COS 511: Theoretical Machine Learning. Lecturer: Rob Schapire Lecture #24 Scribe: Jordan Ash May 1, 2014

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1 COS 5: heoretical Machine Learning Lecturer: Rob Schapire Lecture #24 Scribe: Jordan Ash May, 204 Review of Game heory: Let M be a matrix with all elements in [0, ]. Mindy (called the row player) chooses row i while Max (called the column player) chooses column j. In this case, from Mindy s expected loss is: Loss = M(i, j) Alternatively, Mindy could select a move randomly from a distribution over the rows and Max could select a move randomly from a distribution over the columns. Here, the expected loss for Mindy is: Loss = X i,j (i)m(i, j)(j) = M = M(, ) and are called mixed strategies, while i and j are called pure strategies. 2 Minimax heorem: In some games, such as Rock, aper, Scissors, players move at exactly the same time. In this way, both players have the same information available to them at the time of moving. Now we suppose that Mindy plays first, followed by Max. Max knows the that Mindy chose, and further knows M(, ) for any he chooses. Consequently, he chooses a that maximizes M(, ). Because Mindy knows that Max will choose = arg max M(, ) for any she chooses, she selects a that minimizes max M(, ). hus, if Mindy goes first, she could expect to su er a loss of min max M(, ). Overall, it may initially seem like the player to go second has an advantage because she has more information available to her. From Mindy s perspective again, this leads to: max min M(, ) apple min max M(, ) So Mindy playing after Max seems to be better than if the two play in reverse order. However, John von Neumann showed that the expected outcome of a game is always the same, regardless of the order in which players move. v = max min M(, ) =min max M(, )

2 Here, v denotes the value of the game. his may seem counterintuitive, because the player that goes second has more information available to her at the time of choosing a move. We will prove the above statement using an online learning algorithm. Let: hen, = arg min = arg max max M(, ) min M(, ) 8 : M(,) apple v () 8 : M(, ) v (2) In other words, for some optimal, the maximum loss that Max could cause is bounded by v and Mindy s loss is at least v, regardless of the particular strategies they choose. If we had knowledge of M, we might be able to find by employing techniques from linear programming. However, we don t necessarily have this knowledge, and even if we did, M could be massively large. Further, applies here only for opponents that are perfectly adversarial, so it doesn t account for an opponent that might make mistakes. hus, it makes sense to try to learn M and iteratively. We do this with the following formulation: for t =,..., Mindy chooses t Max chooses t (with knowledge of t ) Mindy observes M(i, t )8i Loss = M( t, t ) end Clearly, the total loss of this algorithm is simply M( t, t ). We want to be able to compare this loss to the best possible loss that could have been achieved by fixing any single strategy for all iterations. In other words, we want to show: M( t, t ) apple min M(, t) + [Small Regret erm] 2. Multiplicative Updates Suppose we use a multiplicative weight algorithm that updates weights in the following way, where n is the number of rows in matrix M: 2

3 2 [0, ) (3) (i) = 8i (4) n t+ (i) = t (i) M(i,t) Normalizing Constant (5) Our algorithm is similar to the weighted majority algorithm. he idea is decrease the probability of choosing a particular row proportionally to the loss su ered by selecting that row. After making an argument using potentials, we could use this algorithm to obtain the following bound: where = ln( ) and c =. 2.2 Corollary M( t, t ) apple min M(, t )+c ln(n) (6) We can choose such that: M(, ) apple min M(, t )+ (7) q ln(n) where = O( ), which goes to zero for large. In other words, the loss su ered by Mindy per round approaches the optimal average loss per round. We ll use this result to prove the Minimax theorem. 2.3 roof Suppose that Mindy uses the above algorithm to choose t, and that Max chooses t such that t = arg max M(,), maximizing Mindy s loss. Also, let: = = t (8) t (9) We also know intuitively, as mentioned before, that max min M(, ) apple min max M(, ), because as stated earlier, the player that goes second has more information available to her. 3

4 o show equality, which would prove the Minimax theorem stated earlier, it s enough to show that max min M(, ) min max M(, ) also. min max M apple max M By definition of : = max t M By convexity: apple max t M By definition of t : = t M t By corollary 2.2: apple min M t + he proof is finished because that: By definition of : =min M + apple max min M+ goes to zero as gets large. his proof also shows max M apple v + where v = max min M. If we take the average of the t terms computed at each round of the algorithm, we get something within of the optimal value. Because goes to zero for large values of, we can get closer to the optimal strategy by simply increasing. In other words, this strategy becomes more and more optimal as the number of rounds increases. For this reason, is called an approximate min max strategy. A similar argument could be made to show that is an approximate max min strategy. 3 Relation to Online Learning In order to project our analysis into an online learning framework, consider the following problem setting: 4

5 for t =,..., Observe x t from X redict ŷ t 2{0, } Observe true label c(x t ) end Here we consider each hypothesis h as being an expert from the set of all hypotheses H. We want to show that: number of mistakes apple number of mistakes of best h + [Small Regret erm] We set up a game matrix M where M(i, j) =M(h, x) =ifh(x) 6= c(x) and 0 otherwise. hus, the size of this matrix is H X. Given an x t, the algorithm must choose some t, a distribution used to predict x t s label. h is chosen according to the distribution t, and then ŷ t is chosen as h(x t ). t in this context is the distribution concentrated on x t (is at x t and 0 at all other x 2 X). Consequently: M( t,x t ) = E[number of mistakes] apple min M(h, x t ) + [Small Regret erm] h Notice that min h M(h, x t) is equal to the number of mistakes made by the best hypothesis h. IfwesubstituteM( t,x t )with h t(h) {h(x t ) 6= c(x t )} = r[h(x) 6= c(x)] above, we obtain the same bound as was found in the previous section. 4 Relation to Boosting We could think of boosting as a game between the boosting algorithm and the weak learner it calls. Consider the following problem: for t =,..., he boosting algorithm selects a distribution D t over the training set samples X he weak learner chooses a hypothesis h t end Here we assume that all weak learners h t obey the weak learning assumption, i.e. that r (x,y) Dt [h t (x) 6= y)] apple 2 and >0. We could define the game matrix M 0 in terms of the matrix M used in the last section. However, here we want a distribution over the X samples rather than over the hypotheses, so we need to transpose and normalize M. M 0 = M 5

6 In other words, M 0 (i, j) =M 0 (x, h) =ifh(x) =c(x) and 0 otherwise. Here, t = D t, and t is a distribution fully concentrated on the particular h t chosen by the weak learner. We could apply our same analysis from the multiplicative weights algorithm: M 0 ( t,h t ) apple min x M 0 (x, h t )+ Also, M 0 ( t,h t )= x (x) {h(x) =c(x)} = r[h t (x) =c(x)] 2 + Combining these facts: 2 + apple M 0 (x, h t ) apple min x M 0 (x, h t )+ 8x : Rearranging, X M 0 (x, h t ) 2 + > 2 which is again true because approaches 0 as gets large. In other words, we have found that over 2 of the weak hypotheses correctly classify any x when gets su ciently large. Because the final hypothesis is just a majority vote of these weak learners, we have proven that the boosting algorithm drives training error to zero when enough weak learners are employed. 6

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