2,154 VOTE RESULTS 2,094 DISCLOSURES 558 VOTE RESULTS 95 VOTE RESULTS 18,278 VOTE RESULTS 150 VOTE RESULTS PAGES 1-2 PAGES 3-6 PAGES 7-11 PAGE 12

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1 THIS REPORT CAN BE ACCESSED AT SEMLERBROSSY.COM/SAYONPAY PAGES 1-2 2,154 VOTE RESULTS PAGES 3-6 2,094 DISCLOSURES PAGES VOTE RESULTS PAGE VOTE RESULTS PAGE 13 18,278 VOTE RESULTS PAGE VOTE RESULTS PAGE 15-16

2 CEO Pay Ratio disclosure did not cause a significant deviation from historical voting trends in. Although Say on Pay support was lowest among Russell 3000 companies that disclosed a Pay Ratio above 150x, this likely has more to do with outsized CEO pay magnitude than Pay Ratio disclosure. The disclosure of median employee pay had minimal effect on vote results, as it provided few additional insights on income inequality that were not previously known from standalone CEO pay disclosure. However, we expect that this may change in future years as shareholders continue to request more detailed Pay Ratio disclosure to better understand approaches to human capital management and pay philosophy. Say on Pay Results by Pay Ratio: Russell 3000 Avg SOP Vote Companies with SOP < % 91.4% 91.3% 18.7% 20.7% 19.4% 87.4% 27.2% Ratio < 40x n = x - 75x n = x - 150x n = 462 > 150x n = 488 At the end of, women held 18.6% of all Russell 3000 Board seats, 210 basis points above the year-end figure but 140 basis points below our prediction. More interestingly, the percentage of women elected to new Russell 3000 Board seats reached 35% during. This percentage has grown rapidly in recent years and serves as an indicator of the growth potential for overall female Board representation. Increased shareholder and institutional efforts surrounding the topic of Board diversity suggest that the percentage of women holding Board seats will continue to increase over the next few years. Female Representation on Russell 3000 Boards 12.4% 13.2% 13.9% 15.1% 16.5% 18.6% 2013 Source: Seml er Brossy data and anal ysi s ; Fundvotes, LLC; ISS Voti ng Anal yti cs 1

3 Average Say on Pay vote support for the S&P 100 (89.6%) was lower than average vote support for the remaining Russell 3000 companies (90.3%). Despite the continued trend of lower support for S&P 100 companies (observed in seven of the last eight years), the gap in average vote support between two indexes decreased by 160 basis points from to. During this period we also observed an increase in the failure rates for both indexes. In, 3.2% of S&P 100 companies and 2.6% of the remaining Russell 3000 companies failed Say on Pay versus 2. and 1.5%, respectively, in. Average Say on Pay Support Russell 3000 (not in S&P 100) S&P % 89.9% 88.6% 87.1% % 90.8% % 90.3% 90.8% 90.3% 88.8% 89.5% 89.6% Environmental proposals received median support of 31% in, with five proposals passing. This marked the highest annual level for median support and passing proposals. While vote support for environmental proposals increased this year, the number of proposals submitted decreased from 67 in to 42 in. This decrease suggests that companies may be recognizing the increased efforts around environmental topics and are choosing to engage directly with shareholders on these issues. We anticipate that environmental issues will continue to be an important focus area for shareholders, investors, and proxy advisors in 2019, which will drive even higher vote support on these proposals. Environmental Proposals: Median Vote Support 2 19% 2011 n = n = 29 23% 22% 23% 2013 n = 28 n = 45 n = 64 26% 28% n = 75 n = 67 31% n = 42 Source: Seml er Brossy data and anal ysi s ; Fundvotes, LLC; ISS Voti ng Anal yti cs 2

4 57 Russell 3000 companies (2.6%) failed Say on Pay in. Three companies have failed since our last report at the end of Q3 OSI Systems, Palo Alto Networks, and Rite Aid % 5 1.4% 2.6% 2.5% 2.4% 2.8% 1.7% 1.5% 2.6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 5% 6% 21% 19% 15% 17% 16% 17% 15% 16% 72% 73% 76% 75% 76% 75% 78% 75% PERCENT APPROVAL Below Avg = 90.9% n = 2,660 Failures = % 2, % 2, % 2, % 2, % 2, % 2, % 2, The average vote result is the lowest observed since 2012 The failure rate (2.6%) was the highest observed since The percentage of companies that received over 9 vote support (75%) was in-line with the historical average Nearly one-third of the S&P 500 has received vote support below 7 at least once since % of Russell 3000 and 7% of S&P 500 constituents have failed Say on Pay at least once over the same period Vote results for current S&P 500 and Russell 3000 constituents S&P 500 Russell % 8% Below 5 Support at Least Once 32% Below 7 Support at Least Once 67% 54% Below 9 Support at Least Once 3

