National Association of Business Economics 46th Annual Meeting Philadelphia, PA. October 4, 2004

Transcription

1 The Cost of Terrorism: How Much Can We Afford? National Association of Business Economics 46th Annual Meeting Philadelphia, PA October 4, 2004 Robert P. Hartwig, Ph.D., CPCU, Senior Vice President & Chief Economist Insurance Information Institute 110 William Street New York, NY Tel: (212) Fax: (212)

2 Presentation Outline TRIA Background & Update Is Terrorism an Insurable Risk Yet? Determinants of insurability Workers comp-specific problems Capacity, Capital & Financial Strength The Global Face of Terrorism The Market for Terrorism Insurance Politicization of the Terrorism Threat Q & A

3 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA): UPDATE TRIA expires 12/31/05 (enacted Nov. 26, 2002) Pan-industry coalition coalescing around a 2-year extension House subcommittee hearings held April 28 went well H.B introduced in June 2004 Passed by subcommittee September 30 Senate hearings May 18 many committee members amenable BUT seem inclined to wait for Treasury study due June 2005 Reauthorization opposed by some groups (e.g., CFA, AEI) Exclusionary language (except WC) for terror already developed by ISO & approved in 46 jurisdictions

4 Federal National Security and Counterterrorism Spending $600 $500 $400 $354 $547 Federal national security and antiterror spending increased by 55% between FY2001 and FY2004 $ Billions $300 $200 $100 Total Excludes: Billions spent by state and local governments Mitigation costs borne by private industry $0 Cost of terrorism insurance FY2001 FY2004 Source: 9/11 Commission.

5 Structure of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Max Loss $100 $75 $50 ($ Billions) 10% Industry Co-Reinsurance above 7% Retention Federal Government covers 90% above 7% retention to $100B max 10% Industry Co-Reinsurance above 10% Retention Federal Government covers 90% above 10% retention to $100B max 10% Industry Co-Reinsurance above 15% Retention Federal Government covers 90% above 15% retention to $100B max $25 $15 billion $12.5 billion $10 billion $0 7% Retention* Government recoups payouts below $10B in Year 1, $12.5 Year 2, $15B Year 3 with 3% max surcharge on policy premium. 10% Retention* 15% Retention* Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 * Company retention based on direct premiums written. Source: U.S. Congress, Insurance Information Institute.

6 Insurance Industry Retention Under TRIA ($ Billions) $25 $20 Above the retention, federal govt. pays 90% and private insurers pay 10%. Govt. caps its losses at $100 billion. $17.5 Proposed $20.0 $ Billions $15 $10 $10.0 $12.5 $15.0 $5 $0 Year 1 (2003) Year 2 (2004) Year 3 (2005) Year 4 (2006) Year 5 (2007) Source: Insurance Information Institute

7 ARE WE THERE YET? THREE YEARS AFTER 9/11, IS TERRORISM AN INSURABLE RISK?

8 Terrorism Violates Traditional Requirements for Insurability Requirement Estimable Frequency Estimable Severity Definition Insurance requires large number of observations to develop predictive rate-making models (an actuarial concept known as credibility) Maximum possible/ probable loss must be at least estimable in order to minimize risk of ruin (insurer cannot run an unreasonable risk of insolvency though assumption of the risk) Violation Very few data points Terror modeling still in infancy, untested. US intelligence infrastructure deeply flawed. Potential loss is virtually unbounded. Losses can easily exceed insurer capital resources for paying claims. Extreme risk in workers compensation and statute forbids exclusions. Source: Insurance Information Institute

9 Terrorism Violates Traditional Requirements for Insurability (cont d) Requirement Diversifiable Risk Random Loss Distribution/ Fortuity Definition Must be able to spread/distribute risk across large number of risks Law of Large Numbers helps makes losses manageable and less volatile Probability of loss occurring must be purely random and fortuitous Events are individually unpredictable in terms of time, location and magnitude Violation Losses likely highly concentrated geographically or by industry (e.g., WTC, power plants) Take-up rate low outside most atrisk zones/industries leads to adverse selection problem Terrorism attacks are planned, coordinated and deliberate acts of destruction Dynamic target shifting from hardened targets to soft targets Terrorist adjust tactics to circumvent new security measures Actions of US and foreign governments may affect likelihood, nature and timing of attack Source: Insurance Information Institute

10 Modeling Severity & Frequency Weapons Selection Frequency Exposure Location # & Type Employee Blast/Explosion Chemical Biological Radiological Other (e.g., Dam Failure) Casualty Footprint Physical distributio n of intensity of event Weapon availability Target attractiveness Relative attractiveness of region State-by- State Analysis Targets Type of structure/ facility Sources: Insurance Information Institute based on NCCI Item Filing B-1383 & EQECAT modeling.

