Viet Nam: Ho Chi Minh City Long Thanh DauGiay Expressway Technical Assistance Project

Transcription

1 Validation Report Reference Number: PVR-360 Project Number: Loan Number: 2374 December 2014* Viet Nam: Ho Chi Minh CityLong ThanhDauGiay Expressway Technical Assistance Project Independent Evaluation Department * Revised May 2015.

2 ABBREVIATIONS ADB Asian Development Bank EIRR economic internal rate of return EPMU expressway project management unit EPMU HLD expressway project management unit for the Ho Chi Minh CityLong ThangDauGiay HCMC Ho Chi Minh City HLD Ho Chi Minh CityLong ThangDauGiay JICA km Japan International Cooperation Agency kilometer PCR project completion report RRP SOE report and recommendation of the President state-owned enterprise TA technical assistance VEC Viet Nam Expressway Corporation NOTE In this report, $ refers to US dollars. Key Words adb, asian development bank, expressways, ho chi minh city, lessons, performance evaluation, project completion report, regulatory framework, roads, technical assistance, tool road operation, transport, viet nam, vec The guidelines formally adopted by the Independent Evaluation Department (IED) on avoiding conflict of interest in its independent evaluations were observed in the preparation of this report. To the knowledge of IED management, there were no conflicts of interest of the persons preparing, reviewing, or approving this report. In preparing any evaluation report, or by making any designation of or reference to a particular territory or geographic area in this document, IED does not intend to make any judgments as to the legal or other status of any territory or area.

3 PROJECT BASIC DATA Project Number: PCR Circulation Date: Oct 2012 Loan Number: 2374 PCR Validation Date: Dec 2014 Project Name: Ho Chi Minh CityLong ThanhDauGiay Expressway Technical Assistance Project Country: Viet Nam Approved ($ million) Actual ($ million) Sector: Transport and ICT Total Project Costs: ADB Financing: ($ million) ADF: Loan: (SDR equivalent, million) Borrower: OCR: 0.00 Beneficiaries: Others: Cofinancier: Total Cofinancing: Approval Date: 28 Nov 2007 Effectiveness Date: 20 Mar Sep 2008 Signing Date: 20 Dec 2007 Closing Date: 30 Jun Jan 2012 Project Officers: Validators: Quality Reviewer: P. J. Vallely P. J. Vallely L. D. Thang J. Supangco, Consultant F. D. De Guzman, Senior Evaluation Officer, IED2 B. Nguyen, Senior Evaluation Specialist, IED2 Location: ADB headquarters Viet Nam Resident Mission Viet Nam Resident Mission Peer Reviewer: Director: From: Nov 2007 Oct 2008 Jan 2009 To: Sep 2008 Dec 2008 Jan 2012 T. Yokota, Senior Evaluation Specialist, IED2 B. Finlayson, IED2 ADB = Asian Development Bank; ADF = Asian Development Fund; ICT = information and communication technology; IED2 = Independent Evaluation Department, Division 2; OCR = ordinary capital resources; PCR = project completion report; SDR = special drawing rights. A. Rationale I. PROJECT DESCRIPTION 1. The greater Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC), the largest city in Viet Nam and the country s economic hub, had a population of 7.9 million, which was forecast to increase by 2.1% per annum to 10.3 million by Growth in the value of annual trade through its port exceeded 15% in With continued high economic growth expected in the medium term, household incomes were forecast to rise, increasing the demand for vehicles and traveling. The road network within and around HCMC was becoming congested, reducing traveling speed and increasing transport costs. There was a need for a high-capacity, high-speed expressway network to complement the national and provincial road networks. Hence, the Ho Chi Minh City Long ThanhDau Giay (HLD) Expressway was identified as a development project to provide relief to the traffic, ease access to the port areas, and improve the road networks around HCMC.

