HUMAN BEINGS ARE MORE RATIONAL THAN WE THINK
|
|
- Christal Wilkins
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 HUMAN BEINGS ARE MORE RATIONAL THAN WE THINK David H. Wolpert NASA Ames Research Center NASA-ARC
2 HYPOTHESIS Often humans are rational, but appear irrational to us, the modelers, because we misconstrue their decision problems. If true, then to best predict / control human behavior, whenever they appear to be irrational, we must be careful in modeling their decision problem Income comparison - happiness determined by relative income - appears to be irrational...
3 INCOME COMPARISON Men do not desire to be rich, but richer than other men. - John Stuart Mill Our wants are in relation to society; they are relative. - Karl Marx I do count my blessings. But then I count those of others who have more, and that pisses me off. - New Yorker cartoon WHY?
4 INCOME COMPARISON 1) Experiment: If your neighbor s income is moderately greater than yours, it makes you unhappy. 2) Experiment: If your neighbor s income is much greater than yours, or less than yours, it does not make you unhappy. 3) Such income comparison holds in almost all cultures. (Can be confounding factors though.) 4) Income comparison may even be corroborated by fmri studies. WHY?
5 INCOME COMPARISON 1) Effects of income comparison: People will choose to have lower income, if that means others have even lower income. 2) Effects of income comparison: Beyond a certain minimal level, as countries become richer, their citizens do not become happier. (The Easterlin paradox.) 3) Effects of income comparison: Some economists have argued that government should not try to imize GDP. Rather imize average national happiness. This implies reducing income inequality.
6 ONLY IDEAS IN THIS TALK: 1) Observing others may provide information on how to modify behavior to imize future expected payoff 2) Unhappiness often causes us to modify our behavior Observing others may rationally cause unhappiness 3) Is all unhappiness such a computational shortcut?
7 MODEL OVERVIEW Model the statistical implications of (Payoff of Decision maker D) - (Payoff of Neighbor N) on Change in D s payoff if he searches for a new strategy
8 MODEL CONCLUSIONS 1) If (D s payoff - N s payoff) > 0, the difference does not predict that D s payoff would rise if D searched. Ignore the Bundy s (those with less income) 2) If (D s payoff - N s payoff ) << 0, the difference does not predict that D s payoff would rise if D searched. Ignore the Vanderbilts (those with much greater income) 3) If (D s payoff - N s payoff ) < 0, the difference predicts that D s payoff would rise if D searched. Keep up with the Joneses
9 MODEL IMPLICATIONS 1) Some payoff differences between D and N imply that D should search for a new strategy x. 2) In real world, often if D is unhappy about a payoff difference with N, D searches for a new strategy x; a Hedonic Prod. Example: x is the style D uses to play a sport, payoff is how frequently D wins. Hypothesis: Hedonic prods are a computational shortcut for the full calculation saying D should search, changing D s behavior to make him search
10 MODEL ATTRIBUTES 1) Model may explain data concerning domains other than income 2) Model makes testable predictions - so it s refutable. 3) Model potentially extensible to explain other phenomena: U-shaped lifetime happiness curves hedonic contagion self-handicapping
11 MODEL DETAILS x X possible strategies D and N can adopt f D (x) payoff function of D f N (x) payoff function of N L D set of N D pairs (x, f D (x)) - D adopts the best of those, having payoff L D L N set of N N pairs (x, f N (x)) - N adopts the best of those, having payoff L N
12 MODEL DETAILS Search of f D is IID sampling of y s from window function W σ (µ D, y) = 1/σ if y - µ D σ / 2 = 0 otherwise where σ is known, but mean µ D is not. Same for search of f N, with mean µ N. With probability ρ, µ N = µ D, drawn from h. Otherwise they are independently drawn from h: P(µ N, µ D ) = ρδ(µ N, µ D )h(µ N ) + (1 - ρ)h(µ N )h(µ D )