11 Additional Insurability Concerns Information Problems: Traditional Insurance assumes that emerging issue information is available and shared (Terrorism information sharing is asymmetric Classified data is not shared). Unique Role & Responsibility of Government: Insurance is designed for policyholders insurable interests (Victims of terrorism are mostly surrogate targets for attacks mainly aimed at government, and the government is in a unique position to influence the likelihood of attack based upon foreign policy.) Source (this slide and next three): Terrorism, TRIA, and a Timeline to Market Turmoil? by James Macdonald of ACE USA, presentation before the Real Estate Roundtable, April 22, 2004.

12 Additional Insurability Concerns Surplus Impairment Risk: Statutory Accounting requires insurers to set aside reserves for the ultimate liabilities arising from the insurance policies they underwrite. (Insurers are not allowed to post reserves for losses that have not occurred. Therefore, insurers are not allowed to post reserves specifically related to catastrophe losses from natural perils or terrorism until they actually occur. As a result, catastrophe losses deplete insurer s capital & surplus base intended for the security of all policyholders). Pre-Loss Funding: Almost all insurance assumes that premiums are paid first, normally at the inception of the policy. (In terrorism programs or pools, private and public sector solutions, such as TRIA, often use a combination of pre-loss and post-loss funding. )

13 Terrorism & Workers Comp: Unique Insurability Problems Unlimited risk-of-ruin due to uncapped medical obligations and lifetime income payments 9/11 transformed many WC underwriting decisions into capital management decisions. WC insurers cannot exclude terrorism in any state. WC take-up ratio = 100% With the exception of PA state WC laws do not even permit exclusion of war. Traditional statewide rating approach is completely unsuitable for pricing terrorism Office worker in Times Square = Same premium as office worker in Rochester? Also: Lowest rated classes present disproportionate risk to terrorist loss (assuming an attack similar to 9/11): office, secretarial (8810).

14 Terrorism & Workers Comp: Unique Insurability Problems New Exposure Basis: Employees by location not yet formally embraced by rating agencies new underwriting & exposure management systems now required. Catastrophe Reinsurance: Prior to 9/11, life insurers provided low-cost WC reinsurance over single event insurer retentions of $10 million or less with no Terrorism or NRBC exclusion. New Bermuda capacity has not replaced the life reinsurers, who exited market after 9/11. No NRBC is available to today for national account insurers. Source: Terrorism, TRIA, and a Timeline to Market Turmoil? by James Macdonald of ACE USA, presentation before the Real Estate Roundtable, April 22, 2004.

15 CAPITAL, CAPACITY & PERFORMANCE CAN INSURERS AFFORD ANOTHER MAJOR TERRORIST ATTACK?

16 Sept. 11 Industry Loss Estimates ($ Billions) Life Other $1.0 (3.1%) Liability $4.0 (12.3%) Property - WTC 1 & 2 $3.6 (11.1%) Property - Other $6.0 (19.5%) Aviation Liability $3.5 (10.8%) Event Cancellation $1.0 (3.1%) Aviation Hull $0.5 (1.5%) Workers Comp $1.8 (5.8%) Biz Interruption $11.0 (33.8%) Current Insured Losses Estimate: $32.5B Source: Insurance Information Institute

17 Death Toll from September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attack EVENT WTC victims (workers & visitors)* WTC hijacked jets (incl. 10 hijackers) Pentagon victims on the ground Pentagon hijacked jet (incl. 5 hijackers) Pennsylvania jet crash (incl. 4 hijackers) TOTAL DEATHS 2, ,995 Source: *New York City Medical Examiner estimate of 2,752 (as of 29 Oct. 2003), less 147 killed on hijacked jets.

