary empathy with and understanding of their attributes and needs can be developed; 2. The beneficiaries may be helped to participate in on-going, well-managed program mes of animal husbandry or rural industry! wherever feasible, thereby 'piggy backing' on their technological and managerial capabilities and at the same time, supplementing them in the field; 3. Local non-governmental agencies aca demic, voluntary, and others could be usefully involved in the sharing of function of aftercare, maintenance, and sustenance of the benefit obtained; 4. Since much of the emphasis at the political and administrative levels seems to be on achieving quantitative targets rather than on fulfilling the real objectives of the programme, a professionally managed agency at the state and district levels may be necessary to look at the qualitative aspects of the programme, catalyse diagnosis, and ensure coordination and follow-up. Such an agency could provide feedback to the political leadership and senior bureaucracy in terms of the real achievements of the programme. It should consist of professionals dedicated to IRDP and its mission, and it should be entrusted with no other task but that of ensuring the success of IRDP. For example, a recent visit to a district showed that out of nearly 5,500 beneficiaries in , nearly 40 per cent had been helped with milch cattle and 20 per cent through minor irrigation (wells) and pump sets. The latter set of assets invariably involved investments of the order of Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 12,000 for each beneficiary. The role of this agency could be to follow up the beneficiaries in the years ahead, because the district machinery would be more interested in meeting new targets. Such follow-up would include marketing for milk, feed for cattle, and veterinary care in the case of the first category, and inputs like diesel, power, fertilizer, seed, etc., for beneficiaries of the minor irrigation schemes. The agency could then get back to the district and state leadership, bring shortcomings to their notice, and ensure corrective action. Thus, in designing anti-poverty programmes such an Antyodaya and IRDP, means of providing a range of services from distribution of benefits to aftercare advice and support will have to be assessed and measures taken to overcome the limitations. Otherwise, the programme may pursue short term targets and lose sight of the main objective. Vol. 7. No. 3. July-September,

8 References 1_ Gupta,R t -The poverty trap: Lessons from Dharampur," and Satia, J.K., "Developmental tasks and middle management roles in rural development." in Bureaucracy and the poor. Korten, D.C., and Alfonso, F.B. (eds.). Manila: Asian Institute of Management, Madras Institute of Development Studies. Structure and Intervention: An evaluation of DPAP, IRDP, and related programmes in Ramanathapuram and Dharmapur! districts of Tamil Nadu. Madras, Mukherjee, A.; and Sengupta, N., "Rajasthan's Antyodaya programme," Yojana, Vol. 23, April 16, Planning Commission. The Sixth Five Year Plan, New Delhi: Government of India, a. Programme Evaluation Organisation. Evaluation studies of rural industries projects, 1978; Report on evaluation study of small farmers, marginal farmers, and agricultural labourers' projects, 1979; Study of the crash scheme on rural employment, New Delhi: Planning Commission, Government of India. -. A quick study of the Antyodaya scheme 5b of Rajasthan. New Delhi: Planning Commission, Government of India, a. Special Schemes Organisation. Antyodaya: A five year perspective and plan of action. Jaipur: Government of Rajasthan, b. Antyodaya: Rajasthan's attack on rural poverty, (2nd edn). Jaipur: Government of Rajasthan, Reserve Bank of India. The small farmers development agencies, : A field study. Bombay, Vyas, V.S. makes the [observation in Intervention for rural development: Experiences of the Small Farmers' Development Agency. Desai, B.M. (ed.). Ahmedabad: Indian Institute of Management, 1979, pp Vikalpa