Spillovers, Capital Flows and Prudential Regulation in Small Open Economies

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1 Spillovers, Capital Flows and Prudential Regulation in Small Open Economies Paul Castillo, César Carrera, Marco Ortiz & Hugo Vega Presented by: Hugo Vega BIS CCA Research Network Conference Incorporating financial stability considerations into central bank policy models The opinions expressed in this paper are not necessarily shared by the institutions with which we are currently affiliated. Hugo Vega October 29th 213 1/42

2 Contents Motivation Literature The Model Workers Tradable Good Producers Non-Tradable Good Producers Results Policy Conclusions Hugo Vega October 29th 213 2/42

3 Motivation Some stylized facts we attempt to replicate: Strong capital inflows in Latin-American region. Rapid output growth in both tradable and non-tradable sectors. Increase in indebtedness, asset prices booms, real appreciation, and current account deficit. Active policy response using macroprudential instruments. Hugo Vega October 29th 213 3/42

4 Current8account8balance , USG Housing8Prices USG81857 S/ S/ III. 98 III. 99 III. III. 1 III. 2 III. 3 III. 4 III. 5 III. 6 III. 7 III. 8 III. 9 III. 1 III. 11 III. 12 III USN Constant.domestic.currency 15Y 1Y 5Y Output8Growth 12Y 115Y 11Y 15Y Multilateral8RER8Index Index.29.=.1 12Y 115Y 11Y 15Y Y g5y Y 95Y 1Y 95Y Tradable Nongtradable 9Y 85Y September 213:.92h56 MoM. Change: gh36 YoY.Change:.2h39 9Y 85Y 8Y 8Y Jang3 Julg3 Jang4 Julg4 Jang5 Julg5 Jang6 Julg6 Jang7 Julg7 Jang8 Julg8 Jang9 Julg9 Jang1 Julg1 Jang11 Julg11 Jang12 Julg12 Jang13 Julg13 Figure: Peru - Key Macroeconomic Variables

5 Literature Kiyotaki and Moore (1997): credit limits and asset prices. Role of financial development in the amplification of capital flow externalities (Aghion et al. (24), Aoki et al. (29)). Caballero and Krishnamurthy (21) study the interaction between domestic and foreign lending during periods of sudden stops, using collateral assumptions similar to ours. Paasche (21): Two credit constrained SOEs who borrow and export commodities to a third large one. A negative productivity shock in one SOE generates an adverse terms of trade shock on the other, which is amplified. Sudden stop episodes associated with higher borrowing (Mendoza (22), Jeanne and Korinek (21), Bianchi (211)). Hugo Vega October 29th 213 5/42

6 What we do We build a stylized two sector real business cycle model incorporating borrowing constraints that generates the co-movements pointed out in the data, emphasizing spill over effects from the tradable to the non-tradable sector. We propose a countercyclical LTV rule that manages to reduce output volatility in this economy, generating redistributive welfare effects. Hugo Vega October 29th 213 6/42

7 Some intuition 1. Borrowing constraints generate a link between entrepreneurs credit limits and the price of assets used as collateral. 2. This link is responsible for the co-movement between sectors in response to a productivity shock to the tradable sector. 3. When tradable productivity increases, factor demand pushes asset prices up, expanding the borrowing capacity of entrepreneurs in both sectors. 4. This yields output co-movement and increased borrowing in the non-tradable sector. Hugo Vega October 29th 213 7/42

8 The Model 1. Extension of the model of Aoki et al. (29) considering a 2 sector SOE in which entrepreneurs require collateral to borrow as in Iacoviello (25). 2. Real DSGE model without money or price rigidity. 3. Three agents: Workers (W ) and entrepreneurs/producers of tradable (T ) and non-tradable (NT ) goods. Hugo Vega October 29th 213 8/42

