Assessing Allegheny County s Revenue Sharing Program after 10 Years

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1 University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and International Affairs Center for Metropolitan Studies RESEARCH NOTE August 2008 Assessing Allegheny County s Revenue Sharing Program after 10 Years By David Y. Miller, Director Center for Metropolitan Studies and Jennifer Easton, MPA University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and International Affairs ABSTRACT This paper provides an assessment of the impact of a unique revenue sharing program in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, 10 years after its implementation. As a response to sprawl and fiscal inequity among communities, state legislators adopted Act 77, a double-barreled reform that allowed the county to both fund regional assets and redistribute revenue among its 128 municipalities through a 1-percent sales tax increase. Funds dedicated to municipalities are parceled out using a need-based formula, the impact of which on the fiscal structure of its local governments had not been fully explored. To accomplish that task, we first break the municipalities into groups based on their relative fiscal health. With those categories established, we then assess the fiscal condition of those groups and how revenue sharing has affected them over time. Analysis indicates that the need-based formula contains elements that are essentially at odds, so that the biggest gainers over time are not only fiscally stressed communities, but also rich and growing ones that increase tax efforts a prospect that is out of line with Act 77 s policy aims. INTRODUCTION In 1993, the Pennsylvania legislature adopted a law (Act 77) to create a regional asset district and tax-sharing program for Allegheny County. The law emerged as a response to three distinct, but related problems. First, the escalating fiscal difficulties facing the local government of Pittsburgh had resulted in a diminished ability of the city to provide financial support to the region s largest and most popular cultural attractions (Miller and Parker, 1990). Pittsburgh, home to the zoo, aviary and conservatory, had hollowed out during the city s rapid population decline, leaving a shrinking tax base to shoulder the tax burden for supporting those facilities. At the same time, demand for the attractions had not declined, but sprawled visitors to the attractions were no longer predominantly Pittsburgh residents. A similar theme was beginning to emerge in other city issues: Pittsburgh was providing regional services without regional support. It was an Center for Metropolitan Studies. Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh. Suite 3912 Wesley W. Posvar Hall, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania cmsgspia@pitt.edu 1

2 arrangement viewed as not only unfair, but unsustainable, as the growing gap between the cost of service provision and the capacity of public support threatened the continued operation of the city s cultural attractions. Second, not only the city government, but the other municipalities and the county government were seen as too dependent on tax strategies that were uncompetitive: specifically, high real estate levies, a heavy city amusement tax and personal property tax (Jensen and Turner, 2000). Finally, the region was facing a rapidly expanding financial inequity among and between the region s communities (Miller, 2002). Allegheny County has more governments per capita than any other county in the United States, with 2.23 per 10,000 residents (Hamilton, 1998). It includes 296 governments, of which 128 are municipalities. With this high degree of fragmentation exists a wide spectrum of fiscal status and remarkable differences in tax-base capacity among communities some pockets of wealth are able to tax at relatively low rates and provide ample services, while their poorer neighbors levy high rates on their dwindling populations and net meager revenues. The difference in service provision means a difference in quality of life between richer and poorer communities. Perhaps more ominously, the trend suggests a gap that can become only wider without revenue to invest in infrastructure and sustainable development, poorer municipalities drive away what revenue potential still remains. For instance, between 1981 and 1997, per capita tax assessments for the wealthiest quartile of municipalities grew five times faster than for those of the poorest quartile of municipalities (Miller, 2002: 139). Act 77 was two reform initiatives bundled together in a single piece of legislation. The first reform authorized the creation of a special district unit of government within the borders of Allegheny County, called the Allegheny County Regional Asset District. Second, it authorized the creation of a revenue sharing program for local governments in the county. For the initiators of this legislation, the policy problem that was their primary objective was the funding of the asset district, while the revenues sharing program was seen as an important way to sell the first reform. To fund these two reforms, the county was authorized to levy a 1 percent local option sales and use tax. 1 Revenues from the tax are collected by the state and distributed according to the following breakdown, explained below: 50% Regional Asset District (RAD): Half of each year s revenues from the new tax are transferred to a Regional Asset District that allocates funding for regional cultural programs and venues, referred to as regional assets. Most RAD dollars fund libraries, parks, sports venues and special facilities like the zoo and aviary, which are guaranteed specific streams of funding. In the first full year of the program, 1995, parks and libraries each received about 30% of RAD funds; sports and special facilities shared 35%; and the final 5% went to administration and other cultural entities, such as performing groups or smaller nonprofits. 2

