What is Cyclical in Credit Cycles?
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1 What is Cyclical in Credit Cycles? Rui Cui May 31, 2014
2 Introduction Credit cycles are growth cycles Cyclicality in the amount of new credit Explanations: collateral constraints, equity constraints, leverage constraints Credit cycles are also risk cycles Cyclicality in the distribution of new credit credit quality of the marginal borrowers Modeling production heterogeneity is essential Today: A general equilibrium model with a banking sector featuring the comovement in the quantity and quality of credit
3 Credit Cycles Facts Issuer Credit Quality (Expected Default Frequency) Credit Growth (in %) (Compustat) Credit cycles are not only growth cycles, they are also risk cycles.
4 Mechanism (0) Current banking sector balance sheet determines effective discount rates Bankers are the only marginal agent on the loan market by assumption
5 Mechanism (0) Current banking sector balance sheet determines effective discount rates Bankers are the only marginal agent on the loan market by assumption (1) Bankers evaluates potential projects by computing their risk-adjusted present values Risky borrowers are more sensitive to movements in discount rates
6 Mechanism (0) Current banking sector balance sheet determines effective discount rates Bankers are the only marginal agent on the loan market by assumption (1) Bankers evaluates potential projects by computing their risk-adjusted present values Risky borrowers are more sensitive to movements in discount rates (2) Capital producers respond to fluctuating asset prices in their production decisions Asset prices movements shift the production frontier of the aggregate economy
7 Mechanism (0) Current banking sector balance sheet determines effective discount rates Bankers are the only marginal agent on the loan market by assumption (1) Bankers evaluates potential projects by computing their risk-adjusted present values Risky borrowers are more sensitive to movements in discount rates (2) Capital producers respond to fluctuating asset prices in their production decisions Asset prices movements shift the production frontier of the aggregate economy (3) Once financed, these projects stay and accumulate on banks balance sheets Fully solved general equilibrium model to extract dynamic implications
8 Results Interaction between production heterogeneity and financial frictions generates fundamental economic forces that leads to endogeneous boom-bust cycles A risks buildup process A slow recovery process Negative correlation in financial volatility and growth in real volatility New perspective on volatility paradox that typically focuses on financial volatility
9 Set up Three types of agents: households, bankers and capital producers. Risk neutral households can consume and make deposits with bankers, they maximize [ ] E exp ( ρt) dct H 0 Bankers hold all risky capital. I impose that bankers consume λndt (N is bankers networth). They maximize E [ 0 exp ( λt) log (λn t) dt ] This is a continuous time adoption of Kiyotaki-Gertler model, but with fixed risk free rate ρ and simplified effective bankers pricing kernel θ t B = exp ( λt) λ N t.
10 Capital Producers Two types of capital producers producing K j {A,B}, both captial produces cash flow at rate AK j dt, they depreciate at rate δ. But they have differential exposure to the systematic shock, in aggregate dk j K j = (Φ j (i j ) δ) }{{} dt + σ j dz t net investment Quality is captured by σ A < σ B. Cash flow from type B projects are more sensitive to macroeconomic shocks than type A projects.