9 The Model (II) 4. Besides the markets for tradable and non-tradable goods, the model incorporates markets for labour, capital, housing and credit. 5. The credit market is segmented by collateral asset and production sector. 6. The tradable sector uses capital (k) as collateral to obtain foreign lending while the non-tradable sector uses housing (h) as collateral to borrow from domestic agents (the workers). 7. We assume a fixed aggregate supply for both capital and housing assets. Hugo Vega October 29th 213 9/42

10 Wages Labour supply Non-tradable goods supply (HH) Debt service (NT) Non-tradable entrepreneurs Final goods imports (NT) Intermediate goods imports (NT) Workers Credit (NT) Net housing demand (HH) Housing market Net housing demand(nt) T goods supply (NT) Net housing demand(t) NT goods supply (T) Net capital demand(t) Net capital demand(nt) Capital market Tradable goods supply (HH) Wages Labour supply Tradable entrepreneurs Final goods imports (T) Intermediate goods imports (T) Final goods imports (HH) Final goods exports Credit (T) Debt service (T) Foreign economy Figure: The Model

11 Workers Are the patient agents in the domestic economy. Lend to entrepreneurs producing non-tradable goods (b NT s ) charging the domestic interest rate (R s ). Consume a basket (C w,s ) of tradable (c T w,s) and non-tradable (c NT w,s ) goods; use housing services (h W s ) and supply labour (l s ). Worker Equations Hugo Vega October 29th /42

12 Tradable Good Producers/Entrepreneurs Consume the same basket of goods (C t,s ) as workers. Combine housing services (h T s ), capital (ks T ), labour (ls T ) and imported inputs (m T s ) to produce (ys+1 T ). Given the lag in production, entrepreneurs need working capital loans (b T s ). These are subject to borrowing constraints: R sb T s ] θs T E s [qs+1 k ks T where qs k is the price of capital, Rs is the foreign interest rate and θs T is the fraction of capital value accepted as collateral. Tradable Entrepreneur Equations Hugo Vega October 29th /42

13 Non-Tradable Good Producers/Entrepreneurs Consume the same basket of goods (C nt,s ) as workers. Use the same inputs (h NT s, ks NT producers to manufacture (y NT s+1 )., l NT s, m NT s ) as tradable good They are also subject to borrowing constraints in the domestic credit market that only admits housing as collateral. R s P W s b NT s ] θs NT E s [qs+1 h h NT s Producers of non-tradable goods sell at relative price p NT s which is expressed in units of tradable goods. Non-Tradable Entrepreneur Equations Hugo Vega October 29th /42

14 Results: A tradable productivity shock An increase in productivity in the tradable sector generates an expansion in the tradable and non-tradable sectors and boosts the price of both assets used as collateral. The positive wealth effect experienced by tradable entrepreneurs increases demand for non-tradable goods. This generates a real appreciation which leads to an expansion in the non-tradable sector. Given the increase in housing prices, the borrowing constraint of the non-tradable sector is relaxed. Non-tradable firms demand for housing decreases. Such a decrease is not big enough to outweigh the effect of higher housing prices on their borrowing. Hugo Vega October 29th /42

15 During the adjustment process, collateral assets are exchanged between the non-tradable and the tradable sector. Non-tradable firms use less housing and the excess is absorbed by tradable firms. The latter liberate capital which is acquired by their non-tradable counterparts. Workers experience a positive wealth effect because of higher wages. This stimulates savings, reducing the domestic interest rate. As a result, the borrowing constraints of non-tradable firms relax even further and housing becomes less attractive. Higher demand for imported inputs in both sectors explains the current account deficit that follows the shock. Hugo Vega October 29th /42

16 15 x 1 3 Agg. Output.2 Current Acc. 6 x 1 3 House prices x 1 3 Output (T) x 1 3 For. debt (T) 5 x 1 3 Capital prices x 1 3 Output (NT) x 1 3 Dom. debt (NT) 8 x 1 3 RER (p NT /p T ) Figure: Tradable Productivity Shock (γ =.98, R = 1.5, θ =.3) More shocks

