An Investigation of Relationship between Earnings Conservatism and Price to Book Ratio Based on Basu s Method

Transcription

1 Inernaional Journal of Business and Developmen Sudies Vol. 3, No. 1, (2011) p An Invesigaion of Relaionship beween Earnings Conservaism and Price o Book Raio Based on Basu s Mehod Mahdi Salehi Behzad Ghorbani Absrac One of he mos imporan conceps in financial saemen analysis and evaluaion is conservaism. Thus recogniion of he facors which influence conservaism can considerably help he invesor in managing he selecion of more conservaive asses properly and avoiding he unrue exposure of financial saemens. This research is abou o consider he relaion of effecive facors on organizaions conservaism ha one of hem is he porion of shares marke value o shares book value. Daa was colleced from annual repors of lised companies on Tehran Sock Exchange during The resuls of he sudy revealed ha here was no significan relaionship beween earnings conservaism and price o book raio. Keywords: Earnings conservaism, Price o book raio, Good news and Bad news. Inroducion Financial informaion is one of he mos imporan principals a presen human sociey. In oday s world unlike before by companies exension from single owner business unis o gian corporaions or even inernaional and mulinaional companies, heir financial informaion users have become more and encompass a grea range. Each user makes decision in relaion wih his presen siuaion by receiving compressed informaion from companies. Much of his informaion is supplied by accouning sysem. Afer providing, financial saemens are given o he Assisan Professor, Accouning and Managemen Deparmen, Ferdowsi Universiy of Mashhad, Iran, mahdi_salehi54@yahoo.com Faculy Member of Islamic Azad Universiy, Khodabandeh Branch, Iran

2 30 Mahdi Salehi and Behzad Ghorbani users ouside of he organizaion. This grea range of users has differen pars which are: Invesors, credior providers, financial analyzers, banks and credi insiuions, insurances, governors. Each par in relaion wih heir differen needs, demand for paricular informaion, in which meeing all hese needs by financial saemen providers is impossible. Since invesors play imporan par by heir repuaion and heir direc influence on company s policies and decisions because of owning capial, hey have gain more aenion in providing financial saemens and i assumes ha by meeing heir needs much of oher users needs would be saisfied. Furher, now day s world communicaion developmen and faciliaion, and need for massive capial o gain more profi made companies collecing capial from sociey o coincidence his new siuaion. Invesors and crediors would be encouraged o inves in companies in condiion ha knowing heir saus by sudying financial saemens. In such siuaion financial informaion users especially invesors and crediors face agency and asymmery problems. Direcing managers who are responsible for providing financial saemens by heir complee awareness of company s financial siuaion and heir arge of collecing more capial and financial resources, have differen moivaions han invesors and crediors. Mos of business managers are opimisic and when hey are asked abou company s saus, hy answer i is in is bes siuaion. If managers no be resrained, his asses and profi opimism would be exended. Ofen managers ry o show company s picure desirable. In such siuaion accouning principles and procedures supporing by accouning sandards, using conservaism principle o regulae managers opimism, suppor sakeholder righs and publish financial saemens fair. Hence conservaism is one of he accouning limiing principles, which has been used by accounans for years (Was 2003). Problem of he sudy The aim of financial saemens is providing precise and classified informaion abou company s financial saus and flexibiliy, which is useful for grea range users in economic decision making. In financial reporing lieraure, conservaism is explained as: conservaism is

