Banking, Trade, and the Making of a Dominant Currency 1 / 30

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Banking, Trade, and the Making of a Dominant Currency 1 / 30"

Transcription

1 Banking, Trade, and the Making of a Dominant Currency Gita Gopinath Harvard Jeremy Stein Harvard 1 / 30

2 What is a Dominant Currency? 1 Trade invoicing 2 / 30

3 What is a Dominant Currency? 1 Trade invoicing Dollar Invoicing in World Imports Imports from U.S. = 4.7 Euro Invoicing in World Imports Imports from Euro Area = / 30

4 What is a Dominant Currency? 1 Trade invoicing Dollar Invoicing in World Imports Imports from U.S. = 4.7 Euro Invoicing in World Imports Imports from Euro Area = 1.2 Prices rigid in currency of invoicing 2 / 30

5 What is a Dominant Currency? 1 Trade invoicing Dollar Invoicing in World Imports Imports from U.S. = 4.7 Euro Invoicing in World Imports Imports from Euro Area = 1.2 Prices rigid in currency of invoicing 2 International bank funding and corporate borrowing Dollar liabilities of non-u.s. banks comparable to U.S. banks 62% of foreign currency local liabilities of banks denominated in dollars Currency mismatch 2 / 30

6 What is a Dominant Currency? 1 Trade invoicing Dollar Invoicing in World Imports Imports from U.S. = 4.7 Euro Invoicing in World Imports Imports from Euro Area = 1.2 Prices rigid in currency of invoicing 2 International bank funding and corporate borrowing Dollar liabilities of non-u.s. banks comparable to U.S. banks 62% of foreign currency local liabilities of banks denominated in dollars Currency mismatch 3 Central bank reserves Dollar: 64%; Euro: 20%; Yen: 4% 2 / 30

7 What is a Dominant Currency? 1 Trade invoicing Dollar Invoicing in World Imports Imports from U.S. = 4.7 Euro Invoicing in World Imports Imports from Euro Area = 1.2 Prices rigid in currency of invoicing 2 International bank funding and corporate borrowing Dollar liabilities of non-u.s. banks comparable to U.S. banks 62% of foreign currency local liabilities of banks denominated in dollars Currency mismatch 3 Central bank reserves Dollar: 64%; Euro: 20%; Yen: 4% 4 Exorbitant Privilege Violation of UIP: Dollar risk-free assets pay lower expected returns (in a common currency) 2 / 30

8 What we do 1 Unified theory for dominance in trade invoicing and finance 2 Strategic complementarity of unit of account and store of value 3 Dominant currency, despite multiple candidates 4 Currency mismatch and exorbitant privilege 3 / 30

9 What we do 1 Unified theory for dominance in trade invoicing and finance 2 Strategic complementarity of unit of account and store of value 3 Dominant currency, despite multiple candidates 4 Currency mismatch and exorbitant privilege Eichengreen (2010): experience suggests that the logical sequencing of steps in internationalizing a currency is: first, encouraging its use in invoicing and settling trade; second, encouraging its use in private financial transactions; third encouraging its use by central banks and governments as a form in which to hold private reserves. 3 / 30

10 Main Idea High $ invoicing

11 Main Idea High $ invoicing High HH/firms $ expenses

12 Main Idea High $ invoicing High HH/firms $ expenses High demand for $ safe assets

13 Main Idea High $ invoicing Low r on $ safe assets High HH/firms $ expenses High demand for $ safe assets

14 Main Idea High $ invoicing Low r on $ safe assets High HH/firms $ expenses High demand for $ safe assets 4 / 30

15 Model: Exogenous invoicing Two countries: U.S and an EM. Two dates: 0 and 1 Two agents: Importers/Savers and Banks/Borrowers 5 / 30

16 Model: Exogenous invoicing Two countries: U.S and an EM. Two dates: 0 and 1 Two agents: Importers/Savers and Banks/Borrowers Importers max C 0 + βe 0 W 1 + θ log(m), (P1) C 0 W 0 Q h D h E 0 Q $ D $ Q R A R W 1 = D h + E 1 D $ + ξa R, Preference for safe money-like assets, θ > 0 M = ( D α h h Dα $ $ ) 1 α h +α $ Stein (2012), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012), Sunderam (2014), Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2015), Nagel (2016) Price in invoice currency set at time 0 and sticky through time 1 5 / 30

17 Model: Exogenous invoicing go α h Q h = β + θ (α h + α $ )D h α $ Q $ = β + θ (α h + α $ )D $ Q R = β E 0 (E 1 ) = E 0 = 1; E 0 (ξ) = 1 6 / 30

18 Model: Exogenous invoicing EM Banks (agglomeration of banks and borrowing firms) N local currency risky projects 7 / 30

19 Model: Exogenous invoicing EM Banks (agglomeration of banks and borrowing firms) N local currency risky projects Safe local claims B h ; safe dollar claims B $ ; risky local bonds B R 7 / 30

20 Model: Exogenous invoicing EM Banks (agglomeration of banks and borrowing firms) N local currency risky projects Safe local claims B h ; safe dollar claims B $ ; risky local bonds B R subject to, max E 0 [γn B h EB $ ξb R ] B h,b $,B R Q h B h + Q $ B $ + Q R B R N Limits to safe asset creation γ L : Worst case payout of project ĒB $ + B h γ L N Ē: Worst case value of EM currency Comparative disadvantage in manufacturing dollar safe claims E 0 γ = 1, E 0 ξ = 1 7 / 30

21 Model: Exogenous invoicing and banking market structure UIP Violation & Exorbitant Privilege: Q $ > Q h > Q R Q $ β Q h β = Ē 8 / 30

22 Model: Exogenous invoicing and banking market structure UIP Violation & Exorbitant Privilege: Q $ > Q h > Q R Q $ β Q h β = Ē Fund with $ deposits if cheaper than funding with h deposits. 8 / 30

23 Model: Exogenous invoicing and banking market structure UIP Violation & Exorbitant Privilege: Q $ > Q h > Q R Q $ β Q h β = Ē Fund with $ deposits if cheaper than funding with h deposits. Market clearing D $ =B $ + X $ }{{} exogenous,us D h = B h 8 / 30

