The Effects of Elderly Employment Stabilization Law on Labor Supply and Employment Status *

Transcription

1 The Effects of Elderly Employment Stabilization Law on Labor Supply and Employment Status * March 2013 Preliminary. Please do not cite without permission. Ayako Kondo Hosei University, akondo@hosei.ac.jp Hitoshi Shigeoka Simon Fraser University, hitoshi_shigeoka@sfu.ca Abstract Given the fast aging population and resulting pressure on the social security system, the government of Japan revised the Elderly Employment Stabilization Law (EESL) to ensure that older people can continue to work longer.. Starting from 2006, employers are legally obliged to introduce a system to continue employment up to the pension eligibility age. This paper examines the effect of this legal enforcement on old men s labor supply and employment status, by comparing the affected cohorts and cohorts a few years older than them. We find that the EESL revision actually increased the employment rate of men in the affected cohorts in their early 60s. At the same time, increase in non-regular staffs comprise of substantial fraction of this increased employment, suggesting that the productivity of those workers is lower than prevailing wages of regular staffs of their age. Also, we do not find evidence for crowding out of new hires of the same age group by the increase in incumbent workers staying in the same employee. * This research is supported by the Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (# , PI: Ayako Kondo). All the analyses based on the Labour Force Survey were implemented by Ayako Kondo, under approval by the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. We are grateful to David Green, Kosuke Takeda, and seminar participants at Tokyo Labor Workshop and OEIO for numerous suggestions. Disclaimer required by the Statistics Bureau: (1) Since the Labour Force Survey is a sample survey, all results are potentially subject to sampling errors. (2) All the analyses in this paper are done by the author, not the Bureau, and thus their consistency with the Bureau s official reports is not guaranteed. 1

2 1 Introduction Aging population is emerging as a serious social concern in many developed countries. Among others, Japan has experienced very rapid aging in the past few decades. As of 2010, the ratio of the elderly (65 years or older) in Japan s population is 23.1%, which is the highest in the OECD countries. Given this fast aging population and the resulting increase in the social security burden, the government of Japan has started to gradually raise the pension eligibility age, and it has been trying to ensure that older people can stay in the labor force until the raised pension eligibility age. Specifically, the eligibility of full pension benefit started to rise in 2001, and five years later in 2006, the Elderly Employment Stabilization Law (here after EESL) was revised to fill the gap between the prevailed mandatory retirement at age 60 and the full pension eligibility. Starting from April 2006, employers have to institute a system to continue employment up to the pension eligibility age. The five-year lag between the rise in the pension eligibility age and the revision of EESL allows us to distinguish the effect of the EESL from the effect of pension reform. Both reforms affect the cohorts who turn 60 at the time of implementation or younger. Thus, cohorts born in 1946 and after are affected by both the rise in pension eligibility age and change in EESL, while cohorts born in are subject to only the rise in pension eligibility age. Comparing these gap cohorts (i.e., those who turn 60 in ) and cohorts born after 1946 (i.e., those who turn 60 in 2006 or later), we can isolate the effect of mandated employment from the effect of the rise in pension eligibility age. 2

3 This policy change offers a unique opportunity to examine whether a policy that intends to increase labor demand rather than supply can be effective to promote employment of the elderly. It is not a priori obvious whether the revision actually had significant effects on employment of the elderly in their 60s for two reasons. First, even before the EESL revision, the firms were able to continue to employ workers older than 60; therefore, if there had not been excess supply of labor, the EESL revision could have no effect. Second, the revised EESL has no clear guideline for employment conditions for these post-retirement workers, and it is legally possible to induce voluntary retirement by offering very low wages after the retirement age desired by the employer. Despite of this fact, we find that the EESL revision actually increased the employment rate of men in the affected cohorts in their early 60s. This result implies that, in Japan in the 2000s, the limited demand of labor was binding the employment of men in their early 60s.We further decompose the increased employment into different types of employment contracts and find that both regular staffs and non-regular increased. Since non-regular staffs are typically paid much lower wages than regular staffs, our result suggests that productivity of those workers is lower than prevailing wages of regular staffs of their age. Furthermore, we find that, while the increase in employment mainly comes from an increase in workers who remain in the same employer, there was no decline in the number of workers who switch employers or move across industries. This result suggests that the increase in staying incumbents did not crowd out hiring in the external labor market for the retired elderly. 3

4 A large body of literature has found that an increase in the retirement age defined in the social security system increases elderly s labor supply and delays the actual age of retirement (e.g,. Krueger and Pischke 1992, Mastrobuoni 2009, Manoli and Weber 2012, Behaghel and Blau 2012). 1 This paper is distinct from these existing studies in that, while the changes in pension eligibility age in the past literature primarily affect the labor supply behavior, the EESL revision in Japan made the employers to increase their labor demand to match the potential increase in the labor supply. If the legal obligation to continue employment actually increases employment after the previous mandatory retirement age, it implies that old men s employment is constrained by limited labor demand. Our findings are in line with Neumark and Stock (1999), who find that Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which prohibits age discrimination in employment, actually increased old workers employment in the United States. An important difference between Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) in the United States and the EESL revision in Japan is that the EESL explicitly targets workers in the early 60s and allows mandatory retirement after the age of 65. Neumark and Srock (1999) argue that the ADEA steepened the wage profile by making employers easier to commit to Lazear (1979) type contract. The increase in non-regular staffs in our finding offers another kind of evidence for Lazear-type contract in the sense that these workers near the retirement age were paid more than their productivity. 1 Studies using Japanese data also show significant effects of pension benefits on elderly s employment (e.g. Abe 1998, Oishi and Oshio 2000, Ishii and Kurosawa 2009). 4

