Electricity markets: Investments

Transcription

1 Electricity markets: Investments Lecture 9 Matti Liski Spring 2017

2 Introduction How does this lecture fit the course structure? At the early part of the course we covered the optimal policy instruments (prices and quantities): the consumer side: do consumers respond rationally to the instruments? We looked at consumers technology choices This week we have discussed how the instruments impact the electricity market prices we also covered subsidy schemes and other instruments deviating from the theoretical optimum (prices and quantities) Similarly as for the consumers, we still need understand how investments in new technologies are made in response to changes in the prices

3 Why investments are risky? difference due to fuel cost TWh Figure: Demand and supply. Fuel cost includes the cost of emissions

4 Incentives to invest Arises from quality differences scarcity in low cost supply Incentive to invest rent TWh Figure: Technologies that do not use carbon inputs are of higher quality (economically).

5 Making emissions more costly: rent Fuel costs increase: Good for investments TWh Figure:

6 But prices can also decline in the future: mark-up High price protects against the downside inv. cost Figure: Thus, in a market equilibrium, there is a mark-up over investment costs. The carbon cost may have to be very high before market-based investments take place. Feed-in tariffs provide a protection for the downside risk, so investments take place earlier.

7 Nuclear power investments Why important? Significant source of power (both domestically and globally) Climate policies have an impact on investments Traditional policy instruments (prices or quantities) tend to encourage investments Subsidy schemes for renewables discourage investments We should learn to evaluate the profitability of such investments, from a corporate and social perspective

8 Nuclear power investments Plan: Nuclear globally Nuclear in the Nordics Institutional background: the Finnish model of ownership Tools for analysis: levelized costs and the market impact Quantitative Assessment

9 How important is Nuclear Globally? The Future of Nuclear Power. An Interdisciplinary MIT Study (2003, link) [..]our study postulates a global growth scenario that by mid-century would see 1000 to 1500 reactors of 1000 megawatt-electric (MWe) capacity each deployed worldwide, compared to a capacity equivalent to 366 such reactors now in service update of the study: Since 2003 construction costs for all types of large-scale engineered projects have escalated dramatically. The estimated cost of constructing a nuclear power plant has increased at a rate of 15% per year heading into the current economic downturn.

10 Construction history Nuclear Reactors under Construction Worldwide 200 Other 150 Eastern Europe 100 Western Europe 50 0 United States and Canada Figure: Source: Davis, see dropbox

11 Generation history % 20% 15% 10% 5% Mycle Schneider Consulting Nuclear Electricity Production in the World in TWh (net) and share of electricity production (gross) max 17.6% max 2,660 TWh 2,441TWh TWh ,7% % Sources: IAEA-PRIS, BP, MSC, Figure: Source: The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2016

12 Nuclear in the Nordics: units abbr. TWh/year closure: technical/announced marginal cost, e/mwh Forsmark-1 F / Forsmark-2 F / Forsmark-3 F / Oskarshamn-1 O / Oskarshamn-2 O / Oskarshamn-3 O / Ringhals-1 R / Ringhals-2 R / Ringhals-3 R / Ringhals-4 R / Loviisa-1 L /2027 N.A. Loviisa-2 L /2030 N.A. Olkiluoto-1 OL /2038 N.A. Olkiluoto-2 OL /2040 N.A. Olkiluoto-3 OL /2079 N.A. Fennovoima FE /2084 N.A. Notes: The table lists the Nordic nuclear units and their announced/estimate closure dates. The energy produced is obtained from the plant capacity and historical availability factors. Closure dates from Energiauutiset 3/2016 for the Swedish units, from Fortum for Loviisa; the remaining are our estimates. On 14 October 2015, Oskarshamn announced the final decision to close units 1 and 2 of Oskarshamn, citing low electricity prices, high taxes for nuclear generation, and investment needs. On 15 October 2015, Vattenfall, the main owner of Ringhals nuclear plant, annouced the final decision to close units 1 and 2 of Ringhals. Vattenfall motivated the clousures with fuel costs, operation and maintenance costs, investment costs, and competence and resource needs (source: Company press releases). Marginal costs are measured in 2015 euros (source: Energikommissionen M 2015:01).

13 e right to control units R1-R4 and F1-F3. Similarly, Uniper controls the Oskarhamn nitsnuclear O1-O3, andin Fortum no ownership-implied rights for closing any of the units. the has Nordics: ownership his suggests that the plant closure game is played between Vattenfall and Uniper. Figure % Vattenfall tot. gen. 93 TWh, 56 % nuclear 70.4% Ringhals R1* R2* R3 29.6% Forsmark R4 F1 F2 22.2% F3 9.9% Oskarshamn Uniper tot. gen. 22 TWh, 56 % nuclear 54.5% O1* O2* O3 Fortum 45.5% * tot. gen. 48 TWh, 27 % nuclear Closures announced in Share of nuclear assets in Sweden. Notes: Ownership strucutre of the Swedish nuclear fleet. The 10 nuclear units are located in Forsmark, Ringhals, and Oskarshamn sites. The main owners are Vattenfall, Uniper and Fortum. As in our theory developments, the key players own other assets benefitting from the