3 25% County Tax Relief: Allegheny County government receives a quarter of Act 77 sales tax revenues annually, or between $36-39 million. The legislation required that part of the first year s sum be used for tax relief, and the county accordingly reduced real estate tax by 5 mils and abandoned its personal property tax, roundly criticized over the years as inequitable and difficult to collect (Turner 1995). 25% Local Revenue Sharing: The state treasurer s office distributes the remaining quarter of Act 77 revenues among each of the district s 128 municipalities using a redistributive formula weighted to favor poorer municipalities. In the first year, municipalities were required to reduce or eliminate taxes considered uncompetitive. Pittsburgh receives the largest share of this revenue, about $20 million annually, while the remaining 127 municipalities split about $18 million annually. Regional decision-making in a metropolitan area is emerging as one of the practical innovations of the late 20th and earlier 21st century. Miller (2002) identified four forms of regional decision-making based on the primary ways governments can interact: coordinate planning and development activities; cooperate in service delivery; realign jurisdictional boundaries; and share fiscal resources. The first form is coordinating regionalism and deals with the integrated planning of the region as a whole and the consistency of local municipal strategic plans with the strategic plan of the region. The second form is administrative regionalism. It comes in two primary forms- -the functional transfer of services from municipal governments to either special districts or to county governments, and the day-to-day negotiations between all types of local governments that lead to a myriad of cooperation agreements at an operational level between those governments. The third form is structural regionalism. Structural regionalism involves boundary change. It takes the existing structure of local government in a region and significantly alters the 5 rules of the game. Whereas the other three forms of regionalism generally retain the existing structure, this form attacks those boundaries. There are three types of structural regionalism: annexation, city/county consolidation, and mergers/consolidations. Annexation occurs generally when a part of the territory of one government is transferred to another government. This could involve transactions between two municipalities or between a county responsible for unincorporated territory within its boundaries and a municipality. City-county consolidations occur (albeit infrequently) when separate city and county governments are merged into a single government. Mergers and consolidations occur when two or more municipalities join together with either one of the governments assuming responsibility for the new territory or with the creation of an entirely new municipality comprising the merged or consolidated communities. The final form is fiscal regionalism. This form recognizes the governmental structure of the existing configuration of local governments but creates metropolitan regional funding mechanisms for a wide variety of public purposes. Defined as a set of cooperative strategies that recognize the