24 Model: Invoicing Shares, UIP Deviations, Dollar Borrowing Walking up a supply curve Q $ Q h B $ θ(ē 1) (γ L N+ĒX $ ) ᾱ $ α $ ᾱ $ α $ (a) Q $ Q h (b) B $ ᾱ $ = α hēx $ γ L N High dollar invoicing = low return on safe dollar claims 9 / 30

25 Model: Endogenous Invoicing Invoice fraction η of N in dollars (exports) max E 0 [γn 0 + γ(1 η)n + EγηN B h EB $ ξb R φ2 ] B h,b $,B R,η Nη2 s.t., Q h B h + Q $ B $ + Q R B R N + N 0 ĒB $ + B h γ L N 0 + (1 η)γ L N + Ēηγ L N B h γ L N 0 + (1 η)γ L N Comparative disadvantage in manufacturing $ safe claims Currency mismatch: Ē Invoicing costs: φ (ηn) 2 2 N ; Proxies for risk-aversion of ultimate owners of exporting firms. 10 / 30

26 Model: Endogenous Invoicing Shares Dollar premium (DP): Invoicing choice (IC): Q $ Q h = β ( µ(η)(ē 1) κ ) η = γ L βφ (Q $ Q h ) Q $ Q IC DP η optimal η 11 / 30

27 Model: Endogenous Invoicing Shares Dollar premium (DP): Invoicing choice (IC): Q $ Q h = β ( µ(η)(ē 1) κ ) η = γ L βφ (Q $ Q h ) Q $ Q IC DP η optimal η Why invoice in dollars? To access cheap dollar financing 11 / 30

28 Endogenous Invoice Shares and Multiple Equilibria Continuum of EMs and US Safe asset demand only in own local currency and in dollars M i = ( D α hi hi D α ) 1 $i α hi +α $i $i Invoicing decisions in j effect invoicing shares in i α $i a + b η j dj j i a > 0: share of U.S. goods b > 0: share of goods from other EMs; a + b < 1 Integrated markets for dollar deposits, segmented markets for EM currencies. 12 / 30

29 Simultaneous determination of invoicing and banking Multiple Equilibria with varying degrees of dollar invoicing η η a ā a 13 / 30

30 Simultaneous determination of invoicing and banking Multiple Equilibria with varying degrees of dollar invoicing Q $ Q h βφ γ L η a ā a θ γ L (N+N 0) 14 / 30

31 Dollar vs. Euro: Emergence of a dominant currency Two global currencies: Dollar and Euro EM Importers/Savers M i = ( D α hi hi D α $i $i D α ) 1 ei αi ei α $i = a + b η $j dj α ei = a + b j i j i η ej dj 15 / 30

32 Dollar vs. Euro: Emergence of a dominant currency Two global currencies: Dollar and Euro EM Importers/Savers M i = ( D α hi hi D α $i $i D α ) 1 ei αi ei α $i = a + b η $j dj α ei = a + b j i j i η ej dj Symmetry: Ē ei = Ē $i = Ē Integrated markets for dollar and euro deposits 15 / 30

33 Dollar vs. Euro: Emergence of a dominant currency Invoicing decision Market-clearing: η $i = γ L βφ (Q $ Q hi ) cη ei η ei = γ L βφ (Q e Q hi ) cη $i D hi = B hi i A Ri = B Ri i D $i = B $i + X i i D ei = B ei + X i i 16 / 30

34 Dollar vs. Euro: Emergence of a dominant currency Three possible equilibria No global currency (symmetric) η $ = η e = 0, B $ = B e = 0 Single/dominant global currency (asymmetric) η $ > 0, η e = 0, B $ > 0, B e = 0 Multiple global currencies (symmetric) η $ > 0, η e > 0, B $ > 0, B e > 0 17 / 30

35 Numerical Example Parameter N N 0 X α h φ θ β γ L Ē b c Value / 30

36 Dominance in Trade Invoicing 19 / 30

37 Dominance in Banking 20 / 30

38 Currency Mismatch 21 / 30

39 Exorbitant Privilege 22 / 30

40 Comments Which currency dominates? The role of history Pre-1999, a $ >> a e, Dollar only dominant currency Post-1999, closer in size, but history picks the dollar Can take a long time to reverse 23 / 30

41 Comments Which currency dominates? The role of history Pre-1999, a $ >> a e, Dollar only dominant currency Post-1999, closer in size, but history picks the dollar Can take a long time to reverse Why dollarization of central bank reserves? Lender of last resort of banks Central bank asset mix mirrors commercial banks liability structure Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2010) 23 / 30

42 Data: Relation between trade invoicing and bank liabilities D $,i = α $,i Qe β D e,i α e,i Q $ β 24 / 30

43 Data: Relation between trade invoicing and bank liabilities D $,i = α $,i Qe β D e,i α e,i Q $ β Dollar share in bank liabilities CH SE DKNO TR GB AU KR JP CA Dollar share in trade invoicing R-squared= 0.72 BIS Locational Banking Statistics, Local Liabilities 24 / 30

44 Data: Relation between trade invoicing and bank liabilities Dollar share in bank liabilities (deposits and loans, non-banks) CH DK SE Dollar share in trade invoicing R-squared= 0.82 GB AU KR CA JP BIS Locational Banking Statistics, Local liabilities 25 / 30

45 Conclusion 1 Unified theory for dominance in trade invoicing and finance Invoice in dollars because dollar financing cheap Dollar financing cheap because of invoicing in dollars 2 Strategic complementarity of unit of account and store of value 3 Dominant currency, despite multiple candidates 4 Currency mismatch and exorbitant privilege 26 / 30

46 Conclusion 1 Unified theory for dominance in trade invoicing and finance Invoice in dollars because dollar financing cheap Dollar financing cheap because of invoicing in dollars 2 Strategic complementarity of unit of account and store of value 3 Dominant currency, despite multiple candidates 4 Currency mismatch and exorbitant privilege China s Renminbi Share as settlement currency: 0% in 2010, 25% in 2015 Second most widely used currency in global trade finance 26 / 30

