Chien Jen, Wang 1. Received: Apri 2, 2014 Accepted: April 22, 2014 Online Published: June 25, 2014

Transcription

1 Inernaional Journal of Economics and Finance; Vol. 6, No. 7; 2014 ISSN X E-ISSN Published by Canadian Cener of Science and Educaion The Impac of Macroeconomic and Corporae Governance Facors on Firm Value of Taiwanese Green Technology Indusry: A Consideraion of Differenial Slope Chien Jen, Wang 1 1 Deparmen of Inernaional Trade, Takming Universiy of Science and Technology, Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C. Correspondence: Chien Jen, Wang, Deparmen of Inernaional Trade, Takming Universiy of Science and Technology, Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C. Tel: chienjen@akming.edu.w Received: Apri 2, 2014 Acceped: April 22, 2014 Online Published: June 25, 2014 doi: /ijef.v6n7p157 URL: hp://dx.doi.org/ /ijef.v6n7p157 Absrac Presenly, he Taiwanese governmen is emphasizing he developmen of he green energy indusry o lower he counry s dependence on oil impors and o conserve Taiwan s environmen. Green energy is considered o be an emerging and favored indusry. This paper uses pooled esimaion regression and Differenial Slope Esimaion o explore he relevan key facors of macroeconomics and corporae governance ha affec firm value in Taiwan s green echnology indusry. Resuls sugges ha when he reurn on equiy is high, he firm s sock price increases as well. The TCRI, which is indicaive of a firm s credi raing was found o be significanly and negaively relaed o sock price. Therefore, a lower credi raing has a higher sock price. In addiion, our analysis also showed ha boh he foreign invesor sockholding rae and board size have a significan and posiive relaionship wih sock price. More foreign invesors and a larger board of direcors may increase he execuion and performance of he company s corporae governance, hereby raising he firm s sock price. Keywords: pooled esimaion, Differenial Slope Esimaion, corporae governance, macroeconomic facors, green echnology indusry 1. Inroducion Accurae evaluaion of firms is essenial for invesors, and many key facors can affec a firm s value. Generally, hese facors can be divided ino company s inernal facors and ouward macroeconomic facors; boh mus be considered when esablishing a firm s valuaion. Much of he lieraure has noed ha companies wih high levels of ransparency and public disclosure have low marke risk and high sock values. Therefore, srenghening corporae governance is a very imporan sep oward providing objecive reference informaion for invesors. The mechanism of corporae governance helps o srenghen an enerprise s operaions and faciliaes he pursui of he greaes benefi o shareholders. A firm wih sound corporae governance is more likely o iniiae he useful, do away wih he harmful, solve informaion asymmery problems, and arac long-erm capials and inernaional invesors. American researchers began o explore he issues of corporae governance in he 1930s. In 1999, he World Bank defined corporae governance as he way in which firms build up a mechanism o maximum he value of firm value under he regulaions of law and conrac. According o he Organizaion for Economic Cooperaion and Developmen (OECD), corporae governance is a sysem in which a company uses is managemen and he auhoriies o boh regulae and specify he rules and procedures i follows when making a decision. Hisorical financial evens such as he Asian financial crisis in 1997, Enron in 2001, MCI WorldCom in 2002, and global financial crisis in 2008 all serve o highligh he imporance of corporae governance and financial supervision. Therefore, srenghening corporae governance remains an inernaional rend, paricularly afer he financial seaquake, and governmens are acively endeavoring o build up corporae governance mechanisms now more han ever. Berles and Means (1932) firs proposed he concep of separaion beween ownership and managemen, and analyzed he differeniaion of ownership and managemen in large corporaions. The discussion of corporae governance has coninued o arac he aenion of researchers and praciioners. Yeh, Lee and Ko (2002) proposed ha he inenion of corporae governance is o find hose people who have he righ o manage he 157