4 governmental structure of the existing configuration of local governments but create regional funding mechanisms for a wide variety of purposes, fiscal regionalism strives to balance the distribution of costs and benefits across local governments without threatening their existing political structure (Miller, 2000). As such, they are relatively recent innovation in metropolitan cooperation. There are three broad types of fiscal regionalism: cultural asset districts, tax and revenue sharing programs, and peaceful coexistence plans. The first type is reflected in the asset district. Like Denver s Scientific and Cultural Facilities District, Allegheny County s Regional Asset District draws upon region-wide revenue to support central city cultural programs and facilities enjoyed by residents and non-residents alike (Hansberry 2000). In both Denver and Pittsburgh, the change in funding sources for 6 cultural assets was patterned to follow a change in their use: fifty years ago, city residents were the primary users and appropriate primary underwriters of public support for those assets. Today, as the city centers shrink and suburbs grow, non-city residents are the primary users of those facilities (Miller 2000). Creating cultural asset districts has created balance, providing a regional solution to what is essentially a regional problem. Tax- and revenue-sharing policy, another strategy of fiscal regionalism, is a particularly interesting element of Act 77. It calls for collecting a pool of revenue or assessed value, which is then redistributed according to need, for the purpose of more equitably allocating the gains of development in a region. While Act 77 s impact on cultural facilities has been a welldocumented infusion of necessary sustaining funds, its impact on the relative fiscal status of the municipalities to which it redistributes unrestricted revenue has been left largely unexplored. 3 The purpose of this paper is to provide an assessment of the impact of the revenue sharing program on the fiscal structure of governments in Allegheny County. To accomplish that task we first break the 128 municipalities into groups based on their relative fiscal health. With those categories established, we then assess the fiscal condition of those groups and how revenue sharing has affected them over time. MEASURING FISCAL STRESS Degrees of fiscal stress can be measured on a two-dimensional scale (see Figure 1). One dimension represents the inputs or the rates of taxation. In the American political culture, the principle of limited government places an important premium on lower rates of taxation. Higher rates of taxation are difficult to defend to the public in their role as "voter." The second dimension represents the outputs or resources that are generated from the rates of taxation utilized by a government and adopted by its elected officials. On this dimension, a premium is placed on greater resources as those resources enable the government to address demands for services requested by the public in their role as "consumer." Voters want low

5 taxes and consumers want value through services for the taxes they invest. Figure 1 Two-Dimensional Scale for Identifying Relative Municipal Fiscal Health

6 As is suggested by Figure 8.1, there are four general categories of governments that represent the distribution of governments along this dimensional scale. The first represents those local governments with lower rates of taxation that yield greater resources. These governments would be the envy (or "Ideal" as we have categorized them in Figure 1) of all the other governments by virtue of having a minimal tax rate that voters would applaud their elected officials for "doing their job". These governments would also be envied as the yield from that minimal tax rate would generate substantial dollars that consumers would applaud their elected officials for "doing their job". A second category represents those governments that have higher rates of taxation, where those rates of taxation generate relatively higher amounts of resources. We have labeled this category as "Proactive". Generally, communities in this category could lower rates of taxation, but service levels appear to be acceptable to voter-consumers. Older, more affluent suburbs are representative of this category. The third category represents those governments that have lower rates of taxation, where those rates generate relatively lower amounts of resources. Communities in this category could raise their rates of taxation and generate greater resources, but have elected not to do so. Their relatively limited bundle of services appears to be accepted by the voterconsumers. We have labeled this group as reactive in that they could, from a resource perspective, address demands, if requested, without creating a noncompetitive tax rate. Newer towns on the fringes of an urban area are representative of this category. A final category represents governments that have higher rates of taxation that yield the least resources. Such jurisdictions would be ones that are minimally meeting demands but maximally taxing voter-consumers. These governments and their elected officials would suffer the worst of both worlds. They would be unable to justify the higher rates of taxation to the voter with the delivery of adequate services to the consumer. The voter would be upset with the high rates of taxation while the "consumer" would be dissatisfied with the quality of service. Indeed, one could argue that such a jurisdiction is not competitive and, and market terms, constitutes a business failure. We have categorized this group as "Undesirable" to represent the difficult position faced by local elected officials. Further, no elected official would seek out this condition. Indeed, we argue that identifying communities in this category is the act of identifying fiscally distressed communities. An original applied use of this scale was to identify those municipalities suffering from fiscal stress (Miller, 1988). The assumption was that those municipalities with the highest inputs and lowest outputs would be the most fiscally stressed in a metropolitan area. These municipalities would be in a condition that would not be one logically chosen by the elected officials. Lacking

