The Impact of the National Bank of Hungary's Funding for Growth Program on Firm Level Investment

Transcription

1 The Impact of the National Bank of Hungary's Funding for Growth Program on Firm Level Investment Marianna Endrész, MNB Péter Harasztosi, JRC Robert P. Lieli, CEU April, 2017 The views expressed in this presentation are those of the authors' and do not necessarily reect the ocial stance of the National Bank of Hungary. 1 / 40

2 The Funding for Growth Program (NHP) In June 2013 the National Bank of Hungary introduced the 1st phase of the Funding for Growth Program (NHP) to reinvigorate business lending and growth HUF 700 billion=eur 2.3 billion (approx. 2.3% of GDP) was made available to banks (nancial intermediaries) at no cost Banks were asked to re-lend the amount to SMEs at an interest rate of 2.5% or less Nominal purpose of loan must be i) Renance existing loans ii) Finance working capital iii) Finance new long term investment First phase ended in December 2013, was extended a number of times 2 / 40

3 This paper Fairly narrow program evaluation approach: how much new investment did the program generate by the end of 2013? New=investment that would not have happened otherwise Must construct a credible counterfactual investment path Full-edged cost-benet analysis would be much trickier... First to combine micro data and a rigorous econometric methodology to evaluate a funding for lending type loan program: DID estimation with additional correction for likely violation of parallel trend assumption 3 / 40

4 Some literature Churm et al. (2012): Evaluation of Bank of England's funding for lending scheme; focus on credit aggregates and lending costs Darracq-Paries, M. and De Santis, R. (2013): macro study of ECB's 3-year LTRO Banerjee and Duo (2014): Evaluation of directed loan program in India; perhaps closest to this study 4 / 40

5 Main ndings Participating rms did invest more: 30% of their total investment in 2013 can be attributed to the program leading to a 6% increase in investment in the SME sector (3% in the private sector as a whole) Strong heterogeneity by rm size: the program eect was proportionally larger for smaller rms; virtually non-existent for medium-sized rms Theoretical interpretation of heterogeneity (some insight into small rm nance): before the program small rms were facing a steep aggregate credit supply curve and larger rms were facing a at one and/or larger rms were rationed in the program, small rms were not 5 / 40

6 Data sources National Tax and Customs Oce data: rm panelbalance sheets of all double entry book-keeping rms in Hungary Investment is dened as change in xed assets + depreciation Caveat! positive investment at the rm level does not necessarily imply an increase in the capital stock at the macro level Program data reported to the National Bank of Hungary by banks Central Credit Registry (information on other loans taken out by rms)originally available up to / 40

7 Basic facts about NHP phase 1. Firm size Num. of Num. of Part. Tot. loans Av. loan size (employees) rms 2013 partic. rate (mill. EUR) (thsd. EUR) Micro (1-9) 318,574 2, % Small (10-49) 21,726 2, % Med. (50-249) 4, % / 40

8 The basic problem of program evaluation Average investment in 2013: non-nhp rms NHP rms HUF 5.1 mill. HUF 65.6 mill. ( EUR 15 thousand) (EUR 225 thousand) Program eect vs. selection? Average investment of NHP rms: HUF 47.2 mill. HUF 65.6 mill. (EUR 156 thousand) (EUR 225 thousand) Program eect vs. selection vs. other time varying factors? How to construct conunterfactual investment path for participants? 8 / 40

9 Avg. I(t) Million HUFs a) all firms Avg. I(t) Million HUFs b) micro-sized firms Avg. I(t) Million HUFs c) small-sized firms Avg. I(t) Million HUFs d) medium-sized firms Solid line: not NHP firms. Dashed line: NHP firms 9 / 40

10 Theoretical framework Potential outcomes: I 13 (1): investment of a randomly chosen rm in 2013 if we forced it to participate exogenously I 13 (0): investment if rm was excluded exogenously (or the program would not exist at all) Participation dummy P = 0: the rm does not participate P = 1: the rm participates Investment actually observed in 2013 I 13 = PI 13 (1) + (1 P)I 13 (0) 10 / 40

