Capital Requirements, Risk Choice, and Liquidity Provision in a Business Cycle Model
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1 Capital Requirements, Risk Choice, and Liquidity Provision in a Business Cycle Model Juliane Begenau Harvard Business School July 11,
2 Motivation How to regulate banks? Capital requirement: min equity/ risky assets Literature: higher capital requirements limit banks' risk-taking reduce lending and liquidity provision This paper: develops general equilibrium model to quantify trade-os derives optimal capital requirement shows importance of eect of capital requirements on endogenous prices mechanism is based on household's demand for safe assets 2
3 Quantitative GE model Main features banks are essential for a part of production households' preference for safe & liquid bank debt banks receive government subsidy Quantied with data from the FDIC and NIPA Consistent with business cycle facts macroeconomic variables banking sector aggregates 3
4 Findings Optimal capital requirement 14% of risky assets Increasing the capital requirement to 14% reduces the supply of liquid bank debt by 9% reduces volatility of income-risky-asset ratio by 6% increases loans by 2% Main proposition: Higher capital requirements leading to a reduction in the supply of bank debt can in fact result in more lending Core assumption: Investors value safe and liquid assets in the form of bank debt more the scarcer they are 4
5 Corporate bond spread and bank debt Spread Bank Debt-to-GDP The gure plots the spread between the Aaa corporate bond rate and the implied interest rate on bank debt against the bank debt-to-gdp ratio for
6 Related literature 6 Banks' role for production Diamond 1984; Sharpe 1990; Boyd & Prescott 1986; Holmström & Tirole 1997; Winton 2000; Van Den Heuvel 2002; Bolton & Freixas 2006 James 1978; Hoshi, Kashyap & Scharfstein 1991; Gertler & Gilchrist 1992; Dell'Ariccia, Detragiache & Rajan 2008; Iacoviello & Minetti 2008 Households' demand for liquid bank debt Diamond & Dybvig 1983; Gorton & Winton 1995; Diamond & Rajan 2000; Kashyap, Rajan & Stein 2002; Van Den Heuvel 2008; Williamson 2012; Dang, Gorton, Holmström & Ordonez 2013; DeAngelo & Stulz 2013; Allen, Carletti & Marquez 2014 Bansal & Coleman 1996; Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jørgensen 2013; Greenwood, Hanson & Stein 2014 Risk-shifting incentives Kareken & Wallace 1978; Keeley & Furlong 1990; Gennotte & Pyle 1991; Schneider & Tornell 2004; Farhi & Tirole 2011; Admati et al 2013; Allen, Carletti, Goldstein & Leonello 2014 Kelly, Lustig & Nieuwerburgh 2012; Gandhi & Lustig 2012; Marques, Correa & Sapriza 2013; Duchin & Sosyura 2014 Quantication of capital requirements Corbae & D'Erasmo 2011, 2012; Christiano & Ikeda 2013; Clerc et al 2014; Nguyen 2014; Martinez-Miera & Suarez 2014
7 Outline Mechanism Model Trade-o Description Taking the model to the data Welfare 7
8 Two-sector business cycle model Technology f : non-bank dependent y f t = Z f t ( ) α ( ) 1 α k f t 1 N f t Technology h : banking sector funded activities as part of the overall output (collateralized lending) y h t = Z h t ( k h t 1 ) v Banks run h production directly Choose investment and risk 8
9 Banks' risk-return trade-o Captures menu of investment choices ( ) Zt h productivity level in yt h = Zt h k h v t 1 log Z h t+1 ( σ h t ) = ρ h log Z h t ( ) ( ) σ h t 1 + φ1 φ 2 σt h σ h t +σt h ɛ h t+1 Productivity maximizing σ h Risk choice of banks E[log(Z h )] σ h σ h t determines mean and exposure to aggregate shock 9
10 Balance sheet and prots Balance sheet at the beginning of t k h t 1 + b t 1 = e t 1 + s t 1 Prots π t = yt h δ h kt 1 h B + rt b t 1 }{{}}{{} income from k h interest inc. r t s t 1 }{{} interest exp. Capital requirement e t ξk h t 10
11 Subsidy to banks Capture eects of guarantees on banks' liabilities Assume: government cannot commit to not bailout banks Guarantees subsidize leverage and risk-taking Unlimited liability and explicit subsidy T R t = ω 3 kt 1 h exp }{{} ω 1 size ω 1, ω 2, ω 3 > 0 e t 1 + π t k h t 1 }{{} capitalization risk-taking + ω 2 σ h t }{{} Implies complementarity between leverage and risk-taking 11
12 Banks' problem Maximize present value of dividend payout d t subject to d t = π t + T R t e t κ 2 ( dt d ) 2 adjk h Dividend smoothing motive captured with dividend adjustment costs 12
13 Households Utility of households where η > 1. Net worth of households U (c t, s t ) = log c t + θ (s t/c t ) 1 η 1 η n t = (d t + p t ) Θ t 1 + (1 + r t ) s ) t 1 + (r ft + 1 δ f k f t 1 Taxes Maximize discounted expected utility subject to the budget constraint c t + s t + k f t + p t Θ t = n t + w f t N f t 13