7 resources, they would be forced into an unacceptable tax package and a resulting inadequate bundle of services, a plan they would have no reason to design. Further, few, if any, voter-consumers would seek out such a community. In the absence of legal authority to go out of business, such communities would nonetheless be noncompetitive. Scale economies aside, individuals deciding to locate in these communities would have to contribute more in taxes than they would get back in services in order for the community to improve its fiscal position. As a result, the scale has come to be known as a scale of relative metropolitan fiscal stress. We have operationalized the relative standing of each community in Allegheny County based on the above analysis. The Rate of Taxation dimension in Figure 8.1 is measured by calculating the rate of taxation of each municipality. Even though similar rates of taxation may generate differing amounts of resources, from a competitive perspective, it is assumed that elected officials do compare rates with their neighbors. Based on the formulas cited above, the 128 municipalities were rank ordered with the value 1 assigned to the municipality with the highest standardized tax rate. Conversely, the municipality with jurisdictions while higher scores indicate lower degrees of fiscal stress. For instance, in an earlier version of the scale, the community with the highest overall fiscal stress rating in 1991 was the small borough of Braddock (pop. 4,682). This community had the sixth highest input and third lowest the lowest standardized tax rate was assigned the value 128. The Available Resources dimension in Figure 8.1 is measured as the amount of property tax revenue generated per person in the municipality. For each of the 128 municipalities, tax millages for municipal, school, and county taxing jurisdictions were multiplied by the assessed value of the community. The resulting number represents the total property tax dollars generated. This number is divided by the community s population to arrive at the total property tax dollars generated per person. Based on the formulas cited above, the 128 municipalities were rank ordered with the value 1 assigned to the municipality with the lowest per capita yield. Conversely, the municipality with the highest per capita yield was assigned the value 128. A final ranking is calculated by adding the two ranks together. The municipality with the lowest combined score received the rank of 1. The second lowest combined school or was assigned the value of 2, and so on until all 128 municipalities received a score. Low scores indicate a high degree of fiscal stress relative to all the other taxing output of all the jurisdictions in the study (Miller, 2002). As a final step the municipalities were divided into quartiles with 32 communities in each group. The 32 communities with the lowest scores were compiled into a group and labeled stressed. The next 32

8 communities were compiled into a group labeled "strapped." Scores on the scale from 65 to 96 were compiled into a group labeled "stable." The City of Pittsburgh fell into this category and was eliminated from subsequent analysis so that the groups would be relatively equal in size.iv Hence, only 31 cases are included in this group. The municipalities with the highest scores (and therefore lowest fiscal stress) were compiled into a group labeled "stately." Appendix 1 is a list of municipalities by category. Although attaching labels to the four classes of communities carries subjective connotations, those labels have heuristic value in presenting the subsequent analysis. Indeed, validating both the scale and the subjective labels assigned is important and necessary. With 20.3 percent of the non- Pittsburgh population in Allegheny County, communities in the "stressed" category have 52 percent of all families in poverty; 53 percent of all violent crimes; and 43 percent of all vacant housing units (Miller, 2002). The median family income in stressed communities is 50 percent of the median family income in the stately communities. (2004) in a report titled Back to Prosperity. Communities in the "stressed" category have 15 percent of the workforce but 24 percent of the unemployed. Further, in 1987, Pennsylvania adopted the Municipal Fiscal Disparities Act, which serves as a Chapter 11 reorganization process for "bankrupt" municipalities. To date, eight communities in the study area have a patent to be declared a "distressed municipality as defined in the act. On the scale, those municipalities all fall in the "stressed" category. Indeed, they rank first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, eleventh, and twelfth. Overall, the population of Allegheny County dropped by 4.1% during the decade of the 90 s (see Table 1). There was also some population shifting going on within the county and the City of Pittsburgh and those municipalities classified as Stressed on our scale lost 9.5% and 9.7% respectively while those municipalities classified as Stately grew by 7.6%. This pattern of hollowing out observed here corroborates the broader state-wide demographic changes documented by the Brookings Institution Table 1: 1990 to 2000 Populations for Allegheny County Municipalities Allegheny County Municipalities Population Stately Stable Strapped Stressed Pittsburgh Total County , , , , ,879 1,335, , , , , ,563 1,281,220 Change 19,904-8,125-13,320-17,839-35,316-54,696 % Change 7.60% -2.70% -6.10% -9.70% -9.50% -4.10%