5 10 75% Below 5 2% 4% 2% 3% 3% 2% 3% 5% 4% 4% 4% 2% 7% 6% 9% 7% 7% 8% 8% 8% 11% 15% 15% 18% 13% 19% 17% 13% 17% 7% 8% 26% 5 86% 83% 79% 76% 74% 77% 72% 72% 76% 71% 59% Utilities n = 65 Avg = 92.9% Industrials % Consumer Staples % Financials % Consumer Discretionary % Materials % Health Care % Information Technology % Real Estate Energy % Comm. Services % 1 Reclassification of GICS sectors in September resulted in a shift of companies between the IT, consumer discretionary, and communication services (formerly telecommunication services) sectors. The failure rate for the communication services sector (6.8%) increased significantly from (2.1%), and was substantially higher than the broader Russell 3000 (2.6%) Average Say on Pay support in the communication services sector (86.1%) was 415 basis points lower than the broader Russell 3000 (90.2%) Recent consolidation in the industry removed some companies with historically high Say on Pay support, and likely contributed to year-over-year volatility 10 75% Below % 6.8% 9% 11% 8% 15% 17% 26% 76% 7 n = 67 Avg = 91.3% n = 96 Avg. = 89.1% 59% n = 74 Avg. = 86.1% Average vote support for the energy sector has trailed that of the Russell 3000 over the last three years During that period, the failure rate for the energy sector (2.9%) was 100 basis points higher than the failure rate for the broader Russell 3000 (1.9%) Companies in the energy sector have recently been criticized for problematic pay practices and outsized pay magnitude during sustained periods of poor performance This has led to some top-paying energy companies (e.g., Nabors Industries) to cancel performance-based equity awards and/or decrease CEO pay to improve perceived pay for performance misalignment Average Say on Pay Results Russell 3000 Energy Sector 91.7% 90.9% 90.2% 90.6% 87.6% 88.5% Source: Seml er Brossy data and anal ysi s ; F undvotes, LLC; ISS Voti ng Anal yti cs. Russel l 3000 sampl e effecti ve as of June 26,

6 91% 88% Russell 3000 S&P % 92% 91% 9 89% 9 91% 91% 92% 91% 91% 91% 91% 9 18% 12% Russell 3000 S&P % 15% 15% 15% 13% 13% 14% 14% 12% 12% 12% 14% 12% 8% The gap between average vote support for the Russell 3000 and S&P 500 has narrowed over the last three years ISS recommended Against large companies (S&P 500) more often than small companies (Russell 3000) % 86% 75% 95% % ISS For (n = 1,855) 14% ISS Against (n = 299) ISS For (n = 1,855) ISS Against (n = 299) ISS recommended Against 14% of companies, the highest observed rate since 2013 (14%) Shareholder support was 31% lower at companies that received an ISS Against recommendation, the largest difference since voting began in 2011 Rec. Rec. For Against For 81% of companies (n=1,651) 6% of companies (n=125) Against 8% of companies (n=165) 5% of companies (n=102) ISS Against in, For in (n=165) % ISS For in, Against in (n=125) 290 companies (14.2%) received both an ISS For and Against recommendation during the last two years A change in an ISS recommendation resulted in a 27%-3 difference in Say on Pay support over the past two years Source: Seml er Brossy data and anal ysi s ; F undvotes, LLC; ISS Voti ng Anal yti cs. Russel l 3000 sampl e effecti ve as of June 27,. 5