47 Micro-foundation for P1 back Risk-Neutral Investors: max C C0 n 0 n + βe 0 C1, n,cn 1,Dn h,dn $,An R (P2) subject to: C n 0 W n 0 Q h D n h E 0Q $ D n $ Q RA n R C 1 = D n h + E 1D n $ + ξan R, Q R = β, A R > 0 D n h = Dn $ = 0 if Q h > β, Q $ > β 27 / 30

48 Micro-foundation for P1 back Risk-Averse Importers: max E 0 U(C 1 ), C 1,D h,d $ subject to: (P3) W Q h D h E 0 Q $ D $ P 1 C 1 D h + E 1 D $, where the consumption aggregator and price level are given by, C = C 1 α h C α $ P = P1 α h (E 1 P $ ) α α α (1 α) 1 α = E1 α α α (1 α) 1 α = νeα 1 and α = α $ α h +α $ 28 / 30

49 Micro-foundation for P1 back (c) (d) Figure: Relative demand for dollar deposits (in partial equilibrium) 29 / 30

50 Micro-foundation for P1 back (a) (b) Figure: Full equilibrium 30 / 30

Dominant Currency Paradigm

Dominant Currency Paradigm Dominant Currency Paradigm Gita Gopinath Harvard CREI Lectures, 2018 Lecture III 1 / 5 Endogenous currency choice Engel (JIE, 2006), Gopinath, Itskhoki and Rigobon (AER, 2010) Prices are sticky one period

More information

Banking, Trade, and the Making of a Dominant Currency

Banking, Trade, and the Making of a Dominant Currency Banking, Trade, and the Making of a Dominant Currency Gita Gopinath Harvard and NBER Jeremy C. Stein Harvard and NBER March 28, 2018 Abstract We explore the interplay between trade invoicing patterns and

More information

Banking, Trade, and the Making of a Dominant Currency

Banking, Trade, and the Making of a Dominant Currency Banking, Trade, and the Making of a Dominant Currency Gita Gopinath Harvard and NBER Jeremy C. Stein Harvard and NBER November 11, 2017 Preliminary and Incomplete (click here for the most recent version)

More information

Banking, Trade and the Making of a Dominant Currency by Gita Gopinath and Jeremy Stein

Banking, Trade and the Making of a Dominant Currency by Gita Gopinath and Jeremy Stein 1 Banking, Trade and the Making of a Dominant Currency by Gita Gopinath and Jeremy Stein Discussion by: Fabrizio Perri Minneapolis Fed NBER Summer institute, EFG July 2018 2 Features of dominant currency

More information

Trade Invoicing, Bank Funding, and Central Bank Reserve Holdings

Trade Invoicing, Bank Funding, and Central Bank Reserve Holdings AEA Papers and Proceedings 2018, 108: 1 5 https://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20181065 Trade Invoicing, Bank Funding, and Central Bank Reserve Holdings By Gita Gopinath and Jeremy C. Stein* In recent work (Gopinath

More information

Financial Crises, Dollarization and Lending of Last Resort in Open Economies

Financial Crises, Dollarization and Lending of Last Resort in Open Economies Financial Crises, Dollarization and Lending of Last Resort in Open Economies Luigi Bocola Stanford, Minneapolis Fed, and NBER Guido Lorenzoni Northwestern and NBER Restud Tour Reunion Conference May 2018

More information

Optimal margins and equilibrium prices

Optimal margins and equilibrium prices Optimal margins and equilibrium prices Bruno Biais Florian Heider Marie Hoerova Toulouse School of Economics ECB ECB Bocconi Consob Conference Securities Markets: Trends, Risks and Policies February 26,

More information

Multi-Dimensional Monetary Policy

Multi-Dimensional Monetary Policy Multi-Dimensional Monetary Policy Michael Woodford Columbia University John Kuszczak Memorial Lecture Bank of Canada Annual Research Conference November 3, 2016 Michael Woodford (Columbia) Multi-Dimensional

More information

Frequency of Price Adjustment and Pass-through

Frequency of Price Adjustment and Pass-through Frequency of Price Adjustment and Pass-through Gita Gopinath Harvard and NBER Oleg Itskhoki Harvard CEFIR/NES March 11, 2009 1 / 39 Motivation Micro-level studies document significant heterogeneity in

More information

1 Dynamic programming

1 Dynamic programming 1 Dynamic programming A country has just discovered a natural resource which yields an income per period R measured in terms of traded goods. The cost of exploitation is negligible. The government wants

More information

Dominant Currency Paradigm

Dominant Currency Paradigm Dominant Currency Paradigm A New Model for the Small Open Economy Camila Casas Banco de la República Gita Gopinath Harvard Federico Díez Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas UC Berkeley

More information

DISCUSSION OF CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS, RISK CHOICE, AND LIQUIDITY PROVISION IN A BUSINESS CYCLE MODEL

DISCUSSION OF CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS, RISK CHOICE, AND LIQUIDITY PROVISION IN A BUSINESS CYCLE MODEL DISCUSSION OF CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS, RISK CHOICE, AND LIQUIDITY PROVISION IN A BUSINESS CYCLE MODEL BY JULIANE BEGENAU Dmitriy Sergeyev Bocconi University and IGIER Structural Changes in the Banking Sector

More information

A Model with Costly Enforcement

A Model with Costly Enforcement A Model with Costly Enforcement Jesús Fernández-Villaverde University of Pennsylvania December 25, 2012 Jesús Fernández-Villaverde (PENN) Costly-Enforcement December 25, 2012 1 / 43 A Model with Costly

More information

1.3 Nominal rigidities

1.3 Nominal rigidities 1.3 Nominal rigidities two period economy households of consumers-producers monopolistic competition, price-setting uncertainty about productivity preferences t=1 C it is the CES aggregate with σ > 1 Ã!