5 Our results are also consistent with the earlier studies in Japan. 2 Using data from Keio Household Panel Survey, Yamamoto (2008) finds that the revision of EESL in 2006 substantially increased both regular and non-regular employment of the affected cohorts among men who had been salaried workers in their 50s. There are two main differences between Yamamoto (2008) and our approach: first, we distinguish the effects of the EESL revision from the effect of pension reform, and second, we use a nationally representative data with a large sample size. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a detailed explanation of the institutional settings. Then Section 3 describes data and Section 4 presents our empirical models. Section 5 reports our findings, and Section 6 concludes. 2 Institutional Background Japan s population is aging rapidly. According to Population Census, the ratio of elderly (65 years or older) has increased from 14.6% in 1995 to 23.1% in 2010, which is already the highest among the OECD countries. This ratio is expected to keep rising: according to the projection by National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, it is expected to exceed 30% by Since the Japanese public pension program is designed as a pay-as-you-go system, this rapid aging of population makes it inevitable to raise the pension eligibility age. Along with the rise in pension eligibility age, the government of Japan has been trying to ensure that old workers can stay in the 2 Relatedly, Ishii and Kurosawa (2009) examine the effect of the rise in pension eligibility age using data for from Survey on Employment Conditions of Older Persons and find a modest positive effect on full-time employment for the affected cohorts. 5

6 labor force longer by revising EESL. This revision is intended to make employers continue to employ old workers until they become eligible for the pension benefits. Established in 1971, the EESL initially intended to protect and promote employment of workers older than 50. The revision passed in 1994 and enacted in 1998 prohibited firms to set mandatory retirement age younger than 60. Since the eligibility age of oldage pension for employed workers had been 60 until 2001, most employees in private companies were able to work until they became eligible for the full pension benefit. However, the pension reform act to raise the pension eligibility age gradually came into effect in 2001, 3 and cohorts born in 1941 or later (i.e., those who turn 60 in 2001 or later) can no longer receive the full pension benefit at the age of 60, the prevailing mandatory retirement age. This pension reform led to the revision of the EESL passed in 2004 and enacted in 2006, which legally mandated employers to institute a system to continue employment until the pension eligibility age. The timings of revisions of EESL and the pension system are summarized in Table 1. 4 Note that "mandatory retirement" in Japan does not necessarily mean full retirement from the labor force. Typically, employees stop working in their current position as a regular staff either in the month in which they reach the pre-determined retirement age or at the end of the fiscal year during which they reach the retirement age (i.e. March 31 after the 60th birthday since fiscal years starts April 1 in Japan). At this point, some workers leave the labor force or begin working for a new employer, but a substantial number of "retired" employees remain with their present employer on a different kind of employment contract, which typically pays much lower wages. The 3 See Appendix A1 for details of Japan s public pension system. 4 The final goal of the revision in EESL is to ensure employment until age of 65, which is the maximum age at which the government intends to raise the pension eligibility age. 6

7 EESL revision legally mandated firms to offer such re-employment opportunities to all employees below the pension eligibility age. Therefore, it is important to distinguish continued employment mandated by the EESL from a raise in the mandatory retirement age. Raising the mandatory retirement age means that the employer continues to hire the worker on the same contract as a regular staff. Under the current EESL, employers can terminate the contact as a regular staff and re-employ the same person as a non-regular staff with much lower wages. 5 Since such kind of re-employment had been quite common in small companies even before the EESL revision, the effect of this revision is expected to be larger for employees in large firms. There are three important institutional features of EESL revision for our empirical analysis. First, there is a five-year lag between the rise in the pension eligibility age and the revision of EESL; the rise in pension eligibility age stated in 2001 whereas the revision of EESL enacted in Both reforms affect the cohorts who turn 60 at the time of implementation or younger. Thus, as summarized in Table 2, while cohorts born in 1946 and after are affected by both the rise in pension eligibility age and change in EESL, cohorts born in are subject to only the rise in pension eligibility age. Comparing these gap cohorts and cohorts born after 1946, we can isolate the effect of mandated employment from the effect of the rise in pension eligibility age. Also, by comparing the cohort born in and the cohort born before 1941, we can identify the effects of the changes in pension eligibility age. 5 Also, it is allowed to pay much higher severance pay to those who retire at the age of 60 than those who continue to work. Hence, it is possible for a firm to induce retirement at age 60 by making the severance pay conditional on retirement at age 60 large enough to exceed the forgone earnings from employment beyond 60. 7