17 The Role of Borrowing Constraints The next figure shows the dynamics of the model considering different values of θ. A larger θ implies less restrictive borrowing constraints on entrepreneurs. Consequently, when θ is relative large, the model does not generate spillover effects. On the contrary, output in the non-tradable sector falls instead of rising in response to a positive productivity shock in the tradable sector. Debt of non-tradable entrepreneurs falls instead of rising and both houses and capital prices are muted. Hugo Vega October 29th /42

18 The real appreciation is much smaller in this case, which also is consistent with a milder current account deficit. But, tradable (and aggregate) output response is not very different. The opposite is observed when θ is relative low: the real exchange rate appreciates substantially, and the current account deficit is much higher, output in the non-tradable sector expands, and the debt of the non-tradable sector increases. Asset prices also increase, amplifying the initial impact of productivity shocks. Hugo Vega October 29th /42

19 15 x 1 3 Agg. Output.3 Current Acc. 1 x 1 3 House prices x 1 3 Output (T) x 1 3 For. debt (T) 1 x 1 3 Capital prices x 1 3 Output (NT) x 1 3 Dom. debt (NT) 15 x 1 3 RER (p NT /p T ) 1 5 θ =.6 θ =.3 θ =.9 θ = Figure: Tradable Productivity Shock: The role of borrowing constraints

20 Policy The analysis of the role of borrowing constraints suggests a role for policy: minimize spillover effects. But the presence of borrowing constraints in our model is a structural one. The values for θ T and θ NT should be treated either as deep parameters or an endogenous response of agents to the frictions present in credit markets. For this reason, an authority that employs LTV ratios as a policy instrument faces an upper bound, as it is not possible to force lenders to accept less collateral than the one they privately deem adequate. We explore a (potentially) second best solution: time varying LTV rules in which the policy value of θ (θ int ) must be set below the private one (θ priv ). Hugo Vega October 29th 213 2/42

21 θ priv θ int τ + θ int time Figure: LTV Rules

22 Policy (II) We BANCO propose CENTRAL DE RESERVA a countercyclical DEL PERÚ rule that takes into account the position of the economy with respect to the business cycle. θ T,int s NT,int s θ T,int = θ θ NT,int = E s ( ) φθ Ys+1 where Y denotes aggregate output (value added) defined as and φ θ >. Y s = ( ys T p M s 1m T s 1 + p NT s ys NT p M s 1m NT s 1) /P W s Y Hugo Vega October 29th /42

23 Policy (III) An LTV rule targeting aggregate output does a good job dampening the spillover from the tradable to the non-tradable sector in the aftermath of a tradable productivity shock. Aggregate output is slightly affected, but there is a sizeable dampening on asset prices and the real exchange rate. Tighter LTV ratios imposed on the economy manage to curtail the expansion in debt in both sectors but the effect is bigger on non-tradable firms. Actually, borrowing taken by these firms diminishes, forcing non-tradable entrepreneurs to hold on to their houses. This reduces their demand for capital, explaining why tradable firms cannot exchange capital for housing. Hugo Vega October 29th /42

24 15 x 1 3 Agg. Output.2 Current Acc. 6 x 1 3 House prices x 1 3 Output (T) x 1 3 For. debt (T) 5 x 1 3 Capital prices x 1 3 Output (NT) x 1 3 Dom. debt (NT) 8 x 1 3 RER (p NT /p T ) Base LTV y Figure: Tradable Productivity Shock: Countercyclical LTV Rule

25 Welfare and Volatility In order to further analyse the impact of LTV rules, we solve the model using a second order approximation around the non-stochastic steady state. We find that the countercyclical rule reduces the volatility of output. Table We also investigate the second order effects on welfare. This measure is the difference between the mean welfare measure and its non-stochastic steady-state value. Results show that the introduction of a countercyclical LTV policy rule generates strong redistribution effects. Namely, its use produces welfare increases for a subset of agents in the economy, while the rest suffer a reversal. Hugo Vega October 29th /42