7 The frequency of companies failing Say on Pay due to time-based equity grants and special awards/ mega-grants increased by 2,300 basis points and 800 basis points, respectively, from levels. Most other reasons for failure were less prevalent. Failed Say on Pay Vote Results 1 Russell 3000, n=57 Likely Causes of Votes Under 5 Number Pay and Problematic Rigor of Shareholder Non- Special Say on Pay Vote Results of Performance Pay Performance Outreach and Performance Awards/ Mega- Benchmarking Company q YOY Failures Relation Practices Goals Disclosure Based Equity Grants Practices Molina Healthcare, Inc. 5 79% -29% 1 X X Waterstone Financial, Inc. 5 86% -36% 1 X X Cogent Communications Holdings, Inc. 5 66% -17% 5 X X X Vista Outdoor Inc. 5 97% -48% 1 X X Fluidigm Corporation 49% 98% -49% 1 X X X RAIT Financial Trust 49% 92% -43% 1 X X X AECOM 48% 52% -4% 1 X X X USG Corporation 47% 97% -51% 1 X Rambus Inc. 46% 77% -31% 1 X X X X Virtus Investment Partners, Inc. 46% 66% -2 1 X X Mattel, Inc. 46% 92% -46% 1 X X X Boingo Wireless, Inc. 45% 58% -13% 1 X X Chesapeake Energy Corporation 45% 57% -12% 2 X X X X Mondelez International, Inc. 45% 85% -41% 1 X X X Trinseo S.A. 44% 96% -52% 1 X Envision Healthcare Corporation 44% 52% -8% 1 X X Commercial Metals Company 44% 95% -51% 1 X X Tritax Big Box REIT plc 44% 9-46% 1 X The Walt Disney Company 44% 84% -4 1 X X IMAX Corporation 43% 3 13% 2 X X X X X LivePerson, Inc. 42% 91% -49% 1 X X X X Universal Insurance Holdings, Inc. 42% 47% -4% 2 X X X X Digimarc Corporation 42% 75% -33% 1 X X Halliburton Company 42% 66% -24% 1 X X X X Tanger Factory Outlet Centers, Inc. 42% 8-38% 1 X X Preferred Bank 42% 98% -56% 1 X X X Hospitality Properties Trust 42% 48% -6% 2 X Medifast, Inc. 41% 42% -1% 3 X X Nabors Industries Ltd. 41% 44% -3% 7 X X X Huron Consulting Group Inc. 4 99% -59% 1 X X istar Inc. 4 87% -47% 1 X X X Nexstar Media Group, Inc. 39% 99% -6 1 X X X Qualys, Inc. 39% 96% -57% 1 X X X Tutor Perini Corporation 38% 42% -4% 8 X X X X G-III Apparel Group, Ltd. 37% 67% -3 2 X X X Gentherm Incorporated 37% 91% -54% 1 X X Whitestone REIT 36% 43% -8% 2 X X Zoe's Kitchen, Inc. 35% 96% -6 1 X X FCB Financial Holdings, Inc. 33% 55% -22% 1 X X X X New York Community Bancorp, Inc. 33% 5-17% 3 X X X X First Horizon National Corporation 32% 95% -63% 1 X X Cleveland-Cliffs Inc. 32% 57% -26% 1 X X X Sanmina Corporation 31% 76% -45% 1 X X X Synergy Pharmaceuticals Inc. 29% X X X GenMark Diagnostics, Inc. 29% 65% -37% 1 X X X X Ameriprise Financial, Inc. 81% -56% 1 X X Ophthotech Corporation 24% 64% -4 1 X Patterson-UTI Energy, Inc. 24% 97% -73% 1 X X X Bed Bath & Beyond Inc. 21% 44% -22% 4 X X X X Nevro Corp. 2 82% -61% 1 X X X Wynn Resorts, Limited 2 59% -39% 1 X X X OSI Systems, Inc. 38% 98% -6 1 X X Palo Alto Networks, Inc. 21% 94% -73% 3 X X X X X Rite Aid Corporation 16% 88% -71% 1 X X X Acacia Research Corporation 19% 97% -77% 2 X X FleetCor Technologies, Inc. 14% 37% -23% 3 X X X X Nuance Communications, Inc. 1 33% -24% 5 X X X Summary Statistics: Count (n=57) Prevalence 61% 6 28% 37% 44% 35% 11% 1 As of December 31,. 6