8 Second, the Japan s unemployment insurance system also offers compensating benefits to workers older than 60 who are paid significantly lower than salaries paid before age Anecdotally, it is said that this Continuous Employment Benefits (koyo keizoku kyufu) makes it easier for the firms to offer very low wages to the workers reemployed as non-regular staffs at the age of 60. Third, until April 2013, employers can refuse to renew the contract for some of the employees who have reached mandatory retirement age, if these employees do not meet the criteria set by a labor-management agreement. Hence, it is not a priori obvious whether the revision actually has significant effects on employment of old men in their 60s. 3 Data: Labour Force Survey Our primary source of data is the Labour Force Survey conducted monthly by the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. The survey covers households residing in Japan. There are two types of questionnaire in the survey: basic questionnaire and special questionnaire. The basic questionnaire is distributed to about 40 thousand households, and the questions on employment status are asked to the members who are 15 years old or older (about 100 thousand persons in total) in those household. In addition, the special questionnaire, which contains more detailed questions about demographic background (such as education) and employment status than the basic questionnaire, is distributed to 10 thousand households among the subset of the 6 Furthermore, workers who actually retired can claim unemployment benefit by pretending to be seeking for a job. The unemployment benefits typically covers up to 150 days, and this could help retired workers to fill the gap between the retirement and the eligibility of full pension benefits. 8

9 respondents to basic questionnaire. The survey is conducted as of the last day of each month, and the reference period is the last week of the month. We limit our sample to men for the following two reasons. First, the proportion of full-time regular employees in population is as low as about 10-15% for female in their 50s (i.e. right below the retirement age), thus EESL revision is likely to be irrelevant to the majority of women. Second, as explained in the appendix, the timing of pension reform for female employees in private sector is different from that for female employees in public sector and all male employees. The outcome variables we examine are the following: labor force participation rate, employment to population ratio, population ratios of different types of employment, and the ratio of unemployment in the population. The definition of each variable is listed in Table 1. Data from the special questionnaire allow us to distinguish regular staffs ( seishain in Japanese) from non-regular staffs ( hiseiki in Japanese). This distinction is very important in Japan, because the majority of non-regular staffs are paid much lower than the regular staffs. In particular, if a firm decide to re-employ workers who reach the retirement age with much lower wages, such re-employed workers are classified as non-regular staffs. On the basic questionnaire, the same classification is not available, but we can distinguish temporary employees, who are on fixed-term contract for a year or a shorter period, from permanent employees, whose contracts are on either permanent or longer than a year. Although a non-negligible number of non-regular staffs might be included in permanent employees, many re-employed elderly workers are on the one-year contract. Thus we also examine changes in temporary employees. 9

10 Regarding explanatory variables, the precise information on age is essential in our analysis. The Labour Force Survey asks the year and month of birth to all adult respondents, thus we can compute the age in months at the survey month. Note that education is available only from the special questionnaire, thus our analyses using the basic questionnaire do not control for educational background. The special questionnaire also asks industry and firm size of both current and previous jobs, and, if the respondent quit a job (i.e., leave a firm) in the past 3 years, year and month of quitting are available. Using these variables, we can identify employment status and industry at age of 59 for those who were 61 years old as of the survey month. The data from the basic questionnaire are available from Thus, the youngest cohort that can be followed up to age 65 is the cohort born in 1946, which is the first cohort fully affected by the EESL revision implemented in 2006 (i.e., cohort who is age 60 in 2006). We focus on the cohorts born between 1938 and 1950, because the mandatory retirement before reaching age 60 was legal for cohorts born before The data from the special questionnaire is available only for , thus analyses based on the special questionnaire are limited to cohorts born between 1943 (i.e., 59 years old in 2002) and 1948 (i.e., 63 years old in 2011). Summary statistics by selected cohorts are presented in Table 4. 4 Empirical Strategy 4.1 Estimation of discontinuity in employment status at the age of 60 Since the EESL revision affects cohorts who reached 60 in 2006 or later, we estimate the jumps in employment status at the age of 60 in an age regression discontinuity design framework, and see the change in the magnitude of jumps across 10

11 affected (born in 1946 or later) and non-affected cohorts (born before 1946). 7 Comparing these two groups of cohorts allows us to isolate the changes in employment and labor supply induced by additional employment opportunities generated by the EESL revision. Also, by comparing the cohorts born in and the cohorts born before 1941, we can gauge the effects of the gradual changes in pension eligibility age, which started in 2001, and compare it with the effects of the EESL revision. Since we need a large sample size around the cut off age, we use data from the basic questionnaires. We limit the sample to a bandwidth of one year around the age threshold and estimate the following equation: Yi = α 0 + α11[ Ai c] + α21[ Ai c]*( Ai c) + α3(1 1[ Ai c]) *( Ai c) + α41[ Ai = c] + ε i (1) where Y i is a measure of employment for individual i, A i is the age of individual i in months, c is the age cutoff, and ε i represents unobserved error components. In our case, c is 60 years old. 1[ A i c] is a post-age dummy, a dummy variable that takes one if individual i is c years old or older. Our parameter of interest is coefficient α 1. All coefficients on 1[ A i c] and their standard errors have been multiplied by 100 unless otherwise specified, so they can be interpreted as changes in percentage points. As a baseline specification, we use a linear function in age fully interacted with the post-age dummies, as described in equation (1). The right hand side of equation (1) includes a dummy for being exactly at the age cutoff in months ( 1[ A i = c] ) to dummy out those exactly at the age 60 at the time of survey for the following reasons. First, since age 7 Examples of studies that use an age regression discontinuity design to examine various outcomes include Card et al. (2008, 2009), Chay et al. (2011), Anderson et al. (2012), Carptender and Dobkins (2010), Lee and McCrary (2009), and Shigeoka (2012). 11