18 Top 10 Insured Losses Worldwide, ($2003) $35 $32.5 $30 $25 $20 $15 $10 $5 $20.9 $17.3 $4.9 $6.0 $6.2 $6.4 $6.4 $6.8 $7.6 $ Billions $0 Euro. Storms/Floods (1997) Hurricane Jeanne (2004)* Hurricane Hugo (1989) Windstorm Lothar (1999) Windstorm Daria (1990) Hurricane Charley (2004)* Typhoon Mireille (1991) Northridge Earthquake (1994) Hurricane Andrew (1992) Sept. 11 Terror Attack (2001) *Insurance Information Institute estimate; Hurricane Charley figure is from ISO/PCS. Both in 2004 $. Sources: Swiss Re, Natural Catastrophes and Man-Made Disasters in 2003, Sigma, no. 1, 2004; except Sept. 11 estimate from Hartwig, Robert P., 2004 Mid-Year Property/Casualty Insurance Update, Insurance Information Institute. Figure is stated in 2001 dollars.

19 Insured Loss Estimates (As of September 13, 2002) ,323 2,913 2,442 2, , Top 20 Groups (pre-tax, net of reinsurance, $ millions) NOTES: *Includes $474 mil for American Re $ Millions **Includes $289 mil for Converium ***Insurer is bankrupt Lloyd's Munich Re* Berk Hath Swiss Re Allianz XL Aioi St. Paul Zurich** Nissan AIG Citigroup Hartford ACE Chubb Taisei*** ERC Axa CNA Liberty Mut. ING Royal & Sun Partner Re Source: Morgan Stanley, Insurance Information Institute as of September 13, 2002.

20 Top 5 Costliest Terrorist Attacks (by insured property loss*) $35,000 $30,000 $25,000 $32,500 $ Millions, Adjusted to 2001 Price Level Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 cost insurers $125 million $20,000 $15,000 $10,000 9/11/01 2,995 Killed Injured 4/24/93 1 Killed 54 Injured 6/15/96 0 Killed 228 Injured 2/26/93 6 Killed 725 Injured 4/10/92 3 Killed 91 Injured $5,000 $0 9/11 Terrorist Attacks $907 $744 $725 $671 Bomb Near NatWest Tower in London IRA Car Bomb Near Manchester Mall Bomb in WTC Garage Bomb in London Financial District *Includes property, business interruption and aviation hull losses. Source: Swiss Re; Insurance Information Institute.

21 Under Most Scenarios TRIA Is Dormant But Vital When Triggered U/W Loss ($ B) P&C U/W Loss With and Without TRIA Support Total loss as % of policyholder surplus 68% TRIA not triggered under approximately 98% of scenarios 2% 2% 4% 6% 12% 20% 9/10 3/4 1/2 1/4 1/20 1/25 3/10 1/50 1/100 1/500 1/1000 Chance of an Event Source: EQECAT, NCCI Industry Loss with TRIA Federal Contribution Excess of TRIA Limit

22 Percent of 2003 Surplus Lost Due to a $25 Billion Terrorism Attack in 2004 With TRIA in Place 14.4% 32.5% Top 10 US P/C Insurers by Market Share Even with TRIA in place, some major insurers will lose more than 10% of their policyholder surplus: Terrorism is a clear threat to stability. 11.7% 12.6% 13.3% 14.7% 11.7% 7.7% 22.1% 4.7% Source: The Economic Effects of Federal Participation in Terrorism Risk, Analysis Group, September 14, 2004.

23 Estimated Workers Comp Insured Losses & Deaths for Terrorist Events WC Losses ($ Billions) $100 $90 $80 $70 $60 $50 $40 $30 $20 $10 $0 Source: Eqecat, NCCI. 1,300 $0.9 $1.1 $1.8 Sears Tower Airplane Attack Fatalities 1,000 El Paso Energy Truck Bomb 12,300 $7.4 9/11 Attack Rockefeller Ctr. Truck Bomb $15.4 Nuclear Power Plant Sabotage 173,000 $91.0 New York City Anthrax Release

24 Port Security War Game Estimates $58B Impact from Simulated Terrorist Attack Source: OECD report, Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Facts and Economic Impact, July 2003