4 2 2. The construction of the HLD expressway was to be handled by the Viet Nam Expressway Corporation (VEC), a state-owned enterprise (SOE) under the Ministry of Transport. However, VEC lacked adequate capacity and experience in areas such as project management, financial management, and procurement. This technical assistance (TA) project 1 was aimed at completing the documentation required for commencing construction of the HLD expressway and at strengthening the capacity of VEC. In particular, the project was to help implement preconstruction activities for the HLD expressway, including detailed designs, bidding documents, and updated resettlement plans. The construction of the HLD Expressway was to be financed under the ensuing construction loan (Loan 2451-VIE). 2 B. Expected Impact 3. The report and recommendation of the President (RRP) of the TA stated that the expected impact of the project was a reduction in the cost and travel times in the movement of passengers and goods between HCMC and the provinces to the north, northeast, and south of the city through the construction of the HLD expressway (RRP, para. 14). Performance indicators in the project s design and monitoring framework included completion of HLD expressway construction by the end of 2013 and reduction in passenger and freight vehicle operating costs by an average of 30%, in real terms, within 1 year of project completion (RRP, Appendix 1). C. Objectives or Expected Outcome 4. The expected project outcome was the completion of documents required to commence the construction of the HLD expressway, and a strengthened VEC with enhanced capacity as a commercially oriented infrastructure provider (RRP, para. 14). Performance indicators were the: (i) award of civil works contracts by the end of 2009; (ii) planning for the new VEC organizational structure with increased staffing finalized by the end of 2009; and (iii) revised legal and regulatory framework for toll road operations to enable commercial toll road construction and operation, prepared for consideration by the end of 2009 (RRP, Appendix 1). D. Outputs 5. The project had two outputs The first output covered the pre-construction activities of the HLD expressway. The envisaged outputs were: (i) completed detailed engineering designs, (ii) prepared bidding documents, (iii) completed and updated resettlement plans, (iv) completed and updated environmental impact assessment, (v) civil works contracts procured by VEC, (vi) prepared operation and maintenance concession documents, and (vii) a resettlement plan implemented by VEC (RRP, para. 17). 6. The second output pertained to the regulatory and institutional strengthening of the VEC. The planned outputs were: (i) a revised organizational structure for VEC; (ii) identified legal and regulatory constraints, and remedies to enable VEC to operate as an efficient, financially secure provider of expressway facilities; (iii) completed training needs assessment and an implemented training program; (iv) implemented training programs and strengthened capacity of VEC to manage resettlement, social, and environmental impacts of expressways implemented; and (v) an asset management system identified and commissioned to function (RRP, para. 18). 1 ADB Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors: Proposed Loan to the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam for the Ho Chi Minh CityLong ThanhDau Giay Expressway Technical Assistance Project (Loan 2374-VIE). Manila. 2 ADB Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors: Proposed Loan to the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam for the Ho Chi Minh CityLong ThanhDau Giay Expressway Construction Project. (Loan 2451-VIE). Manila.

5 3 E. Provision of Inputs 7. The total cost of the project at approval was $11.2 million. The actual cost was slightly lower at $10.8 million. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) financed $10.0 million through a TA loan. The Ministry of Finance agreed to make the loan proceeds available to VEC through onlending arrangements under a subsidiary loan agreement between the Ministry of Finance and VEC. The government was to contribute $1.2 million equivalent as counterpart funds to cover management costs, a portion of contingencies, and all taxes and duties. Project inputs were to be used for consulting services for the conduct of surveys and aerial photography, among other things. 8. The project was classified Category C under the ADB environmental categorization requirement. It was not expected to cause any adverse environmental impacts. The ensuing investment project was to be categorized at a later stage. F. Implementation Arrangements 9. VEC was designated as the executing agency for the project, with planning and implementation delegated to a project implementation unit (PIU). The expressway project management unit for HLD (EPMU HLD) under VEC was responsible for the day-to-day activities of project implementation. VEC was to engage and direct the work of all consultants. The project design in the RRP envisaged the consulting services funded under the project were to be engaged by VEC under a single contract. The consulting services were to be implemented by an international consulting firm in association with national consultants. 10. The project completion report (PCR) 3 indicated all six loan covenants were complied with. It also indicated that some activities that were not completed within the project period were carried over to the ensuing loan project. The compliance of covenants related to the carried over activities is not reviewed here as it is linked with their completion. The RRP noted that a midterm review of project implementation would be carried out by ADB and the government to determine any midcourse corrections (RRP, para. 32). However, it is not clear from the PCR whether such a midterm review was undertaken. II. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE AND RATINGS A. Relevance of Design and Formulation 11. The PCR rated the project highly relevant. It noted the TA s consistency with the sector objectives of ADB and the government s policies, and that the project sought to facilitate preparatory works for the HLD expressway. The ensuing loan for the construction of HLD expressway (Loan 2451-VIE, see footnote 2) was approved on 9 September 2008, 4 days after the TA loan became effective. The PCR indicated the project was highly relevant in strengthening the capacity of VEC as a commercially oriented infrastructure provider. 12. At appraisal, the project was envisaged to cover pre-construction activities for a total distance of 51 km between the second ring road and Dau Giay. During project implementation, a 4-km section from the HCMC inner road network to the second ring road was included in the project scope, increasing the project s total length to 55 km. In the comment on the draft validation, SERD explained that the first 4-km section of the HLD expressway was expected to 3 ADB Completion Report: Ho Chi Minh CityLong ThanhDauGiay Expressway Technical Assistance Project in the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. Manila.