3 An Invesigaion of Relaionship beween Earnings 31 applying some degree of aenion in evaluaion in uncerain condiions, so ha avoiding reporing incomes and asses more han realiy. Almos all of he ouside users are rying o forecas profi in some of fuure periods. So invesors esimae heir expeced profi using company s financial repors. In addiion, invesors mosly rely on indexes like cash profi or cash flows raher han oher indexes, so repored profi is one of he indexes for invesor s expeced oupu deerminaion. This research assumes ha conservaism which is endency o recogniion bad news abou incomes raher han good news is generally more in porfolios of companies wih lower proporion of marke value o book value, raher han porfolios of companies wih higher proporion. As a resul negaive relaionship beween earnings conservaism and P/B raio is basically because of profi commimen pars, no operaing cash flow pars of i. Basu (1997) has explained he earnings conservaism as a mehodology, in which in reacion o bad news, he idenificaion of incomes and ne oucomes decreases, in he case ha in reacion o good news i doesn increase. Price share is he price of each share a he end of each year under review. Common book share is all of he facors which are wrien in equiy par (belong o common sock) in balance shee. For calculaing book value of a common sock, he value of owners common sock is divided on he number of shares owned by people. Price o book raio, shows he value of company s capial marke divide on company s asses book value. Porfolio is he baske of shares. Ofen invesors form a baske of shares o reduce he risk of heir invesmen, which is called porfolio. The periods in which earnings conservaism is calculaed, call examined periods. Good news means shares posiive oupu, and bad news means shares negaive oupu. Research objecives The aim of curren sudy is o deermining wheher earnings conservaism is more in porfolios which heir proporion of marke

4 32 Mahdi Salehi and Behzad Ghorbani value o book value is less, or in reverse, in porfolios which heir proporion of marke value o book value is more. Invesors righ for requesing real financial saemen disclosure brings a need for earnings conservaism o limi liigaion losses, which are resuls of claim abou exaggeraion in asses or ne incomes. Legal proceedings are mosly because of showing incomes and asses more han realiy, raher han showing less han realiy. Audiors and managers become encouraged o idenify incomes and asses less, since hey undersood ha he expenses of idenifying hem more, is more han idenifying hem less. So, earnings conservaism can considerably help he invesor in managing he selecion of more conservaive asses properly and avoiding he unrue exposure of financial saemen. Managers ac biased in using accouning crierions which are he base for reporing o he invesors, o improve he benefis of hemselves and inerfere in informaion ransformaion. Convenion inerpreaion poins o benefis conflics beween conrac paries and he exploiive unis. These conracs include managers conracs, shareholder and oher crediors deb conrac. Each pary is looking for is own benefis. Bu conservaism because of is requiremen for self proof and confirmaion capabiliy, limis managers bias opporunisic behavior and delays profi idenificaion, so shows ne asses and profi less. In conracs, hese effecs improve he firm s value. Since conservaism limis managers opporunisic pay offs o himself and oher groups like sockholders. In his concep, conservaism is an efficien convenional mechanism. Since axable income and mehods of is calculaions, depends on repored profi, in consequence profi calculaion is under peneraion and manipulaion. The relaionship beween repored profi and axable income has been seen in some companies who were looking for refunding heir furher ax paid because of cheaing in heir profi reporing. Firms have axable income unil hey are profiable. The relaionship and dependence beween axable income and repored profi is a moivaion of profi ransformaion o fuure periods. So, one of he mos imporan conceps in financial saemen evaluaion and analysis is he concep of conservaion.

5 An Invesigaion of Relaionship beween Earnings 33 Review of lieraure Ball a el., (2000) exended Basu s (1997) approach o undersand inernal differences beween counries, in conservaism based on differences in deviaion on regression coefficien of profi o oupu. Richardson and Tinaikar (2004) expressed ha if equiy prices record good and bad news efficienly, he applicaion of Ex-pos conservaism makes deviaion on regression coefficien of profi o oupu for firms wih negaive oupu (bad news), becomes more raher han firms wih posiive oupus (good news). Givoly and Hayn (2000) in a sudy used he proporion of coefficien deviaion of bad news o good news o induce conservaism. 2 Basu (1997) compared regressions R for firms wih good and bad news, o induce conservaism and assered ha accouning idenifies bad news conservaion in profis in a more imely mehod, raher han bad news. Was (2003) in a sudy calculaed earnings conservaism as differen proof rai, needed for idenifying profi agains loss. Kwon e al., (2001) in a research idenified good news as profis raher han idenifying bad news as losses. Jinhan a el., (2005) considered he relaionship beween earnings conservaism and price o book raio. Their resuls were congenial wih Basu s (1997) findings, ha incomes are conservaism, which means ha profis are associaing wih firm s bad news oupus raher han firm s good news vigorously. In addiion hey poined o wo new hings: he firs, earnings conservaism is relaed o P/B raio conrarily and he second, he conrary relaionship beween earnings conservaism and P/B raio is a commimen phenomenon no a cash flows phenomenon. Research mehodology This research mehodology of his research is correlaion mehodology, which is run based on real informaion abou sock marke and financial saemens of lised companies on Tehran Sock Exchange.