12 in months is constructed by subtracting the birth date (in months) from survey months, the age at exactly on the age cutoff include those just below and above age cutoff. Second, according to a survey conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, some firms define the date of mandatory retirement age as the exact day on which the worker reaches the retirement age, and some other firms define it as the end of the month when the worker reaches the retirement age. We also perform robustness checks by running the baseline specification without the dummy for being exactly at the age of 60, using triangular weights to put less weight for observations far from the cutoff, and adding quadratic terms in age fully interacted with the post-age dummies. To account for potentially common unobserved shocks within the same age cells, the standard errors are clustered at the age in month in all specifications, following Lee and Card (2008). 4.2 Estimation of relative changes in the retirement age by cohort In order to see how the change at age 60 has lasting impact on early 60s, we estimate relative changes in the retirement age by cohort, following Mastrobuoni (2009). Specifically, we estimate the following equation using the sample of men born in year in the basic questionnaire: = 1( = )( +, 1( = ))+ +.(2) y i represents one of the outcome variables (dummies for labor force participation and employment). A i is the age of individual i, and B i is his year of birth. Coefficients β a,b represents the difference in cumulative distribution function of retirement age at age a between cohort b and cohort 1940, the baseline cohort. X i represents explanatory 12

13 variables other than age*cohort dummies; for the analyses using the basic questionnaires, X i includes regional unemployment rates and region dummies. Under an assumption that a retired person never comes back to the labor force or employment, 8 a plot of +, over age a can be interpreted as cumulative distribution function of the retirement age for each cohort born in year b. Furthermore, as shown in Mastrobuoni (2009), under an additional assumption that the probability of retirement before age 59 is the same across cohorts, ( )=, can be interpreted as the difference in retirement age of cohort born in year b compared to the baseline cohort born in Since both the rise in pension eligibility age and the revision of EESL are implemented in the beginning of fiscal year (i.e., April 1st), ideally, we should define the cohort based on fiscal year. However, at this moment, the data are available only up to December 2011, thus we cannot fully trace those born in the last quarter of fiscal year 1946 up to age 65. Thus, we estimate the same model defining cohorts by fiscal year and calendar year. Also, we estimate the same model that controls for education, using the special questionnaires for cohorts Results 5.1 Changes in employment status at around age 60 across cohorts Figure 1 plots the average of selected outcome variables at age in months for the two groups of cohorts: born before 1946 (cohorts ) and after 1946 (cohorts This assumption may be too restrictive for the cases of employment and regular staffs, because some people may become unemployed temporarily and then employed again. Even so, the ratio of individuals whose y i is equal to zero can be interpreted as the lower bound of the ratio of everretired individuals. 13

14 1948). 9 The former group is affected only by the change in pension eligibility age, while the latter is affected both by the change in pension eligibility age and the legal obligation of continuous employment. Figure 1A and 1B visually show that cohorts affected by the EESL revision are apparently more likely to stay in the labor force and to be employed after the age of 60 than cohorts affected only by the change in the pension eligibility age. 10 While the age profiles before the age of 60 are similar across the two groups, the decline in labor force participation and employment at the age of 60 became less pronounced for the cohorts affected by the legal obligation of continuous employment. Furthermore, labor force participation and employment of the group born after 1946 stay higher than the group born before 1946 until around the age of 64. This pattern suggests that the positive effect of the obligation of continuous employment on employment and labor force participation persist for a couple of years after the cohort turns 60. Panel C also shows that the group born after 1946 are less likely to be unemployed than the group born before Further, we estimate equation (1) for each cohort to gauge the size of the jumps at the age of 60. Table 5 summarizes the estimated jumps at the age of 60 for employment outcomes for each cohort separately. 11 Columns (1) and (2) show roughly 4-5 percentages points of drops in labor participation and roughly 9-10 percent points of 9 We also compare the cohorts that are affected by the change in the pension eligibility age (cohorts ) and cohort that are not affected by it (cohorts ) in Appendix Figure A1. The graphs suggest that that pension eligibility does not seem to substantially affect the labor force participation as well as employment. Figure A2 show graphs narrowing the range of cohort into 1 year (i.e., 1945 vs. 1946) and Figure A3 displays a separate graph for each single year cohort. 10 The graphs that just compare adjacent cohorts (the cohorts born in 1945 and 1946) can be found in the Appendix figure A2. 11 The graphs for each cohort separately for each outcome are summarized in Appendix Figures A3. 14