More information

The Costs of Losing Monetary Independence: The Case of Mexico

The Costs of Losing Monetary Independence: The Case of Mexico The Costs of Losing Monetary Independence: The Case of Mexico Thomas F. Cooley New York University Vincenzo Quadrini Duke University and CEPR May 2, 2000 Abstract This paper develops a two-country monetary

More information

Household Finance in China

Household Finance in China Household Finance in China Russell Cooper 1 and Guozhong Zhu 2 October 22, 2016 1 Department of Economics, the Pennsylvania State University and NBER, russellcoop@gmail.com 2 School of Business, University

More information

China vs. U.S.: IMS Meets IPS

China vs. U.S.: IMS Meets IPS China vs. U.S.: IMS Meets IPS Emmanuel Farhi and Matteo Maggiori December 2018 Abstract Currently both the International Monetary System (IMS) and the International Price Systems (IPS) are dominated by

More information

State-Dependent Pricing and the Paradox of Flexibility

State-Dependent Pricing and the Paradox of Flexibility State-Dependent Pricing and the Paradox of Flexibility Luca Dedola and Anton Nakov ECB and CEPR May 24 Dedola and Nakov (ECB and CEPR) SDP and the Paradox of Flexibility 5/4 / 28 Policy rates in major

More information

Heterogeneous Firm, Financial Market Integration and International Risk Sharing

Heterogeneous Firm, Financial Market Integration and International Risk Sharing Heterogeneous Firm, Financial Market Integration and International Risk Sharing Ming-Jen Chang, Shikuan Chen and Yen-Chen Wu National DongHwa University Thursday 22 nd November 2018 Department of Economics,

More information

Exercises on the New-Keynesian Model

Exercises on the New-Keynesian Model Advanced Macroeconomics II Professor Lorenza Rossi/Jordi Gali T.A. Daniël van Schoot, daniel.vanschoot@upf.edu Exercises on the New-Keynesian Model Schedule: 28th of May (seminar 4): Exercises 1, 2 and

More information

Monetary Economics Final Exam

Monetary Economics Final Exam 316-466 Monetary Economics Final Exam 1. Flexible-price monetary economics (90 marks). Consider a stochastic flexibleprice money in the utility function model. Time is discrete and denoted t =0, 1,...

More information

China vs. U.S.: IMS Meets IPS

China vs. U.S.: IMS Meets IPS China vs. U.S.: IMS Meets IPS By EMMANUE FARHI AND MATTEO MAGGIORI The international monetary system is currently dominated by an established Hegemon, the U.S. However, it does not take much imagination

More information

ON INTEREST RATE POLICY AND EQUILIBRIUM STABILITY UNDER INCREASING RETURNS: A NOTE

ON INTEREST RATE POLICY AND EQUILIBRIUM STABILITY UNDER INCREASING RETURNS: A NOTE Macroeconomic Dynamics, (9), 55 55. Printed in the United States of America. doi:.7/s6559895 ON INTEREST RATE POLICY AND EQUILIBRIUM STABILITY UNDER INCREASING RETURNS: A NOTE KEVIN X.D. HUANG Vanderbilt

More information

A Macroeconomic Model with Financial Panics

A Macroeconomic Model with Financial Panics A Macroeconomic Model with Financial Panics Mark Gertler, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, Andrea Prestipino NYU, Princeton, Federal Reserve Board 1 March 218 1 The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors

More information

International Prices and Exchange Rates Gita Gopinath

International Prices and Exchange Rates Gita Gopinath International Prices and Exchange Rates Gita Gopinath Nominal and Real Exchange Rates Exchange-rate pass-through and expenditure switching Currency Wars, Fear of Floating 1 / 72 Non-neutrality of Nominal

More information

A Macroeconomic Model with Financial Panics

A Macroeconomic Model with Financial Panics A Macroeconomic Model with Financial Panics Mark Gertler, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, Andrea Prestipino NYU, Princeton, Federal Reserve Board 1 September 218 1 The views expressed in this paper are those of the

More information

Banks and Liquidity Crises in Emerging Market Economies

Banks and Liquidity Crises in Emerging Market Economies Banks and Liquidity Crises in Emerging Market Economies Tarishi Matsuoka Tokyo Metropolitan University May, 2015 Tarishi Matsuoka (TMU) Banking Crises in Emerging Market Economies May, 2015 1 / 47 Introduction

More information

Foreign Exchange Market Intervention, Inflation and. Export Competitiveness

Foreign Exchange Market Intervention, Inflation and. Export Competitiveness Foreign Exchange Market Intervention, Inflation and Export Competitiveness Wukuang Cun Rutgers University Jie Li Central University of Finance and Economics March 2013 1 Abstract During recent years, the

More information

Global Imbalances and Currency Wars at the ZLB

Global Imbalances and Currency Wars at the ZLB Global Imbalances and Currency Wars at the ZLB Ricardo Caballero 1 Emmanuel Farhi 2 Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas 3 1 MIT & NBER 2 Harvard & NBER 3 UC Berkeley & NBER Pacific Basin Research Conference, San

More information

Capital Controls and Optimal Chinese Monetary Policy 1

Capital Controls and Optimal Chinese Monetary Policy 1 Capital Controls and Optimal Chinese Monetary Policy 1 Chun Chang a Zheng Liu b Mark Spiegel b a Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance b Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco International Monetary Fund

More information

Exam #2 Review Questions (Answers) ECNS 303 October 31, 2011

Exam #2 Review Questions (Answers) ECNS 303 October 31, 2011 Exam #2 Review Questions (Answers) ECNS 303 October 31, 2011 1.) For Ch. 9 and 10: Review your Ch. 9 and 10 notes, Quiz #6, and any practice problems that were assigned for Ch. 10. 2.) Exogenous vs. Endogenous

More information

Macroprudential Policy Implementation in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union

Macroprudential Policy Implementation in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union Macroprudential Policy Implementation in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union Margarita Rubio University of Nottingham ECB conference on "Heterogenity in currency areas and macroeconomic policies" - 28-29 November

More information

Financial Crises, Liability Dollarization, and Lending of Last Resort in Open Economies. BIS Research Network Meeting, March 2018