11 The program eect and its identication Average treatment eect for the treated: How to identify this? ATT = E[I 13 (1) I 13 (0) P = 1] Decomposing the average investment of NHP and non-nhp rms: E[I 13 P = 1] E[I 13 P = 0] = ATT + {E[I 13 (0) P = 1] E[I 13 (0) P = 0]} Counterfactual expression in curly brackets: hypothetical investment dierence between NHP and non-nhp rms if NHP had not been implemented. 11 / 40

12 Identication I: Dierence-in-dierences Parallel trend assumption: E[I 13 (0) P = 1] E[I 13 (0) P = 0] = E[I 12 P = 1] E[I 12 P = 0] Therefore, ATT = {E[I 13 P = 1] E[I 13 P = 0]} {E[I 12 P = 1] E[I 12 P = 0]}. This is the dierence-in-dierences (DID) estimator 12 / 40

13 Avg I(t) in millions of 2013 HUF Dierence-in-dierences: graphical illustration Effect by DiD (δ) No NHP NHP firms NHP firms - assumed inv. path under DiD 13 / 40

14 The problem with simple DID Relies on 'parallel trend assumption': average change in investment without the program same for participants and non-participants But: self-selection into the program may well depend on this quantity. For example: I 13 (0) I 12 > threshold participate I 13 (0) I 12 threshold do not participate This would imply a violation of the parallel trend assumption 14 / 40

15 Avg I(t) in millions of 2013 HUF Problem with DID: graphical illustration Program effect (δ-δ*) Correction (δ*) No NHP NHP firms NHP firms - assumed inv. path under DiD NHP firms - assumed inv. path under corrected DiD 15 / 40

16 Identication: Where does the correction come from? We assume that participants in the 1st phase would have borrowed some amount on the market even without the program Program operates on intensive margin rather than extensive margin Margin is only 2.5%banks cherry picked among existing clients (later: risk sharing). Out of 6126 participants: 5332 borrowed between 2005 and borrowed in 2012 alone Percentage of rms with new loans: Market NHP Total Micro Small Medium / 40

17 Identication: Where does the correction come from? Look at investment history of rms that took out a new market loan in a pre-program year vs. those who did not. Compare: average change in investment between 2010 and 2011 for rms that borrowed in 2011 average change in investment between 2010 and 2011 for rms that did not borrow in 2011 Construct DID estimator for 'investment eect' of market loan. Estimate the average eect of NHP on participants by DID = [NHP treatment eect estimated by DID] [market loan treatment eect estimated by DID] Will show corroborating evidence that correction 'well calibrated' 17 / 40

18 Avg I(t) in millions of 2013 HUF Identication: graphical illustration of the correction term Correction (δ*) Firms - no new loan in 2011 Firms - new loan in 2011 Firms - new loan in assumed investment under DID 18 / 40

19 Implementation I. Starting point: two period panel year xed eects (DID) regressions with rm and Allowing for size-related heterogeneity in the treatment eect: Pre-treatment capital stock (K): polynomials of K, interacted with treatment dummy Pre-treatment number of employees (L): polynomials of L, interacted with treatment dummy Additional controls (X ): pre-treatment nancial statistics computed from balance sheet data more credible identication, increased eciency 19 / 40

20 Implementation II. Pruning the group of non-participants. Use logit regression to estimate Propensity score = P(participation K, L, X ). Drop rm if propensity score is very low. Outlier control 20 / 40

21 Estimated model Basic DID regression model: two period panel (t = 2013, 2012) with rm and year xed eects + size + other controls: I it = + 3 ) (α j (K i,t 1 K) j + β j (K i,t 1 K) j P i D13 t j=1 3 ) (κ j (L i,t 1 L) j + λ j (L i,t 1 L) j P i D13 t j=1 + δp i D13 t + X i,t 1γ + c i + θ t + u it where P i =program participation dummy; D13 t =year dummy Corrective regressions: same form, but t = 2011, 2010, P i =new market loan in 2011, and D13 t replaced with D11 t δ 21 / 40

22 Benchmark matching estimator 1-to-1 propensity score matching estimator: take each rm in the treated group, nd the rm in the control group with the closest propensity score value take the dierence between the observed investment volumes in 2013 (program year) compute average Matching estimator is consistent for ATT only if selection-on-observables condition holds: (I 13 (0), I 13 (1)) participation K, L, X Set of controls is unlikely to be sucient for this, but still useful benchmark 22 / 40