9 ACT 77 IMPACT ASSESSMENT In 1995, the first year of the revenue sharing program, just under $31 million was allocated to the municipalities in the county (see Table 2). The City of Pittsburgh received the largest share, $18,564,915 or 60%. The balance was fairly evenly distributed between the other municipal groups. Between 1995 and 2005, the available funds for the revenue sharing program increased by 21.6% to $37,635,131. Most notable in the data is the low rate of growth for the city of Pittsburgh (8.3%) compared to the other groups of municipalities (36.9% to 46.4%). Pittsburgh s share dropped from 60% to 53.4% in Potential explanations for this decline will be offered later in this paper. Table 2: 1995 and 2005 Revenue Sharing Allocation for Municipalities Allegheny County Municipalities Population Stately Stable Strapped Stressed Pittsburgh Total County 1995 $2,480,214 $3,669,845 $2,788,588 $3,459,054 $18,564,915 $30,962, $3,561,936 $5,023,024 $4,082,861 $4,852,527 $20,114,782 $37,635,131 Change $1,081,722 $1,353,179 $1,294,273 $1,393,473 $1,549,867 $6,672,514 % Change 43.60% 36.90% 46.40% 40.30% 8.30% 21.60% The component of Act 77 that allocates revenues from the pool to the county s 128 municipalities was designed to be redistributive, more heavily benefiting those communities with a diminished capacity to generate tax dollars. The distribution formula has two parts. First, the formula measures the base share a government receives from the revenue sharing program by identifying that government s total taxes collected as a percentage of all of the taxes collected by all of the governments participating in the program. This can be understood as a municipality s proportion of the total taxes collected countywide. For instance, a particular municipality that collected 2% of the total taxes collected by all the municipalities would be theoretically entitled to 2% of the available revenuesharing funds. The second part of the formula adjusts that percentage by each municipality's relative wealth. Wealth is measured as the ratio of a particular municipality's per capita assessed value to the average assessed value of all of the municipalities. In the case above, if the community had one half the per capita wealth it would receive twice as much as it would have received if the formula was simply based on relative tax effort. The municipality with 2% of taxes collected and one half the relative wealth would receive

10 4% of the available revenue-sharing funds. Conversely, if the municipality with 2% of taxes collected had twice the relative wealth, it would receive 1% of the available revenue-sharing funds. As is demonstrated in Table 3, the proceeds for both 1995 and 2005 indicate that the program is achieving its desired outcomes. In 1995, Stately municipalities received $9.46 per capita while those municipalities in the Stressed category received twice as much - $18.86 per capita. In 2005, the range for the same two categories was $12.63 and $29.31 per capita. Table 3: 1995 and 2005 Per Capita Revenue Sharing Allocation for Municipalities Allegheny County Municipalities Population Stately Stable Strapped Stressed Pittsburgh Total County 1995 $9.46 $12.11 $12.83 $18.86 $50.19 $ $12.63 $17.02 $20.01 $29.31 $60.12 $29.37 Change $3.17 $4.92 $7.18 $10.45 $9.93 $6.20 % Change 33.50% 40.60% 56.00% 55.40% 19.80% 26.70% The allocation for the City of Pittsburgh grew much more modestly during the period but still represents twice the per capita allocation of even the Stressed municipalities group. That is primarily a function of the part of the formula that establishes the base allocation total taxes. As a major metropolitan city six times the size of the next largest municipality in Allegheny County, its tax effort is significantly larger, dwarfing those other municipalities. When the revenue sharing program was conceived, it was probably with the understanding that utilizing a factor as tax effort would yield a greater distribution of the revenue sharing funds to the city than other measures, such as population, that could have been used as the base calculation. Although tax effort gave Pittsburgh a greater initial allocation, as the City hollows out and the most stressed of the county municipalities grow more stressed, the relative allocation for the City is diminished. The revenue sharing program, by virtue of its redistributive formula, should have a very differential impact on communities, and the information in Table 4 confirms that observation. Table 4 compares a municipality s allocation from Act 77 to the total of its locally raised taxes, an approximation of that municipality s budget. In 1995, the revenue sharing allocation constituted 3% of Stately municipalities budgets and 11.1% of Stressed municipalities budgets. For the City of Pittsburgh, although large on a per capita basis, the percentage allocation (5.5%) falls