25 U.S. Policyholder Surplus: $400 $350 Capacity at year end 2003 was just 2.3% above its mid-1999 peak $ Billions $300 $250 $200 $150 $100 $50 $0 Surplus (capacity) peaked at $339.3 Billion in mid-1999 and fell by 15.9% ($53.9 billion) to $285.4 billion at year-end 2002 Surplus is a measure of underwriting capacity. It is analogous to Owners Equity or Net Worth in non-insurance organizations Source: A.M. Best, ISO, Insurance Information Institute

26 * Target Commercial includes: Comm property, liability and workers comp; Surplus must also back-up on non-terrorist related property/liability and WC claims Source: Insurance Information Institute estimates based on A.M. Best Q.A.R Data. Capital Myth: US P/C Insurers Have $350 Billion to Pay Terrorism Claims Total PHS = $298.2 B as of 6/30/01 = $291.1 B as of 12/31/02 = $347.0 B as of 12/31/03 "Target" Commercial* $114 billion 33% Personal $146 billion 42% Only 33% of surplus backs target lines net of reserve deficiency Commercial Reserve Deficiency $30 billion (est.) 9% Other Commercial $58 billion 17%

27 US Reinsurers: Change in Policyholder Surplus ($ Billions) $ Billions $70 $65 $60 $55 $50 $60.9 $58.9 $56.4 Reinsurer PHS fell 20% from Capacity today similar to Same story globally. $64.6 $48.8 $45 $45.2 $ E Source: A.M. Best; Insurance Information Institute

28 U.S. Insured Catastrophe Losses ($ Billions) $30 $25 $20 $15 $10 $5 $0 $7.5 $2.7 $4.7 $ Billions 2004 could become the second worst year ever for natural disaster losses in the US $22.9 $5.5 $16.9 $8.3 $7.3 $2.6 $10.1 $8.3 $4.3 $28.1 $5.9 $17.0 $ E* *2004 figure is 2004 estimate as of September 20, Note: 2001 figure includes $20.3B for 9/11 losses reported through 12/31/01. Includes only business and personal property claims, business interruption and auto claims. Source: Property Claims Service/ISO; Insurance Information Institute

29 Underwriting Gain (Loss) $10 $0 ($10) ($20) ($30) ($40) ($50) ($60) $ Billions In 2001 insurers paid out $52 billion more in loss and associated expenses than they earned in premiums Source: A.M. Best, Insurance Information Institute

30 Property/Casualty Insurer ROE vs. Industry Cost of Capital: % 15% ROE Cost of Capital 10% 5% 0% -5% US P/C insurers missed their cost of capital by an average 6.4 points from 1991 to Source: The Geneva Association, Insurance Information Institute

31 ROE vs. Cost of Capital: US P/C Insurance: F 20% 15% The non-life insurance industry achieved its costs of capital in 2004 for the first time in many years 10% 5% 0% -5% US P/C insurers missed their cost of capital by an average 6.5 points from 1991 to F Source: The Geneva Association, Ins. Information Inst. ROE pts pts -1.2 pts Cost of Capital

32 Insurer Downgrade/Upgrade Ratio* E Ratio of Downgrades to Upgrad Sources: Impairment Rate and Rating Transition Study 1977 to 2002, A.M. Best & Co.; 2003E from S&P. *U.S. property/casualty and life/health insurers

33 P/C Company Insolvency Rates: 1993 to % 1.33% 10-yr Failure Rate = 0.72% 0.79% 1.02% 1.03% 0.58% 0.60% % 0.28% 0.23% Source: A.M. Best; Insurance Information Institute

34 PRICING ENVIRONMENT PRE/POST 9/11 CAN BUYERS OF INSURANCE AFFORD ANOTHER MAJOR TERRORIST ATTACK?

35 Cost of Risk: * $13 $12 $11 $10 $9 $ = -41.8% = % $8.91 $11.96 $8 $7.70 $7.30 $7 $6 $5 $6.10 $6.40 $6.49 $5.70 $5.25 $5.71 $5.20 $4.83 $6.46 $ * Cost of risk includes insurance premiums, retained losses and administrative expenses Source: 2003 RIMS Benchmark Survey; Insurance Information Institute