8 Percentage of Companies The first year of CEO Pay Ratio disclosure provided an interesting opportunity to evaluate a company s CEO pay relative to pay for their median employee, a number that is largely influenced by business organization structure and employee demographic. The Pay Ratio provided interesting statistics about the variation in CEO pay across industries and companies of different sizes. However, these statistics did not translate to significant additional insight for Say on Pay voting. This may change going forward as we wait to see how proxy advisors incorporate the Pay Ratio into evaluations and how shareholders utilize the context of multiple years of disclosure. 600x 500x 400x 300x 200x 100x 0x 75x 16x S&P 500 (n=437) 113x 34x Russell 3000 (n=2,094) 166x 73x 300x 151x 530x 323x 10 P 25 P 50 P 75 P 90 P Thousands $200 $150 $100 $50 $0 $24 $24 S&P 500 (n=437) $47 $42 Russell 3000 (n=2,094) $68 $62 $103 $97 $138 $ P 25 P 50 P 75 P 90 P The median CEO Pay Ratio of the S&P 500 was 2.3 times the median CEO Pay Ratio of the Russell 3000 Median employee compensation ranges for the two indexes were almost identical, except at the 90 th percentile, where the Russell 3000 was 8% higher than the S&P % 1 5% Russell th P: 73x 75th P: 151x S&P th P: 166x 90th P: 323x 75th P: 300x Russell 3000 S&P th P: 530x The Russell 3000 distribution is concentrated below 323:1 while the S&P 500 is concentrated below 530:1 0x 100x 200x 300x 400x 500x 600x 700x 800x CEO Pay Ratio 7

9 90P: $14.4M 75P: $8.5M $149.8K 50P: $4.7M $97.4K 25P: $2.4M $62.2K $42.2K 10P: $1.2M $23.6K CEO Compensation Median Emp. Compensation We observed that the CEO Pay Ratio is more heavily influenced by the magnitude of CEO compensation than by median employee compensation CEO compensation scales as company size increases, while median employee compensation has little correlation with company size Company revenue, a primary determinant of CEO compensation, has a direct correlation with the CEO Pay Ratio Bottom quartile median employee compensation has a stronger effect on Pay Ratio magnitude than top quartile median employee compensation 400x 400x 300x 300x 200x 200x 100x 0x 28x < $0.5B n = x $0.5-$1.5B n = x $1.5-$3.5B n = x $3.5-$10B n = x > $10B n = x 0x 121x < $5B n = x $5-$10B n = x $10-$15B n = x $15-$30B n = x > $30B n = x 400x 300x 300x 200x 200x 390x 100x 0x 192x < $40K n = x 73x 64x $40-$55K n = 381 $55-$70K n = 340 $70-$100K n = x > $100K n = x 0x < $50K n = x $50-$65K n = x $65-$90K n = x $90-$120K n = 63 92x > $120K n = 80 Source: Seml er Brossy data and anal ysi s ; F undvotes, LLC; ISS Voti ng Anal yti cs. Russel l 3000 sampl e effecti ve as of June 26, * Excl udes compani es wi th no empl oyees, no CEO, or CEOs wi th no compensati on. 8

10 Median Employee Comp. ($000s) In Russell 3000 data, we observed that the CEO Pay Ratio and CEO compensation show a positive relationship, while the Pay Ratio and median employee compensation show an inverse, and weaker relationship CEO Comp. ($MM) $35 $30 $25 $20 $15 $10 $5 $0 Correlation Coefficient = x 50x 100x 150x 200x 250x 300x 350x 400x 450x 500x CEO Pay Ratio $300 $250 $200 Correlation Coefficient = $150 $100 $50 $0 0x 50x 100x 150x 200x 250x 300x 350x 400x 450x 500x CEO Pay Ratio Source: Seml er Brossy data and anal ysi s ; F undvotes, LLC; ISS Voti ng Anal yti cs. Russel l 3000 sampl e effecti ve as of June 26, * Excl udes compani es wi th no empl oyees, no CEO, or CEOs wi th no compensati on. 9

11 The composition of a company s workforce and the use of seasonal or part-time employees are primary drivers of high CEO Pay Ratios at the 75 th and 90 th percentiles in the Consumer Staples and Consumer Discretionary sectors In early May, we observed an increase in the S&P 500 s 90 th P Pay Ratio and 10 th P median employee compensation caused by the Pay Ratio filings of many apparel retail companies in the Consumer Discretionary sector with January 31 st fiscal year-ends Similarly, highly-paid CEOs in the Information Technology sector drove high CEO Pay Ratios at the 90 th percentile 800x 700x 600x 500x 400x Legend 90P 75P Median 25P 10P 950:1 300x 200x 100x 42x 49x 50x 56x 63x 79x 83x 85x 90x 136x 185x 0x Financials n=371 Health Care n=288 Utilities n=64 Real Estate n=144 Energy n=105 Information Technology n=259 Comm. Services n=85 Industrials n=322 Materials n=102 Consumer Staples n=83 Consumer Discretionary n= x 700x 600x Legend 90P 75P Median 1353:1 500x 400x 25P 10P 431x 300x 200x 100x 158x 215x 96x 111x 103x 151x 264x 169x 158x 256x 0x Financials n=58 Health Care n=56 Utilities n=27 Real Estate n=31 Energy n=28 Information Technology n=47 Comm. Services n=17 Industrials n=62 Materials n=21 Consumer Staples n=29 Consumer Discretionary n=61 Source: Seml er Brossy data and anal ysi s ; F undvotes, LLC; ISS Voti ng Anal yti cs. Russel l 3000 sampl e effecti ve as of June 26, * Excl udes compani es wi th no empl oyees, no CEO, or CEOs wi th no compensati on. 10

