EU Guidance on Seveso II Directive and its possible application in the non-eu countries

Transcription

1 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 1 EU Guidance on Seveso II Directive and its possible application in the non-eu countries Safety Reports Luciano Fabbri European Commission - Joint Research Centre Institute for The Protection and Security of the Citizen Major Accident Hazards Bureau luciano.fabbri@jrc.it 1

2 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 2 Presentation Objective Part 1 To provide an overview of the EU guidance with an emphasis on key obligations, guiding principles and risk analysis elements Part 2 To provide information on some examples of support to implementation specifically addressed to those countries involved in the accession process (BEQUAR benchmark) Focus on Safety Reports 2

3 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 3 Part 1 Overview of the EU guidance Focus on Safety Reports 3

4 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 4 Presentation Outline 1. SEVESO Directive: role of MAHB and EU guidance documents 2. SEVESO Directive requirements relevant to safety reports 3. EC Guidance related to safety reports 1. Guiding principles for preparing and reviewing safety reports 2. A brief review of risk analysis practices for application in safety reports 4

5 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 5 1 SEVESO Directive: general aspects and role of MAHB 5

6 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 6 1. SEVESO Directive: aim prevention of major accidents involving dangerous substances limitation of the consequences of accidents on man and the environment high level of protection for man and the environment throughout the European Union 6

7 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 7 1. SEVESO Directive: general philosophy I N S P E C T I O N S Goal-oriented Safe Technology Safe Management It should be demonstrated within the Safety Report Emergency Planning Land-Use Planning Information to the Public Accident Reporting and Lessons Learnt 7

8 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 8 1. SEVESO: main actors and role of MAHB REGULATORY CONTROL UNDERSTANDING HAZARDS - Inspections - Accident Analysis EC DG ENVIRONMENT: Conception, Formulation - Controlled substances - Causes of accidents - Monitoring - Organisational failures and Monitoring of Implementation National Competent Authorities: Implementation MANAGING RISKS - Land-Use Planning - Emergency Planning - Risk Reduction ASSESSING RISKS - Consequence Assessment - Risk Assessment - Consistency EC JRC/MAHB: Research-based technical & Scientific support to the Community (DG ENV and MS) EU guidelines Databases Tools and methods 8

9 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 9 REGULATORY CONTROL - Inspections - Controlled substances - Monitoring UNDERSTANDING HAZARDS - Accident Analysis - Causes of accidents - Organisational failures MANAGING RISKS - Land-Use Planning - Emergency Planning - Risk Reduction ASSESSING RISKS - Consequence Assessment - Risk Assessment - Consistency 9

10 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation SEVESO: EU guidance general principle To support the implementation of the Directive Drawn up by the EC in collaboration with MS Endorsed by the EC and by the MS (CCA) It should not considered mandatory (not legislation) It does not preclude any other reasonable interpretations of the Directive s requirement It gives an authoritative interpretation of the Directive meaning It should be considered recommended practice 10

11 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation SEVESO: EU guidance documents Safety Management System Guidance - Seveso II Safety Report Guidance - Seveso II (1998) New Guidance on the Preparation of a Safety Report to meet the Requirements of Directive 96/82/EC as amended by Directive 2003/105/EC (Seveso II) Land Use Planning Guidance (1999) New Land-Use Planning Guidelines in the context of Article 12 of the Seveso II Directive, as amended by directive 105/2003/EC, adopted by the Committee of Seveso Competent Authorities Guidance on Inspections SEVESO II Article 9(6) - Explanations and Guidelines EN DA GE FR SP FI SV PT NL IT Information to the Public Guidance EN FR GE SP As will be seen from the Foreword, this document was prepared under the "Seveso I" Directive (82/501/EEC). Although this Directive has now been repealed, the "Seveso II" Directive (96/82/EC) which replaces it has very similar provisions. Article 8(1) and Annex VII of Directive 82/501/EEC are replaced by Article 13(1) Substances Dangerous for the Environment. Substances dangerous to the aquatic environment in the context of the Council Directive 96/82/EC: Report by Technical Working Group 7 Carcinogens Single exposure carcinogenic substances in the context of the Council Directive 96/82/EC: Report by Technical Working Group 8 11

