IMO REVIEW OF RESOLUTIONS A.744(18) AND A.746(18) Note by Norway

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1 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION E IMO SUB-COMMITTEE ON FLAG STATE IMPLEMENTATION 9th session Agenda item 12 FSI 9/12/2 21 November 2000 Original: ENGLISH REVIEW OF RESOLUTIONS A.744(18) AND A.746(18) Comments and proposals on requirements on surveys and repairs, and on procedures for change of flag and class, aiming at the elimination of sub-standard ships Note by Norway Executive summary: Action to be taken: Paragraph 24 Related documents: Introduction SUMMARY This document gives a number of recommendations aiming at the elimination of sub-standard ships. Most of the recommendations are based on investigations done by Norwegian authorities into the sinking of the Cypriot registered bulk carrier Leros Strength in Most recommendations are relevant in relation to the review of resolutions A.744(18) and A.746(18). FSI 9/INF.5, resolution A.744(18), resolution A.746(18) 1 IMO has repeatedly developed new and stricter provisions aiming at improving safety of life at sea, as well as minimising the danger of pollution of the marine environment. However, in spite of general improvements of the standards, the international community still experiences very serious maritime accidents causing heavy loss of life and/or severe pollution. Thus, an imperative need for further improvements still exists. 2 Norway recognises that even ships of very high quality may become involved in serious accidents threatening both human lives and the marine environment. However, available statistics indicate that at the present time the majority of serious accidents are caused by substandard ships; i.e. ships not (fully) complying with mandatory international standards. Accidents have clearly shown that sub-standard ships are still able to operate - in spite of new and stricter regulations, strengthened Port State Control with increased scope and better targeting and the introduction of various new vetting schemes. We assume that the actual number of sub-standard ships is now relatively small, but the damages which may be caused by each of them, can be catastrophic. Furthermore, experience has shown that an accident caused by a single sub-standard ship, may result in new regional or international regulations affecting the whole maritime industry economically, and not only sub-standard ships. As long as sub-standard For reasons of economy, this document is printed in a limited number. Delegates are kindly asked to bring their copies to meetings and not to request additional copies.

2 FSI 9/12/2-2 - ships are able to operate in international trade, similar accidents and subsequent consequences for the whole maritime industry may be repeated in the future. 3 In our opinion, one of the main challenges for IMO in the coming years is therefore to continue and strengthen its efforts to effectively eliminate sub-standard ships - or at least ensure that such ships will no longer be able to operate with economic advantages. We fully recognise that these viewpoints are not new, but the sad fact remains that the international community has so far not succeeded in fully eliminating the dangerous and unfair operation of sub-standard ships. 4 The oil tanker Erika is the most recent example of a ship, apparently being of an inadequate standard, which was subject to a serious accident resulting in very serious consequences. 5 Another example in recent years is the bulk carrier Leros Strength which sunk in Although Norwegian interests were involved only to a limited degree in this accident (i.e. pollution of the Norwegian coastline by bunker oil), the sinking of this ship close to the Norwegian coast and with the loss of 20 lives, caused considerable public concern in Norway. Therefore, Norwegian authorities decided to make various investigations into this casualty. 6 The Norwegian Maritime Directorate recently published a report into this accident (Ref: MSC 73/INF.8 and FSI 9/INF.5), which should be regarded as a supplement to the Flag State report by Cyprus. Although we were not able to establish with certainty the precise causes of this accident, our investigations identified various factors that seem to have contributed significantly. This led to various proposals for amended procedures etc, which are likely to contribute to preventing that the standard of a ship can gradually deteriorate into sub-standard without being detected and acted upon. The proposals should therefore also contribute to reducing the risk that similar casualties will occur in the future. 7 During the process of finalising our report on Leros Strength, we also concluded that a number of the findings seemed to be generally applicable - not only to bulk carriers but also to oil tankers and other types of ships. It was also concluded that a summary of our findings should be brought to the attention of IMO, so that due consideration may be given to amending international regulations so as to contribute to the elimination of sub-standard shipping, and prevention of accidents caused by such ships. 8 During the process to finalise this document, various meetings have been arranged with participation from shipowners, seafarers organisations, classification societies as well as maritime authorities from other countries to discuss various aspects highlighted by the Leros Strength accident. During these discussion some topics not directly related to this accident but which also seemed significant in relation to the elimination of sub-standard ships were brought up, and it was decided to include also such aspects in this document to IMO. 9 In the following, we will start by giving a summary of the Leros Strength accident and the main findings of our investigations. Thereafter, we will give a summary of general lessons learnt and recommendations directly related to this specific accident as well as other recommendations that are considered to merit further consideration by IMO. The sinking of Leros Strength in February Leros Strength was a Greek owned and Cypriot flagged bulk carrier delivered in July The vessel sailed from Murmansk in Russia on 2 February 1997 destined for Police,