13 MODEL DETAILS The hedonic prod is posterior expected change in D s payoff if D searches for (and adopts) another x: H(L D, N N, L N ) = E(f D (x) - L D L D, N N, L N ) Search for new x iff H(L D, N N, L N ) > 0 Many simplifications: - Cost-free search - Infinite cost to decline new x and return to L D - Extremely simple statistical model of search - D knows N N (how hard N searched) and L N (N s best payoff), but nothing else about N s search
14 MODEL SUMMARY x X possible strategies D and N can adopt f D (x) payoff function of D f N (x) payoff function of N L D set of N D pairs (x, f D (x)) L N set of N N pairs (x, f N (x)) - D adopts the best of those x s, L D - N adopts the best of those x s, L N µ D, µ N means of payoffs for D and N σ width of payoffs for D and N ρ prior probability that µ D = µ N H the hedonic prod; search iff H > 0
15 MODEL SUMMARY
16 MODEL SUMMARY
17 MODEL SUMMARY
18 MODEL SUMMARY
19 MODEL SUMMARY
20 THE VANDERBILTS AND BUNDYS If L D - L N > σ, or L N - L D min > σ, H = L D min +σ / 2 L D σ / 2 L D min +σ / 2 L D σ / 2 dt th(t) dt h(t) L D This H is independent of all that D knows about N Intuition: D concludes that f N and f D are independent Conclusion: Ignore the Vanderbilts and the Bundys
21 THE VANDERBILTS AND BUNDYS If L D - L N > σ, or L N - L D min > σ, H = L D min +σ / 2 L D σ / 2 L D min +σ / 2 L D σ / 2 dt th(t) dt h(t) L D 1. As N D grows, L D - L min D approaches σ 2. So for fixed L N - L D > 0, as N D grows, L N - L min D grows 3. So for fixed gap in payoffs, the more D has searched, the more likely that he concludes that N is a Vanderbilt
22 THE JONESES For simplicity, let h be a very wide window function. Then if L D - L N > 0, H 0: Everyone with less payoff than you is a Bundy Remaining case: L D < L N L D min + σ If ρ 0, H 0 Intuition: D concludes that f N and f D are independent
23 THE JONESES h a very wide window function, and L D < L N L D min + σ: If ρ substantially non-zero, where: H σ γ N N N N + 1 β = (L N - L D min )/ σ γ = (L N - L D min )/ σ < β 1 β N N β N N
24 THE JONESES h a very wide window function, L D < L N L D min + σ, ρ > 0: H σ γ N N N N β N N β N N 1) Can have H > 0: Intuition: D concludes f N = f D, and that a new sample of f N would likely exceed L D : Keep up with the Joneses. 2) Can have H < 0: Intuition: D concludes f N = f D, but N N is so large that a new sample of f N would likely be less than L D
25 RELATION TO PREVIOUS WORK Herding (information cascades) Tiny search space (e.g., binary) Observe neighbor s move, not just payoff Not been related to hedonic utility Social comparison Typically observe many neighbors, not just one Observe neighbor s move, not just payoff Not been related to hedonic utility Indirect social influence (conformity due to biased sampling) Observe neighbor s move only Not been related to hedonic utility
26 RELATION TO PREVIOUS WORK Cognitive limitations (Friedman, Robson, Netzer, Rayo and Becker) Assumes bounded rationality of one type (e.g., finite number of possible happiness values) to explain another (income comparison) Little (no?) experimental data supporting that assumed bounded rationality. Samuelson s model Very complicated Usual problems of evolutionary psychology Frank s musings (and others) No formal model
27 FUTURE WORK 1) Self-handicapping Generalization of inappropriate prods: D chooses action guaranteeing f N f D, to avoid hedonic prod. Experiment: People may handicap themselves to have excuse ready to explain why they later lose. 2) Hedonic contagion If D know N well enough to know f N = f D, N s (lack of) a prod provides D information about whether D should have a hedonic prod. Experiment: (Un)happiness of someone s close social contacts greatly affects their (un)happiness.
28 CONCLUSION 1) Observing others may provide information on how to modify behavior to imize payoff 2) Unhappiness often causes people to modify behavior 3) Therefore observing may others may rationally cause someone to be unhappy; a hedonic prod 4) This explains much experimental data on income comparison 5) Like other computational shortcuts, a hedonic prod may be inappropriately stimulated. (Agrees with experiment.) Is this the basis for the emotion of unhappiness in all contexts?