15 drops in employment at the age of 60 for cohorts born before For cohorts born after 1946, who are affected by the revised EESL, the estimated drops in both labor force participation and employment are smaller. This result confirms the observation from Figure 1A and 1B that the EESL revision actually increased employment and labor force participation among men who have just reached the age of Column (3) shows a substantial decrease in unemployment right after the age of 60. The estimated jump in unemployment at the age of 60 is 4.9 percentage points for those born in 1945 and 2.9 percentage points for those born in 1946, implying 2.0 percentage points decline in the unemployment-to-population ratio at the age of 60. Since the obligation of continuous employment decreased unemployment among men at the age of 60, the drop in employment at the age of 60 (column (2)) shrunk more than the drop in labor force participation (column (1)). 13 Going back to Figure 1, Panel D and E show that, while the revised EESL slightly increased the ratio of regular staffs to population right after the age of 60 (i.e., smaller drops at the age of 60 for those born after 1946), the ratio of non-regular staffs to population was also increased. These two graphs imply that the legal obligation of continuous employment increased the number of workers who can continue to work as regular staffs on the one hand, but on the other hand, a substantial number of workers are terminated the contract as regular staffs at the age of 60 and switched to positions as nonregular staffs, which are usually paid much less than regular staffs. Furthermore, columns (4)-(5) of Table 5 shows that increase in employment at age 60 are mainly driven by the increase in the permanent employees, whom all of the regular staffs are included, while 12 The RD estimates from other specifications are summarized in Appendix Table A1. 13 Note that labor force participation (LFP) is defined as the sum of employed and unemployed. 15

16 the temporary employees also increased slightly. Column (6) confirms that there was no change in self-employed, whom the EESL should not have affected. 5.2 Estimated relative changes in the retirement age by cohort So far, we have shown that the revision of EESL has brought substantial changes in men s employment status at the age of 60. This section explores how the revision of EESL beyond the age of 60 by estimating the relative changes in the retirement age by cohort. We estimate equation (2) to calculate ( )=,, the estimated changes in retirement age of cohorts born in year b relative to cohort Table 6 reports the estimated T(b) for cohorts born in In all specifications, cohorts born in statistically significantly stay longer in the labor force than the older cohorts, and cohorts born in 1946 stay even longer. The point estimates for cohort 1946 imply that one in four men became to stay another year after the implementation of the revised EESL compared to the baseline cohort. The same trend is observed for employment as well. Our results show that the revision of the EESL indeed delayed retirement of men in the affected cohorts. 14 Further, we estimate equation (2) for being employed as regular staffs and nonregular staffs using cohorts born in in the special questionnaire sample. We do not include these variables in Table 6 because, for these variables, the assumption that a person who exited from this status would never come back to the same status is not plausible, and thus ( )=, are difficult to interpret. However, it is informative 14 For robustness check, we add controls for education using cohorts born in the special questionnaire. The results remain qualitatively the same. 16

17 to estimate β a,b for these outcomes as well, since β a,b represents the difference in the outcome variable at age a between cohort b and cohort Note that the baseline cohort is those born in 1945 unlike in 1940 for analysis using basic questionnaire. Table 7 reports estimated β a,b for age The ratio of regular staffs around the age of 61 was substantially lower for cohorts born 1944 and 1943, suggesting that the opportunity for regular employment had been increasing in the few years prior to the EESL revision. In contrast, the ratio of non-regular employment at the age of 61 is significantly higher in 1946 cohort, implying that the EESL revision also increased reemployment as non-regular staffs. The fact that a part of the observed increase in employment due to the EESL revision comes from the increase in non-regular staffs suggests that productivity of those workers is lower than prevailing wages of regular staffs of their age. 5.3 Suggestive evidence from decomposition by jobs at age 59 So far, we have shown that the EESL revision actually increased the employment of men in their early 60s. This subsection exploits the information from special questionnaire to retrieve information on the firm which employed the respondent at the age of 59, and examine the implications of the EESL revision for the mobility of elderly worker. Since the nature of the EESL revision indicates that this increase should mainly come from the increase in workers who stay with the same employer, we first explore the ratio of men in their early sixties who remain in the same job since the age of 59. Second, we explore whether this increase in the staying incumbents crowded out the workers who switch employers after reaching the retirement age. That is, whether the EESL revision 17

18 reduced the mobility of workers in their early sixties by making more workers stay with the same employer. Figure 2 plots the proportion of workers who remain in the same job as age 59 over age. Panel A includes those who were not employed at age 59, and Panel B includes only those who were employed at the time of age 59. Both graphs confirm that more workers stay in the same employer after the age of 60 in the affected cohorts (i.e., born 1946 or later) than the older cohorts. Table 8 confirms the findings in the figures. In this table, we limit the sample to those who were employed as an employee at the age of 59, because those who were selfemployed or not employed at the age of 59 are not affected by the EESL. Row B-2 confirms the findings of Figure 2: The ratio of people who were employed at age 61 increased by 6.0%. Most of this 6 percent-increase comes from the increase in those who stayed in the same job (row A-3). At the same time, there is only a slight decline in the ratio of workers who switch employers (row A-4) or industry (row A-6). This result suggests the increase in staying incumbents did not crowd out new hires of the elderly. Next, we explore the differences between those who were employed at large firms and small firms before the age of 60. As explained in Section 2, re-employment after age of 60 had been already common in small companies even prior to the EESL revision in 2006, thus the EESL is expected to have a larger effect for larger firms. To confirm this point, we repeat the same excise by examining the following two groups separately: those who were employed at large firms (500 or more employees) in Panel B and small firms (less than 100 employees) at the age of 59 in Panel C. 18