3 - 3 - FSI 9/12/2 Poland, where she was expected to arrive 8 February She had a crew of 20 people, all Polish citizens. The vessel was loaded with tonnes of apatite, which is classified as a harmless, non-dangerous fertiliser. 11 On 8 February 1997 at 7.50 a.m. the Captain of Leros Strength contacted the Rescue Coordination Centre in Sola/Stavanger, Norway, requesting immediate assistance. The ship was then approximately 30 nautical miles south west of Stavanger. The Captain reported that the bow was under water up to hold no.1. He was unable to steer and the situation was getting progressively worse. After approximately 3 minutes the radio contact was abruptly cut off. It was later established that the vessel had sunk, and there were no survivors. 12 When Norwegian Authorities decided to become actively involved in the investigations into the sinking of Leros Strength, the main objective was to attempt to contribute to establishing the direct causes - and hopefully also the underlying causes - of this tragic accident. If the causes could be established, this could possibly be a basis for proposing new/revised regulations or procedures related to bulk carriers, thereby - in the longer term - hopefully contributing to preventing similar casualties in the future. 13 The Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry requested the Norwegian Maritime Directorate (NMD) to investigate the sinking by conducting underwater inspections of the wreck, in co-operation with the Flag State (Cyprus) and others. It was later decided that NMD should also examine relevant survey documentation on the vessel for the years preceding the accident, as part of these investigations. In this process it has been of particular interest to investigate the effectiveness of the Enhanced Survey Programme (ESP) for bulk carriers. Taking into account that Leros Strength had changed from one classification society to another some months prior to the accident, it was agreed that the investigation should also attempt to establish if the IACS Transfer Of Class Agreement (TOCA) had been working as intended, or if it was still possible to avoid necessary upgrading by switching from one classification society to another. 14 The preliminary and final underwater inspections of the wreck were carried out in September 1997 and June 1999 respectively in close co-operation with the Republic of Cyprus, the International Transport Workers Federation and others. Summing up the underwater inspections, the results were clearly not providing the answers one was hoping for when making the decision to conduct these inspections. Leros Strength had been very severely crushed and distorted, and the damage was most likely accounted for by the geology of the wreck site. It was unfortunately not possible to identify with certainty the specific direct cause of this accident. However, from other available information it was possible to identify the direct cause in general terms, which was clearly ingress of water into the fore part of the ship. The "Marine Accident Report" written by the Department of Merchant Shipping in Cyprus concluded - based on stability calculations of alternative flooding scenarios - that "it is highly probable that when the Master was in contact with the RCC Stavanger the vessel s fore-peak, no. 1 and no. 2 cargo holds were flooded". 15 The investigations into the sinking of Leros Strength did not established any other external factors than the weather that could explain the circumstances significant for progressive water ingress and subsequent sinking. As far as we know, no vessel other than Leros Strength ran into real problems because of the weather conditions in the areas where the voyage took place. Taking into account the circumstances and the large extent of flooding into different compartments prior to the sinking, it was therefore concluded that the structural integrity of the ship during this voyage could not have been up to the required standards.