Answers to chapter 3 review questions
Answers to chapter 3 review questions 3.1 Explain why the indifference curves in a probability triangle diagram are straight lines if preferences satisfy expected utility theory. The expected utility of
More informationOpinion formation CS 224W. Cascades, Easley & Kleinberg Ch 19 1
Opinion formation CS 224W Cascades, Easley & Kleinberg Ch 19 1 How Do We Model Diffusion? Decision based models (today!): Models of product adoption, decision making A node observes decisions of its neighbors
More informationBEEM109 Experimental Economics and Finance
University of Exeter Recap Last class we looked at the axioms of expected utility, which defined a rational agent as proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern. We then proceeded to look at empirical evidence
More informationFinish what s been left... CS286r Fall 08 Finish what s been left... 1
Finish what s been left... CS286r Fall 08 Finish what s been left... 1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium A strategy-belief pair, (σ, µ) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if (Beliefs) At every information set
More informationAlgorithmic Game Theory and Applications. Lecture 11: Games of Perfect Information
Algorithmic Game Theory and Applications Lecture 11: Games of Perfect Information Kousha Etessami finite games of perfect information Recall, a perfect information (PI) game has only 1 node per information
More informationDerivation of zero-beta CAPM: Efficient portfolios
Derivation of zero-beta CAPM: Efficient portfolios AssumptionsasCAPM,exceptR f does not exist. Argument which leads to Capital Market Line is invalid. (No straight line through R f, tilted up as far as
More informationSOLVING ROBUST SUPPLY CHAIN PROBLEMS
SOLVING ROBUST SUPPLY CHAIN PROBLEMS Daniel Bienstock Nuri Sercan Özbay Columbia University, New York November 13, 2005 Project with Lucent Technologies Optimize the inventory buffer levels in a complicated
More informationFDPE Microeconomics 3 Spring 2017 Pauli Murto TA: Tsz-Ning Wong (These solution hints are based on Julia Salmi s solution hints for Spring 2015.
FDPE Microeconomics 3 Spring 2017 Pauli Murto TA: Tsz-Ning Wong (These solution hints are based on Julia Salmi s solution hints for Spring 2015.) Hints for Problem Set 2 1. Consider a zero-sum game, where
More informationEfficiency and Herd Behavior in a Signalling Market. Jeffrey Gao
Efficiency and Herd Behavior in a Signalling Market Jeffrey Gao ABSTRACT This paper extends a model of herd behavior developed by Bikhchandani and Sharma (000) to establish conditions for varying levels
More informationRisk Aversion, Stochastic Dominance, and Rules of Thumb: Concept and Application
Risk Aversion, Stochastic Dominance, and Rules of Thumb: Concept and Application Vivek H. Dehejia Carleton University and CESifo Email: vdehejia@ccs.carleton.ca January 14, 2008 JEL classification code:
More informationu (x) < 0. and if you believe in diminishing return of the wealth, then you would require
Chapter 8 Markowitz Portfolio Theory 8.7 Investor Utility Functions People are always asked the question: would more money make you happier? The answer is usually yes. The next question is how much more
More informationEconomics 430 Handout on Rational Expectations: Part I. Review of Statistics: Notation and Definitions
Economics 430 Chris Georges Handout on Rational Expectations: Part I Review of Statistics: Notation and Definitions Consider two random variables X and Y defined over m distinct possible events. Event
More informationA Formal Study of Distributed Resource Allocation Strategies in Multi-Agent Systems
A Formal Study of Distributed Resource Allocation Strategies in Multi-Agent Systems Jiaying Shen, Micah Adler, Victor Lesser Department of Computer Science University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 13 Abstract
More informationEvaluating Strategic Forecasters. Rahul Deb with Mallesh Pai (Rice) and Maher Said (NYU Stern) Becker Friedman Theory Conference III July 22, 2017
Evaluating Strategic Forecasters Rahul Deb with Mallesh Pai (Rice) and Maher Said (NYU Stern) Becker Friedman Theory Conference III July 22, 2017 Motivation Forecasters are sought after in a variety of
More informationMicroeconomic Theory II Preliminary Examination Solutions
Microeconomic Theory II Preliminary Examination Solutions 1. (45 points) Consider the following normal form game played by Bruce and Sheila: L Sheila R T 1, 0 3, 3 Bruce M 1, x 0, 0 B 0, 0 4, 1 (a) Suppose
More informationOther Regarding Preferences
Other Regarding Preferences Mark Dean Lecture Notes for Spring 015 Behavioral Economics - Brown University 1 Lecture 1 We are now going to introduce two models of other regarding preferences, and think
More informationMacroeconomics II Consumption
Macroeconomics II Consumption Vahagn Jerbashian Ch. 17 from Mankiw (2010); 16 from Mankiw (2003) Spring 2018 Setting up the agenda and course Our classes start on 14.02 and end on 31.05 Lectures and practical
More informationCommentary: Challenges for Monetary Policy: New and Old
Commentary: Challenges for Monetary Policy: New and Old John B. Taylor Mervyn King s paper is jam-packed with interesting ideas and good common sense about monetary policy. I admire the clearly stated
More informationIn this model, the value of the stock today is the present value of the expected cash flows (equal to one dividend payment plus a final sales price).