19 Rows B-1 and C-1 show that, as expected, the increase in the ratio of people who were employed at age 61 out of those employed at age 59 among affected cohorts is larger for large firms. Also, among those who were employed in a large firm, the ratio of those who switched employer is declined by 4.8% (row C-4). This suggests that, before the EESL revision, a substantial number of workers were forced to quit the large firm and move to (probably) smaller firms. Indeed, as shown in Panel D in Table 8, the ratio of workers who moved to a smaller firm declined by 2.3% (row D-1), whereas the ratios of those who moved to a larger firm (row D-3) and those who moved to public sector (row D-4) did not change. 6 Concluding remarks Aging population imposes enormous pressure on the stability of social security system. One way to maintain the social security system is to ensure that the elderly continue to stay in employment longer. To understand the effectiveness of such a policy, we examine the revision of EESL in Japan, which legally obliged employers to introduce a system to continue employment up to the pension eligibility age. We find that the revision actually increased the employment rate of men in the affected cohorts in their early 60s. This result indicates that the limited labor demand is likely to be a binding constraint for policies attempting to promote employment among older workers. Also, a substantial portion of the increased employment comes from an increase in non-regular staffs, who are typically paid much lower than regular staffs. This result suggests that the productivity of these workers who were not hired as a regular staff is lower than the prevailing wages of regular staffs in their age. Thus, our results can be 19

20 interpreted as evidence for the existence of Lazear (1979) type contracts, in which young workers are paid lower than their productivity and older workers are paid higher than their productivity. It also implies that regular staffs in their late 50s tend to be over-paid and this might be a reason of the limited labor demand. Lastly, it is important to emphasize that it had not been prohibited to hire workers older than the mandatory retirement age of 60 even before the revision of EESL. Therefore, the increase in employment after the EESL revision can be viewed as a distortion brought to the market by a government intervention. If the EESL actually forces employers to hire workers whom they would not hire otherwise, there must be some adjustment in response to this forced employment. Examining whether such adjustment indeed takes place and, if so, where such adjustment takes place e.g. whether firms limit new hires or induce quitting before the age of 60 is left as the avenue for future work. 20

21 Appendix A1 Japan s Public Pension System Japan s public pension system consists of three subsystems, and everyone at age is mandated to enroll in one of them: Employee s Pension for employees of private companies, Mutual Aid Pension for public servants, and National Pension for others. 15 People who have enrolled only in the National Pension are supposed to receive so called basic benefits from the age of 65. Enrollees of Employee s Pension or Mutual Aid Pension pay extra premium, which is proportional to their earnings, and they are supposed to receive extra benefits after retirement. More specifically, the benefits for Employee s Pension Plan consist of the basic part, which are determined only by the number of months that the person had paid the contribution, and the proportional part, which is proportional to the amount of premiums paid in the past. The basic part is designed to be equivalent to the basic benefit of National Pension Plan, except that the eligibility age for National Pension benefits has been 65 since the introduction of the system in 1961, whereas the eligibility age for Employee s pension benefits had been 60 until The pension reform plan enacted in 1994 announced that the eligibility age for basic part of Employee s Pension would be raised from 60 to 65 as summarized in the right columns of Table 1. Specifically, starting in 2001, the eligibility age for male is raised from 60 by one year per every two years, and it will be completed in 2013, when the cohort born in 1949 reaches age 64. The oldest cohort affected by this gradual rise in pension eligibility age is those born in 1941, who were 60 years old in In the 15 In Japanese, Employee s Pension, Mutual Aid Pension, and National Pension are called Kosei Nenkin, Kyosai Nenkin, and Kokumin Nenkin, respectively. 21

22 meantime, the eligibility age for the proportional part has remained 60 until 2013, although it is also supposed to be raised to 65 by For female, the reform on pension eligibility age is going to take place 5 years after the change for male. Due to this difference in the timing, we limit our sample to male. The same reform was implemented to Mutual Aid Pension Plan for public sector employees, except that there is no delay in timing of rises for female. 22

23 References Anderson, Michael, Carlos Dobkin, and Tal Gross The Effect of Health Insurance Coverage on the Use of Medical Services. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 3(4): Behaghel, Luc and David M. Blau Framing Social Security Reform: Behavioral Responses to Changes in the Full Retirement Age. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 4(4): Card, David, Carlos Dobkin, and Nicole Maestas Does Medicare Save Lives? Quarterly Journal of Economics 124(2): Card, David, Carlos Dobkin, and Nicole Maestas The Impact of Nearly Universal Insurance Coverage on Health Care Utilization: Evidence from Medicare. American Economic Review, 98(5): Chay, Kenneth Y., Daeho Kim, and Shailender Swaminathan Medicare, Hospital Utilization and Mortality: Evidence from the Program s Origins. Mimeo. Carpenter, Christopher, and Carlos Dobkin The Effect of Alcohol Consumption on Mortality: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from the Minimum Drinking Age. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1(1): Ishii, Kayoko and Masako Kurosawa Pension Reform and the Labor Supply Effect for Elderly Males. The Japanese Journal of Labour Studies 589: (in Japanese). Krueger, Alan B. and Jorn-Steffen Pischke The effect of social security on labor supply: a cohort analysis of the notch generation. Journal of Labor Economics, 10 (4): Lazear, Edward P Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?" Journal of Political Economy 87: Lee, David S., and David Card Regression Discontinuity Inference with Specification Error. Journal of Econometrics, 142(2): Lee, David S. and Justin McCrary The Deterrence Effect of Prison: Dynamic Theory and Evidence., Mimeo. Manoli, Day and Andrea Weber The Effects of Increasing the Early Retirement Age on Social Security Claims and Job Exits. Mimeo. 23