2 company, as well as allocaing decision-making responsibiliy and resources ha influence he firm s value. Yeh e al. (2002) focused mainly on he op-managemen of a corporaion and expeced o increase he benefis and preven he drawbacks of corporae governance, as well as proecing he equiy of shareholders. Gompers, Ishii, and Merick (2003) found ha corporae governance is significanly relaed o firm valuaion and ne profi margin in he Unied Saes. La Pora e al. (2002) demonsraed ha firms have greaer access o exernal financing in counries wih more effecive legal proecion for minoriy shareholders, resuling in broader and more valuable capial markes. Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) also found ha firms end o be larger, more valuable, and more numerous in counries wih beer invesor proecion. Gompers e al. (2003) confirmed ha an invesmen sraegy ha purchased socks of beer-governed companies and sold socks of poorly governed companies earned an abnormal reurn of 8.5% per year during he 1990s. Klapper and Love (2004) examined he relaionship beween corporae governance and performance in a cross-secion of firms from 14 emerging markes by using a governance score (CLSA). They found ha companies wih higher governance sandards have greaer marke valuaion and beer operaing performance. Durnev and Kim (2005) also used a CLSA score o es he associaion beween corporae governance and valuaion for a sample of firms from 27 counries, and suggesed ha firms can increase shareholders value by adoping higher levels of corporae governance in counries wih weaker legal regimes. Braga-Alves and Shasri (2011) consruced a composie index (NM6) by combining six proxies for he main governance pracices and found ha higher scores for his index are relaed o greaer marke value. They also noed ha an invesmen sraegy ha purchased socks of firms wih high NM6 and sold socks of firms wih low NM6 would have earned abnormal reurns of 10.68% per year beween 2001 and Mos lieraure shows us ha good governance is no only associaed wih higher equiy reurns, bu also wih higher firm value and beer operaing performance. Enerprises face various kinds of risks, no only from he inernal environmen bu also from he exernal environmen. In addiion o he corporae governance facors, a firm s value is also influenced deeply by ouward macroeconomic facors. The sysemaic risk, drawn from hasy change of he exernal macro-economic environmen, exers a grea influence on enerprise s performance. For insance, he volailiies of commodiy prices, ineres raes, and a counry s financial policy describing sysemaic risk all could play a role in affecing a firm s performance. These facors canno be obviously noed from financial saemens. However, i is imporan for he enerprise o explore he impac of uncerainy on a firm s performance o evaluae firm value more exacly and furher o engage in relaive risk managemen. Bildersee and Robers (1981) showed a securiy s sysemaic risk is sensiive o ineres rae flucuaions. Abell and Krueger (1989) evidenced he ineres raes and inflaion were imporan macro-economic variables influencing he changes in sysemaic risk. Chan, Lee, and Yeh (2000) examined he relaionship beween sysemaic risk and sock reurn from 1992 o 1999 and showed regardless of he lengh of holding reurn (shorer or longer), he effecs of sysemaic risk are significanly relaed o he asse reurns for Taiwan lised companies. This poin is furher confirmed by empirical resuls of Wu and Wang (2008). A presen, valuaions in he green echnology indusry have araced he aenions of researchers and praciioners. Due o he increase in global warming and he subsequen weaher changes, developing he green energy indusry increasingly becomes he focus of global discussion. Research in green energy and regeneraing energy is also increasing. Governmens worldwide view green iniiaives as favorable o susain perpeual producion and developmen. As a resul, hey inves many resources in research and developmen (R&D) and adop green policies o govern producion. Taiwanese green echnology iniiaives are based on an esablished background of high-echnology developmen and herefore, his counry has he poenial o develop ino a major producer of green energy producs. Taiwan s LED (Ligh Emiing Diode) indusry, he second larges LED indusry in he world (Japan being he larges), is represenaive of green energy produc iniiaives. Furhermore, he producion of Taiwan s LED elemens and backligh model is ranked firs in he world he producion value was approximaely USD 20 billion in 2009, and USD 55 billion in Taiwan s large, lised companies, including Taiwan Semiconducor Manufacuring (TSMC), Formosa Plasics (FPC) and HON HAI have all invesed considerable capial in he producion of LED lighing soluions. In addiion, he creaion of Original Brand Manufacuring (OBM) for Taiwan s LED firms can open more sales channels o furher advance he Taiwanese LED indusry in he global lighing marke. This shows ha he Taiwanese governmen pays aenion o promoing his emerging indusry and, on a greaer scale, on developing he green echnology indusry in Taiwan. However, many facors can affec he firms operaing performance and heir value. This paper aemps o explore he Taiwanese green echnology indusry, and undersand he key facors ha influence sable growh of green energy. This is done mainly from a macroeconomic and corporae governance poin of view. The 158