6 4 be financed by JICA. However, this arrangement became no longer feasible during the implementation of the project and ADB decided to include the pre-construction activities for this section under the project. The PCR noted the inclusion of the additional 4-km section to the HLD expressway enhanced the ensuing project s relevance. 13. The validation notes the project design had some limitations in its original formulation. At appraisal, the project anticipated a single consulting firm to cover both project components, including design of the expressway, assessment of impacts, environmental and social safeguard plans, as well as regulatory and VEC strengthening activities (RRP, para. 25). However, during implementation it was realized that a second firm was required to validate the detailed designs and other pre-construction documents prepared by the first firm. This necessitated a change in project scope and a second firm was engaged (PCR, para. 16). The validation considers the engagement of the second firm as an independent appraiser necessary to provide the needed checks and balances and to ensure the quality of works by the design firm. The absence of such tripartite mechanism of design firm appraisal firm VEC placed the project outputs at risk and reflected a flaw in the original project formulation. The inclusion of the appraisal firm at a later stage enhanced the quality of the project design. However, it contributed to project implementation delays as indicated by the PCR that the project should have been planned more carefully (PCR, para. 30) and the project could have started the procurement of the appraisal consultant early so the consultant would be ready at the start of the design work (PCR, para. 32). Due to this shortcoming in project design at appraisal, the validation finds a highly relevant rating unjustified and assesses the project relevant. B. Effectiveness in Achieving Project Outcome and Outputs 14. The PCR rated the project effective. It noted that the project completed the documentation to commence the construction of the HLD expressway. It also indicated that the institutional support was successfully completed by developing management tools and restructuring VEC. A capable implementation agency was established under VEC the EPMU HLD to implement the construction project under Loan 2451-VIE. VEC was reorganized into a corporation and it was operating and managing the overall program. 15. This validation notes that while the civil works contracts for the first section of the project under Loan 2451-VIE were awarded by the end of 2009, the completion of the awards for the other sections was delayed. These awards were only expected to be made by the end of 2012 after the completion of the TA loan. Of the remaining sections, the loan review missions reported that the finalized bid documents for packages 7, 8, and 9 were expected to be completed with no additional costs foreseen on the project s account. The construction supervision consultancy for the section funded by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was being negotiated during the PCR stage. The other contracts still being processed at that time were the provision of quality assurance equipment ($0.7 million) and the hiring of project audit consultants ($0.17 million). 16. The PCR indicated that most of the expected outputs were achieved at project completion, and the incomplete tasks including income restoration programs, external resettlement monitoring, and engagement of an external appraiser for land acquisition and resettlement plans were carried over to the HDL Expressway Construction Project to be financed by a loan from ADB (Loan 2451-VIE, see footnote 2) and JICA. This validation holds a similar view as the PCR that these remaining activities were not substantial and could easily be delivered under the main construction project. It is also of the view that the remaining contracts to be awarded would not entail significant outlays. However, the PCR could have been more explicit on the amount of funds required for the remaining contracts and activities.