12 The Pay Ratio has an inverse relationship with Say on Pay, but is not a primary driver of Say on Pay results Outsized pay magnitude for the CEO continues to have the strongest effect on Say on Pay votes As a result, high Pay Ratios are correlated with low Say on Pay support Only 22% of Russell 3000 constituents disclosed a Ratio above 175:1, yet those companies made up 48% of Say on Pay vote failures Failed Say on Pay (n=48) > 250x 35% 175x - 250x 13% < 50x 23% 100x - 175x 13% 50x - 100x 17% 175x - 250x 7% > 250x 15% 100x - 175x 17% 50x - 100x 26% All Companies (n=1,888) < 50x 35% Avg SOP Vote Companies with SOP < % 91.4% 91.3% 87.4% Avg SOP Vote Companies with SOP < % 92.1% 90.5% % 26.4% 18.7% 20.7% 19.4% 14.7% % Ratio < 40x n = x - 75x n = x - 150x n = 462 > 150x n = 488 Ratio < 100x n = x - 175x n = x - 300x n = 94 > 300x n = 105 Ratio > 150x n = % Ratio > 300x n = % 75x - 150x n = % 175x - 300x n = x - 75x n = % 100x - 175x n = 131 7% Ratio < 40x n = % Ratio < 100x n = 92 5% Source: Seml er Brossy data and anal ysi s ; F undvotes, LLC; ISS Voti ng Anal yti cs. Russel l 3000 sampl e effecti ve as of June 26, * Excl udes compani es wi th no empl oyees, no CEO, or CEOs wi th no compensati on. 11

13 The number of equity proposals (558) was lower than in any of the previous seven years. We suspect that this is largely attributable to the elimination of the 162(m) provision that had required shareholder approval of performance goals in incentive plans every five years 6 of equity proposals received vote support above 9, versus 65% in. Only 2 proposals failed, versus 5 in Companies that received Say on Pay support below 7 received 11 percentage points less support on equity plan proposals, a small increase above the average (9 percentage points) that we observed over the previous four years % 0.4% 0.6% 0.6% 0.1% 0.6% 0.6% 0.4% 13% 8% 9% 8% 6% 8% 7% 8% 75% 5 52% 34% 43% 38% 37% 48% 52% 55% 3 31% 28% 32% 65% 61% 65% 6 PERCENT APPROVAL Below Avg. = 83.2% n = 632 Failures = % % % % % % % Say on Pay 7-9 Say on Pay Below 7 Say on Pay % 9 92% 91% 87% 88% 83% 83% 83% 85% 83% 85% 79% n = 683 n = 607 n = 560 n = 677 n =

14 39% of Say on Golden Parachute votes received vote support above 9, in-line with the historical average of 4 over the previous four years The failure rate for Say on Golden Parachute votes (14.7%) decreased from (19.5%), but was higher than the failure rate in any other previous year The number of Say on Golden Parachute votes (95) decreased significantly from the number in (123) 10 75% % 6.9% 5.6% 5.2% 7.6% 19.5% 14.7% 9% 56% 34% 2011 Avg. = 85.2% n = 32 Failures = 0 19% 45% 22% % % 21% 4 32% 38% 38% % % 79.7% % 44% 29% 82.2% % 46% 81.3% % 17% 31% 39% 39% 74.2% % 77.2% PERCENT APPROVAL Below The Web.com Group s advisory vote on Golden Parachute failed after receiving only 44.7% support ISS recommended that shareholders vote Against the proposal ISS noted that the CEO s excise tax gross-up payments would not be triggered by a transaction, but that his single-trigger cash and equity awards would be contingent upon a qualifying termination following a transaction ISS estimated that total change-in-control payments payable to NEOs would be $11.4M, approximately 0.8% of the transaction equity value CIC Agreement CEO NEOs Severance Trigger Single trigger Double trigger Severance Multiple Severance Basis Equity Treatment Excise Tax Gross-up 1.5x 0.5x, 1.0x Base salary + greater of target bonus in year in which CIC occurs or prior year Time-based: Auto-accelerated Performance: Single trigger; deemed earned at target level of performance None 13