11 between the other categories of municipalities. Table 4: 1995 and 2005 Revenue Sharing as a % of a Municipality's Local Taxes Allegheny County Municipalities % of Taxes Stately Stable Strapped Stressed Pittsburgh % 4.90% 7.80% 11.10% 5.50% % 4.40% 7.20% 11.80% 6.20% Change -0.60% -0.50% -0.60% 0.70% 0.70% % Change % % -7.50% 6.40% 12.50% Between 1995 and 2005, the overall change in the impact of the revenue sharing program was surprisingly modest. For Stately municipalities, the revenue sharing program dropped from 3% to 2.4% of budget, Stable municipalities from 4.9% to 4.4%, and Strapped municipalities from 7.8% to 7.2%. Stressed municipalities and the City of Pittsburgh increased from 11.1% and 5.5% to 11.8% and 6.2% respectively. Modest does not mean insignificant. It is clear that the City of Pittsburgh and the county s Stressed municipalities are becoming more dependent on the this program, while the 9.4% of the available revenue sharing funds that Stately communities receive is of declining importance to their total budgets. A more thorough analysis of how the allocation formula has operated over time reveals that its two principle components work in opposite directions that serve to keep the overall distributions relatively the same. Whether a municipality sees a growing or shrinking proportion of the program depends on the interaction between its relative tax effort and its relative fiscal position. The annual formula recalculation will result in a maximum increased allocation share for a municipality when a municipality increases its share of the total taxes (+) collected countywide and experiences relative economic decline (-). If both factors, (+,+) or (-,-), are heading in the same direction, the change in allocation will depend on the intensity of the change of each factor. Finally, that municipality experiencing a relative decline in tax effort (-) and an increase in relative wealth (+) should see a significant reduction in its revenue sharing allocation. Analysis of the change in those factors is presented in Table 5 and indicates that Stately municipalities are the most likely to be increasing tax effort and Stressed municipalities are continuing to lose ground is relative wealth. Municipalities in the Stately category saw their relative share of total tax effort increase by 29.2% between 1995 and As a practical response to growing populations (they were the only group with population growth) and increasing service demands, these Center for Metropolitan Studies. Suite 3912 Wesley W. Posvar Hall, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania cmsgspia@pitt.edu