12 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation EU guidance documents: current activities Guidelines for the Preparation of a Safety Report Guidelines and scenarios database for Land-Use Planning Directive (Art 9 Annex II) 1b I II III IV V High Level Doc (EU revised guideline) Detailed Guidelines Workbooks of practice Mutual Joint Visits Programme Exchange amongst Seveso Inspectors Recommendations of Good Practice 12

13 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 13 2 SEVESO Directive Requirements relevant to safety reports Art. 9 Annex II Annex III 13

14 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation Safety Reports: Directive Requirements (Art. 9 and Annexes II and III) Operator must demonstrate proper design and implementation of: a major-accident prevention policy (MAPP) and safety management system (SMS) strategy to analyse risks of major-accident necessary measures to prevent accidents and limit their consequences adequate safety and reliability principles in design, construction, operation and maintenance appropriate internal emergency plans Sufficient information also must be included to support competent authorities in land-use planning Applies only to upper tier establishments 14

15 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation Safety Reports: Content (Annex II) The safety report must include the following minimum data information on: MAPP and SMS environment of the establishment description of the installation hazard identification, risk analysis and prevention methods Measures of control and limitation of the consequences of an accident It may be combined with other relevant documentation 15

16 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation Safety Report: WHEN? Safety Report must be provided: in case of a new establishment a reasonable period of time prior to the start of construction or operation in case of existing establishments (e.g., due to a new classification of substances of concern) without delay, but not later than within one year after the Directive applies without delay after a periodic or necessary review. 16

17 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation Safety Report: Review Safety Report must be reviewed and updated every five years or at the request of the Competent Authority at the initiative of the operator (voluntary) where justified by new facts new technical knowledge about safety new knowledge about hazard assessment in case of modification of a site 17

18 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation Safety Reports: Dispensations (Art. 9 para 6) Operator must apply and demonstrate that particular substances are 'in a state incapable of creating a major-accident hazard' Competent Authority must 1) apply harmonised criteria to decide whether or not to grant a dispensation 2) for dispensations, indicate to which matters the information required in the Safety Report can be limited 18

19 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation Safety Reports: Obligations of the CA Examine the safety report and communicate the conclusions to the Operator Conclusions should be provided in written form and contain the following details: date of review additional sources of information used in the review (e.g., inspection report) specific conclusions (positive or negative) with reference to specific details in the report clear identification of deficiencies and inaccuracies that must be corrected 19

20 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation Safety Reports: Other related obligations Inspections (Art. 18) Land-use planning (Art. 12) External emergency planning (Art. 11) Identification and communication of domino effects (Art. 8) Information to the public (Art. 13) 20

21 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 21 3 EC Guidance on safety reports 21

22 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation EC Guidance relevant to safety reports Guidance on the Preparation of a Safety Report (2005) Seveso II Article 9(6) Explanations and Guidelines 22

23 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 23 Background The Amendment of the Seveso II Directive 2003/105/EC gave the Commission the mandate to review by 31 December 2006 in close cooperation with the Member States, the existing Guidance on the Preparation of a Safety Report (EUR 17690, 1998) Survey on Safety Reports practices within the MS, 2004 Workshop on Safety Reports (Dublin, on 12 May 2004) review revise First meeting of the editing group (November 2004) Publication of the guidance document (December, 2005) EC Interservice consultation & Council Decision C (2007)

24 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation EU safety report guideline Flexible approach! Sufficient level to satisfy the Directive Amendment s requirement I 0 II III IV V Directive (Art 9 Annex II) High Level Doc (EU revised guideline) Area for future developments 1b Detailed Guidelines Workbooks of practice 0. General Philosophy I. Purpose II. Scope III. Limitations IV.. 24

25 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation Objective of the guideline To provide guidance to assist with the interpretation of the requirements on Safety Reports Not mandatory Not pretending to prescribe a particular format for the presentation of info Do not preclude other reasonable interpretations of the requirements in the Directive Agreed over extensive discussions, and having a certain authority as presenting current EU good practice 25

26 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation Guiding principles for safety report Preparation and Review 0 I IIIIIIVV 4 1b Directive (Art Annex 9 II) High Level Doc (EU revised guideline) Detailed Guidelines Workbooks of practice 26

27 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 27 Purpose of the safety report The safety report must be prepared and reviewed in view of the General Obligations outlined in Article 5: Operator must take all necessary measures: to prevent major accidents to control and limit the consequences of an accident on man and the environment Operator must prove to the Competent Authority (CA) that he has taken all necessary measures The safety report should demonstrate that these general obligations have been met 27