6 34 Mahdi Salehi and Behzad Ghorbani Research hypoheses According o he objecives of he sudy he following hypoheses are posulaed in he sudy: 1. Earnings conservaism is more in porfolios in which price o book raio is less. 2. There is earnings conservaism in all of he porfolios. 3. There is earnings conservaism in all of he reviewed periods. Conservaism measuremen mehod Earnings conservaism measuremen is a resul of reverse regression of profi on oupu in firms porfolios. The measuremen mehod is Basu (1997) in regression equaion X i = β o + β1 R1 + ε i variable xi is firm s profi for fiscal year, which is balanced by equiy marke value, in he beginning of fiscal year or in oher words, he end of he fiscal year -1. The variable Ri shows i firms common sock marke oupu rae for 12 monhs which ended four monhs afer he nex fiscal year. And assume ε i as random meddlers. The β1 regression coefficien has been inerpreed as a scale of being imely, wih which profis reflec annual oupu of firms porfolios wih ended fiscal year in. GN In a firm s given porfolio, ( ) BN β1 and ( β ) 1 are esimaed for subsidiary porfolios of firms wih good and bad news in year. The BN ( p) GN ( p) equaion C = β β measures earnings conservaism for a P 1 1 given porfolio, which is he difference beween profi high sensiiviy for firms good news inconras bad news in p porfolio in fiscal year. The measuremen of proporion of marke value o book value a he beginning of year is p 1 / B 1, where P 1 ( B 1) shows equiy marke value (book value) a he end of fiscal year -1. Daa collecion mehod Daa needed for his research has been colleced based on library mehod. So, necessary informaion has been colleced from exised documens and Tehran Sock Exchange organizaion daabase. The gahered informaion included firms financial saemens. The gahered daa has been modified, classified by Excel sofware and hen financial

7 An Invesigaion of Relaionship beween Earnings 35 saemens have been analyzed by one variable and mulivariae regression. Daa analysis According o Basu,s (1997) mehod, in regression equaion X i = β o + β1 R1 + ε i variable xi is firm s profi for fiscal year, which is balanced by equiy marke value, in he beginning of fiscal year or in oher words, he end of he fiscal year -1. The variable Ri shows i firms common sock marke oupu rae for 12 monhs which ended four monhs afer he nex fiscal year. And assume ε i as random meddlers. Saisical sociey is divided in wo pars. The firs par is common sock wih posiive oupu (good news) and he second par is common sock wih negaive oupu (bad news). To deermine he effec of accurae observaions, norm will be used, i.e. he highes and he lowes percenages of ne profi will be removed. The β1 regression coefficien has been inerpreed as a scale of being imely, wih which profis reflec annual oupu of firms porfolios wih ended fiscal year in. GN In a firm s given porfolio, ( ) BN β1 and ( β ) 1 are esimaed for subsidiary porfolios of firms wih good and bad news in year. The BN ( p) GN ( p) equaion C = β β measures earnings conservaism for a P 1 1 given porfolio, which is he difference beween profi high sensiiviy for firms good news inconras wih bad news in p porfolio in fiscal year. P/B sands for price equiy o book equiy raio. Good news sands for shares posiive oupu and bad news sands for shares negaive oupu. These are resuled by SPSS sofware. Variable Mean S.D Table1. Descripive saisics of full sample Firs Quarile Median Third Quarile Min Max R E P/B

8 36 Mahdi Salehi and Behzad Ghorbani Table2. Descripive saisics of Good news Variable Mean Sandard Firs Third Median Deviaion Quarile Quarile Min Max R E P/B Table3. Descripive saisics of bad news Variable Mean Sandard Firs Third Median Deviaion Quarile Quarile Min Max R E P/B Year Number of observaion Table4. The relaionship beween profis and oupus Good News Bad New Adjused Number of observaion Adjused Mean