7 5 17. The PCR considered the institutional strengthening support for VEC complete. This support included the development of management tools and restructuring of VEC. The PCR concluded the project significantly improved the capabilities of VEC and EPMU HLD in planning, managing, and implementing the expressway project. The validation notes that VEC was able to finalize its increased staff in 2010, although it was a year behind schedule. Also, the revised legal and regulatory framework for toll road operation was approved in August 2012, after a delay of 3 years. On the whole, the validation assesses the project effective. C. Efficiency of Resource Use in Achieving Outputs and Outcomes 18. The PCR rated the project efficient. It noted the project completed most of the outputs. However, the loan became effective 6 months later than envisaged (Target: March 2008; Actual: September 2008) and faced start-up problems due to the delay in finalizing the subsidiary loan agreement between the Ministry of Finance and VEC. Project completion was delayed by 12 months and loan closing date was extended twice for about 18 months (Target: June 2010; Actual: January 2012) due to the local governments slow decision-making process on land acquisition and agreement on the technical solution for interchange design options in the first 4- km section. Despite the two extensions, some project activities were not completed and were transferred to supervision packages under the construction loan (Loan 2451-VIE), including income restoration programs, external resettlement monitoring, and external appraiser for land acquisition and resettlement (PCR, para. 9). The PCR (Appendix 3) indicated the transferred activities were survey and detailed designs, resettlement planning and implementation, and procurement of civil works (PCR, Appendix 3) and the cost of their implementation would to be financed under the subsequent HLD Expressway construction project. The PCR did not indicate if these activities were completed, and the dates if indeed completed. 19. The validation notes the completion of several target outputs was delayed (PCR, Appendix 1). Specifically: (i) Resettlement plan and EIA target: approved by July 2009, actual: mid 2010); (ii) O&M concession documents target: approved by end 2009, actual: drafted in November 2009 and approval was expected end 2012; (iii) Regulations for VEC target: revised and submitted to MOT by end 2009, actual: submitted mid-2011 and approved by MOT August 2012; 4 and (iv) Training plan target: implemented by end 2009, actual: end In addition, the PCR reported the project was implemented at a slightly lower cost than the appraisal estimate (Approved: $11.2 million, Actual: $10.8 million). However, the validation notes the cost of implementing the transferred activities (see para. 21 above) was to be covered by the HLD expressway construction project supported by ADB and JICA. This meant the actual cost to complete the project activities (including the extended 4 km) would have been more than the reported $10.8 million. Based on these observations on the implementation process and cost, the validation assesses the project less than efficient. 5 D. Preliminary Assessment of Sustainability 20. The PCR rated the project likely sustainable. Given the nature of the project activities, sustainability needs to be viewed separately for the two project outputs. As a facilitating input into the ensuing investment project, the TA loan does not have much scope for sustainability on its own, except contributing to the construction project through its design features. Although its main output was to prepare documentation to enable the commencement of construction of the HLD expressway, the implicit expectation was that the ensuing investment project would have better safeguards and its outcomes would be more sustainable. More importantly, the outputs 4 According to the additional comments provided in March 2015 by the Viet Nam Resident Mission. 5 The regional department disagrees with the downgrade of the PCR rating.

8 6 would be free from serious design and implementation flaws or deficiencies. The PCR indicated the project completed the required documents, but it did not discuss how they contributed to the sustainability of the outcomes of the ensuing construction project. For instance, one of the project s most important outputs was the revised legal and regulatory framework for toll road operation to enable commercial toll road construction and operation (para. 21). However, the PCR did not indicate if the implementing rules and regulations were in place or if the intended outcomes of the revised legal and regulatory would be sustainable. 21. For the second output regulatory and institutional strengthening of VEC sustainability is a crucial aspect as VEC was expected to become a commercially oriented expressway provider of construction, management, and O&M. VEC has gone through two transformations, first as an SOE, then restructured into a corporate organization. This validation recognizes that the institutional strengthening of VEC is a long-term process. However, VEC was assessed to have inadequate experience in project management, financial management, procurement, and safeguards issues (RRP, para 6), and this was reiterated in the RRP for Loan 2451-VIE (RRP, para. 10). The PCR indicated the need for VEC to establish an in house appraisal team for design documents as its capacity to undertake in-house appraisals and implement construction projects seemed to remain limited (PCR, para. 36). It advised further monitoring and follow-up on institutional strengthening of VEC (PCR, para. 33). 22. In regard to VEC s financial viability, the PCR indicated VEC s financial situation does not seem to be sustainable and it could only be improved if the government provides VEC with major financial support and authority (PCR, para. 26). The PCR provided no indication of any government guarantee. The RRP for Loan 2451-VIE indicated government s assurances that by the beginning of fiscal year 2020 VEC will achieve: (i) a debt service coverage ratio of at least 1.2 times, and (ii) a debt to equity ratio of not greater than 90:10 (Loan 2451-VIE, RRP, para. 59). However, the PCR provided no evidence that VEC s financial requirements would be met by Loan 2451-VIE s RRP also indicated that VEC would establish toll rates sufficient to satisfy VEC s debt service coverage ratio and debt to equity ratio (Loan 2451-VIE, RRP, para. 59) latest by the time the HLD Expressway is opened for operation. 6 Again, the PCR provides no evidence these toll rates were established. The PCR cautioned that both the government and ADB should take into consideration the precarious financial situation of VEC and the overly ambitious master plan for expressway construction that VEC will manage (PCR, para. 40). Taking all these concerns together, the validation assesses the project less than likely sustainable. 7 E. Impact 23. The PCR indicated that the HLD expressway would achieve its impact in user savings through lower vehicle operating cost and reduced travel time in the movement of passengers and freight within the HCMC areas and the south of Viet Nam. However, these impact indicators relate to the HLD expressway, which was yet to be completed. The main impact of the TA loan was in getting the civil works contracts awarded, and in laying down appropriate design and safeguards arrangements for the project under Loan 2451-VIE, to be followed during construction. The PCR should have confirmed this aspect but, instead, cited possible gains accruing to the ensuing project. For VEC, the impact was more tangible. The capacity of VEC was enhanced and this institution building is likely to have an influence over future expressways in Viet Nam, once it becomes financially sustainable. The capability to have well-designed expressways, in turn, is likely to impact poverty and gender issues by bringing remotely located 6 According to the additional comments provided in March 2015 by Viet Nam Resident Mission, the HLD expressway was opened for operation in February The regional department disagrees with the downgrade of the PCR rating.

