Conditional Cash Transfers and Public Employment Programmes an overview. Fabio Veras Soares IPC-IG (UNDP/SAE/IPEA)

Transcription

1 Conditional Cash Transfers and Public Employment Programmes an overview Fabio Veras Soares IPC-IG (UNDP/SAE/IPEA) 0

2 CCT and PEP programmes Outline of the Presentation Are CCTs and Public Work and Employment Programmes competing models of social protection? CCT programmes: 1. going beyond the commonalities; 2. Impacts Cash for work: what are the recent innovations? 1. From short term public works towards employment guarantee schemes. 2. Lessons from the recent experiences in India, Ethiopia and South Africa. 1

3 CCT and PEP programmes CCTs and PEPs are competing models for social protection policy intervention? In practice they may compete: political support, budget restrictions, policy inertia, adequacy of institutions. However, it is important to recognize that they are not necessarily exclusive policies; and can be integrated either at a horizontal level Or at a vertical level, l in which h one of the policies i are the backbone of the social protection policy while the other act as complement Bolsa Familia and NREGA vis à vis JJHD (Argentina) 2

4 CCT and PEP programmes Common Features: Targeting mechanisms: geographical, categorical and means testing; Co responsibilities: education and health; Cash: regular payment of cash to women/mother Rationale: immediate poverty alleviation and stop the intergenerational cycle of poverty. Beyond commonalities: Differ with regard to the emphasis in the two objectives and with regards to... its placein the social protection system: permanent welfare policy or short term safety net 3

5 CCTs in Latin America: an overview 4

6 CCTs in Latin America: an overview Origins Safety nets to alleviate the effect of the structural reforms of the 1990 s (Honduras) Institutional reform (Mexico, Chile, Brazil, Uruguay) Response to a crisis (Argentina, Colômbia, Uruguay); Strategy t to reduce poverty in the context t of the MDGs (Paraguay and El Salvador) 5

7 CCTs in Latin America: an overview Design options Targeting tools and target population; Incorporation of new beneficiary; Coverage level; Value of the benefit (fixed per family, varying per children, denting poverty, covering conditionality cots) The way conditionality is implemented; Degree of coordination with the line ministries (supply side); Graduation rules, minimum and maximum permanence in the programme. 6

8 CCTs in Latin America: an overview Some examples of variability Bolsa Família: It has an unconditional component for the extreme poor and a minimum permanence of two years, It does not use proxy means test and has large coverage (25%) It is implemented in places where there is no supply of health and education services (and conditonalities are not required in this case), Several steps are taken before exclusion from the programme for non compliance with conditionalities; Line Ministries in charge of conditionality monitoring Strong role at the local level Use of New Public Management tools to involve municipalities. Evaluation was not planned before programme expansion 7

9 CCTs in Latin America: an overview Some examples of variability Panes and Family Allowance (Uruguay) PANES was designed as a temporary program, running from April 2005 to December 2007 with a quasi experimental evaluation. It had a conditional cash transfer component Ingreso ciudadano and use a proxy means approach to select beneficiary and reached 10% of the population Reform of the contributory family allowance to merge with Ingreso ciudadano with the aim to cover all children. The new Family Allowance intends to cover 50% of Uruguayan children regardless of adult s contributory status. First CCT embedded in the SocialSecurity Security System. Higher transfer for teenagers in secondary education. 8

10 CCTs in Latin America: an overview Some examples of variability Puente and Chile Solidario It does not consider itself a CCT programme!; It targets the extreme poor not reached by existing social protection/policy programmes; Contract with families to work in seven dimensions (including employment, education, health, housing, identification, income and family dynamics): psychosocial support. Despite the low value of the transfer, there is an array of subsidies that the extreme poor family should have access to: housing and water/electricity and family allowance. Two years under Puente, plus three under Chile Solidario, but eligibility to other transfers is independent of the permanence in the programme. 9

11 CCTs in Latin America: an overview Some examples of variability Argentina Jefe and Jefa de Hogares Programme created to fight the crisis: quick implementation and high coverage. Besides traditional conditionality and it had also work conditionality (productive initiatives, cooperatives or training). Exit strategy (2006): FamilyPlan (structural poverty and no time limit) and Employment and Training Insurance (transitory poverty and two years limit). No new beneficiaries. 2009: Family allowance for families of unemployed workers and in the informal sector (means testing). It will allow the incorporation of new beneficiaries. This reform came after strong campaign from civil society and opposition parties. 10