24 Mastrobuoni Giovanni Labor Supply Effects of the Recent Social Security Benefit Cuts: Empirical Estimates Using Cohort Discontinuities. Journal of Public Economics 93: Neumark, David and Wendy Stock Age Discrimination Laws and Labor Market Efficiency. Journal of Political Economy, 107(5): Shigeoka, Hitoshi. The Effect of Patient Cost-sharing on Utilization, Health and Risk Protection., Mimeo. Yamamoto, Isamu Konenreisha Koyo Anteiho Kaisei no Kokabunseki (Analyses of the effects of EESL revision), in Yoshio Higuchi and Miki Seko Eds, Nihon-no Kakei Kodo no Dynamism IV: Seido Seisaku nohenko to Shugyo Kodo, Keio University Press. (in Japanese). 24

25 Table 1: Major revisions of Elderly Employment Stabilization Law and related pension reforms; year Contents Employment Obligation to make an effort not to set the mandatory retirement age younger than 60 Obligation to make an effort to continue employment after mandatory retirement age Cohort affected Contents Pension Cohort affected 1994 Announcement that mandatory retirement younger than 60 would be prohibited from 1998 Announcement of the gradual rises in eligibility age of Oldage Basic Pension from Mandatory retirement younger than 60 became illegal Obligation to make effort to continue employment until age 65 Announcement that continuing employment until the pension eligibility age would be legally mandated from Legal obligation to continue employment until the pension eligibility age The eligibility age of Oldage Basic Pension started to rise (by one year of age in every two years until 2013) Revision of Old-age Employees' Pension earnings test to encourage labor supply

26 Table 2: Legal lower limit of mandatory retirement age and age until which employers are obliged to continue employment Cohort born Legal lower limit of mandatory retirement age Age until which employers are legally obliged to continue employment Eligibility age of Old-age Employee's Basic Pension

27 Table 3 Definition of Types of Workers Variable name Definition Questionnaire Labor force Employed + unemployed basic Employed Persons with any kind of paid jobs, including self-employed and those on a temporary leave basic Permanent Persons who work on contract of no specific period or a year employees or more of employment basic Temporary employees Persons who work on contract of a year or a shorter period basic Regular Core employees, corresponding to Japanese word "Seishain," staff based on how they are called at their workplaces special Employees other than regular staff, corresponding to Japanese Non-regular word "Hiseiki," based on how they are called at their staff workplaces special Unemployed Persons without a job and seeking for a job basic 27

28 Table 4: Summary statistics A. From basic questionnaire All By cohort groups Sample size 752, , , ,868 Labor force 76.6% 73.1% 73.9% 82.8% Employed 71.7% 67.7% 69.2% 78.0% Unemployed 4.9% 5.3% 4.7% 4.8% Permanent employees 47.1% 41.6% 44.5% 54.6% Self employed 16.4% 18.2% 15.8% 15.6% B. From special questionnaire All By cohort groups Sample size 88,111 43,941 44,170 Labor Force 78.1% 74.5% 81.6% Employed 73.6% 70.1% 77.1% Regular staffs 39.4% 36.5% 42.7% Non-regular staffs 17.6% 17.4% 17.8% Unemployed 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% Education High school or less 70.4% 72.4% 68.4% Jr. college 4.6% 4.2% 4.9% 4yr college or more 19.9% 18.5% 21.3% Never go to school 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% Unknown 5.0% 4.8% 5.2% Note: Data come from Labour Force Survey. The sample is limited to years old male. 28