9 An Invesigaion of Relaionship beween Earnings 37 As i shown in Table 5, here has been earnings conservaism during 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007, bu nor during 2007 and The highes amoun of earnings conservaism is for 2007 and he lowes amoun is for Mean of Annual regressions (-value) Table6. The relaionship of Price o book raio and he relaionship of profis and revenues P/B V (high) Good News Bad News Adj. Adj IV III II I (low) = - Based on Basu's (1997) mehod, in he regression equaion X i = β o + β1 R1 + ε i, he variable xi for company profi has been shown for fiscal year of, which has been balanced for he commence of fiscal year; i.e. a he end of financial period of -1 via price equiy. The variable sands for he revenue for 4 monhs of he end of fiscal year. The saisic sample has been deailed in subordinae samples of good and bad news, which depends o ha wheher he shares profi is posiive or negaive annually. The sample in 5 porfolios has been deailed via P/B raio, which is he price equiy o book equiy raio a he beginning of fiscal year. The companies wih P/B 1 has been divided in remained porfolios (3 o 50 equally). P/B=1 can be considered as criical surface which simulaes conservaism. The implemenaion of porfolio 1 conains companies wih he lowes amoun of P/B raio and porfolio 5 conains companies wih he highes amoun of P/B raio. To deermine he effec of accurae observaions, he norm will be used; i.e. he highes

10 38 Mahdi Salehi and Behzad Ghorbani and he lowes percenage of shares ne profi and price o book raio will be removed. Also he observaions wih negaive official value of equiy will be removed a he beginning of fiscal year. β1 of good and β2 of bad news poins o he shares revenue coefficien in good and bad news subordinae samples wihin P/B porfolio. To measure he amoun of earnings conservaism, we P BN ( p) GN ( p) usec = β1 β1, i.e. he difference of variaion coefficien for companies wih good and bad news wihin a defined porfolio. The deviaion coefficien β will be inerpreed as a scale of o be imely. 1 There are earnings conservaism wihin porfolios 1, 2, 3 and 4, bu nor wihin 5. (Porfolio 5 has he highes amoun of P/B). Also i shown ha here is no a meaningful relaionship beween profi observaion and P/B. he highes amoun of earnings conservaism is for porfolio 4 and he lowes is for 5. Diagram1. The increase and decrease of earnings conservaism every porfolio Conclusion According o calculaion based on Basu's (1997) mehod, here is no relaionship beween earnings conservaism and price o book raio. Also here is no earnings conservaism wihin all porfolio and periods, so all hree hypoheses are rejeced. The presen research lead o ha here is no a meaningful relaionship beween earnings conservaism and price o book raio. Whereas, in a similar research by Jinhan e al., (2005) i was approved

11 An Invesigaion of Relaionship beween Earnings 39 he diverse relaionship beween porfolio conservaism and he price o book raio. I seems ha he difference of resuls is because of governmenal ownership of major of acceped companies in Tehran socks exchange. So i is recommended ha he applicans of fiscal saemens and analyzers which ry o preend he fuure profi by presen profis o be aware of research resuls, because of imaginaion ha he lised companies on Tehran Socks Exchange. Wih less price o book raio have more earnings conservaism similar o research of oher counries.

12 40 Mahdi Salehi and Behzad Ghorbani References 1.Ball, R., S.P. Kohari, and A. Robin (2000), The Effec of Inernaional Insiuional Facors on Properies of Accouning Earnings. Journal of Accouning and Economics, 29: Basu, S (1997), The Conservaism Principle and he Asymmeric Timeliness of Earnings. Journal of Accouning and Economics, 24: Givoly, D. and C. Hayn (2000), The Changing Time-series Properies of Earnings, Cash Flows and Accruals: Has Financial Reporing Become More Conservaive? Journal of Accouning and Economics, 29: Jinhan Pae, Daniel B. Thornon, and Michael Welker (2005), The Link beween Earnings Conservaism and he Price o Book Raio 5. Kwon, Y, D. Newman and Y. Suh (2001), The Demand for Accouning Conservaism for Managemen Conrol. Review of Accouning Sudies, 6: Richardson, G. and S. Tinaikar (2004), Accouning Based Valuaion Models. Wha Have We Learned? Accouning and Finance, 44: Was, R. (2003), Conservaism in Accouning Par I: Explanaions and Implicaions. Accouning Horizons.Sepember, 17: