The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks

Transcription

1 The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks Preliminary Césaire Meh Department of Monetary and Financial Analysis Bank of Canada Kevin Moran Université Laval The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 1/33

2 Motivation A large literature quantitatively studies the role of financial factors in business cycle dynamics Asymmetric information between financial intermediaries and firms eg., Bernanke et al., 1999; Carlstrom & Fuerst, 1997 Limited enforcement of contracts eg., Kiyotaki & Moore, 1997, Cooley, Marimon & Quadrini, 2004 Key Feature: the supply of funds of financial intermediaries unaffected by their balance sheet The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 2/33

3 Evidence Peek & Rosengren (1997, 2000): a 1% decrease in capital ratio: reduces bank lending by 6% reduces investment in real estate sector Van den Heuvel, 2002 Output growth is more sensitive to shocks in US states with low levels of bank capital Kashyap & Stein, 2000; Kishan & Opiela, 2000 Liquidity, net worth affects lending by banks The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 3/33

4 Our interpretation of the evidence Banks face market imperfections in attracting loanable funds These market imperfections may be what motivates the holding of net worth Important to take this into account when building models of banking and business cycles The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 4/33

5 Ratio of Bank Net Worth over Assets Key banking sector indicator; subject of many policy discussions Business cycle fact: countercyclical The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 5/33

6 Net Worth to Asset Ratio Capital Asset Ratio (Detrended, normalized) GDP (Detrended, normalized) The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 6/33

7 Net Worth to Asset Ratio: Canada Cumulative per cent change from each recession Figure 3: Economic booms and the capital ratio (annual, 1870 to 2002) Cumulative change in real GDP Cumulative change in capital ratio Great Depression 1960 recession recession Sources: Bank of Canada ( ), Leacy (1983), Statistics Canada (2004), Urquhart (1986), and authors calculations The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 7/33

8 Variable Cyclical Properties of the Net Worth to Asset Ratio: 1990:1-2005:2 Cross-Correlation of Ratio with: σ(x) σ(gdp) X t 2 X t 1 X t X t+1 X t+2 Net Worth to Asset Ratio Investment GDP Bank Loans (C & I) The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 8/33

9 Objective A framework with a double moral hazard problem: entrepreneurs and bankers bankers and households This framework is embedded into a quantitative model of aggregate fluctuations The model is used address two questions 1. are movements in capital-asset ratios consistent with the evidence? 2. how does bank net worth affect the transmission of shocks? The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 9/33

10 Findings The model replicates cyclical features in the ratio of net worth to asset 1. countercyclicality 2. volatility 3. autocorrelation The model replicates persistence in output The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 10/33

11 Policy Implications Debate: Market Forces should play a bigger role in regulating banks Our Model: Net Worth to Asset Ratio is market determined Can be brought to bear on policy discussions: how should bank net worth to asset ratio react to shocks? The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 11/33

12 Literature Carlstrom & Fuerst (1997, 1998, 2001); Bernanke et al. (1999) One source of moral hazard, no bank net worth Holmstrom & Tirole (1997), Chen (2001), Meh & Moran (2003), Sunirand (2003), Aikman & Paustian (2004) Not quantitative Van den Heuvel (2001) Movements in Bank Capital regulatory-driven The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 12/33

13 Rest of the Talk Financial Contract Rest of the Model Findings Conclusion and Future Work The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 13/33

14 Economic Environment Three types of agents: households, bankers and entrepreneurs households are risk averse, bankers and entrepreneurs risk neutral bankers are endowed with a monitoring technology entrepreneurs can produce capital goods Consumption Good: F(K t, N t ) = z t K θ t H 1 θ t z t+1 = ρ z z t + ǫ t+1 The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 14/33

15 Capital Good Sector Production Capital Good: produced by entrepreneurs f(i t ) = R i t R = {0, R} The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 15/33

16 Two Sources of Moral Hazard Loans Funds Entrepreneurs Banks Households 1. Moral Hazard Entrepreneurs may privately choose low return projects to enjoy private benefits 2. Moral Hazard Banks have an incentive not to monitor in order to save costs Entrepreneurial Net Worth Bank Net Worth The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 16/33

17 Households Optimization Problem: with respect to max E 0 β t log(c h c h t,h t,x t,kt+1 h t ) + ψ(1 h t ), t=0 c h t + q t x t r t k h t + w t h t k h t+1 = (1 δ)k h t + x t, The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 17/33