Financial Crises, Liability Dollarization, and Lending of Last Resort in Open Economies. BIS Research Network Meeting, March 2018 Financial Crises, Liability Dollarization, and Lending of Last Resort in Open Economies Luigi Bocola Guido Lorenzoni BIS Research Network Meeting, March 2018 Motivation 1 / 17 Financial sector stability

More information

Household income risk, nominal frictions, and incomplete markets 1

Household income risk, nominal frictions, and incomplete markets 1 Household income risk, nominal frictions, and incomplete markets 1 2013 North American Summer Meeting Ralph Lütticke 13.06.2013 1 Joint-work with Christian Bayer, Lien Pham, and Volker Tjaden 1 / 30 Research

More information

QUANTITATIVE EASING AND FINANCIAL STABILITY

QUANTITATIVE EASING AND FINANCIAL STABILITY QUANTITATIVE EASING AND FINANCIAL STABILITY BY MICHAEL WOODFORD DISCUSSION BY ROBIN GREENWOOD CENTRAL BANK OF CHILE, NOVEMBER 2015 NARRATIVE OF THE CRISIS Pre-crisis, a shortage of safe assets Excessive

More information

Debt Constraints and Employment. Patrick Kehoe, Virgiliu Midrigan and Elena Pastorino

Debt Constraints and Employment. Patrick Kehoe, Virgiliu Midrigan and Elena Pastorino Debt Constraints and Employment Patrick Kehoe, Virgiliu Midrigan and Elena Pastorino Motivation: U.S. Great Recession Large, persistent drop in employment U.S. Employment-Population, aged 25-54 82 Employment

More information

Concerted Efforts? Monetary Policy and Macro-Prudential Tools

Concerted Efforts? Monetary Policy and Macro-Prudential Tools Concerted Efforts? Monetary Policy and Macro-Prudential Tools Andrea Ferrero Richard Harrison Benjamin Nelson University of Oxford Bank of England Rokos Capital 20 th Central Bank Macroeconomic Modeling

More information

Macroeconomics. Basic New Keynesian Model. Nicola Viegi. April 29, 2014

Macroeconomics. Basic New Keynesian Model. Nicola Viegi. April 29, 2014 Macroeconomics Basic New Keynesian Model Nicola Viegi April 29, 2014 The Problem I Short run E ects of Monetary Policy Shocks I I I persistent e ects on real variables slow adjustment of aggregate price

More information

Habit Formation in State-Dependent Pricing Models: Implications for the Dynamics of Output and Prices

Habit Formation in State-Dependent Pricing Models: Implications for the Dynamics of Output and Prices Habit Formation in State-Dependent Pricing Models: Implications for the Dynamics of Output and Prices Phuong V. Ngo,a a Department of Economics, Cleveland State University, 22 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland,

More information

Quantitative Easing and Financial Stability

Quantitative Easing and Financial Stability Quantitative Easing and Financial Stability Michael Woodford Columbia University Nineteenth Annual Conference Central Bank of Chile November 19-20, 2015 Michael Woodford (Columbia) Financial Stability

More information

Stability Regulation. Jeremy C. Stein Harvard University and NBER

Stability Regulation. Jeremy C. Stein Harvard University and NBER Monetary Policy as Financial- Stability Regulation Jeremy C. Stein Harvard University and NBER The Mission of Central Banks Modern view: price stability is paramount goal. Historical view: financial stability

More information

International Monetary Theory: Mundell Fleming Redux

International Monetary Theory: Mundell Fleming Redux International Monetary Theory: Mundell Fleming Redux by Markus K. Brunnermeier and Yuliy Sannikov Princeton and Stanford University Princeton Initiative Princeton, Sept. 9 th, 2017 Motivation Global currency

More information

Macroprudential Policies in a Low Interest-Rate Environment

Macroprudential Policies in a Low Interest-Rate Environment Macroprudential Policies in a Low Interest-Rate Environment Margarita Rubio 1 Fang Yao 2 1 University of Nottingham 2 Reserve Bank of New Zealand. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect

More information

Fiscal Devaluations. Emmanuel Farhi Gita Gopinath Oleg Itskhoki. Harvard Harvard Princeton 1 / 32

Fiscal Devaluations. Emmanuel Farhi Gita Gopinath Oleg Itskhoki. Harvard Harvard Princeton 1 / 32 Fiscal Devaluations Emmanuel Farhi Gita Gopinath Oleg Itskhoki Harvard Harvard Princeton 1 / 32 Motivation Currency devaluation: response to loss of competitiveness What if devaluation impossible? 1 /

More information

A Model of Safe Asset Determination

A Model of Safe Asset Determination A Model of Safe Asset Determination Zhiguo He (Chicago Booth and NBER) Arvind Krishnamurthy (Stanford GSB and NBER) Konstantin Milbradt (Northwestern Kellogg and NBER) February 2016 75min 1 / 45 Motivation

More information

INVESTMENT DYNAMICS IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS Alfredo Garcia, University of Virginia joint work with Ennio Stacchetti, New York University May 2007

INVESTMENT DYNAMICS IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS Alfredo Garcia, University of Virginia joint work with Ennio Stacchetti, New York University May 2007 INVESTMENT DYNAMICS IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS Alfredo Garcia, University of Virginia joint work with Ennio Stacchetti, New York University May 2007 1 MOTIVATION We study resource adequacy as an endogenous

More information

A Model of the Reserve Asset

A Model of the Reserve Asset A Model of the Reserve Asset Zhiguo He (Chicago Booth and NBER) Arvind Krishnamurthy (Stanford GSB and NBER) Konstantin Milbradt (Northwestern Kellogg and NBER) July 2015 ECB 1 / 40 Motivation US Treasury

More information

Credit Crises, Precautionary Savings and the Liquidity Trap October (R&R Quarterly 31, 2016Journal 1 / of19

Credit Crises, Precautionary Savings and the Liquidity Trap October (R&R Quarterly 31, 2016Journal 1 / of19 Credit Crises, Precautionary Savings and the Liquidity Trap (R&R Quarterly Journal of nomics) October 31, 2016 Credit Crises, Precautionary Savings and the Liquidity Trap October (R&R Quarterly 31, 2016Journal