4 FSI 9/12/ The study that NMD carried out of the available information on surveys etc during approximately 5 years prior to the sinking, gave a rather confusing picture of the structural condition of Leros Strength during this period. It was concluded that much of the survey documentation on this vessel for the relevant period was inadequate. Descriptions of deficiencies found and their location were often imprecise/unclear, and very little information was available on the repairs carried out. There are examples of defects required to be repaired immediately by one surveyor, which were deferred for a year by the next surveyor. Furthermore, in many cases it was impossible from the available documentation to determine with certainty whether defects found but not repaired at an earlier survey have actually been repaired, or if they have been overlooked at the next survey. When the ESP documentation is lacking - as in this case - it is also impossible to verify the effectiveness of ESP. 17 In most respects the TOCA requirements applicable at the time of class transfer of Leros Strength seem to have been complied with. However, our investigations indicate a need for introducing stricter requirements and restrictions regarding transfer from one classification society to another. Recommendations 18 Recommendations based on lessons learnt from the Leros Strength accident as well as related concerns, are listed in the following: a) All survey reports should comply with the following requirements: Include a clear description of which compartments of the ship that have been surveyed. Include a clear description of which structural elements that have been surveyed within each compartment, and what type of survey ( overall or close-up ) was done. Include a clear description of the condition of each individual structural element surveyed, including - when relevant - a clear identification of which items that require specific types of repair. The principle of negative reporting only seems to be accepted in many cases. In accordance with this principle, reporting can be limited to the identification of those items having been identified as defective during a survey. All items not mentioned will be assumed as surveyed and found OK in accordance with this principle, and can therefore not be separated from items overlooked/forgotten during the survey. The principle of negative reporting only should therefore be generally banned from all survey reporting. b) Standard terminology for accurately describing the seriousness and extent of problems/defects identified during surveys should be agreed, and made mandatory for all survey reports. c) It is not uncommon that a given survey is split between two or more survey stations. In such cases it is very difficult to ensure that the job in total will be adequate in all respects. Therefore, surveys should ideally not be split. Whenever a survey for good reasons has to be split, the remaining items to be dealt with must be clearly

5 - 5 - FSI 9/12/2 identified on a numbered list. When the remaining surveys are carried out, this must be documented by making specific references to the list from the previous survey. d) Whenever a surveyor is of the opinion that repairs are required, each item to be repaired must be identified separately on a numbered list. Whenever repairs are carried out, this must be documented by making specific reference to all items on this list. e) All repairs of items relevant to the structural integrity of a ship must be planned beforehand in co-operation with a surveyor from the classification society, and when carried out also be inspected and approved by a surveyor. Documentation on all such repairs must be available as part of the survey documentation. f) Whenever a surveyor is of the opinion that it is acceptable to defer any repair previously required by another surveyor, such decision should not be left to the discretion of this (last) surveyor alone. Only the Head Office should be authorized to make this type of decision. g) Generally speaking, the quality of thickness measurements is vital to making correct decisions regarding the minimum extent of repairs. According to Res. A.744(18), as amended, thickness measurements need not be carried out under the direct supervision of the classification society, provided that the measurement company has been approved by a Recognized Organization. There is a requirement for the surveyor to recheck the measurements as deemed necessary to ensure acceptable accuracy, but this can not be interpreted as a mandatory obligation for all cases. Consideration should be given to strengthening the obligation of the surveyor in relation to thickness measurements, so that he is either mandatory required to directly supervise the measurements, or to recheck (i.e. spot-check) the measurements to verify the accuracy. h) Even if the classification society of Leros Strength rejected the application for a 3 months extension of the Special Survey no.4, in practice the owners were able to continue trading for almost 2 months after expiry of the certificates, because of their decision to change to another classification society. It seems that owners have come to expect that applications for 3 months extensions of the 5-year period will normally be accepted, and that such extensions are interpreted as permissions to continue trading beyond the due dates. This practice - which now seems to be quite common - is clearly in violation of the intention as well as the actual wording of the relevant SOLAS regulation I/14(e). This type of malpractice should therefore be brought to an end. i) For ships above a certain age (15 or 20 years) - and at least for high risk ships - consideration should be given to requiring a surveyor from the Flag State to actively supervise (parts of) the Special Surveys related to structural integrity. Alternatively, attendance from a second surveyor from the ship s classification society could be required. j) Additional requirements should be introduced on transfer of class ( TOCA ) between IACS societies:

6 FSI 9/12/2-6 - Consideration should be given to requiring that all outstanding recommendations have to be required rectified to the satisfaction of the losing society, prior to the ship being permitted to transfer to another classification society. Alternatively, the losing society should be required to urgently supply the gaining society with all documentation relevant to describe the condition of a ship, including the survey history and historical documentation regarding recommendations. Additionally, when a periodical survey is due, no transfer of class should be allowed until the losing society has carried out the complete survey with satisfactory results. k) Consideration should be given to introducing mandatory IMO requirements regarding the procedure for change of Flag, similar to the TOCA procedure of IACS, but expanded as indicated above for change of class. The following factors should be noted in relation to this proposal: Such new IMO requirements will be of particular importance for ships which are unclassed, or which are classed by a non-iacs society. Will prevent a shipowner having a ship classed by an IACS society to escape from the recommendations given by the classification society, by declassing the ship or by changing class to a non-iacs society. Will strengthen Flag State involvement in general. New regulations should provide flexibility, however, so that duplication of tasks can be avoided in cases fully covered by IACS s TOCA. 19 We recognise that some of the above recommendations (a, e and h) are partially covered by existing regulations or procedures. However, experience has shown that new/stricter or clearer measures are needed to ensure full compliance during all surveys of ships. For some of these subjects consideration should also be given to introducing sanctions on violations, in order to effectively ensure compliance. 20 The report referred to in paragraph 6, also includes the following recommendation: Renewed consideration should be given to making SOLAS Chapter XII applicable also for bulk carriers with a length less than 150 m.. This recommendation is not repeated in this document. The sole reason for this omission is the fact that MSC has decided that a Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) of bulk carriers, co-ordinated by UK, should be completed within a period of two years. In view of this, we consider that the question of possible extension of the application of SOLAS Chapter XII should not be discussed until this FSA has been completed. Action requested of the Sub-Committee 21 Norway is of the opinion that all recommendations listed in paragraph 18 above may contribute to the elimination of sub-standard ships, provided appropriate measures are adopted and implemented effectively. Most recommendations are relevant both for statutory and for classification matters. Furthermore, the recommendations are not only relevant for bulk carriers, but also for tankers and other types of ships. Norway therefore requests IMO - and also classification societies - to give thorough consideration to these recommendations, with a view to the possible introduction of new or amended provisions.

7 - 7 - FSI 9/12/2 22 In our view, all recommendations in paragraph 18 except items (j), (h) and (k) fit within the present work program of the FSI Sub-Committee, item 12 Revision of resolutions A.744(18) and A.746(18). 23 Norway has also submitted a document to MEPC 45 containing the same recommendations as listed in paragraph 18 (MEPC 45/7/16), so that these recommendations could also be considered in relation to the Erika accident. According to Circular letter No.2263, MEPC requested MSC to establish a Working Group during MSC 73 to fully examine the measures proposed in the Norwegian document referred to, as well as a number of other documents, and to also request FSI and other sub-committees to further develop relevant issues, and report back to the committees. In view of this, we expect the Working Group planned for MSC 73 to come up with proposals for dealing with items (j), (h) and (k) in paragraph In conclusion, Norway requests the Sub-Committee as follows:.1 Consider items (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g) and (i) of paragraph 18 when developing proposals in response to work program item Revision of resolutions A.744(18) and A.746(18), and develop draft new provisions, as appropriate..2 If relevant, consider (j), (h) and (k) of paragraph 18 in accordance with the requests expected to be given by the Working Group proposed to be established under MSC 73.