12 communities were much more apt to see their total taxes collected grow at a faster rate than non-growth municipalities. At the same time, the Stressed municipalities saw little relative tax effort growth but received more from the revenue sharing program because economic conditions deteriorated. Overall, Stressed municipalities saw a 24.5% increase in the gap between their relative wealth and that of the average of all the communities. This suggests that economic growth is occurring within Allegheny County in such a way that the economic gap between its richest and poorest communities is significantly widening. Table 5: Average % Change in Distress and Tax Effort 2005/1995 Allegheny County Municipalities Change 2005/1995 Stately Stable Strapped Stressed Pittsburgh In Relative Distress -4.60% -1.10% 4.50% 24.50% 2.20% In Relative Effort 29.20% 11.90% 9.70% 1.20% -8.90% The data also suggest that, relative to its tax effort position in 1995, the City of Pittsburgh s tax effort has been significantly reduced over the last 10 years. As the City has addressed its severe financial condition by reducing costs, limiting revenue increase, and entering the Act 47 program for fiscally strapped municipalities, its taxes have actually decreased in relation to the taxing levels of all the other jurisdictions. Indeed, all other categories of municipalities saw a relative increase in tax effort as Pittsburgh s effort declined by 8.9%. This decline also accounts for the city s relative modest growth in total disbursements from the pool (the total pool increased 21.6% while Pittsburgh s increase was 8.3%). CONCLUSION If revenue distributions to Allegheny County municipalities through the Act 77 formula are studied as a snapshot from any given year along the policy s decade-plus history, the breakdown appears to approximate what its creators envisioned: Communities with a diminished capacity to generate tax dollars benefit more heavily. Indeed, municipalities that fall into lower categories of fiscal health by any measure consistently receive the most Act 77 dollars per capita. The more subtle interactions between formula variables over time have created a scenario far less straightforward. Over time, a municipality s expanding or shrinking share of the tax dollars dispersed countywide depends on the interaction between two factors: relative tax effort, which determines its base share of the program, and relative fiscal position, which determines how the base share will be adjusted to reflect need. Therefore, the biggest gainers are not only poor Center for Metropolitan Studies. Suite 3912 Wesley W. Posvar Hall, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania cmsgspia@pitt.edu

13 communities that experience economic decline, but also rich and growing communities that expand tax collections. In the end, the formula tends to reflect the well documented underlying phenomenon of an ever-widening gap in financial condition between those two classes. It is safe to assume that reinforcing this polarization was not among Act 77 s original policy aims. Likewise, it is fair to assume that the formula could be made more redistributive by adjustments that would make it less likely to reward tax growth in well-to-do municipalities and more likely to direct funds to the stressed communities where they are needed most. If Act 77 continues to distribute revenue using the current formula, its ability to expand assistance to the trailing communities, including Pittsburgh, will continue to diminish as the deteriorating tax base in those jurisdictions means they are entitled to an ever-shrinking base share of the allocation. REFERENCES: Hansberry, Jane Denver s Scientific and Cultural Facilities District: A Case Study in Regionalism. Government Finance Review 16(6): Hamilton, David K Organizing Government Structure and Governance Functions in Metropolitan Areas in Response to Growth and Change: A Critical Overview. Journal of Urban Affairs 22(1): 80. Jensen, Brian K. and James Turner Act 77: Revenue Sharing in Allegheny County. Government Finance Review 16(6): Miller, D.Y Fiscal Regionalism: Metropolitan Reform without Boundary Changes. Government Finance Review 16(6): 8. Miller, D.Y Working Paper Series, Pennsylvania Economy League, Inc. Pennsylvania Economy League, Inc., Western Division Regional Asset Nature of the Pittsburgh Zoo, Phipps Conservatory and the Pittsburgh Aviary. Pittsburgh: Pennsylvania Economy League, Inc., Western Division: Turner, James The Allegheny Regional Asset District: Communities Thinking and Acting Like a Region. Government Finance Review 11(3): 20. Notes: 1 Act 77, Pennsylvania HB 659, was introduced in March 1993, passed in December of that year and implemented in early Pennsylvania Treasury Department (2007). Act 77 distribution tables, Center for Metropolitan Studies. Suite 3912 Wesley W. Posvar Hall, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania cmsgspia@pitt.edu

14 3 As of its 2008 budget, the Allegheny Regional Asset District has distributed $1.97 billion in grants. A full funding history and discussion of impacts, , is available at < iv In Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, as a home-rule municipality, has access to a variety of other taxes in addition to the property tax. Many of these sources are not typically available to the other municipalities in the region. If the burden of these additional taxes were included in the analysis, Pittsburgh would be ranked in the stressed category. Center for Metropolitan Studies. Suite 3912 Wesley W. Posvar Hall, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania cmsgspia@pitt.edu