More information

Financial Regulation in a Quantitative Model of the Modern Banking System

Financial Regulation in a Quantitative Model of the Modern Banking System Financial Regulation in a Quantitative Model of the Modern Banking System Juliane Begenau HBS Tim Landvoigt UT Austin CITE August 14, 2015 1 Flow of Funds: total nancial assets 22 20 18 16 $ Trillion 14

More information

A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk

A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk Viral Acharya, Itamar Drechsler and Philipp Schnabl NYU Stern NBER, CEPR, and NYU Stern Global Research Forum on International Macroeconomics and Finance Questions 1 Did financial sector bailouts ignite

More information

The International Medium of Exchange

The International Medium of Exchange The International Medium of Exchange Ryan Chahrour Boston College Rosen Valchev Boston College September 6, 2018 Abstract We propose a model of endogenous, persistent coordination on the international

More information

Appendix: Common Currencies vs. Monetary Independence

Appendix: Common Currencies vs. Monetary Independence Appendix: Common Currencies vs. Monetary Independence A The infinite horizon model This section defines the equilibrium of the infinity horizon model described in Section III of the paper and characterizes

More information

Macroeconomics 2. Lecture 6 - New Keynesian Business Cycles March. Sciences Po

Macroeconomics 2. Lecture 6 - New Keynesian Business Cycles March. Sciences Po Macroeconomics 2 Lecture 6 - New Keynesian Business Cycles 2. Zsófia L. Bárány Sciences Po 2014 March Main idea: introduce nominal rigidities Why? in classical monetary models the price level ensures money

More information

. Fiscal Reform and Government Debt in Japan: A Neoclassical Perspective. May 10, 2013

. Fiscal Reform and Government Debt in Japan: A Neoclassical Perspective. May 10, 2013 .. Fiscal Reform and Government Debt in Japan: A Neoclassical Perspective Gary Hansen (UCLA) and Selo İmrohoroğlu (USC) May 10, 2013 Table of Contents.1 Introduction.2 Model Economy.3 Calibration.4 Quantitative

More information

Capital Goods Trade and Economic Development

Capital Goods Trade and Economic Development Capital Goods Trade and Economic Development Piyusha Mutreja B. Ravikumar Michael Sposi Syracuse U. FRB St. Louis FRB Dallas December 2014 NYU-FRBATL Conference Disclaimer: The following views are those

More information

Comments on The International Price System, by Gita Gopinath. Charles Engel University of Wisconsin

Comments on The International Price System, by Gita Gopinath. Charles Engel University of Wisconsin Comments on The International Price System, by Gita Gopinath Charles Engel University of Wisconsin I thank the organizers of this conference for inviting me to discuss this very interesting paper by Gita

More information

A Unified Theory of Bond and Currency Markets

A Unified Theory of Bond and Currency Markets A Unified Theory of Bond and Currency Markets Andrey Ermolov Columbia Business School April 24, 2014 1 / 41 Stylized Facts about Bond Markets US Fact 1: Upward Sloping Real Yield Curve In US, real long

More information

Technology shocks and Monetary Policy: Assessing the Fed s performance

Technology shocks and Monetary Policy: Assessing the Fed s performance Technology shocks and Monetary Policy: Assessing the Fed s performance (J.Gali et al., JME 2003) Miguel Angel Alcobendas, Laura Desplans, Dong Hee Joe March 5, 2010 M.A.Alcobendas, L. Desplans, D.H.Joe

More information

The New Keynesian Model

The New Keynesian Model The New Keynesian Model Noah Williams University of Wisconsin-Madison Noah Williams (UW Madison) New Keynesian model 1 / 37 Research strategy policy as systematic and predictable...the central bank s stabilization

More information

The Eurozone Debt Crisis: A New-Keynesian DSGE model with default risk

The Eurozone Debt Crisis: A New-Keynesian DSGE model with default risk The Eurozone Debt Crisis: A New-Keynesian DSGE model with default risk Daniel Cohen 1,2 Mathilde Viennot 1 Sébastien Villemot 3 1 Paris School of Economics 2 CEPR 3 OFCE Sciences Po PANORisk workshop 7

More information

Household Debt, Financial Intermediation, and Monetary Policy

Household Debt, Financial Intermediation, and Monetary Policy Household Debt, Financial Intermediation, and Monetary Policy Shutao Cao 1 Yahong Zhang 2 1 Bank of Canada 2 Western University October 21, 2014 Motivation The US experience suggests that the collapse

More information

A Model of the Reserve Asset

A Model of the Reserve Asset Discussion of A Model of the Reserve Asset by Zhiguo He, Arvind Krishnamurthy and Konstantin Milbradt Mathieu Taschereau-Dumouchel The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania ASSA San Fransisco

More information

Bank Regulation under Fire Sale Externalities

Bank Regulation under Fire Sale Externalities Bank Regulation under Fire Sale Externalities Gazi Ishak Kara 1 S. Mehmet Ozsoy 2 1 Office of Financial Stability Policy and Research, Federal Reserve Board 2 Ozyegin University May 17, 2016 Disclaimer:

More information

Fiscal Multipliers and Financial Crises

Fiscal Multipliers and Financial Crises Fiscal Multipliers and Financial Crises Miguel Faria-e-Castro New York University June 20, 2017 1 st Research Conference of the CEPR Network on Macroeconomic Modelling and Model Comparison 0 / 12 Fiscal

More information

Capital Requirements, Risk Choice, and Liquidity Provision in a Business Cycle Model

Capital Requirements, Risk Choice, and Liquidity Provision in a Business Cycle Model Capital Requirements, Risk Choice, and Liquidity Provision in a Business Cycle Model Juliane Begenau Harvard Business School July 11, 2015 1 Motivation How to regulate banks? Capital requirement: min equity/

More information

ECON 815. A Basic New Keynesian Model II

ECON 815. A Basic New Keynesian Model II ECON 815 A Basic New Keynesian Model II Winter 2015 Queen s University ECON 815 1 Unemployment vs. Inflation 12 10 Unemployment 8 6 4 2 0 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 Core Inflation 14 12 10 Unemployment