3 perpeual developmen and carbon reducion effecs have a posiive influence on human living environmen. In his paper, we uilize Taiwanese LED green energy firms as a sample o explore he impac of macroeconomic and corporae governance facors on firm value. In he process, we consider several imporan facors, including ineres raes and cusomer price index from a macroeconomic perspecive, and TCRI credi raing, direcor sockholding rae, foreign invesor sockholding rae, and board size from a corporae governance perspecive. While previous sudies have used regression mehods, he esimaion mehod used in his sudy includes boh a fixed effecs model and a random effecs model. The sudy also uses differenial slope analysis o analyze wheher he specific variable on a firm s value varies from company o company. This was no well addressed in previous sudies. The empirical resuls showed ha when he reurn on equiy is high, he firm s sock price increases as well. The firm s credi raing (TCRI) is significanly and negaively relaed o sock price. A higher foreign sockholding rae and greaer board size improve he execuion and performance of he company. The remainder of he paper is organized as follows. Secion 2 inroduces he empirical model. Secion 3 discusses he mehodology and daa. Secion 4 presens he empirical resuls of he analysis; and Secion 5 summarizes and concludes he paper. 2. Empirical Model Recenly, global governmens have placed a greaer emphasis on green echnology indusry as he mos favored for growh. Based on hisory and agains a background of groundbreaking high-echnology developmen, Taiwan has he poenial o develop as a major producer of green echnology producs. This paper explores he impac of macroeconomic and corporae governance facors on firm value in Taiwan s green echnology indusry. Given he relevan variables, he empirical model used for his paper can be esimaed as Equaion (1). P i, i 1ROE i, 2TCRI i, 3Fi, 4 Di, 5BS i, 6CPI 7 IR i, (1) where P i, represens he quarerly sock closing price of he i h green firm a ime ; ROE i, is he reurn on equiy of he i h green firm a ime represening he firm s profi performance; TCRI i, is he credi raing of he i h green firm a ime, which has been divided ino Degree 1 9 (Degree 9 indicaes he highes credi risk and Degree 1 indicaes he lowes credi risk); F i, is he foreign invesor s sockholding rae of he i h green firm a ime ; D i, is he direcor sockholding rae of he i h green firm; BS i, is he number of direcors on he board; CPI expresses he cusomer price index (2006=100); and IR is he bank ineres rae (he average loan rae of Taiwan five banks); and ε i, is he disurbance erm. 3. Mehodology and Daa In his paper, we employ pooled esimaion regression, which combines he cross-secional and ime series daa. The mehodology includes he Fixed-effecs model (FEM) and he Random-effecs model (REM), and furher uses he Hausman es o judge he suiabiliy of he models. Furher, o differeniae and gauge individual firm behavior, we use Differenial Slope Esimaion (Wald es) o invesigae he esimaion coefficien β k of he FEM and REM for he specific firm. Pooled esimaion has he advanages of providing numerous daa observaions and blending cross-secional and ime series daa o improve he efficiency of economeric esimaes (Hsiao, 1985). This mehodology yields reliable coefficien esimaes when unobservable individual fixed or random effecs exis. Two models for fixed and random effecs can respecively be wrien as follows: Fixed Effecs Model: Random Effecs Model: Y Y i K X (2) i k 1 i 0 i k ki i k 1 K k ki i X (3) where i = 1,, N, and = 1,, T, and N and T respecively denoe he cross-secional and ime dimensions of he panel. Y i and X ki represen he dependen variable and independen variable, respecively. Individual effecs are α i when fixed, and (α 0 + μ i ) when random and normally disribued. ε i is he disurbance erm~iid(0, σ 2 ). The primary difference beween he FEM and REM relaes o wheher he disurbance erm ε i is idenical and independen (iid). FEM has fixed consans o illusrae daa characerisics, so ε i is iid. However, he REM consans are random, so i is unnecessary for ε i o be iid. (Noe 1) Hausman (1978) proposed a mehod for judging he applicabiliy of he FEM or REM. More specifically, he Hausman es is o be used o examine wheher he consan (μ i ) and explanaory variables (X ki ) are correlaed. If he consan (μ i ) significanly 159