Money & Banking Notes Chapter 7 Stock Mkt., Rational Expectations, and Efficient Mkt. Hypothesis Computing the price of common stock: (i) Stockholders (those who hold or own stocks in a corporation) are
More informationProspect Theory: A New Paradigm for Portfolio Choice
Prospect Theory: A New Paradigm for Portfolio Choice 1 Prospect Theory Expected Utility Theory and Its Paradoxes Prospect Theory 2 Portfolio Selection Model and Solution Continuous-Time Market Setting
More informationTotal /20 /30 /30 /20 /100. Economics 142 Midterm Exam NAME Vincent Crawford Winter 2008
1 2 3 4 Total /20 /30 /30 /20 /100 Economics 142 Midterm Exam NAME Vincent Crawford Winter 2008 Your grade from this exam is one third of your course grade. The exam ends promptly at 1:50, so you have
More informationEconomics of Money, Banking, and Fin. Markets, 10e
Economics of Money, Banking, and Fin. Markets, 10e (Mishkin) Chapter 7 The Stock Market, the Theory of Rational Expectations, and the Efficient Market Hypothesis 7.1 Computing the Price of Common Stock
More informationAnswers to Chapter 10 Review Questions
Answers to Chapter 10 Review Questions 10.1. Explain why peak end evaluation causes duration neglect. With peak end evaluation an event is remembered solely according to instant utility at particular points
More informationMaking Hard Decision. ENCE 627 Decision Analysis for Engineering. Identify the decision situation and understand objectives. Identify alternatives
CHAPTER Duxbury Thomson Learning Making Hard Decision Third Edition RISK ATTITUDES A. J. Clark School of Engineering Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering 13 FALL 2003 By Dr. Ibrahim. Assakkaf
More informationSection 0: Introduction and Review of Basic Concepts
Section 0: Introduction and Review of Basic Concepts Carlos M. Carvalho The University of Texas McCombs School of Business mccombs.utexas.edu/faculty/carlos.carvalho/teaching 1 Getting Started Syllabus
More informationNotes II: Consumption-Saving Decisions, Ricardian Equivalence, and Fiscal Policy. Julio Garín Intermediate Macroeconomics Fall 2018
Notes II: Consumption-Saving Decisions, Ricardian Equivalence, and Fiscal Policy Julio Garín Intermediate Macroeconomics Fall 2018 Introduction Intermediate Macroeconomics Consumption/Saving, Ricardian
More informationME3620. Theory of Engineering Experimentation. Spring Chapter III. Random Variables and Probability Distributions.
ME3620 Theory of Engineering Experimentation Chapter III. Random Variables and Probability Distributions Chapter III 1 3.2 Random Variables In an experiment, a measurement is usually denoted by a variable
More informationSTUDENTID: Please write your name in small print on the inside portion of the last page of this exam
STUDENTID: Please write your name in small print on the inside portion of the last page of this exam Instructions: You will have 60 minutes to complete the exam. The exam will be comprised of three parts
More information18.440: Lecture 32 Strong law of large numbers and Jensen s inequality
18.440: Lecture 32 Strong law of large numbers and Jensen s inequality Scott Sheffield MIT 1 Outline A story about Pedro Strong law of large numbers Jensen s inequality 2 Outline A story about Pedro Strong
More informationOptimizing S-shaped utility and risk management
Optimizing S-shaped utility and risk management Ineffectiveness of VaR and ES constraints John Armstrong (KCL), Damiano Brigo (Imperial) Quant Summit March 2018 Are ES constraints effective against rogue
More informationECON 459 Game Theory. Lecture Notes Auctions. Luca Anderlini Spring 2017
ECON 459 Game Theory Lecture Notes Auctions Luca Anderlini Spring 2017 These notes have been used and commented on before. If you can still spot any errors or have any suggestions for improvement, please
More informationConsumption. Basic Determinants. the stream of income
Consumption Consumption commands nearly twothirds of total output in the United States. Most of what the people of a country produce, they consume. What is left over after twothirds of output is consumed
More information2017 Acumen Edelman Trust Barometer New Zealand Report. Join the conversation #TrustBarometerNZ
2017 Acumen Edelman Trust Barometer New Zealand Report Join the conversation #TrustBarometerNZ 2017 Edelman Trust Barometer Methodology Online Survey in 28 Countries General Online Population Informed
More informationECON 1100 Global Economics (Fall 2013) The Distribution Function of Government portions for Exam 3
ECON Global Economics (Fall 23) The Distribution Function of Government portions for Exam 3 Relevant Readings from the Required Textbooks: Economics Chapter 2, Income Distribution and Poverty Problems
More informationMicroeconomics II. CIDE, MsC Economics. List of Problems