26 Welfare and Volatility (II) Which agents are favoured by the rule depends on the source of the shocks and how limiting the borrowing constraints are, captured by θ. For example, when all shocks are taken into account, imposing the countercyclical rule on an economy with low θ makes the entrepreneurs better off and the workers worse off. This outcome is reversed when θ is high. The intuition is that at low values of θ the entrepreneurs are very constrained and shocks generate high domestic interest rate fluctuations which disappear at high levels of θ. Table Hugo Vega October 29th /42

27 Conclusions 1. A productivity shock in the tradable sector generates an increase in both asset prices and borrowing. Those effects spillover to the non-tradable sector and generate a real appreciation. 2. The appreciation and the increase in housing prices further reinforces this mechanism by increasing the ability of non-tradable firms to borrow. 3. As a result, non-tradable sector borrowing increases and a current account deficit appears. Hugo Vega October 29th /42

28 Conclusions (II) 4. In the model, the response to a positive tradable productivity shock is similar to the response that an increase in commodity prices would generate for economies where tradable sector production is mostly commodities. Therefore, the model simulations can also be interpreted as showing a positive correlation between capital flows and terms of trade, a stylized fact observed in many commodity producer economies, such as Chile, Peru and Canada. 5. On the policy side, we show that countercyclical LTV rules can dampen the spillover effects of borrowing constraints. 6. We find that these LTV rules reduce the volatility of output and generate redistributive welfare effects. Hugo Vega October 29th /42

29 Spillovers, Capital Flows and Prudential Regulation in Small Open Economies Paul Castillo, César Carrera, Marco Ortiz & Hugo Vega Presented by: Hugo Vega BIS CCA Research Network Conference Incorporating financial stability considerations into central bank policy models The opinions expressed in this paper are not necessarily shared by the institutions with which we are currently affiliated. Hugo Vega October 29th /42

30 Worker Equations Consumption basket: C w,s [ (γ T ) 1 ε ( c T w,s ε + ( 1 γ T ) 1 ( ] ε ε c NT ) ε 1 ε 1 ε ) ε 1 w,s Price index: [ Ps W = γ T + ( 1 γ T ) ( p NT s ) 1 ε ] 1 1 ε Euler equation: [ ] 1 R s Ps W = βe s C w,s C w,s+1 Ps+1 W Hugo Vega October 29th 213 3/42

31 Workers Equations (II) Labour supply: Housing demand: w s P W s q h s E s [ q h s+1 R s = C w,s λ (l s ) η ] = j ( h W s ) φ P W s C w,s Back Hugo Vega October 29th /42

32 Factor Demands (Tradable Goods Production) ( )] qs h = γe s [Fs T qs+1 h + yt s+1 h T s BANCO CENTRAL DE RESERVA ( DEL PERÚ )] ( ) + 1 R γe sf T s s θs T [ ] E s q k s+1 qs k = γe s [Fs T qs+1 k + yt s+1 k T s ] w s = γe s [Fs T ys+1 T ls T ] p M s = γe s [Fs T ys+1 T m T s where p M s is the price of the imported input in tradable good units and: Back F T s C t,s C t,s+1 P W s P W s+1 Hugo Vega October 29th /42

33 Factor Demands (Non-Tradable Goods Production) ( qs h = γe s Fs NT qs+1 h + pnt s+1 ( qs k = γe s [Fs NT qs+1 k + pnt s+1 ( )] w s = γe s [Fs NT p NT ys+1 NT p M s = γe s [Fs NT where s+1 ( p NT s+1 l NT s y NT s+1 m NT s ys+1 NT h NT s ys+1 NT k NT s )] ) ( + 1 R γe s sfs NT )] ) θ NT s E s q h s+1 Back F NT s C nt,s C nt,s+1 P W s P W s+1 Hugo Vega October 29th /42