36 Components of Cost of Risk Per $1,000 of Revenue* % Change $4.0 $3.5 $3.0 $2.5 $2.0 $1.5 $1.0 $0.5 $0.0 $ % +90.3% % $2.92 Total WC Costs $3.63 $3.54 $3.57 $1.86 $2.72 Total Liability Costs $1.67 $2.55 Total Property Costs % $1.00 $1.43 $2.07 Other Costs * Cost of risk includes insurance premiums, retained losses and administrative expenses Source: 2003 RIMS Benchmark Survey; Insurance Information Institute % % $1.26 $1.15 $0.96 $0.87 $0.82 $0.46 Total Admin. Costs Total Mgmt. Liability Costs

37 Commercial Premium Rate Changes Are Sharply Lower 7% 7% 5% 4% 14% 11% 13% 16% 19% 22% 12% 12% 10% 12% 11% 9% 9% 9% 18% 18% 17% 16% 28% 31% 31% 28% 30% 32% 33% 28% 29% 30% 32% 30% 27% 25% 28% 22% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% Is moderation due to realization of performance and profit goals, increasing capacity/ capital, or market- share strategies? 0% Jul-01 Aug-01 Sep-01 Oct-01 Nov-01 Dec-01 Jan-02 Feb-02 Mar-02 Apr-02 May-02 Jun-02 Jul-02 Aug-02 Sep-02 Oct-02 Nov-02 Dec-02 Jan-03 Feb-03 Mar-03 Apr-03 May-03 Jun-03 Jul-03 Aug-03 Sep-03 Oct-03 Nov-03 Dec-03 Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Source: MarketScout.com

38 World Rate-On-Line Index (1990 = 100) Reinsurance prices rising, limits falling: ROL up significantly, though not as much as after Hurricane Andrew in Source: Guy Carpenter

39 THE GLOBAL FACE OF TERRORISM: MOST MAJOR ECONOMIES HAVE CREATED PERMANENT GOVERNMENT-BACKED TERRORISM INSURANCE FUNDS

40 Governments Insuring Terror Risk Government Backed Terrorism Insurance Programs Terrorism Risk Insurance Country Provider Details United Kingdom Pool Re Created in 1990 s due to IRA terrorism losses. Spain Consorcio Covers Extraordinary Risks such as Earthquake, Volcanic Eruption, Flood, Storm, Terrorism and Civil Commotion South Africa SASRIA Created in 1929 due to political climate in South Africa - still in existence today. Israel PTCF Covers losses triggered by politically motivated violence (including terrorism). France GAREAT Created post September 11, pool with state guarantee for terrorism coverage. Germany Extremos Created post September 11, pool with state guarantee for terrorism coverage Australia Created in November 2002 Source: Swiss Re Focus Report: Terrorism

41 Total International Terrorist Attacks, 2003 (Revised 22 June 2004) Number of Attacks (Total = 208) Deaths (Total = 625) In 2003, there were 208 terrorist attacks resulting in 625 deaths and 3,646 injuries Africa Asia Eurasia Latin America Middle East North America Western Europe Source: Patterns of Global Terrorism, US Department of State; Insurance Information Institute

42 Total Casualties Caused by International Terrorist Attacks, 2003 (Revised 22 June 2004) Dead (Total = 625) Wounded (Total = 3,646) 1,205 1,492 In 2003, there were 208 terrorist attacks resulting in 625 deaths and 3,646 injuries Africa Asia Eurasia Latin America Middle East North America Western Europe Source: Patterns of Global Terrorism, US Department of State; Insurance Information Institute

43 International Terrorist Attacks by Type of Event, 2003 Not Applicable, 1 Skyjacking, 1 Chemical, 1 Assault, 3 Bombing, 119 Arson, 3 Firebombing, 4 Suicide Attack, 11 Kidnapping, 14 Armed Attack, 49 Bombings accounted for 57% of the 208 attacks in 2003, while armed attacks accounted for 24%, Source: Patterns of Global Terrorism, US Department of State; Insurance Information Institute

44 International Terrorist Attacks by Type of Facility Struck, 2003 Military, 3 Other, 106 Attacks on businesses accounted for 30% of the 201 terror attacks against facilities in 2003, while attacks against govt. facilities accounted for 8%, Diplomat, 15 Government, 16 Business, 61 Source: Patterns of Global Terrorism, US Department of State; Insurance Information Institute

45 *Total of 4,271 casualties consists of 625 deaths and 3,646 injuries. Source: Patterns of Global Terrorism, US Department of State; Insurance Information Institute International Terrorist Attacks by Casualty, 2003* Business, 29 Government, 355 Diplomat, 8 Military, 44 Other, 3,835 Terrorist attacks killed more civilians than any other group (90% of the 4,271 casualties), followed by military personnel (1%) in Business personnel accounted for 0.7% of casualties (despite 30% of attacks being against business facilities).