28 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 28 General aspects Operator responsibility for content Proportionate approach Demonstration 28

29 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 29 Operator responsibility Preparation is the sole responsibility of the operator. The Competent Authority has no responsibility for content 29

30 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 30 Proportionate approach The level of detail should be proportionate to the extent of potential risks and the complexity of the installation/process/systems involved The safety report should be of a summarising character, Information provided is limited to its relevance in regard to major-accident hazards, However, the information should be sufficient to demonstrate that the requirements have been met The description of measures should be limited to the explanation of their specific objectives and functions. 30

31 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 31 Demonstration justify argue the case provide an absolute proof Demonstration can be recognised by the presence of the following components: Systematic analysis Detailed evidence Substantial justification 31

32 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 32 Systematic analysis A key element of the safety report is the definition of reference accident scenarios. These scenarios normally are the basis for demonstrating that the necessary measures are adequate. The hazard identification and risk assessment process must be systematic. This means that a thorough procedure must be followed to: Identify all major accident hazards in the establishment Assign frequencies and consequences to accidents Rank and select reference scenarios This process must be described in detail in the safety report 32

33 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 33 Detailed evidence The safety report must provide ample evidence to show the consistency between the scenario selected and the safety measures taken The description of essential elements (Annex II) is expected to be characterised by a different level of detail depending on the relevance of the involved topic to the purpose of the safety report. A suggested general approach is illustrated in this diagramme. 33

34 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 34 Substantial justification Specific technical details should be provided to demonstrate that the measures are sufficient and fit for purpose The measures are reliable and effective 34

35 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation Brief overview on Risk analysis practices for application in safety reports 35

36 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 36 Risk analysis and the safety report Risk analysis is a quite complex process It requires specific expertise in risk analysis itself It requires specialised knowledge about the object being analysed (e.g., chemical process safety) Reviewers should understand the fundamentals of risk analysis It is recommended that the review team have access to an expert (on the team or as needed) with specialised knowledge of industrial risk analysis. 36

37 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 37 Selected, and Analysed R = < s. f C > Accident Scenario Expected frequency of an adverse event Consequent reference damage Critical aspects of the establishments 37

38 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 38 The risk analysis may serve different purposes to demonstrate that a particular scenario no longer presents a major-accident hazard due to the measures in place to demonstrate that the extent of the effects of a particular scenario have been limited to demonstrate the efficiency and the effectiveness of mitigation measures to establish whether further mitigating measures are necessary to provide information for competent authority obligations (e.g., emergency plans, land-use planning) the activity is acceptable??? 38

39 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 39 Risk Analysis process Plants data Accident database Hazard identification models HAZARD IDENTIFICATION Scenarios selection Plant data Plant layout Substances data Meteorological data Accident effect models Vulnerability models SCENARIOS CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS SCENARIOS LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS Plant data Reliability database Human factor database Expert Judgment Reliability models Risk acceptability criteria Site maps Plant layout Vulnerable zones measures to prevent /limit consequences Land-use criteria & models Population distribution Vulnerability data Site map Risk calculation models RISK MANAGEMENT RISK CALCULATION AND RISK RANKING PLANT SAFETY IMPROVEMENT EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Site maps Plant layout Road network Traffic model Population behavior model Evacuation models Emergency resources 39

40 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 40 Approaches to risk analysis Normally classified as: Qualitative or (semi) quantitative Deterministic or probabilistic 40

41 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 41 Qualitative vs. (semi)quantitative Qualitative Generally relies on descriptive ranges of frequency and severity, scaled from higher to lower For example: highly likely to extremely unlikely for likelihood very severe to negligible for consequences Quantitative Numerical figures (e.g. occurrence per year, number of fatalities per year). For example: Fault tree. Cumulative probability of one scenario is calculated on the basis of each individual contributing failure 41

42 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 42 Qualitative: matrix representation relies on descriptive ranges of frequency and severity, scaled from higher to lower 42

43 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 43 Quantitative: risk Indicators Individual/Local risk annual frequency of occurrence of the reference damage (e.g., the death), in any point of the geographical area, for an individual. This is a useful figure to characterise the risk in a given location Risk source Sea Residential area Societal Risk An F-N curve describes the cumulative frequency (F) of accidents leading to the reference damage (e.g. death) for a number of people equal to or greater than N. It is a figure useful to characterise the societal dimension of possible accidents Annual frequency F Number of deat N 43