4 correlaes wih explanaory variables (X ki ), hen he esimaion resuls of FEM would be valid, and he FEM provides he bes-fiing model. If (μ i ) is no significanly correlaed wih (X ki ), he bes-fiing model is provided by REM. We sampled 21 Taiwanese green energy LED firms lised on he Taiwan Securiy Exchange Corporaion (TSEC) as subjecs in his research. The research period ranges from 2001 Q1 o 2012 Q4, providing 586 oal quarerly observaions. All daa are from he Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) daabank. Daa source and measuremen informaion are showed in Table 1. Table 1. Daa source and measuremen Noaion Variable Measuremen Source P i, Sock Price Quarerly Sock Closing Price TEJ ROE i, Reurn on Equiy Quarerly Reurn on Equiy TEJ TCRI i, Credi Raing Index Credi Raing Index (Degree 1-9) TEJ F i, Foreign Invesor Sock Holding Rae Foreign Invesor Sock Holding Rae TEJ D i, Direcors Sock Holding Rae Direcors Sock Holding Rae TEJ BS i, Board Size Number of Direcors on he Board TEJ CPI Cusomer Price Index Cusomer Price Index (2006=100) TEJ IR Bank Ineres Raes Taiwan Five Banks Average Loan Raes TEJ 4. Empirical Resuls In his secion, we presen he empirical findings of he esimaion regression showed in Eq.(1) (see Table 2 for a summary of hese findings). Resuls of he Hausman es show ha he Fixed Effecs Model (FEM) provides he greaes explanaory power, so we uilize he FEM o perform he Differenial Slope Esimaion. Tables 3 and 4 presen he esimaion resuls of he Differenial Slope Esimaion and FEM differen in direcor sockholding rae and foreign invesor sockholding rae, respecively. Table 2. Esimaion resuls of panel regression-green echnology firms Fixed Effecs Model Random Effecs Model Explanaory Variable Coefficien -Saisic Coefficien -Saisic ** ROE i, *** *** TCRI i, *** *** F i, 0.287** * 1.79 D i, ** BS i, 0.591* * 0.56 CPI 0.872*** *** 4.05 IR Observaians Adjused R AIC SBC F-saisic 48.70***(0.000) 72.03***(0.000) Hausman es x 2 (7) 62.64***(0.000) Noe. Dependen variable is sock closing price of green company. The esing resuls show ha Fixed Effecs Model (FEM) has he larges explanaory power. *significan a 10% level; **significan a 5% level; ***significan a 1% level. Table 2 shows ha he coefficien of reurn on equiy is significanly and posiively relaed o sock price, indicaing ha he esimaion of ROE is an imporan deerminan of a green echnology firm s sock price. ROE is an indicaor of a company s profi performance. Specifically, we found ha when he ROE is high, he firm s sock price increases as well. However, he TCRI, which is indicaive of a firm s credi raing (good or bad), was found o be significanly and negaively relaed o sock price. The lower credi degree indicaes a lower credi risk. Therefore, a lower credi raing has a higher sock price. Using he credi raing mechanism of he TCRI is 160

5 also helpful for ouer governance conrols, which may promoe he governance qualiy for a company. The use of a credi raing as an indicaor of corporae governance has no been discussed very much in pas lieraure, so in his paper, we explore he relaionship beween a company s credi raing and sock price. In addiion, our analysis also showed ha he foreigner invesor sockholding rae (F) has a significan and posiive relaionship wih sock price, indicaing ha a higher percenage of foreigner sockholding may increase he execuion and performance of he company s corporae governance. Foreign insiuional invesors researching groups posiively appraise a company wih sound managemen; hus, high foreign invesor sockholding may help o raise a company s sock price. Board size (BS) is also he focus of corporae governance. Consisen wih he findings of Dalon e al. (1999), he analysis showed ha he board size conrol variable has a significan and posiive relaionship wih sock price, indicaing ha larger board of direcors leads o greaer efficiency and effeciveness in he supervisory conrol of he company s managemen, hus helping o raise sock price. However, he direcor sockholding rae (D) has a significan and negaive relaionship wih sock price. This probably indicaes ha mos green echnology firms may increase (decrease) heir direcor sockholding separaely before prosperous (depressive) economic condiions. Because macroeconomic facors have a considerably higher correlaion wih sock price, we also consider imporan macroeconomic