9 7 regions within reach of the urban centers, implementing resettlement plans and income restoration measures. By emphasizing safeguards and appropriate resettlement plans, it is likely to protect the environment. However, as mentioned earlier, the financial position of VEC is so far not sustainable. The validation assesses the impact to be moderate. III. OTHER PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTS A. Performance of the Borrower and Executing Agency 24. The PCR rated the performance of the borrower and executing agency satisfactory. It noted the borrower and the executing agency fulfilled their responsibilities successfully in implementing the project. However, it also noted that some delays occurred due to the slow progress in the local governments acquisition of the required land. This validation notes the delay in finalizing the subsidiary loan agreement between the two parties. The executing agency experienced a delay in recruiting the appraisal consultant for the preparation works for the six packages. There were also disagreements on using the correct version of the bid documents and revisions in the design and technical standards to be applied to the HLD expressway. 25. The executing agency incurred delays in the payment of consultants due to misunderstandings on the required supporting documents. The executing agency was also delayed in finalizing and submitting the updated resettlement plans due to setbacks in carrying out detailed measurement surveys. These accumulated delays eventually led to residual activities, which were assumed by the ADB and JICA project supervision consultants and carried over to the HLD expressway project. The PCR indicated that VEC was able to utilize the loan funds and include an extra 4-km section of work by using the savings from the loan. This was done without increasing the amount of the originally approved loan funds (PCR, para. 19). On the whole, the validation views the performance of the borrower and executing agency satisfactory. B. Performance of the Asian Development Bank 26. The PCR rated ADB performance highly satisfactory. The Southeast Asia Department s Transport and Communications Division of ADB processed the TA loan, but subsequently, project administration was transferred to the Viet Nam Resident Mission after project start-up. ADB carried out review missions twice a year during project implementation. The PCR indicated that ADB provided timely assistance and guidance to the VEC, EPMU HLD, local governments including HCMC and Dong Nai People s Committee, and the consultants. All parties concerned appreciated the close involvement and assistance of ADB in project implementation. However, the appraisal and formulation of the project was not thoroughly satisfactory as reflected in a number of minor and incomplete details. The validation considers ADB performance satisfactory. IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT, LESSONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS A. Overall Assessment and Ratings 27. The PCR rated the project successful. However, this validation assesses the project less than successful with ratings of relevant, effective, less than efficient, and less than likely sustainable. On relevance, the absence of an independent appraisal firm to provide the necessary checks and balances and ensure the quality of works by the design firm was a flaw in the project formulation. It necessitated a change in scope during implementation to recruit a second firm and this contributed to project implementation delays. In regard to efficiency, the project encountered some delays and transferred some incomplete activities and the cost of their