Microeconomics II CIDE, MsC Economics List of Problems 1. There are three people, Amy (A), Bart (B) and Chris (C): A and B have hats. These three people are arranged in a room so that B can see everything
More informationChapter 16 Consumption. 8 th and 9 th editions 4/29/2017. This chapter presents: Keynes s Conjectures
2 0 1 0 U P D A T E 4/29/2017 Chapter 16 Consumption 8 th and 9 th editions This chapter presents: An introduction to the most prominent work on consumption, including: John Maynard Keynes: consumption
More informationEco504 Spring 2010 C. Sims FINAL EXAM. β t 1 2 φτ2 t subject to (1)
Eco54 Spring 21 C. Sims FINAL EXAM There are three questions that will be equally weighted in grading. Since you may find some questions take longer to answer than others, and partial credit will be given
More informationProblem 1: Random variables, common distributions and the monopoly price
Problem 1: Random variables, common distributions and the monopoly price In this problem, we will revise some basic concepts in probability, and use these to better understand the monopoly price (alternatively
More informationRandom Variables and Applications OPRE 6301
Random Variables and Applications OPRE 6301 Random Variables... As noted earlier, variability is omnipresent in the business world. To model variability probabilistically, we need the concept of a random
More informationPreferences and Utility
Preferences and Utility PowerPoint Slides prepared by: Andreea CHIRITESCU Eastern Illinois University 1 Axioms of Rational Choice Completeness If A and B are any two situations, an individual can always
More informationOutline. Simple, Compound, and Reduced Lotteries Independence Axiom Expected Utility Theory Money Lotteries Risk Aversion
Uncertainty Outline Simple, Compound, and Reduced Lotteries Independence Axiom Expected Utility Theory Money Lotteries Risk Aversion 2 Simple Lotteries 3 Simple Lotteries Advanced Microeconomic Theory
More informationManagerial Economics Uncertainty
Managerial Economics Uncertainty Aalto University School of Science Department of Industrial Engineering and Management January 10 26, 2017 Dr. Arto Kovanen, Ph.D. Visiting Lecturer Uncertainty general
More informationIntroduction to Game Theory
Introduction to Game Theory 3a. More on Normal-Form Games Dana Nau University of Maryland Nau: Game Theory 1 More Solution Concepts Last time, we talked about several solution concepts Pareto optimality
More informationYao s Minimax Principle
Complexity of algorithms The complexity of an algorithm is usually measured with respect to the size of the input, where size may for example refer to the length of a binary word describing the input,
More informationLecture 2. Vladimir Asriyan and John Mondragon. September 14, UC Berkeley
Lecture 2 UC Berkeley September 14, 2011 Theory Writing a model requires making unrealistic simplifications. Two inherent questions (from Krugman): Theory Writing a model requires making unrealistic simplifications.
More informationUncertainty in Equilibrium
Uncertainty in Equilibrium Larry Blume May 1, 2007 1 Introduction The state-preference approach to uncertainty of Kenneth J. Arrow (1953) and Gérard Debreu (1959) lends itself rather easily to Walrasian
More informationOptimization Models in Financial Mathematics
Optimization Models in Financial Mathematics John R. Birge Northwestern University www.iems.northwestern.edu/~jrbirge Illinois Section MAA, April 3, 2004 1 Introduction Trends in financial mathematics
More informationARE LOSS AVERSION AFFECT THE INVESTMENT DECISION OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE OF THAILAND S EMPLOYEES?
ARE LOSS AVERSION AFFECT THE INVESTMENT DECISION OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE OF THAILAND S EMPLOYEES? by San Phuachan Doctor of Business Administration Program, School of Business, University of the Thai Chamber
More informationPsychological Determinants of Occurrence and Magnitude of Market Crashes
Psychological Determinants of Occurrence and Magnitude of Market Crashes Patrick L. Leoni Abstract We simulate the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model of Mehra-Prescott [12] to establish the link
More informationLecture 5. Xavier Gabaix. March 4, 2004
14.127 Lecture 5 Xavier Gabaix March 4, 2004 0.1 Welfare and noise. A compliment Two firms produce roughly identical goods Demand of firm 1 is where ε 1, ε 2 are iid N (0, 1). D 1 = P (q p 1 + σε 1 > q
More informationEssays on Herd Behavior Theory and Criticisms
19 Essays on Herd Behavior Theory and Criticisms Vol I Essays on Herd Behavior Theory and Criticisms Annika Westphäling * Four eyes see more than two that information gets more precise being aggregated
More informationRational theories of finance tell us how people should behave and often do not reflect reality.