facors o explore heir correlaion wih firm value. For insance, cusomer price index (CPI) is also significanly and posiively relaed o sock price. However, ineres raes were shown o be insignifican. The probable reason is ha Taiwanese ineres raes have been moderaed by he governmen and, herefore, exhibi a smooh, flucuaing endency. As a resul, hey were shown o be insignifican. Table 3. Esimaion of differenial slope Mehod-FEM-Differen in direcor holding D i, Dependen Variable: SP Common Slope Variable Coefficien p-value Variable Coefficien p-value ROE i, *** TCRI i, *** F i, * CPI * IR BS i, * Differen Slope OPTOTECH ** EVERLIGHT *** UNITY ** BRIGHT *** CHIALIN ** GSEO *** JENTECH * SAS *** PTTC ** YTEC * THIEL ** AOC *** LIGITEK ** ACME ** Adjused R AIC SBC D-W Sa Noe. Dependen variable is firm sock price. ***,**and* denoe saisically significan a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respecively. To furher explore he significance of a specific firm s individual behavior, we used he Differenial Slope Esimaion. Table 3 and 4 show he esimaion resuls of his mehod. In Table 3, we discovered mixed resuls for he influence of direcor sockholding rae on sock price. Alhough foureen ou of 21 companies had significan relaionship beween he variables, he same relaionship for he oher seven companies was non-significan. Among he foureen firms for which he relaionship was significan, OPTOTECH (2340), welve companies had a negaive associaion beween direcor sockholding and firm value. For he oher wo companies for which he relaionship was significan and posiive. This resul indicaes ha mos green echnology firms probably increase (decrease) heir direcor sockholding separaely before prosperous (depressive) economic condiions. 161

6 Table 4. Esimaion of differenial slope Mehod-FEM-Differen in foreigner holding F i, Dependen Variable: SP Common Slope Variable Coefficien p-value Variable Coefficien p-value ROE i, *** TCRI i, *** D i, CPI ** IR BS i, * Differen Slope OPTOTECH * EVERLIGHT *** BRIGHT ** TAIWANOASIS * CHIALIN *** GSEO *** SAS ** YTEC ** THIEL *** AOC ** LIGITEK ** ACME ** Adjused R AIC SBC D-W Sa Noe. Dependen variable is firm sock price. ***,**and* denoe saisically significan a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respecively. Table 4 shows he resuls of he Differenial Slope Esimaion as a means o reveal differences in foreign invesor sockholding. For 10 ou of 21 companies, here was a significan and posiive relaionship beween foreign invesor sockholding and firm value, indicaing ha an increase in foreign invesor sockholding can yield an increase in energy firm sock prices. Large, green energy firms, such as CHIALIN (3310), TAIWANOASIS (3066), and GSEO (3406), each have larger marginal effecs of foreign invesor sockholding on firm value. This resul reveals ha a higher percenage of foreign sockholders may increase he execuion and performance of he company s corporae governance. As a resul, if a company is managed well, is sock price will rise. These empirical resuls are consisen wih our inuiion. 5. Conclusion Presenly, he Taiwanese governmen is emphasizing he developmen of he green energy indusry o lower he counry s dependence on oil impors and o conserve Taiwan s environmen. Green energy is considered o be an emerging and favored indusry. Due o is green iniiaives, Taiwan has excellen R&D echnology and manufacuring capabiliies compared o oher counries. This could accelerae he counry s green energy developmen. Meanwhile, Taiwan is already a global leader in he developmen of echnology ha promoes a greener world, namely he LED. Given is economic and environmenal benefis, all counries favor green energy as an indusry wih poenial for grea marke value. These facors have brough naional focus o he issue of corporae governance. Green energy firms wih sound corporae governance no only creae greaer profi opporuniies for shareholders, bu also increase heir capabiliy o cope wih financial emergencies. This paper has used pooled esimaion regression o explore he relevan key facors of macroeconomics and corporae governance ha affec firm value in Taiwan s green echnology indusry. While previous sudies have employed regression mehods o explore he relaionship beween corporae governance facors and firm value, his sudy uses panel daa and differenial slope analysis-mehods ha were rarely used in previous sudies. The esimaion resuls revealed ha when he reurn on equiy is high, he firm s sock price increases as well. The TCRI, which is indicaive of a firm s credi raing was found o be significanly and