44 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 44 The choice of either a qualitative or quantitative approach is strongly influenced by the specific safety culture philosophy within each individual Member State. 44

45 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 45 Deterministic vs. Probabilistic Deterministic Mostly qualitative and consequence based Generally associated with a set of accident sequences identified as the most important Once the scenario is identified, a step-by-step risk analysis of the accident sequence determines what safety measures are needed Uncertainty of frequency/severity is not addressed. Focus is on design of safety measures and safety factors Probabilistic The probabilistic approach is based on quantification of individual events or factors contributing to the risk. It is seen as a risk-based methodology. 45

46 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 46 Deterministic vs. Probabilistic Decision criteria Initiating Events Failure description Deterministic consequence - based approach Consequences (harm, damage etc. in absolute figures) Pre-selected events; Events beyond this closed list are not considered Single failure postulated Probabilistic risk - based approach Risk of harm, damage etc. Seeks to consider all potentially relevant events within the procedure Multiple failures considered Operator behaviour Analysis characterisation Qualitative case-by-case consideration Conservative (precautionary principle) Diagnosis/execution errors considered numerically Seeks to be as realistic as possible Account of uncertainty Fixed Safety Factor (discrete value) Numerical evaluation of risk (Distribution of values) 46

47 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 47 Deterministic vs. Probabilistic The methodologies currently in use in the different Member States do not always fall under one of these two general categories, but might belong to a combination of the two For instance, for some methodologies, a deterministic approach can be used for the selection of significant scenarios ( worst case approach) whilst a probabilistic approach could be used for the assessment of safety measures efficiency and for the definition of a risk reduction strategy. Especially some considerations concerning rare initiating events (e.g. intentional attacks) or specific forms of consequence (e.g. environmental) may be subject to qualitative description only. 47

48 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 48 Typical approach The major-accident scenario usually describes loss of containment e.g., vessel rupture or leak, pipe rupture, the triggered event, namely: fire, explosion, release of hazardous substance(s) Techniques such as the bow tie diagram can be used to describe major-accident scenarios to include underlying causes. 48

49 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 49 Example: The bow-tie diagramme The centre of the diagram is the loss of containment event ( top event ). The bow-tie left side depicts the overall possible causes. The left-side vertical bars refer to the measures (barriers) in place to prevent the release of dangerous substances and control escalation. The bow-tie right side describes possible outcomes. The right-side vertical bars in the bowtie right side refer to the measures to mitigate consequences. 49

50 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 50 Examples of typical causes Examples of relevant internal causes of a potential accident include: physical and chemical process parameters limits (e.g., temperature) hazards during specific operation modes (i.e., start up/shut down) failure of containment (e.g., leaks and ruptures) malfunctions and technical failures of equipment/systems knock-on effects from other equipment failures failures in supply of utilities (e.g., water, electricity) human factors involving operation, testing and maintenance chemical incompatibility and contamination ignition sources (electrostatic charge, etc.) 50

51 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 51 Examples of typical causes Typical external causes include mainly: domino effects from other establishments transportation of dangerous substances off site (i.e. roads, railways, pipelines, shipping, oil or gas ports, air, etc.). failures associated with functional interdependence with the installations of neighbouring activities; failures in transport networks and centres (public roads, railway lines or airports close to the installation and/, or establishment;) natural hazard sources like precipitation (extreme) (rain, snow, hail), wind, thunderstorms, lightning, floods, landslide, seismic activity, etc. 51

52 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 52 Conclusions of Part 1 The risk anlysis plays a major role within the safety report The accident scenarios, their consequences and likelihood and initiating events should be clearly documented so they might be used for preparing the basis for further decisional processes (e.g. external emergency planning and land use planning). This presentation has only introduced a few fundamental concepts necessary to understanding a risk assessment. More information can be found in the safety report guidance and in reference documents listed in this guidance. 52

53 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 53 Demonstrate justify argue the case provide an absolute proof The operator shall expect professional judgment from the assessor The demonstration must be convincing Report contains convincing evidence that operator followed a systematic process for analysing hazards The extent of the demonstration should be proportional to the associated risk 53