11 Capital Producers Capital producers are owned by household, but can only sell their capital to bankers. The production function of type j capital is 2i j Φ j (i j ) = κ j Key assumption: κ A > κ B. Supply of high quality projects are limited. Key endogeneous variable is the risk adjusted present value of the cash flow (net of investment) produced by type j capital [ ] q j = PV j = E A K t j 0 K j θb t dt 0 where dk j t K j 0 = δdt + σ j dz t
12 Frictionless Benchmark
13 Model Schmetic
14 Capital Producers Problem Given q A, q B, capital producers solve a static problem max ij Φ j (i j ) K j q j i j K j Optimal investment follows Φ j ( i j ) = q j κ j
15 Bankers Problem Given their preference, bankers solves a portfolio problem that resembles standard mean-variance efficient investors max αa,α B E [ 0 exp ( λt) log (λn t) dt ] st. dn t N t = λdt + (α A π A + α B π B + (1 α A α B ) r f ) dt + (α A σ A + α B σ B ) dz t where α A, α B are portfolio shares, π A, π B are excess returns by investing in K A, K B ; σ A, σ B are return volatilities for K A, K B
16 Equilibrium Definition An equilibrium of this economy consists of prices processes (q A, q B, r f ), and decisions, (c H, α A, α B, i A, i B ), such that 1. Given prices, households, bankers and capital producers solve their optimization problems. 2. Given decisions, markets for risky capital (K A, K B ) and risk-free bond clears. This pins down bankers portfolio choices α A, α B 3. Market for goods clear A (K A + K B ) = i A K A + i B K B + C H
17 Solving the Model 1. Conjecture the model has two scaled state variables: size and quality of intermediaries balance sheet η = s = N q A K A + q B K B K B K A + K B 2. Write down a system of PDEs that q A and q B must satisfy as functions of η and s 3. Above equations solved on [η, s] [ɛ, 1 ɛ] [0, 1]. Boundary conditions 3.1 s = 0, 1 Single technology economy, solved in ODE 3.2 η = ɛ, impose q j η = η = 1 ɛ, reduce to a system of lower order equations 4. Numerically, I use projection method (5-7th order Chebshev polynomials) to minimize PDE error over a grid.
18 Parameters Model Parameters Interpretation Full Model Simple Model Justification ρ Household Time Discount Rate Risk Free Rate λ Bankers Time Discount Rate Unconditional Mome σ A Cash Flow Volatility of K A 0.02 σ B Cash Flow Volatility of K B Output Volatility κ A Adjustment Cost of K A κ B Adjustment Cost of K B Investment Volatilit A Productivity Investment-Capital R δ Depreciation Literature Full Model: Heterogeneous Production. Simple Model: Homogeneous Production.
19 Model Solution Figure: Solid blue line corresponds to the solution for median s. Shaded area plots the solution corresponding to 25% 75% distribution of s. Median output volatility= 0.046, top to bottom quartile of the distribution of output volatility is [0.025, 0.071].
20 Model Solution Figure: Solid blue line corresponds to the solution for median s. Shaded area plots the solution corresponding to 25% 75% distribution of s. Median output volatility= 0.046, top to bottom quartile of the distribution of output volatility is [0.025, 0.071].
21 Unconditional Moments Moment Interpretation Full Model Simple Model Data σ Y Median Output Volatility(%) σ A Return Volatility of K A(%) 5.11 σ B Return Volatility of K B (%) SR Sharpe Ratio µ c Consumption Growth(%) σ c Consumption Growth Volatility(%) σ Φ ( ia ) Investment Volatility of K A(%) 3.70 σ Φ ( ib ) Investment Volatility of K B (%) i A Investment / Captial Ratio for K A (%) 10.9 i B Investment / Capital Ratio for K B (%) Full Model: Heterogeneous production. Simple Model: Homogeneous production.
22 Conditional Implications Risks Buildup Without production heterogeneity, positive shocks always push the economy away from crisis state Therefore, well captialized banks (higher η) are associated with lower risks of entering a crisis In my framework, well capitalized banks have strong incentive to take on additional risks this will show up in the term structure of crisis probability
23 Conditional Implications Risks Buildup Without production heterogeneity, positive shocks always push the economy away from crisis state Therefore, well captialized banks (higher η) are associated with lower risks of entering a crisis In my framework, well capitalized banks have strong incentive to take on additional risks this will show up in the term structure of crisis probability Slow Recovery In the model, bank equity grows by earning this risk premium associated with its asset Risk premium is higher in crisis state, so return on equity is high recovery is fast When risk taking is endogeous, banks substitute risky, high-yield projects with safe, low-yield ones return on equity in crisis
24 Conditional Implications Risks Buildup Without production heterogeneity, positive shocks always push the economy away from crisis state Therefore, well captialized banks (higher η) are associated with lower risks of entering a crisis In my framework, well capitalized banks have strong incentive to take on additional risks this will show up in the term structure of crisis probability Slow Recovery In the model, bank equity grows by earning this risk premium associated with its asset Risk premium is higher in crisis state, so return on equity is high recovery is fast When risk taking is endogeous, banks substitute risky, high-yield projects with safe, low-yield ones return on equity in crisis
25 Risks Buildup Bottom s quartile Φ(i b )/Φ(i a ) 1 s Median s Top s quartile η η Figure: Left Panel: Investment Ratio as a function of η and s. Right Panel: Drifts of the state variable when starting from η = 0.6 and median s.