12 CCTs in Latin America: an overview CCT and dependency: what do the evaluations say? The evaluations of Progresa/Oportunidades and Familias en Acción show no impact on labour market participation; p Evaluations of Bolsa Familia also did not find any negative impact onlabour force participation. Someimpacton on hours of work for women in the informal sector accompanied of an increase in time spent in domestic chores. In rural contexts, evaluations have found that the transfer lead to investment in production and therefore an increase in consumption and autonomous income. 11

13 CCTs in Latin America: an overview CCT and dependency: what do the evaluations say? The evaluations of Progresa/Oportunidades and Familias en Acción show no impact on labour market participation; p Evaluations of Bolsa Familia also did not find any negative impact onlabour force participation. Someimpacton on hours of work for women in the informal sector accompanied of an increase in time spent in domestic chores. In rural contexts, evaluations have found that the transfer lead to investment in production and therefore an increase in consumption and autonomous income. 12

14 CCTs in Latin America: an overview CCT and dependency: what do the evaluations say? The evaluations of Progresa/Oportunidades and Familias en Acción show no impact on labour market participation; p Evaluations of Bolsa Familia also did not find any negative impact onlabour force participation. Someimpacton on hours of work for women in the informal sector accompanied of an increase in time spent in domestic chores. In rural contexts, evaluations have found that the transfer lead to investment in production and therefore an increase in consumption and autonomous income. 13

15 PEPs: an overview PEP: what are the recent innovations? Public works have a long tradition in the social assistance field. Features: mostly designed crisis response, short lived initiatives despite a discourse to address poverty and structural unemployment. Innovation: To make PEP a more permanent complement to market driven employment creation, particularly, specially in contexts where there is high level of unemployment. 14

16 PEPs: an overview PEPs: what are the recent innovations? The move from short term term safety nets towards a long term approach encompasses large scale govement employment programmes that offer some form of employment guarantee as well as initiatives that promote the labour intensification of government infrastructure spending (Type B and C according to McCord (2008) typology. Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia and NREGA in India. Incorporation of SocialServices Services (economy of care): EPWP. 15

17 PEPs: an overview Some Programme examples NREGA, India (2005) Framework: Right to work Objective: to create durable assets and strengthen the livelihood resource base of the rural poor. Self lftargeting: ti all rural HHs willing to do unskilled manual work are entitled up to 100 days of work/year (45 million hhs benefited ). 60:40 wage and material ratio has to be maintain. No contractors or use of machinery is allowed. Selection of the project at the local level (participatory) Social audits (transparency). Unemployment insurance (paid by state) if work is not provided within 15 days. 16

18 PEPs: an overview Some Programme examples PSNP, Ethiopiai Launched in 2005 as a 5 year programme to target previously recipient of food aid and vulnerable hhs. Objective: to address underlying causes of food insecurity with a focus on community assets and improving natural resource base and social infrastructure Target: 7 8 million rural Ethiopians. PW (80 90%) and Direct Support (10 20%) to HH with no labour. Eligibility: HH facing more than 3 months a year of food dinsecurity. it Community based dtargeting. ti Strong community participation in identifying activities and assets required; PW are implemented from January to June so as not to interfere with farming activities Complemented by Other Food Security Programme (OFSP): including access to credit, agricultural extension services, technology transfer 17

19 PEPs: an overview Some Programme examples EPWP, South thafrica Phase 1 launched in 2004 and Phase 2 in Objective: Provide productive work to the unemployed; ;provide unemployed people with education and skills; ensure that beneficiaries of the EPWP are either enabled to set up their own business/ serviceorbecome employedonce once theyexitthe exit programme; to provide infrastructure for basic services and social services. Target: All unemployed willing to work at the wage rate offered. 1 million by Actual: 1,617,696, but only 11% of the unemployed. Phase 2: 2 million jobs. No beneficiary can be employed more than 24 months within a 5 year cycle (still short tem). EPWP2: there is is an attempt to provide longer term employment particularly in the social sector 18