15 42 director nominees (0.23%) received vote support below 5 in historically, 0.29% of director nominees have received vote support below 5 Over the past four years, average director election vote support at companies that received a Say on Pay vote below 5 in the prior year is 6% lower than at companies that received above 7 vote support Average vote support for male director nominees declined 30 basis points from levels, while vote support for female nominees did not change Director election vote support has declined in each of the last three years. As shareholders and investors expect more oversight from Boards on ESG topics, director election vote support may continue to decline in future years 3.2% 2.8% 2.9% % % 3.5% 3.9% 4.7% % 14.8% 14.7% 14.6% 78.3% 79.1% 78.8% 78.3% 77.5% Avg=96. n=12,469 95% % 75-85% Below 75% 96.6% n=18, % n=18, % n=18, % n=18,278 96% 93% Male Female % 96.8% 96.8% 96.6% 96.6% 95.4% 95.7% 95.6% 95.5% 95.2% Above 7 Say on Pay n=52, Say on Pay n=2,925 Below 5 Say on Pay n=991 n=12,469 n=18,660 n=18,347 n=18,306 n=18,278 14

16 Median support for environmental proposals was 300 basis points higher than, while median support for social proposals was 900 basis points higher Although vote support for environmental and social proposals reached a new peak, the number of environmental and social proposals decreased by 37% and 1, respectively, from levels 5 environmental (11.9%) and 7 social (6.5%) proposals received greater than 5 support 2 19% 23% 22% 23% 26% 28% 31% By comparison, only 7 environmental (2.) and 9 social (1.) proposals passed over the previous seven years combined The environmental proposals that passed were shareholder requests for the respective companies to issue reports detailing one or more of: 2011 n = n = n = 28 n = 45 n = 64 n = 75 n = 67 n = 42 - Sustainability measures (included in 3 passing proposals) - GHG reduction goals (2 proposals) - Coal Combustion and Water impacts (1 proposal) The social proposals that passed were more varied but included requests for reports on: n = % 2012 n = % 21% 2 18% 17% 2013 n = 122 n = 142 n = 128 n = 132 n = % n = Gun safety measures/ mitigation efforts (29% of passing proposals) - Monitor risk of the opioid crisis (29%) - Portfolio impact analyses resulting from 2 Degree policy changes (29%) - Feasibility to eliminate antibiotics from supply chain (14%) We expect support for ESG proposals will only continue to increase in 2019 as shareholders and proxy advisors continue to take an increasingly active role in engagement and proxy voting 15

17 Passing ESG Proposals Recommendation Company Proposal ISS Management Support q Result Environmental Proposals (n=5) Rite Aid Corp. Report on Sustainability For Against 78% Pass Kinder Morgan, Inc. Report on Sustainability For Against 6 Pass The Middleby Corp. Report on Sustainability, Including GHG Goals For Against 57% Pass Genesee & Wyoming, Inc. Adopt GHG Emissions Reduction Goals For None 54% Pass Ameren Corp. Report on Coal Combustion Residual and Water Impacts For Against 52% Pass Social Proposals (n=7) Darden Restaurants, Inc. Assess Feasibility of Adopting a Policy to Phase Out Use of Antibiotics For Against 91% Pass STURM, RUGER & COMPANY, INC. Report on Gun Violence For Against 68% Pass Depomed, Inc. Report on Governance Measures Implemented Related to Opioids For Against 62% Pass Kinder Morgan, Inc. Assess Portfolio Impacts of Policies to Meet 2 Degree Scenario For Against 6 Pass Rite Aid Corp. Report on Governance Measures Implemented Related to Opioids For Against 57% Pass Anadarko Petroleum Corporation Assess Portfolio Impacts of Policies to Meet 2 Degree Scenario For Against 53% Pass American Outdoor Brands Corp. Report on Gun Violence For Against 52% Pass FOR MORE INF ORMAT ION, VISIT US AT SEML ERBRO SS Y. COM SEMLER BROSSY CONSULTING GROUP WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, 10TH FLOOR LOS ANGELES, CA INFO@SEMLERBROSSY.COM S E M L E R B R O S S Y C O N S U L T I N G G R O U P LLC 16