23 Estimated average program eects for participants Treatment=NHP participation Model specication Parameter estimates I/K impact (thousands of EUR) (% point) δ δ δ δ δ/ K (δ δ ) K Matching % - [15.83] FE+f(K,L,X) % 7.4% [13.53] [19.10] Notes: For the FE model, the reported estimates correspond to the 2012 mean capital stock and/or employment among participants. The 2013 HUF/EUR exchange rate was taken to be / 40

24 Estimated average program eects by size category Treatment=NHP participation Size category Parameter estimates I/K impact (thousands of EUR) (% point) δ δ δ δ δ/ K (δ δ ) K Micro (1-9) % 18.7% [9.7] [14.7] Small (10-49) % 7.5% [12.7] [17.3] Medium (50-149) % 5.8% [37.3] [56.7] Medium ( ) % 0.7% [109.3] [158.7] 24 / 40

25 investment rate Average program eect as a function of employment 25% average effect of NHP 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% -5% -10% average effect of NHP 25 / 40

26 Corroborating evidence: Investment by rms in a neighborhood of the 250 employee cuto i(t) Mill. HUF Employment confidence 95% below 250 fit above 250 fit Investment growth NHP 26 / 40

27 Discontinuity regressions Outlier cuto HUF 1 billion Empl. range dummy [35.02] [26.70] [24.59] Const [29.21] [22.38] [22.36] Obs R Part. rate 12.7% 16.66% 14.97% 27 / 40

28 Aggregate eects: decomposition of the actual investment of participating rms Investment (millions of EUR) DID DID PANEL A: Treatment = All NHP actual w/o NHP due to NHP w/o NHP due to NHP All rms Micro (1-9) Small (10-49) Medium (50-149) Medium ( ) / 40

29 Aggregate eects: decomposition of the actual investment of participating rms Relative impact of NHP as % of all investment by: participants SME sector PANEL A: Treatment = All NHP All rms 29.3% 5.6% Micro (1-9) 63.2% 7.1% Small (10-49) 27.2% 6.2% Medium (50-149) 20.8% 6.4% Medium ( ) -14.9% -2.0% 29 / 40

30 Interpretation of results Use a simplied version of theoretical framework in Banerjee and Duo (2015) Simple capital supply/demand graphs can explain size related heterogeneity in treatment eect if we assume that i) Smaller rms were more credit constrained ii) and/or smaller rms could borrow more relative to their pre-existing capital (large rms were rationed in the program, small rms were not) 30 / 40

31 interest rate Firm originally unconstrained on the credit market r* capital supply K* Capital 31 / 40

32 interest rate Unconstrained rm with a small subsidized loan r* capital supply 0.4 r nhp L nhp K* 1 = K nhp Capital 32 / 40

33 interest rate Unconstrained rm with a large subsidized loan r* 0.4 r nhp 0.2 capital supply 0 1 K* K nhp = L nhp Capital 33 / 40

34 interest rate Credit constrained rm 1.2 capital supply r* K* 1 Capital 34 / 40

35 interest rate Credit constrained rm with a small subsidized loan 6 capital supply r* 2 r nhp 1 0 L nhp K* +L nhp=k nhp Capital 35 / 40

36 interest rate Credit constrained rm with a large subsidized loan r* 2 capital supply r nhp K* L nhp=k nhp Capital 36 / 40

37 interest rate The general case: rm constrained on the 'intensive margin' r* K* 4 5 Capital 37 / 40

38 interest rate Subsidized loan used both for new investment and renancing r* 2 1 r nhp L nhp 0 1 L nhp 2 K 3 K* K nhp 4 5 nhp -L nhp Capital 38 / 40

39 Types of NHP loans by rm size Firm size New investment loans Total NHP loans to renancing loans (%) to capital (%) Average Average Median Micro (1-9) Small (10-49) Medium (50-149) Medium ( ) / 40

40 Conclusion The rst phase of NHP generated additional investment that amounts to 6% of all investment in the SME sector in 2013 (0.2% points accounting impact on GDP) The impact was heterogenous with respect to rm size: while 60+% of the investment by micro rms was due to the program medium sized rm would have invested just as much in the absence of the program The paper gives a narrow analysis omitting important issues such as: the impact on potential output and long-term growth (investment quality, multiplier eects) risk-taking related to nancing micro rms the opportunity cost of the program 40 / 40