46 The Market for Terrorism Coverage

47 Terrorism Coverage Take-Up Rate Rising Terrorism take-up rate for non-wc risk rose through 2003 and continues to rise in % 46.2% 32.7% 23.5% 26.0% TAKE UP RATE FOR WC COMP TERROR COVERAGE IS 100%!! 2003:II 2003:III 2003:IV 2004:I 2004:II Source: Marsh, Inc.; Insurance Information Institute

48 Terrorism Coverage: Take-Up Rates by Region 30.3% Terrorism take-up rate is highest in the Northeast 26.2% 21.8% 18.6% Northeast Midwest South West Source: Marsh, Inc.; Insurance Information Institute

49 Terrorism Coverage: Take-Up Rates by Industry Energy Media Food & Beverage Habitational/Hospitality Healthcare Real Estate Transportation Utility Financial Institution Public Entity Tech/Telecom Education Retail Manufacturing Construction 12.2% 26.8% 25.9% 22.1% 21.6% 20.0% 18.2% 35.3% 34.7% 31.5% 31.0% 30.2% 29.5% 27.1% 40.5% Given the choice, what percentage of employers would forego WC terror coverage? 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% Source: Marsh, Inc.

50 Terrorism Premium as a Percentage of Property Premium 5.18% Increase reflects fall in price of property coverage rather than increase in price of terror coverage 3.67% 4.26% 4.36% FACTs on Terror Premium Relative to Property Premium Highest = Energy Industry = 8.03% Lowest = Construction = 2.36% 2003:II 2003:III 2003:IV Average Source: Marsh, Inc.; Insurance Information Institute

51 Terrorism Premium as Percentage of Property Premium, by Industry Energy Habitational/Hospitality Media Real Estate Utility Education Transportation Food & Beverage Public Entity Technology/Telecom Retail Financial Institutions Healthcare Manufacturing Construction 6.07% 5.09% 4.94% 4.76% 4.76% 4.69% 4.20% 4.02% 3.75% 3.56% 3.31% 3.10% 2.36% 8.03% 7.65% Source: Marsh, Inc. 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9%

52 THE POLITICIZATION OF TERRORISM

53 If They Don t Know, Insurers Can t Presume to Know Either

54 They re Here and Plans are 90% Complete to Attack Most major government officials believe another attack is imminent Terrorists plans are 90% complete for next attack Government has no idea of how, when, where, who or what kind of attack is next.

55 Ability of Terrorism to Affect Political Outcomes Also Suggests Terrorism Uninsurable March 11 Madrid bombings taught us that terrorism can be used to not only kill people and destroy property, but affect political outcomes American actions abroad likely influence likelihood of attack in US. [e.g., Is Iraq an al Qaeda recruiting tool?] Both seem to be inconsistent with insurability

56 Number of Chemical Plants that Could Threaten Nearby People 7,728 EPA Homeland Security How is it that the EPA DHS come to such radically different conclusions? DHS estimate is 43% less than EPA 4,391 DHS estimate is 98% less than EPA Threatens More Than 1,000 People Threatens More Than 1,000,000 People Source: EPA and Department of Homeland Security from the Wall Street Journal, Chemical Plants Still Have Few Terror Controls, August 20, 2004, p. B1; Insurance Information Institute

57 Summary Large scale attacks still not insurable even 3 years after 9/11 Too many solvency-threatening scenarios Workers Compensation has many unique problems and take-up rate is 100%; No exclusions allowed Politicization of terror risk makes insuring against terror even more problematic Timely TRIA renewal in jeopardy

58 Insurance Information Institute On-Line If you would like a copy of this presentation, please give me your business card with address