10 8 implementation to the subsequent construction project. The sustainability of the ensuing construction project was unclear, VEC s institutional capacity remained limited and its financial position does not seem sustainable. Overall Ratings Criteria PCR IED Review Reason for Disagreement and/or Comments Relevance Highly relevant Relevant The absence of an independent appraisal firm to provide checks and balances and ensure the quality of works by the design firm was a flaw in the project formulation. It necessitated a change in scope to recruit a second firm and this contributed to implementation delays (para. 13). Effectiveness in achieving project Effective Effective outcome and outputs Efficiency of resource use in achieving outcome and outputs Preliminary assessment of sustainability Efficient Likely sustainable Less than efficient Less than likely sustainable Implementation encountered delays, project completion was delayed, and some incomplete activities were transferred to the ensuing loan (paras. 1819). The sustainability of the ensuing construction project was unclear. VEC s institutional capacity remained limited and its financial position does not seem sustainable (paras. 2022). Overall assessment Successful Less than successful Impact Not rated Moderate Some design documents were still to be fully completed, and the financial viability of VEC was yet to be achieved (para. 23). Borrower and executing Satisfactory Satisfactory agency Performance of ADB Highly satisfactory Satisfactory The appraisal and formulation of the project could have been more thorough and rigorous to avoid the implementation problems, as faced by the project (para. 26). Quality of PCR Satisfactory See para. 31. ADB = Asian Development Bank, IED = Independent Evaluation Department, PCR = project completion report, VEC = Viet Nam Expressway Corporation. Source: ADB Independent Evaluation Department. B. Lessons 28. The PCR identified a few important lessons from the project, including the need to streamline the decision-making process for stakeholders. International consulting firms should also be aware of appraisal and approval procedures for the design documents. This validation notes that the rationale for separating the contract for detailed design (for the TA loan) and project supervision (for the project) was not well considered and resulted in project implementation delays. The additional layer of an appraisal consultant to evaluate the detailed design added to project preparation time. The benefit of such an arrangement was not proven, as the project supervision consultant may still need to revise designs to resolve on-site issues. ADB could consider the practice of one detailed design and project supervision consultant for a project and reevaluate the need for a separate appraisal consultant.

11 9 C. Recommendations for Follow-Up 29. The PCR recommended the need to monitor the appropriate implementation of outstanding items of work, which were transferred from this project to the project under Loan 2451-VIE and JICA. The Viet Nam Resident Mission may need to determine whether these were completed successfully. The PCR also recommended monitoring and follow-up actions on the implementation by VEC of the recommended institutional structure and systems developed under the project. There is also a need to evaluate the outcome of the capacitybuilding program for VEC to manage resettlement, social, and environmental impacts, as implemented under the project. High-level policy dialogue with the government is required to ensure the financial viability of VEC. V. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS AND FOLLOW-UP A. Monitoring and Evaluation Design, Implementation, and Utilization 30. The PCR did not provide an assessment of the project s monitoring and evaluation system since there was no provision made for such a system. The system may have been provided under Loan 2451-VIE and not covered by the PCR. B. Comments on Project Completion Report Quality 31. This validation finds the PCR quality satisfactory. The PCR followed the guidelines for PCR preparation and its presentation was generally clear. 8 However, this validation notes a few shortcomings in the arguments under the efficiency section. Likewise, the section on sustainability could have been more complete by providing a clearer discussion on how the TA loan contributed to the sustainability of the outcomes of the construction project. C. Data Sources for Validation 32. Data sources for this validation included the project s RRP, PCR, and reports of loan review missions. Additional information especially on the TA project relevance was from the ADB Country Strategy and Programs: Viet Nam, and from the country s Five-Year Socio-Economic Development Plan, D. Recommendation for Independent Evaluation Department Follow-Up 33. This validation recommends the preparation of a project performance evaluation report 35 years after the completion of Loan 2451-VIE, with the HLD expressway investment project included in the evaluation. 34. This validation notes that an assessment of the project s relevance could be framed within the context of the HLD expressway investment project. The recommendations come with a caveat that the investment project s implementation is still ongoing, thus, an assessment of its full relevance could only be done once it is completed. Nonetheless, both projects appear to be consistent with the country s development plan and with ADB country and sector strategies. 8 ADB Project Completion Report for Sovereign Operations: Project Administration Instructions. PAI 6.07a. Manila.