14 Nuclear in Finland? Finnish electricity key facts (2014): Total consumption 83.3 TWh (TeraWatthours). Domestic production 65.4 TWh Nuclear is baseload generation: 27 % of electricity supply Ownership structure is special in Finland, and this has implications for investments

15 Nuclear power ownership in Finland Nuclear power plants in Finland are owned by three companies 1. TVO owns two operating units (Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2) and one that is under construction (Olkiluoto3) 2. Fennovoima has been granted a positive decision-in-principle for its unit (Fennovoima 1) 3. Fortum owns two units (Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2) First two are cooperatives. This ownership form is the Finnish model

16 Nuclear power plants in Finland Cooperatives: consortium to joint-finance large investments financing share=output share. Also, the running costs are shared in the same proportions electricity to shareholders with cost-of-service price Majority of nuclear power capacity owned by cooperatives (70 % at the moment, 77 % after OL3 and 82 % after FH1) Industry, consumer, and wholesale interests are represented

17 Illustration of ownership Series A Series B Series C Total (OL1+OL2) (OL3) (Meri-Pori) EPV Energia Oy Fortum Power and Heat Oy Karhu Voima Oy Kemira Oyj Oy Mankala Ab Pohjolan Voima Oy Total Figure: Source: TVO

18 What explains investments in nuclear in Finland? Co-operatives No big exposure in individual balance sheets Less equity required and lower risk premiums for loans Market risk The plant is a long-term contract Willingness to pay for the contract: industry structure and the retail commitments Strategic reasons Capacity share competition

19 Return requirement Cost of capital r E, cost of equity, r D cost of debt A = E + D, assets=equity+debt weighted average cost of capital, WACC: WACC = E A r E + D A r D MIT study(2003): WACC=11.5 % in Finland, 6% or lower. How?

20 Cost of capital: typical project Equity,15% 1/2 11,5% cost of capital Debt, 8% 1/2 Figure: shares of equity and debt

21 Cost of capital: low equity share for a cooperative Equity,15% 1/5 9,5% cost of capital Debt, 8% 4/5 Figure: Cooperative is less exposed to risk

22 Cost of capital: low cost of debt for a cooperative Equity,15% 1/5 7% cost of capital Debt, 5% 4/5 Figure: Cooperative is less exposed to risk

23 Cost of capital: low return requirement of equity Equity,10% 1/5 6% cost of capital Debt, 5% 4/5 Figure: Non-profits interests in cooperatives

24 Levelized Cost of Energy, LCOE LCOE for a given production plant is the constant (in real terms) price for output that would equate the net present value of revenue from the plant s output with the net present value of the cost of production. Formally, N LCOE q t (1 + r) t=1 t = N t=0 LCOE = N t=0 C t (1 + r) t C t (1+r) t N q t t=1 (1+r) t where C t is the cost of production at time period t, N is the total number of periods, r is the annual interest rate, and q t is the quantity of production. To make sure: C 0 captures the fixed costs, and the cost in later periods are the items C 1, C 2,..., C N. We will now see how this exactly works using the worksheet for the nuclear case.

25 Levelized Cost of Energy, LCOE 1. Download the spreadsheet in the lectures folder (see the dropbox folder for the lecture) 2. Look at results tab: row 83 gives the total cost of operations for each 5 year period (thus, take this as one period). The first period ( ) includes the fixed cost, and the later periods the variable costs. This row identifies the cost items needed for the calculation of LCO 3. Production is somewhat hidden in the spreadsheet so here are the directions for finding it: use D84/D30 to obtain the production (divide revenues by price) for period. Do the same for all 5 year periods and you have the total output in TWh (TeraWatthours) for each period. 4. The discount factor can be found on row Now you are ready to go: calculate the LCO for this plant! It would be nice if you can construct a table that reports this number for different discount rates (change that in row 11) and investment costs (row 12) and also for different variable costs (row 10). 6. The tab control panel allows you to change scenarios, and in results you can see when the plant breaks even. Can you explain the relationship between the LCO and the final profitability of the investment?

26 Some references Kessides, I. N., Nuclear power: Understanding the economic risks and uncertainties. Energy Policy, 38(8), pp Lehto, E., Electricity prices in the Finnish retail market. Energy Policy, 39(4), pp Linares, P. & Conchado, A., The economics of new nuclear power plants in liberalized electricity markets. Energy Economics, Volume 40, pp Roques, F. A. et al., Nuclear power: a hedge against uncertain gas and carbon prices?. The Energy Journal, 27(4), pp Rothwell, G., A Real options approach to evaluating new nuclear power plants. The Energy Journal, 27(1), pp Thomas, S., Competitive energy markets and nuclear power: Can we have both, do we want either?. Energy Policy, Issue 38.