34 Table: Parameter calibration Preferences β =.99 γ =.98 λ = 1 η = 1 γ T =.3 ε =.5 j = 5 φ = 3 Technologies α =.3 χ =.2 κ =.2 ν =.3 κ =.2 ψ =.2 ρ A =.7 ρ ζ =.7 Collateral constraint θ T =.3 θ NT =.3 Open economy R = 1.5 p M =.8 Rules φ θ =.8 φ b = 5 Hugo Vega October 29th /42

35 Results: A non-tradable productivity shock Non-tradable output expands, coupled with a very mild increase in tradable output, a fall in asset prices and a short lived current account surplus consistent with a real depreciation. The key difference between the non-tradable productivity shock and the tradable productivity shock is that the price of tradable goods is fixed by arbitrage with the foreign sector while the price of non-tradable goods is determined domestically under perfect competition. Hugo Vega October 29th /42

36 Thus, the increase in productivity in the non-tradable sector is assimilated in the form of lower prices, generating a significant depreciation. As a result, asset and input prices are virtually unchanged and there is hardly any shift in factor allocation. The depreciation has the added benefit of relaxing the non-tradable sector s borrowing constraint. This is a balance-sheet effect: firms in the non-tradable sector contract debt in domestic (basket) units, therefore non-tradable debt in tradable good units expands. Hugo Vega October 29th /42

37 8 x 1 3 Agg. Output x 1 3 Current Acc x 1 4 House prices x 1 5 Output (T) 1 3 x 1 4 For. debt (T) 2.5 x 1 4 Capital prices x 1 3 Output (NT) 8 x 1 3 Dom. debt (NT) RER (p NT /p T ) Figure: Non-Tradable Productivity Shock

38 Results: A foreign interest rate shock A higher foreign interest rate tightens the borrowing constraint of tradable firms, forcing a fall in tradable output. Lower input demand by tradable firms leads to a fall in the prices of houses and labour. The negative wealth effect on tradable entrepreneurs reduces demand for non-tradable goods, triggering a real depreciation. Output in the non-tradable sector falls as well, reducing demand for capital and labour further. The decline in wages prompts workers to borrow, pushing the domestic interest rate up, and discouraging borrowing by non-tradable firms. Hugo Vega October 29th /42

39 Given tighter borrowing constraints, housing is reallocated from the tradable to the non-tradable sector, and capital is reallocated from the non-tradable to the tradable sector, allowing the later to borrow more. The contraction in foreign debt and the depreciation that occurs when the shock hits is consistent with a current account surplus. This shock is basically the opposite of the tradable productivity shock. Thus, a fall in the foreign interest rate that generates capital inflows into this SOE would produce: higher asset prices, current account deficit, real depreciation and a boom in the non-tradable sector coupled with higher debt. Hugo Vega October 29th /42

40 2 x 1 3 Agg. Output.2 Current Acc. House prices x 1 3 Output (T) 4 x 1 3 For. debt (T) Capital prices x 1 3 Output (NT).1 Dom. debt (NT).1 RER (p NT /p T ) Figure: Foreign Interest Rate Shock Back

41 Table: Coefficient of variability θ =.3 θ =.6 θ =.9 V ariable φ θ = φ θ =.8 φ θ = φ θ =.8 φ θ = φ θ =.8 All shocks BANCO CENTRAL YDE RESERVA 2.88 DEL PERÚ Y NT Y T T radable productivity shock Y Y NT Y T Non tradable productivity shock Y Y NT Y T F oreign interest rate shock Y Y NT Y T Back Hugo Vega October 29th /42

42 Table: Welfare θ =.3 θ =.6 θ =.9 V ariable φ θ = φ θ =.8 φ θ = φ θ =.8 φ θ = φ θ =.8 All shocks BANCO CENTRAL WDE w RESERVA DEL PERÚ W NT W T T radable productivity shock W w W NT W T Non tradable productivity shock W w W NT W T F oreign interest rate shock W w W NT W T Back Hugo Vega October 29th /42

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