More information

The Response of Sovereign Bond Yields to U.S. Monetary Policy

The Response of Sovereign Bond Yields to U.S. Monetary Policy The Response of Sovereign Bond Yields to U.S. Monetary Policy Simon Gilchrist 1 Vivian Z. Yue 2 Egon Zakrajšek 3 1 Boston University and NBER 2 Emory University 3 Federal Reserve Board Banco Central de

More information

Ramsey Asset Taxation Under Asymmetric Information

Ramsey Asset Taxation Under Asymmetric Information Ramsey Asset Taxation Under Asymmetric Information Piero Gottardi EUI Nicola Pavoni Bocconi, IFS & CEPR Anacapri, June 2014 Asset Taxation and the Financial System Structure of the financial system differs

More information

Dollar Funding and the Lending Behavior of Global Banks

Dollar Funding and the Lending Behavior of Global Banks Dollar Funding and the Lending Behavior of Global Banks Victoria Ivashina (with David Scharfstein and Jeremy Stein) Facts US dollar assets of foreign banks are very large - Foreign banks play a major role

More information

The Nexus of Monetary Policy and Shadow Banking in China 1

The Nexus of Monetary Policy and Shadow Banking in China 1 The Nexus of Monetary Policy and Shadow Banking in China 1 Kaiji Chen a, Jue Ren b, and Tao Zha c a Emory University b Texas Christian University c FRB Atlanta, Emory University, and NBER MFM Conference

More information

Location, Productivity, and Trade

Location, Productivity, and Trade May 10, 2010 Motivation Outline Motivation - Trade and Location Major issue in trade: How does trade liberalization affect competition? Competition has more than one dimension price competition similarity

More information

Advanced Topics in Monetary Economics II 1

Advanced Topics in Monetary Economics II 1 Advanced Topics in Monetary Economics II 1 Carl E. Walsh UC Santa Cruz August 18-22, 2014 1 c Carl E. Walsh, 2014. Carl E. Walsh (UC Santa Cruz) Gerzensee Study Center August 18-22, 2014 1 / 38 Uncertainty

More information

Technology, Geography and Trade J. Eaton and S. Kortum. Topics in international Trade

Technology, Geography and Trade J. Eaton and S. Kortum. Topics in international Trade Technology, Geography and Trade J. Eaton and S. Kortum Topics in international Trade 1 Overview 1. Motivation 2. Framework of the model 3. Technology, Prices and Trade Flows 4. Trade Flows and Price Differences

More information

The Basic New Keynesian Model

The Basic New Keynesian Model Jordi Gali Monetary Policy, inflation, and the business cycle Lian Allub 15/12/2009 In The Classical Monetary economy we have perfect competition and fully flexible prices in all markets. Here there is

More information

Supplementary online material to Information tradeoffs in dynamic financial markets

Supplementary online material to Information tradeoffs in dynamic financial markets Supplementary online material to Information tradeoffs in dynamic financial markets Efstathios Avdis University of Alberta, Canada 1. The value of information in continuous time In this document I address

More information

GT CREST-LMA. Pricing-to-Market, Trade Costs, and International Relative Prices

GT CREST-LMA. Pricing-to-Market, Trade Costs, and International Relative Prices : Pricing-to-Market, Trade Costs, and International Relative Prices (2008, AER) December 5 th, 2008 Empirical motivation US PPI-based RER is highly volatile Under PPP, this should induce a high volatility

More information

Bernanke and Gertler [1989]

Bernanke and Gertler [1989] Bernanke and Gertler [1989] Econ 235, Spring 2013 1 Background: Townsend [1979] An entrepreneur requires x to produce output y f with Ey > x but does not have money, so he needs a lender Once y is realized,

More information

Microeconomic Theory II Preliminary Examination Solutions Exam date: August 7, 2017

Microeconomic Theory II Preliminary Examination Solutions Exam date: August 7, 2017 Microeconomic Theory II Preliminary Examination Solutions Exam date: August 7, 017 1. Sheila moves first and chooses either H or L. Bruce receives a signal, h or l, about Sheila s behavior. The distribution

More information

A Macroeconomic Framework for Quantifying Systemic Risk

A Macroeconomic Framework for Quantifying Systemic Risk A Macroeconomic Framework for Quantifying Systemic Risk Zhiguo He, University of Chicago and NBER Arvind Krishnamurthy, Stanford University and NBER Bank of Canada, August 2017 He and Krishnamurthy (Chicago,

More information

Chapter 10 Solutions

Chapter 10 Solutions Foundations of International Macroeconomics 1 Workbook 2 Maurice Obstfeld, Kenneth Rogoff, and Gita Gopinath Chapter 10 Solutions 1. (a) With a positive steady-state gross money supply growth rate of 1

More information

Public Information and Effi cient Capital Investments: Implications for the Cost of Capital and Firm Values

Public Information and Effi cient Capital Investments: Implications for the Cost of Capital and Firm Values Public Information and Effi cient Capital Investments: Implications for the Cost of Capital and Firm Values P O. C Department of Finance Copenhagen Business School, Denmark H F Department of Accounting

More information

Currency Risk Factors in a Recursive Multi-Country Economy

Currency Risk Factors in a Recursive Multi-Country Economy Currency Risk Factors in a Recursive Multi-Country Economy R. Colacito M.M. Croce F. Gavazzoni R. Ready NBER SI - International Asset Pricing Boston July 8, 2015 Motivation The literature has identified

More information

Satya P. Das NIPFP) Open Economy Keynesian Macro: CGG (2001, 2002), Obstfeld-Rogoff Redux Model 1 / 18

Satya P. Das NIPFP) Open Economy Keynesian Macro: CGG (2001, 2002), Obstfeld-Rogoff Redux Model 1 / 18 Open Economy Keynesian Macro: CGG (2001, 2002), Obstfeld-Rogoff Redux Model Satya P. Das @ NIPFP Open Economy Keynesian Macro: CGG (2001, 2002), Obstfeld-Rogoff Redux Model 1 / 18 1 CGG (2001) 2 CGG (2002)