29 Table 5: RD Estimates at Age 60 (Basic Questionnaire) LFP Employed Unemployed Permanent employee Temporary employee Selfemployed Cohort (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) N *** *** 4.17*** *** 2.07*** -2.19** 15,437 (0.81) (1.39) (0.95) (1.95) (0.45) (1.03) *** -9.62*** 5.10*** *** ,464 (0.84) (0.99) (1.19) (1.60) (0.55) (1.37) *** -8.22*** 3.97*** -8.27*** ,576 (0.90) (1.55) (0.77) (1.87) (0.55) (0.89) *** -8.94*** 6.46*** -9.29*** 1.02** ,106 (0.62) (1.80) (1.55) (2.02) (0.47) (0.90) *** *** 6.87*** *** 1.50* -2.28** 17,400 (1.09) (1.82) (1.03) (1.64) (0.77) (0.96) *** -7.94*** 5.65*** -7.82*** -1.29*** ,132 (0.71) (1.38) (1.08) (1.24) (0.30) (1.47) *** -9.52*** 3.87*** -9.49*** ,565 (0.69) (0.83) (0.78) (1.08) (0.57) (0.78) *** -9.79*** 4.88*** -9.40*** 1.82*** -1.95** 11,992 (1.07) (1.67) (1.06) (1.86) (0.67) (0.86) *** -5.40*** 2.90*** -6.55*** ,925 (0.69) (1.32) (0.83) (1.79) (0.54) (0.73) *** -5.36*** 2.04** -5.38*** ,070 (0.59) (1.46) (0.99) (1.71) (0.69) (1.12) *** -4.74*** 3.15*** -8.03*** 2.35*** ,572 (0.38) (0.93) (0.92) (1.43) (0.63) (0.84) *** -7.94*** 4.59*** -9.50*** 2.53*** -1.06** 20,551 (0.58) (1.37) (1.04) (1.72) (0.65) (0.53) *** 2.84*** -2.57* ,394 (0.77) (1.01) (0.75) (1.42) (0.56) (0.81) Note: Data are taken from basic questionnaire of Labour Force Survey. Each cell is the estimate from separate estimated regression discontinuities at age 60. The specification is a linear in age, fully interacted with dummy for age 60 or older among people between ages We also include a dummy for those just at age 60. Robust standard errors clustered at age in months are in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. All coefficients on RD estimates and their standard errors have been multiplied by 100, so they can be interpreted as percentage changes. Note that sum of RD estimates from (2) and (3) is the RD estimates from (1) since labor force participation (LFP) is defined as the sum of employed and unemployed. 29

30 Table 6: Relative changes in retirement age Fiscal year Calendar year Labor force Employment Labor force Employment * Base year Base year *** 0.049*** 0.068*** 0.070*** *** 0.106*** 0.066*** 0.083*** *** 0.157*** 0.161*** 0.193*** *** 0.131*** 0.102*** 0.147*** *** 0.295*** 0.256*** 0.317*** Note: Data are taken from basic questionnaire of Labour Force Survey. Each cell reports estimated relative changes of retirement age of cohort b, =, from separate regressions of equation (2) for each cohort. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively, obtained from the test for T(b) 0. Baseline is cohort born in

31 Table 7: Changes in the ratio of regular/non-regular staff to population relative to 1945 cohorts A. Cohorts defined by fiscal year Regular staff Non-regular staff Age\cohort ** 0.018* 0.024** 0.027*** [0.017] [0.017] [0.016] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] * ** ** [0.016] [0.017] [0.016] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] ** [0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] * * [0.016] [0.016] [0.015] [0.014] [0.015] [0.014] * [0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.020] [0.013] [0.014] [0.020] B. Cohorts defined by calendar year Regular staff Non-regular staff Age\cohort * ** [0.017] [0.016] [0.017] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.017] [0.016] [0.017] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] * *** [0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] *** ** ** [0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.014] [0.015] [0.015] ** [0.015] [0.015] [0.016] [0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.017] [0.013] [0.013] [0.016] Note: Data are taken from Special Questionnaires of Labour Force Survey. Each cell reports estimated β a,b in separate regressions of equation (2) for each cohort. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 31

32 Table 8 Comparisons of Jobs at age 59 and 61, between cohorts before and after the EESL revision Cohort Cohort Changes Panel A. Limiting sample to employees at age 59 (A-1) % of employees (incl. executive) at age % 70.90% 1.00% Among them, (A-2) % employed (on any kind of employment) at age % 82.30% 6.00% (A-3) % remaining in the same job until age % 65.00% 6.80% (A-4) % employed in a different job at age % 17.20% -0.90% (A-5) % remaining in the same industry at age % 75.20% 6.90% (A-6) % employed in a different industry at age % 8.00% -0.80% Panel B. Limiting sample to employees at small firm (with <100 employees) at age 59 (B-1) % employed in this size category among those who 50.60% 48.50% -2.10% were employed as an employee at age 59 Among them, (B-2) % employed (on any kind of employment) at age % 88.20% 4.00% (B-3) % remaining in the same job at age % 78.20% 5.00% (B-4) % employed in a different job at age % 10.00% -1.10% Panel C. Limiting sample to employees at large firm (with >=500 employees) at age 59 (C-1) % employed in this size category among those who 21.90% 23.20% 1.40% were employed as an employee at age 59 Among them, (C-2) % employed (on any kind of employment) at age % 76.80% 14.10% (C-3) % remaining in the same job at age % 56.70% 18.90% (C-4) % employed in a different job at age % 20.10% -4.80% Panel D. The firm size at age 61 among those employed in private establishments at age 59 (D-1) Moved to a smaller firm 8.40% 6.10% -2.30% (D-2) Same size (incl. staying at the same firm) 66.20% 74.20% 8.00% (D-3) Moved to a larger firm 2.20% 2.60% 0.40% (D-4) Moved to public sector 0.60% 0.60% 0.00% (D-5) Retired 22.60% 16.40% -6.20% 32