negaively relaed o sock price. Therefore, a lower credi raing has a higher sock price. In addiion, consisen wih Wu and Chen (2007), hey found ha he exernal governance mechanism, indexed by he holdings of ouside insiuions, exhibis a posiive relaionship wih marke reurns. Our analysis also showed ha boh he foreign sockholding rae and board size have a significan and posiive relaionship wih sock price. More foreign invesors and a larger board of direcors may increase he execuion and performance of he company s corporae governance, hereby raising he firm s sock price. However, he direcor sockholding rae has a significan and negaive relaionship wih sock price. This probably indicaes ha mos green echnology firms may increase (decrease) heir direcor sockholding separaely before prosperous (depressive) economic condiions. As opposed o oher exising lieraure, his paper uses differenial slope esimaion o observe he marginal effecs of he relaionship among he variables, and reveal differen characerisics and feaures of each green energy firm. The resuls presened 162

7 here can serve as an imporan reference for invesmen insiuions o consruc heir porfolios, and provide insighs for researchers and governmens engaged in developing he green echnology indusry. Acknowledgmens I would like o hank professors Jang W. Y. and Chang Y. for heir helpful commens and suggesions. All remaining errors are my own. Reference Abell, J. D., & Krueger, T. M. (1989). Macroeconomic Influences on Bea. Journal of Economics and Business, 41, hp://dx.doi.org/ / (89) Berles, A., & Means, G. (1932). The Modern Corporaion and Privae Propery. Transacion Publishers. Bildersee, J. S., & Robers, G. S. (1981). Bea Insabiliy When Ineres Rae Levels Change. Journal of Financial and Quaniaive Analysis, 16, hp://dx.doi.org/ / Braga-Alves, M. V., & Shasri, K. (2011). Corporae Governance, Valuaion, and Performance: Evidence from a Volunary Marke Reform in Brazil. Financial Managemen, 40(1), hp://dx.doi.org/ /j x x Chan, A. L., Lee, W. C., & Yeh, C. K. (2000). The Empirical Sudy of he Relaion beween Sysem Risk, Size and Sock Reurn. Web Journal of Chinese Managemen, 3(4), Dalon, D. R., Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L., & Ellsrand, A. E. (1999). Number of Direcors and Financial Performance: a Mea-Analysis. Academy of Managemen Journal, 42, hp://dx.doi.org/ / Durnev, A., & Kim, H. (2005). To Seal or No o Seal: Firm Aribues, Legal Environmen, and Valuaion. Journal of Finance, 60, Gompers, P. A., Ishii, J. L., & Merick, A. (2003). Corporae Governance and Equiy Prices. Quarerly Journal of Economics, 118, hp://dx.doi.org/ /ssrn Hausman, J. A. (1978). Specificaion Tess in Economerics. Economerica, 46, hp://dx.doi.org/ / Hsiao, C. (1985). Benefis and Limiaions of Panel Daa. Economeric Reviews, 4, hp://dx.doi.org/ / Klapper, L. F., & Love, I. (2004). Corporae Governance, Invesor Proecion, and Performance in Emerging Markes. Journal of Corporae Finance, 10, hp://dx.doi.org/ /ssrn La Pora, R., Lopez-de-Silances, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2002). Invesor Proecion and Corporae Valuaion. Journal of Finance, 57, hp://dx.doi.org/ /ssrn Shleifer, A., & Wolfenzon, D. (2002). Invesor Proecion and Equiy Markes. Journal of Financial Economics, 66, hp://dx.doi.org/ /ssrn Wald, A. (1943). Tes of Saisical Hypoheses Concerning Several Parameers When he Number of Observaions is Large. Transacions of he American Mahemaical Sociey, 54(3), hp://dx.doi.org/ /s Wu, W., & Chen, C. (2007). Relaionship Among Corporae Governance, Agency Problem, and he Performances of Mergers and Acquisiions: Case of Lised Companies in Taiwan. Journal of Macau Universiy of Science and Technology, 1(2), Wu, P. C., & Wang, C. J. (2008). The Effec of Sysemaic Risk on Equiy Valuaion: An Exended Applicaion of he Ohlson Equiy Valuaion Model. Journal of Humaniies and Social Sciences, 4(1), Yeh, Y. H., Lee, T. S., & Ko, C. (2002). Corporae Governance and Raing Sysem. SUNBRIGHT Publishers. Noe Noe 1. See Hsiao (1985). 163

8 Appendix A. Fixed Effecs of Green Technology Firms Source: This Sudy. Company Name Company Code Name Fixed Effecs LTC OPTOTECH EVERLIGHT TYNTEK ICHIUN UNITY BRIGHT TAIWANOASIS CHIALIN GSEO SHIANYIH JENTECH SAS LEDTECH PTTC PARALIGHT YTEC THIEL AOC LIGITEK ACME Copyrighs Copyrigh for his aricle is reained by he auhor(s), wih firs publicaion righs graned o he journal. This is an open-access aricle disribued under he erms and condiions of he Creaive Commons Aribuion license (hp://creaivecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/). 164