FINC3023 Behavioral Finance TOPIC 1: Expected Utility Rational theories of finance tell us how people should behave and often do not reflect reality. A normative theory based on rational utility maximizers
More informationTime Resolution of the St. Petersburg Paradox: A Rebuttal
INDIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT AHMEDABAD INDIA Time Resolution of the St. Petersburg Paradox: A Rebuttal Prof. Jayanth R Varma W.P. No. 2013-05-09 May 2013 The main objective of the Working Paper series
More informationSocial preferences I and II
Social preferences I and II Martin Kocher University of Munich Course in Behavioral and Experimental Economics Motivation - De gustibus non est disputandum. (Stigler and Becker, 1977) - De gustibus non
More informationLecture 3: The night they reread Minsky. Paul Krugmn
Lecture 3: The night they reread Minsky Paul Krugmn 1.8 Securities, commodity contracts, and investments (% of GDP) 1.6 1.4 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 Source:
More informationStochastic Games and Bayesian Games
Stochastic Games and Bayesian Games CPSC 532l Lecture 10 Stochastic Games and Bayesian Games CPSC 532l Lecture 10, Slide 1 Lecture Overview 1 Recap 2 Stochastic Games 3 Bayesian Games 4 Analyzing Bayesian
More informationCONVENTIONAL FINANCE, PROSPECT THEORY, AND MARKET EFFICIENCY
CONVENTIONAL FINANCE, PROSPECT THEORY, AND MARKET EFFICIENCY PART ± I CHAPTER 1 CHAPTER 2 CHAPTER 3 Foundations of Finance I: Expected Utility Theory Foundations of Finance II: Asset Pricing, Market Efficiency,
More information6.207/14.15: Networks Lecture 9: Introduction to Game Theory 1
6.207/14.15: Networks Lecture 9: Introduction to Game Theory 1 Daron Acemoglu and Asu Ozdaglar MIT October 13, 2009 1 Introduction Outline Decisions, Utility Maximization Games and Strategies Best Responses
More informationWhile the story has been different in each case, fundamentally, we ve maintained:
Econ 805 Advanced Micro Theory I Dan Quint Fall 2009 Lecture 22 November 20 2008 What the Hatfield and Milgrom paper really served to emphasize: everything we ve done so far in matching has really, fundamentally,
More informationMicro foundations, part 1. Modern theories of consumption
Micro foundations, part 1. Modern theories of consumption Joanna Siwińska-Gorzelak Faculty of Economic Sciences, Warsaw University Lecture overview This lecture focuses on the most prominent work on consumption.
More informationOn Existence of Equilibria. Bayesian Allocation-Mechanisms
On Existence of Equilibria in Bayesian Allocation Mechanisms Northwestern University April 23, 2014 Bayesian Allocation Mechanisms In allocation mechanisms, agents choose messages. The messages determine
More informationDecision Theory. Mário S. Alvim Information Theory DCC-UFMG (2018/02)
Decision Theory Mário S. Alvim (msalvim@dcc.ufmg.br) Information Theory DCC-UFMG (2018/02) Mário S. Alvim (msalvim@dcc.ufmg.br) Decision Theory DCC-UFMG (2018/02) 1 / 34 Decision Theory Decision theory
More informationComputational Aspects of Prediction Markets
Computational Aspects of Prediction Markets David M. Pennock, Yahoo! Research Yiling Chen, Lance Fortnow, Joe Kilian, Evdokia Nikolova, Rahul Sami, Michael Wellman Mech Design for Prediction Q: Will there
More informationComprehensive Exam. August 19, 2013
Comprehensive Exam August 19, 2013 You have a total of 180 minutes to complete the exam. If a question seems ambiguous, state why, sharpen it up and answer the sharpened-up question. Good luck! 1 1 Menu
More informationEvolution of Perceptions and Play
Evolution of Perceptions and Play Daron Acemoglu MIT Muhamet Yildiz MIT June 2001 Abstract An agent with a misperception may have an evolutionary advantage when his misperception and its behavioral implications
More informationIntroduction to Game Theory Evolution Games Theory: Replicator Dynamics
Introduction to Game Theory Evolution Games Theory: Replicator Dynamics John C.S. Lui Department of Computer Science & Engineering The Chinese University of Hong Kong www.cse.cuhk.edu.hk/ cslui John C.S.