14 Recursive competitive equilibrium State vars: capital stocks, productivity levels, households' net worth, equity after prots Exog. shocks to log Z h & log Z k Given prices, households, rms, and banks optimize Policies satisfy market clearing for bonds, bank debt, capital stocks, labor, bank shares, and consumption. Gov budget constraint holds: T R + Br B = Taxes 14
15 Outline Mechanism Model Trade-o Description Taking the model to the data Welfare 15
16 Decisions relevant for trade-o Risk choice Leverage choice Lending choice 16
17 Risk choice Subsidy: source of excessive risk-taking Productivity maximizing σ h Risk choice of banks E[log(Z h )] σ h Higher ξ : reduce σ h and increase E [ log ( Z h)] 17
18 Leverage choice Households' FOC wrt liquid bank debt: r e = 1 β 1 > r r e r 1 + r e = U s (c, s) /U c (c, s) > 0 Discount on bank debt binding capital requirement: e = ξk h debt is preferred gov. subsidy adds to this What happens to r when s falls? r e r larger the scarcer s reduction in s leads to reduction in r 18
19 Lending choice ( ) 1 + v yh T R k h δh + g k }{{ h } Benet of k h = ξ (1 + r e ) + (1 ξ) (1 + r) }{{} Funding costs of k h Higher capital requirements With rates xed: banks want to reduce scale Reduction in debt reduces r through GE Overall funding costs fall if ξ not too large Fall in funding costs banks want to increase k h Strength depends on key parameters: η and v 19
20 Welfare eects of capital requirements Increase in the capital requirement reduces risk-taking reduces liquidity through a reduction in bank debt increases assets through lower funding costs Optimal capital requirement trades-o reduction in liquidity against reduction in risk-taking and an increase in consumption 20
21 Outline Mechanism Model Trade-o Description Taking the model to the data Welfare 21
22 Mapping from model to data Model NIPA and FDIC balance sheet & inc stat. y h : bank output income sec int. income k h : bank capital loans + trading assets y f : rm output NIPA total GDP bank output k f : rm capital NIPA K k h c: consumption NIPA consumption s: bank debt bank liabilities π: prots net income + non interest expense r: rate on bank debt interest expenses / bank liabilities σ h : risk choice std of BC component log (y h /k h ) e: equity tier 1 equity Period: 1999q1:2013q4 22
23 Quantication of Parameters 1. natural data counterpart e.g. persistences of productivity shocks 2. using steady state conditions of the model and targeting moments one for one 3. jointly e.g. time preference rate of households e.g. parameters governing adjustment costs, liquidity preference, and size of banking sector 23
24 Key parameters Par. Governs Target Moment Value η hh dislike for changes 3.15 in bank debt/ consum. strength of r to ξ vol(bank liab/cons) v conversion of risky 0.30 assets into bank output strength of k h to ξ inc/risky assets 24
25 Business cycle correlations GDP Data Model Investment Consumption Bank income Bank risky assets Bank liabilities Interest rate on bank liabilities Bank income-risky assets Bank prot Bank investment
26 Outline Mechanism Model Trade-o Description Taking the model to the data Welfare 26
27 Welfare Compute the optimal capital requirement use local approximation methods simulate economy under benchmark tier-1-equity/risky asset and under new requirements compute value function of households Welfare as a function of capital requirements 27
28 Optimal ξ = 14% 0 Welfare in % consumption equivalent units ξ
29 Reduction in funding costs 1 + v yh k h δh + T R ) (1 k h + ω 1 (1 v) yh k }{{ h } Benet of k h = ξ (1 + r e ) + (1 ξ) (1 + r) }{{} Funding costs of k h Benchmark: k h costs 2.57% with r = 1.5% and r e = 10% Increase requirement to 14% With xed prices, cost would increase by 10% Reduction in debt reduces r to 0.88% Overall funding costs fall by 16% to 2.15% Fall in funding costs banks increase k h by 2% 29
30 Raising capital requirement during crisis or boom? 0.1 Welfare in % consumption equivalent units Start in Recession Start in Boom ξ
31 Conclusion Mechanism: Higher capital requirement can lead to more lending when bank debt is valued for being safe and liquid Optimal capital requirement about ξ = 14% Caveat: potential for safe asset substitution from shadow banks may mitigate channel 31
32 Thank you 32
33 Subsidy to banks Capture eects of guarantees on banks' liabilities Assume: government cannot commit to not bailout banks Guarantees subsidize leverage and risk-taking Unlimited liability and explicit subsidy T R t = ω 3 kt 1 h exp }{{} ω 1 size ω 1, ω 2, ω 3 > 0 e t 1 + π t k h t 1 }{{} capitalization risk-taking + ω 2 σ h t }{{} Implies complementarity between leverage and risk-taking 33 Back
34 Key parameters (ctd) Par. Governs Target Moment Value risk-return trade-o 0.89 φ 2 strength of σ h & k h to ξ vol(inc/risky-assets) ω 2 risk-taking due to 2.92 subsidy Var ( log ( ) ) yt h /kt h log πt 1 strength of σ h to ξ 34
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