54 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 54 Necessary measures The efficiency and effectiveness of the measures should be proportionate to the risk reduction target (i.e. higher risks require higher risk reduction and, in turn, more stringent measures). Up-to-date technical knowledge should be applied. Validated innovative technology might also be used Relevant national safety requirements must be respected. There should be a clear link between the adopted measures and the accident scenarios for which they are designed. Inherent safety should be considered first, when feasible (i.e. hazards should always be removed or reduced at source). EU safety report guidance 54

55 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 55 Prevent, control and limit Prevent: to reduce the likelihood of occurrence of the reference scenario Example: An automated system to prevent overfilling Control: to reduce the extent of the dangerous phenomenon Example: A gas detection system that reduces the intervention time and may prevent a major release Limit: to reduce the extent of the consequences of a major accident Example: Measures such as emergency response arrangements, bunding or firewalls 55

56 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 56 Major accident as defined in Article 3 an adverse occurrence such as a major emission, fire, or explosion resulting from uncontrolled developments in the course of the operation of any establishment covered by this Directive, and leading to serious danger to human health and/or the environment, immediate or delayed, inside or outside the establishment, and involving one or more dangerous substances. Serious danger (Annex VI) 56

57 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 57 Structural Elements The description of the different sections is expected to be characterised by a different level of detail depending on the relevance of the involved topic to the purpose of the safety report. 57

58 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 58 Definition of reference scenarios A scenario is an undesirable event or a sequence of such events characterised by the loss of containment (LOC) or the loss of physical integrity and the immediate or delayed consequences of this occurrence. 58

59 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 59 Example: Bow-tie left side 59

60 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 60 Part 2 Example of support to the implementation QRA Benchmark exercise Focus on Safety Reports Risk Analysis 60

61 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 61 Support activities to the assisting the CCs on their way towards their accession to the EU In FWP5: Project PA 26: Management of Natural and Technological Hazards Network of Seveso Contacts in 10 Countries Collaboration established with Slovenia (Benchmark) and Poland (Software) Distribution of a tool for Area Risk Assessment Assessment of the status of Seveso implementation, risk assessment expertise, hazardous installation data In FWP6 as a follow up: Risk Mapping Quantitative Area Risk Assessment BENCHMARK Past Industrial Accident data 61

62 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 62 QRA Benchmark focussed on the comparison of independent reviews of the same quantitative risk assessment study of a reference Seveso II establishment. study of the impact of the different reviews on the estimate of the overall risk on the area concerned. conducted by using a single tool for area risk assessmentto improve the inter-comparability of the results. first attempt to explore how independent reviews of the risks associated to a certain Seveso II establishment, could differ from each other. This can contribute to a better understanding of the inspection criteria and practices used by the different national authorities responsible for the implementation of the Seveso Directive in their countries. 62

63 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 63 Why a benchmark? Previous Benchmarks have emphasised the high level of uncertainty associated with the Risk Analysis process. What is the degree of variability of the process associated with the review of an existing Risk Analysis as taken from a safety reports? How the estimate of Area Risk would be affected? 63

64 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 64 Benchmark objectives to conduct independent reviews of the same risk analysis study of a particular hazardous establishment, as reelaborated from the original safety report of the plant; to assess the impact of the risk of the establishment on the overall area affected by potential accidents and a first attempt to analyse how different reviews/interpretations of a specific risk study might be reflected in the different estimate of area risk. 64

65 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 65 Benchmark spin-off Creation of a discussion platform to discuss the criteria and different approaches on how to conduct the assessment of the risk analysis of a Seveso II type establishment. Example of an Area Risk Assessment study to assess the impact of an industrial site on the overall area affected by potential accidents. 65

66 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 66 Participants Bulgaria Ministry of Environment and Water. Cyprus Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovenia Slovakia Department of Labour Inspection. National Directorate General for Disaster Management Ministry of the Interior CK-Trikolor Strategy Division of Civil Protection Department Lithuanian Energy Institute. Fire and rescue Department, Ministry of the Interior. Technical University of Lodz. Centre of excellence MANHAZ (Manag. of Health and Environ. Hazards). University of Cluj-Napoca. Ministry of Environment, Spatial Planning and Energy. Slovenian Environmental Agency-EIA Department. Environmental Agency. 66

67 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 67 General idea Seveso Type establishment Real & Anonymous Fictitiously located JRC & a CA representative ( The Industrial Operator ) Safety report CA participants The Inspectors QRA 67