More informationCHOICE THEORY, UTILITY FUNCTIONS AND RISK AVERSION
CHOICE THEORY, UTILITY FUNCTIONS AND RISK AVERSION Szabolcs Sebestyén szabolcs.sebestyen@iscte.pt Master in Finance INVESTMENTS Sebestyén (ISCTE-IUL) Choice Theory Investments 1 / 65 Outline 1 An Introduction
More informationInfinitely Repeated Games
February 10 Infinitely Repeated Games Recall the following theorem Theorem 72 If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then its finite repetition has a unique SPNE. Our intuition, however, is that long-term
More informationChapter# The Level and Structure of Interest Rates
Chapter# The Level and Structure of Interest Rates Outline The Theory of Interest Rates o Fisher s Classical Approach o The Loanable Funds Theory o The Liquidity Preference Theory o Changes in the Money
More informationFebruary 23, An Application in Industrial Organization
An Application in Industrial Organization February 23, 2015 One form of collusive behavior among firms is to restrict output in order to keep the price of the product high. This is a goal of the OPEC oil
More informationMA300.2 Game Theory 2005, LSE
MA300.2 Game Theory 2005, LSE Answers to Problem Set 2 [1] (a) This is standard (we have even done it in class). The one-shot Cournot outputs can be computed to be A/3, while the payoff to each firm can
More informationDynamic signaling and market breakdown
Journal of Economic Theory ( ) www.elsevier.com/locate/jet Dynamic signaling and market breakdown Ilan Kremer, Andrzej Skrzypacz Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA
More informationONE TENDENCY IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION, AND YET ANOTHER TENDENCY. 13 November 2006
ONE TENDENCY IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION, AND YET ANOTHER TENDENCY 13 November 2006 [While China was formerly a very poor country, it was also a highly egalitarian one. A consequence of the reform movement
More informationECON 314: MACROECONOMICS II CONSUMPTION
ECON 314: MACROECONOMICS II CONSUMPTION Consumption is a key component of aggregate demand in any modern economy. Previously we considered consumption in a simple way: consumption was conjectured to be
More informationLecture 11: Critiques of Expected Utility
Lecture 11: Critiques of Expected Utility Alexander Wolitzky MIT 14.121 1 Expected Utility and Its Discontents Expected utility (EU) is the workhorse model of choice under uncertainty. From very early
More informationBeFi Web Seminar for April 30, BeFi Conference Summary. by Shlomo Benartzi Co-Founder, Behavioral Finance Forum
BeFi Web Seminar for April 30, 2008 2008 BeFi Conference Summary by Shlomo Benartzi Co-Founder, Behavioral Finance Forum BeFi Forum 2008 2008 BeFi Conference Summary Shlomo Benartzi Co-Founder, Behavioral
More informationReading Essentials and Study Guide
Lesson 2 Monetary Policy ESSENTIAL QUESTION How does the government promote the economic goals of price stability, full employment, and economic growth? Reading HELPDESK Academic Vocabulary explicit openly
More informationECON 1000 (Summer 2017 Section 01) Exam #3A
ECON 1 (Summer 217 Section 1) Exam #3A Multiple Choice Questions: (3 points each) 1. I am taking of the exam. A. Version A 2. A government policy that attempts to Internalize an Externality can be generally
More informationINTRODUCTION THE PUBLIC SECTOR MARKET FAILURE INTRODUCTION MARKET FAILURE MARKET FAILURE
Chapter 4 THE PUBLIC SECTOR INTRODUCTION The market can determine WHAT goods to produce, HOW, and for WHOM. Market outcomes may not necessarily be most desirable by policy makers. Government intervention
More informationQuantal Response Equilibrium with Non-Monotone Probabilities: A Dynamic Approach
Quantal Response Equilibrium with Non-Monotone Probabilities: A Dynamic Approach Suren Basov 1 Department of Economics, University of Melbourne Abstract In this paper I will give an example of a population
More informationObjectives for Chapter 24: Monetarism (Continued) Chapter 24: The Basic Theory of Monetarism (Continued) (latest revision October 2004)
1 Objectives for Chapter 24: Monetarism (Continued) At the end of Chapter 24, you will be able to answer the following: 1. What is the short-run? 2. Use the theory of job searching in a period of unanticipated
More informationA Binomial Model of Asset and Option Pricing with Heterogen
A Binomial Model of Asset and Option Pricing with Heterogeneous Beliefs School of Finance and Economics, UTS 15th International Conference on Computing in Economics and Finance 15-17 July 2009 Sydney Basic
More informationApril 29, X ( ) for all. Using to denote a true type and areport,let
April 29, 2015 "A Characterization of Efficient, Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms," by S. R. Williams. Economic Theory 14, 155-180 (1999). AcommonresultinBayesianmechanismdesignshowsthatexpostefficiency
More informationIntroduction to Political Economy Problem Set 3
Introduction to Political Economy 14.770 Problem Set 3 Due date: Question 1: Consider an alternative model of lobbying (compared to the Grossman and Helpman model with enforceable contracts), where lobbies
More informationNew product launch: herd seeking or herd. preventing?