20 PEPs: an overview Some Programme examples JJHD (Argentina) Launched in April 2002 Objective: to mitigate the unemployment impacts of the economic crisis. Mixture ofpublic worksand CCTs. Eligibility: head of hhs with children under the age of 18, persons with disabilities, or a pregnant woman. Work kload: 20 hours per week, wage rate: half hlfof the monthly hh per capita income. Covered 22% of the economically active population at its peak. Type of work: community services, housing construction and repair, small productive projects, training programmes. No administrative information on take up rates. 19

21 PEPs: an overview Impacts of PEPs: NREGA (IHD literature review) Based on the secondary statistics as well as field data it seems that the self-selectivity of NREGA has worked: landless labourers, small and marginal farmers, scheduled caste and scheduled tribe population and women are over-represented among the beneficiaries. There are quota/targets for the latter two groups. NREGA appears to have raised the reservation wage. However, there is a need to index wage to the price rise, which is an area of concern for many. In the field studies it has been observed that NREGA income corresponds to per cent of the household income. This due to the fact that several states works have not provided the numbers of days demanded: about 7 per cent of households completed 100 days of employment in a year. Testimonies of women and men workers reveal that NREGA income is very useful for meeting the family s food expenditure, educational and health needs. Some evidences point out the reduced d hunger periods as well as reduced lean season migration. 20

22 PEPs: an overview Impacts of PEPs: NREGA There are several provisions of decent work that are visible in design and implementation of NREGA, however they need to be further promoted. The quality of the assets being created is also an important issue. NREGA per se may not be a source for securing decent work, as it has in-built limitations as a social protection programme. It does not cater to the goals of promoting skills and development of workers. Some of those elements need to be accounted for in the overall employment promotion strategies of the government. At the best, effective implementation of NREGA would lead to quality of employment and it would improve conditions of work and well being of workers. 21

23 PEPs: an overview Impacts of PEPs: EPWP 1 (Murray Leibbrandt, Ingrid Woolard, Arden Finn and Jonathan Argent, 2010) According to a special supplement of the 2007 LFS, almost one-third of adults had heard of EPWP, yet more than twice this amount were e unaware a of the government e programme Almost 1% of working age men in comparison with only 0.7% of working age women report that they had participated in an EPWP project in the previous six months. The highest h male participation i rate was among the 30 to 34 year old group. For women the highest participation rate was among women aged 50 to 54. Unexpectedly, 33% of recent EPWP participants have completed high school (Grade12 or higher), which is the same proportion o as in the non-participant t population. Targeting issues. The high uptake among the more educated is particularly surprising given the low wage rates of R30 to R50 per day that are typically offered by EPWP projects. The total t wage earned per work opportunity between 2004/05 and 2006/07 declined by 43% in real terms. The current EPWP transfers fairly modest amounts of income into a relatively small number of households o 22

24 PEPs: an overview Impacts of PEP: PSNP (Gilligan, Hoddinott and Tafesse, IFPRI) Beneficiaries receiving at least half of their intended transfers improved one measure of household food security (caloric acquisition above a minimum threshold) Beneficiaries of both PSNP and OFSP are more likely to be food secure, and are more likely to borrow for productive purposes, use improved agricultural technologies, and operate nonfarm own business activities. iti For these households, there was no evidence of disincentive effects in terms of the reduced supply of labor to wage employment or private transfers. 23

25 PEPs: an overview REFERENCES: Gilligan, Daniel O., Hoddinott, John and Taffesse, Alemayehu Seyoum (2008) The impact of Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme and its linkages pdf Murray Leibbrandt, Ingrid Woolard, Arden Finn and Jonathan Argent (2010) Trends in South African Income Distribution and Poverty since the Fall of the Apartheid OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers No. 101 Radhika Lal, Steve Miller, Maikel Lieuw-Kie-Song, Daniel Kostzer (2010) Public Works and Employment Programmes: Towards a Long-Term Development Approach IPC-IG Working Paper # 66. Soares, Fabio V., Ribas, Rafael P., and Osorio, Rafael. (2007) Evaluating the Impact of Brazil s Bolsa Família: Cash Transfer Programmes in Comparative Perspective IPC-IG Evaluation Note # 1. Soares, Fabio V. and Britto, Tatiana (2007) Confronting Capacity Constraints on Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America: the cases of El Salvador and Paraguay IPC-IG Working Paper #

26 Many Thanks 25