26 Risks Buildup Bottom s quartile Φ(i b )/Φ(i a ) 1 s Median s Top s quartile η η Figure: Left Panel: Investment Ratio as a function of η and s. Right Panel: Drifts of the state variable when starting from η = 0.6 and median s.
27 Risks Buildup Distress Probability Distress Probability Top s quartile Median s Bottom s quartile Horizon (yrs) Horizon (yrs) Figure: Left Panel: Homogeneous Production. Right Panel: Heterogeneous Production. I plot the conditional probability of hitting the top 25% of the Sharpe Ratio when starting from η = 0.6.
28 Risks Buildup Distress Probability Distress Probability Top s quartile Median s Bottom s quartile Horizon (yrs) Horizon (yrs) Figure: Left Panel: Homogeneous Production. Right Panel: Heterogeneous Production. I plot the conditional probability of hitting the top 25% of the Sharpe Ratio when starting from η = 0.6.
29 Recovery Dynamics Bottom s quartile 0.7 Φ(i b )/Φ(i a ) 1 Median s s Top s quartile η η Figure: Left Panel: Investment Ratio as a function of η and s. Right Panel: Drifts of the state variable when starting from η = 0.2 and median s.
30 Recovery Dynamics Φ(i b )/Φ(i a ) 1 Bottom s quartile Median s s Top s quartile η η Figure: Left Panel: Investment Ratio as a function of η and s. Right Panel: Drifts of the state variable when starting from η = 0.2 and median s.
31 Recovery Dynamics Bottom s quartile Distress Probability Distress Probability Median s Top s quartile Horizon (yrs) Horizon (yrs) Figure: Left Panel: Homogeneous Production. Right Panel: Heterogeneous Production. I plot the conditional probability of staying in the top 25% of the Sharpe Ratio when starting from η = 0.2.
32 Recovery Dynamics Bottom s quartile Distress Probability Distress Probability Median s Top s quartile Horizon (yrs) Horizon (yrs) Figure: Left Panel: Homogeneous Production. Right Panel: Heterogeneous Production. I plot the conditional probability of staying in the top 25% of the Sharpe Ratio when starting from η = 0.2.
33 Volatility Paradox No concensus has emerged to define volatility paradox generally refers to the observation that prolonged period of low volatility tends to precede a crisis Brunnermeier Sannikov (2013) : compare a series of models differing in their fundamental volatility, banks in low-volatility economies take on more leverage Adrian Boyarchenko (2013): banks run by VaR role, lower financial volatility corresponds to higher leverage Shorter distance to restructuring boundary
34 Volatility Paradox No concensus has emerged to define volatility paradox generally refers to the observation that prolonged period of low volatility tends to precede a crisis Brunnermeier Sannikov (2013) : compare a series of models differing in their fundamental volatility, banks in low-volatility economies take on more leverage Adrian Boyarchenko (2013): banks run by VaR role, lower financial volatility corresponds to higher leverage Shorter distance to restructuring boundary My model endogenize both fundamenal and financial volatilities Low financial volatility symptomatic of lower risk prices Riskier projects come into the money and get financed Negative correlation between financial volatility and growth in fundamental volatility Accumulation of riskier project tend to coincide with a period of low financial volatility and pushes economy closer to a crisis
35 Volatility Paradox Real Volatility Growth(in %) Real Volatility Growth (in %) Financial Volatility(in %) Financial Volatility (in %) Figure: Left Panel: Homogeneous Production. Right Panel: Heterogeneous Production. Simulated 200 years.
36 Conclusion Financial sector s optimal financing decision determined the production mix in the real economy Credit quality of the marginal borrowers vary systematically over the credit cycles. A model to keep track of both asset and liability side of the financial sector. Extract model s conditional implications from the term structure of distress probabilities.
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