68 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 68 Work Programme Documentation Phase Review of the Risk Analysis study Comparison of the different reviews - Area Risk Assessment sensitivity studies 68

69 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 69 Reference Plant Real Food process Company(anonymous) Makes use and produces dangerous substances exceeding the qualifying quantity Sulphur Dioxide Seveso Cat. 2 R23 R34 Ethanol Seveso Cat. 7b R11 Lower-tier Seveso II establishment 69

70 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 70 Safety report Risk Analysis Data Postulated scenarios Frequencies Consequences Vulnerability Models Territory s Data Population Density Population Distribution Meteorology Documentation Phase ARIPAR 70

71 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 71 ARIPAR Aggregation of all risk sources associated with fixed installation and transportation of dangerous substances (by roads, railways, ships and pipelines) Calculation and display of local point risks and iso-risk curves individual area iso-risk curves relative contribution of risk sources F-N curves and I-N histograms Identification of major causes of risk in the area 71

72 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 72 Review of the risk analysis data Postulated Scenarios. Frequencies of initiating events and availability & reliability data of safety measures Source terms &Damage curves Probit functions used to assess the vulnerability 72

73 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 73 Some results: scatter of results Reference analysis 73

74 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 74 Some results: scatter of results 1.E-02 F(y -1 ) 1.E-03 1.E-04 1.E-05 1.E-06 1.E-07 1.E-08 1.E-09 1.E-10 1.E N ref 1.E-02 F(y -1 ) 1.E-03 1.E-04 1.E-05 1.E-06 1.E-07 1.E-08 1.E-09 1.E-10 1.E N ref Worst case scenario less important scenario 74

75 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 75 Some results sensitivity studies Different vulnerability model CPR Green Book AichE 75

76 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 76 Some results sensitivity studies Different Assumptions on scenario (K121) flange release 60 min release 20 min release 76

77 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 77 Summary of the risk analysis review the risk estimates after review were normally higher General tendency in assigning higher values for the frequencies, which did not play a major role in quantitative terms the role of the different vulnerability models used for consequence assessment seems to have contributed more to a different outcome of the risk picture. In the exercise great attention was paid to the influence of frequency data and of the vulnerability models however shown that other aspects can play an important role on the overall risk picture. It is the case of certain assumptions (i.e. the reaction time), which did not attract the due attention during the analysis phase but that it demonstrated to be much more risk sensitive then other parameters. 77

78 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 78 Contribution to risk (%) members (avr) reference K111 K121 K131 K211 K221 K151 K161 A11uvc A11fire A12uvc A12fire A13uvc A13fire scenario 78

79 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 79 Conclusions of Part 2 Effective mechanism for identifying the weakness and strengths within their own country s strategy for reviewing the risk analyses of safety reports. Discussion platform, focussing on current practices and approaches use by the participating countries for analysing risk associated with Seveso-type establishments. exchange of information to take place amongst the participants on several aspects concerning the implementation of the Seveso Directive in their countries. Differently from previous benchmark exercises, where different risk assessors performed their own independent analysis of the same reference establishment, the present benchmark consisted of independent reviews of the same risk analysis study. Notwithstanding the variation in opinion was not less significant than for previous studies. 79

80 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 80 Conclusions of Part 2 (cont.) Uncertainly is a key issue. Human factor analysis is an essential element and should be incorporated in any safety assessment study for Seveso purposes. The benchmark study showed that the overall risk estimate is very much influenced by the vulnerability model selected, which is a major contributor to the uncertainty of the final result. Due to the intrinsic uncertainty associated with the risk analysis, the absolute value of the risk estimate is not necessarily the most important outcome of the overall process. Rather, the QRA framework necessitates a detailed analysis of the risk situation, which leads to a better understanding of the systems and processes involved and highlighting which are the critical elements. It should be noted that for very complex installations a full QRA could be very difficult to evaluate. The amount of information required can be significant and the corresponding uncertainty associated with each parameter may therefore also be very difficult to estimate. Detailed guidance on how to evaluate a risk analysis study from a regulator s standpoint would be extremely useful for the new Member States and Candidate Countries. Finally the use of the ARIPAR software to improve the inter-comparability of the results, was considered to have added good value to the benchmarking process. 80

81 Belgrade 27 August 2007 Workshop No 1: Seveso II Directive EU Guidance and support for its implementation 81 Thanks 81