New product launch: herd seeking or herd preventing? Ting Liu and Pasquale Schiraldi December 29, 2008 Abstract A decision maker offers a new product to a fixed number of adopters. The decision maker does
More information11/6/2013. Chapter 17: Consumption. Early empirical successes: Results from early studies. Keynes s conjectures. The Keynesian consumption function
Keynes s conjectures Chapter 7:. 0 < MPC < 2. Average propensity to consume (APC) falls as income rises. (APC = C/ ) 3. Income is the main determinant of consumption. 0 The Keynesian consumption function
More informationFINAL EXAM: Macro Winter 2017
Name: FINAL EXAM: Macro Winter 217 State clearly your assumptions when you derive a result. You must always show your thinking to get full credit. You have 2.5 hours. Good luck! 1 Please leave this page
More informationThe Effect of Pride and Regret on Investors' Trading Behavior
University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Wharton Research Scholars Wharton School May 2007 The Effect of Pride and Regret on Investors' Trading Behavior Samuel Sung University of Pennsylvania Follow
More informationUNIVERSITY OF VIENNA
WORKING PAPERS Ana. B. Ania Learning by Imitation when Playing the Field September 2000 Working Paper No: 0005 DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA All our working papers are available at: http://mailbox.univie.ac.at/papers.econ
More informationPublic Finance and Public Policy: Responsibilities and Limitations of Government. Presentation notes, chapter 9. Arye L. Hillman
Public Finance and Public Policy: Responsibilities and Limitations of Government Arye L. Hillman Cambridge University Press, 2009 Second edition Presentation notes, chapter 9 CHOICE OF TAXATION Topics
More informationTopic 3 Social preferences
Topic 3 Social preferences Martin Kocher University of Munich Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung Motivation - De gustibus non est disputandum. (Stigler and Becker, 1977) - De gustibus non est disputandum,
More informationLecture 3: Prospect Theory, Framing, and Mental Accounting. Expected Utility Theory. The key features are as follows:
Topics Lecture 3: Prospect Theory, Framing, and Mental Accounting Expected Utility Theory Violations of EUT Prospect Theory Framing Mental Accounting Application of Prospect Theory, Framing, and Mental
More information6 Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information
February 24, 2014, Eric Rasmusen, Erasmuse@indiana.edu. Http://www.rasmusen.org. 6 Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information Entry Deterrence II: Fighting Is Never Profitable: X=1 Subgame perfectness does
More informationKeeping Up with the Joneses Preferences: Asset Pricing Considerations
Keeping Up with the Joneses Preferences: Asset Pricing Considerations Fernando Zapatero Marshall School of Business USC February 2013 Motivation Economics and Finance have developed a series of models
More informationMacroeconomics II. Lecture 07: AS, Inflation, and Unemployment. IES FSS (Summer 2017/2018)
Lecture 07: AS, Inflation, and Unemployment IES FSS (Summer 2017/2018) Section 1 We already mentioned frictions - we said that one cause of frictions are sticky prices So far we have not discussed AS much:
More informationZaner Group. Trading Plan Template. Motivation and Goals
Trading Plan Template Note: Transactions in futures, options and forex is speculative in nature and involves a substantial risk of loss. You should carefully consider whether trading is suitable for you
More informationSequential Rationality and Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Sequential Rationality and Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Carlos Hurtado Department of Economics University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign hrtdmrt2@illinois.edu June 16th, 2016 C. Hurtado (UIUC - Economics)
More information$$ Behavioral Finance 1
$$ Behavioral Finance 1 Why do financial advisors exist? Know active stock picking rarely produces winners Efficient markets tells us information immediately is reflected in prices If buy baskets/indices
More informationSTAT 201 Chapter 6. Distribution
STAT 201 Chapter 6 Distribution 1 Random Variable We know variable Random Variable: a numerical measurement of the outcome of a random phenomena Capital letter refer to the random variable Lower case letters
More informationCommentary: The Search for Growth
Commentary: The Search for Growth N. Gregory Mankiw For evaluating economic well-being, the single most important statistic about an economy is its income per capita. Income per capita measures how much
More information