18 Investment Projects Three types of projects available to the entrepreneur: Project Good Low Priv. Ben. High Priv. Ben. Private benefits 0 bi t Bi t Prob. of success α g α b α b Good project is socially desirable Bank monitoring is private and costly (µi t ) The projects financed by an individual bank are perfectly correlated The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 18/33

19 Timing of Events Within a Period.. Stocks of capital b e h k, k, k t t t Final good production Households, banks and entrepreneurs agree to finance projects -Returns are realized (public) -Returns are shared between the 3 agents Period t Technology shock is realized Households make consumption and investment decisions (1) Banks choose whether or not to monitor Entrepreneurs and bankers consume and invest (2) Entrepreneurs choose which project to undertake. The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 19/33

20 Financial Contract Consider one-period contracts that lead entrepreneurs to choose the good project One optimal contract will have the following structure: the entrepreneur invests all his net worth if success, R is distributed among the entrepreneur, the banker and the households: R = R e t + R b t + R h t if failure, neither party is paid anything objective of the contract: Choose project size and payment shares to maximize expected payoff to entrepreneurs subject to five constraints The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 20/33

21 Financial Contract, continued Incentive constraints of bankers q t α g Rti b t µi t q t α b Rti b t Incentive constraints of entrepreneurs q t α g Rti e t q t α b Rti e t + q t bi t Participation constraint of bankers q t α g Rti b t Rt a a t Participation constraint of households q t α g Rt h i t q t x t Resource constraint a t + (q t x t ) + n t = (1 + µ)i t The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 21/33

22 Upshot of the Contract Shares: R e t = b α ; Rb t = µ q t α ; Rh t = R b α µ q t α Project Size i t = (1/G t ) }{{} entrepreneurial leverage a t + n t }{{} internal funds where G t 1 + µ q t α g R h t The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 22/33

23 Bankers and Entrepreneurs Discount future more than households Bank net worth and Entrepreneurial net worth: a t = [r t + q t (1 δ)] k b t Budget Constraints n t = [r t + q t (1 δ)]k e t c b t + q t k b t+1 = R b ti t c e t + q t k e t+1 = R e ti t The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 23/33

24 Bankers and Entrepreneurs Choice of next period s assets: Bankers: [ ] q t = τ b β E t (r t+1 + q t+1 (1 δ)) α g Rb t+1 G t+1 Entrepreneurs: [ ] q t = τ e β E t (r t+1 + q t+1 (1 δ)) α g Re t+1 G t+1 The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 24/33

25 Aggregation Aggregate Investment and Net Worth: I t = N t + A t G t ; Aggregate Net Worth: A t = [r t + q t (1 δ)]k b t (I t 1 ) N t = [r t + q t (1 δ)]k e t (I t 1 ) The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 25/33

26 Market Clearing Conditions Labor markets: H t = η h h t Final goods market: Y t = Ct h + Ct e + Ct b + (1 + µ t )I t Capital goods market: K t+1 = (1 δ) K t + α g RI t The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 26/33

27 Calibration Preferences and Consumption Good Production β ψ δ θ ρ z Investment Good Production α g R α b µ b τ e τ b Resulting Steady-State Characteristics ROE CA IC I/Y Share 15% 13% 4% The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 27/33

28 Preview of Results Shock to technology (consumption good production) Model Simulation (only technology shocks) The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 28/33

29 Negative Technology Shock 0 Aggregate Output 0 Aggregate Investment 0.2 Price of Capital Percent deviation from s.s Quarters Quarters Quarters Entrepreneurial Net Worth 0 0 Bank Capital 0.6 Capital Asset Ratio Percent deviation from s.s Quarters Quarters Quarters The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 29/33

30 Cyclical Features: Data and Model Variable Panel A: Data Cross-Correlation of Net Worth to Asset with: σ(x) σ(gdp) X t 2 X t 1 X t X t+1 X t+2 Net Worth to Asset Ratio Investment GDP Bank Loans (C & I) Panel A: Model Net Worth to Asset Ratio Investment GDP Bank Loans The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 30/33

31 ACF for Output Growth: Data and Model 0.7 Autocorrelation Function (ACF) for Output Growth Data Model Autocorrelation Lag The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 31/33

32 Conclusion We present a quantitative model of aggregate fluctuations in which the net worth of banks mitigates an agency problem between banks and depositors The cyclical features of the net worth to asset ratio of banks generated by the model are consistent with those observed in data The presence of bank capital affects the transmission of shocks the model exhibits significant persistence The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 32/33

33 Future Work Interaction between market and regulatory discipline on banks Heterogeneity in bank size and capital-asset ratio The Role of the Net Worth of Banks in the Propagation of Shocks - p. 33/33