More information

Solutions to Problem Set 1

Solutions to Problem Set 1 Solutions to Problem Set Theory of Banking - Academic Year 06-7 Maria Bachelet maria.jua.bachelet@gmail.com February 4, 07 Exercise. An individual consumer has an income stream (Y 0, Y ) and can borrow

More information

Chapter 11. Market-Clearing Models of the Business Cycle. Copyright 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

Chapter 11. Market-Clearing Models of the Business Cycle. Copyright 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 11 Market-Clearing Models of the Business Cycle Study Two Market-Clearing Business Cycle Models Real Business Cycle Model Keynesian Coordination Failure Model 11-2 Applying Bank Run Model to Financial

More information

Monetary Easing, Investment and Financial Instability

Monetary Easing, Investment and Financial Instability Comments by Rafael Repullo on Monetary Easing, Investment and Financial Instability Viral Acharya and Guillaume Plantin First Annual Research Conference Bank of Spain, 1 September 2017 Purpose of paper

More information

Maryam Farboodi. May 17, 2013

Maryam Farboodi. May 17, 2013 May 17, 2013 Outline Motivation Contagion and systemic risk A lot of focus on bank inter-connections after the crisis Too-interconnected-to-fail Interconnections: Propagate a shock from a bank to many

More information

Menu Costs and Phillips Curve by Mikhail Golosov and Robert Lucas. JPE (2007)

Menu Costs and Phillips Curve by Mikhail Golosov and Robert Lucas. JPE (2007) Menu Costs and Phillips Curve by Mikhail Golosov and Robert Lucas. JPE (2007) Virginia Olivella and Jose Ignacio Lopez October 2008 Motivation Menu costs and repricing decisions Micro foundation of sticky

More information

LECTURE NOTES 3 ARIEL M. VIALE

LECTURE NOTES 3 ARIEL M. VIALE LECTURE NOTES 3 ARIEL M VIALE I Markowitz-Tobin Mean-Variance Portfolio Analysis Assumption Mean-Variance preferences Markowitz 95 Quadratic utility function E [ w b w ] { = E [ w] b V ar w + E [ w] }

More information

MA200.2 Game Theory II, LSE

MA200.2 Game Theory II, LSE MA200.2 Game Theory II, LSE Problem Set 1 These questions will go over basic game-theoretic concepts and some applications. homework is due during class on week 4. This [1] In this problem (see Fudenberg-Tirole

More information

The Expansionary Lower Bound: A Theory of Contractionary Monetary Easing *

The Expansionary Lower Bound: A Theory of Contractionary Monetary Easing * The Expansionary Lower Bound: A Theory of Contractionary Monetary Easing * Paolo Cavallino Damiano Sandri IMF Research Department CEBRA - Boston Policy Workshop July 2017 * The views expressed herein are

More information

Achieving Actuarial Balance in Social Security: Measuring the Welfare Effects on Individuals

Achieving Actuarial Balance in Social Security: Measuring the Welfare Effects on Individuals Achieving Actuarial Balance in Social Security: Measuring the Welfare Effects on Individuals Selahattin İmrohoroğlu 1 Shinichi Nishiyama 2 1 University of Southern California (selo@marshall.usc.edu) 2

More information

Final Exam. Consumption Dynamics: Theory and Evidence Spring, Answers

Final Exam. Consumption Dynamics: Theory and Evidence Spring, Answers Final Exam Consumption Dynamics: Theory and Evidence Spring, 2004 Answers This exam consists of two parts. The first part is a long analytical question. The second part is a set of short discussion questions.

More information

1 Asset Pricing: Replicating portfolios

1 Asset Pricing: Replicating portfolios Alberto Bisin Corporate Finance: Lecture Notes Class 1: Valuation updated November 17th, 2002 1 Asset Pricing: Replicating portfolios Consider an economy with two states of nature {s 1, s 2 } and with

More information

The Extensive Margin of Trade and Monetary Policy

The Extensive Margin of Trade and Monetary Policy The Extensive Margin of Trade and Monetary Policy Yuko Imura Bank of Canada Malik Shukayev University of Alberta June 2, 216 The views expressed in this presentation are our own, and do not represent those

More information

Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (1999), Taxing Capital Income: A Bad Idea, QR Fed Mpls

Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (1999), Taxing Capital Income: A Bad Idea, QR Fed Mpls Lucas (1990), Supply Side Economics: an Analytical Review, Oxford Economic Papers When I left graduate school, in 1963, I believed that the single most desirable change in the U.S. structure would be the

More information

New Business Start-ups and the Business Cycle

New Business Start-ups and the Business Cycle New Business Start-ups and the Business Cycle Ali Moghaddasi Kelishomi (Joint with Melvyn Coles, University of Essex) The 22nd Annual Conference on Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies Banking Supervision

More information

THE FED BALANCE SHEET UNWIND: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

THE FED BALANCE SHEET UNWIND: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS THE FED BALANCE SHEET UNWIND: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS Robin Greenwood July 2017 (based largely on previous joint work with Sam Hanson and Jeremy Stein) THE FED BALANCE SHEET TODAY Assets ($B) Liabilities

More information

Safe Assets. The I Theory of Money. with Valentin Haddad. - Money & Banking with Asset Pricing Tools - with Yuliy Sannikov. Princeton University

Safe Assets. The I Theory of Money. with Valentin Haddad. - Money & Banking with Asset Pricing Tools - with Yuliy Sannikov. Princeton University Safe ssets with Valentin Haddad The I Theory of Money - Money & Banking with sset Pricing Tools - with Yuliy Sannikov Princeton University World Finance Conference New York City, July 30 th, 2016 Definitions

More information

Microfoundations of DSGE Models: III Lecture

Microfoundations of DSGE Models: III Lecture Microfoundations of DSGE Models: III Lecture Barbara Annicchiarico BBLM del Dipartimento del Tesoro 2 Giugno 2. Annicchiarico (Università di Tor Vergata) (Institute) Microfoundations of DSGE Models 2 Giugno

More information