Yu Ting Forester Wong 3660 Trousdale Pkwy., ACC 308D

Transcription

1 Yu Ting Forester Wong 3660 Trousdale Pkwy., ACC 308D Los Angeles, CA Academic Appointment University of Southern California, Los Angeles, United States Marshall School of Business, Leventhal School of Accounting Assistant Professor, June 2016 Education Columbia University, New York, United States Master of Philosophy (Graduate School of Business), 2015 Doctor of Philosophy (Graduate School of Business), 2016 University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia Bachelor of Law, 2010 Bachelor of Commerce (Accounting) with Honors, 2010 Research Interests Disclosure, institution knowledge, corporate governance, executive compensation, activist investors and securities litigation Published Paper Individual Investors and Mandatory Disclosure: Evidence from the JOBS Act, with Colleen Honigsberg and Robert Jackson, First Published in: Washington University Law Review, Vol 93 (2015); Reprinted in: Corporate Practice Commentator, Vol 59 (2017); Abstract: One prominent justification for the mandatory disclosure rules that define modern securities law is that these rules encourage individual investors to participate in stock markets. Mandatory disclosure, the theory goes, gives individual investors access to information that puts them on a more equal playing field with sophisticated institutional shareholders. Although this reasoning has long been cited by regulators and commentators as a basis for mandating disclosure, recent work has questioned its validity. In particular, recent studies contend that individual investors are overwhelmed by the amount of information required to be disclosed under current law, and thus they cannot and do not use that information to analyze the companies that they own. Using a recent change in the law that allows firms to disclose less information before their initial public offering ( IPO ), we examine whether reduced disclosure leads to less trading by individual investors. Our results show that, immediately following the IPO, individual investors are less likely to trade in the stocks of the firms that provide less disclosure but that this difference disappears after two weeks of trading. Our findings have important implications for the lawmakers now examining whether, and how, to change the mandatory disclosure rules that have served as the basis of federal securities law for generations.

2 Working Papers Wolves at the Door: A Closer Look at Hedge Fund Activism (Job market paper), featured on Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation; Revising for round 1 resubmission Abstract: Some commentators attribute the success of hedge fund activism to the support offered by other investors, many of whom are thought to accumulate stakes in the target firms before the activists campaigns are publicly disclosed. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as wolf pack activism. This paper explores three research questions: Is there any evidence of wolf pack formation? Is the wolf pack formed intentionally (by the lead activist) or is the result of independent activity by other investors? Does the presence of a wolf pack improve the outcome of the activist s campaign? First, consistent with wolf pack formation, I find investors other than the lead activist accumulate significant share-holdings before public disclosure. Second, these share accumulations are more likely to be mustered by the lead activist rather than occurring spontaneously. Notably, for example, the other investors are more likely to be those who had a prior trading relationship with the lead activist. Third, the presence of a wolf pack is associated with a greater likelihood that the activist will achieve its stated objectives (e.g., will obtain board seats) and higher future stock returns over the duration of the campaign. Does Institutional Knowledge Drive the Information Wedge in Emerging Markets? Evidence from Analysts of Local and Foreign Brokerage Firms in China with T.J. Wong and Tianyu Zhang; Under Review Abstract: Using a topical-modeling technique (Latent Dirichlet Allocation) in textual analysis, we examine the contents of the analyst reports for 403 firms listed in the domestic markets of China. We find that these contents can explain the information advantage of analysts from local brokerages (local analysts) over their counterparts from foreign brokerages (foreign analysts), as captured by their relative forecast accuracy. The local analysts superior forecast accuracy is positively associated with the proportion of topics related to politics and government policies in their reports. This positive association is stronger among firms that are either state-owned or receiving government subsidies. However, when the firms that the analysts follow have high overseas sales (top 5% in the sample), foreign analysts can outperform local analysts in forecast accuracy and the foreign analysts superior accuracy is greater as they report more on topics pertaining to financial and profitability ratios of the firms. Bank Boards: What has Changed since the Financial Crisis? with Shiva Rajgopal and Suraj Srinivasan Abstract: The short answer is not much. Several governmental committees highlighted four key deficiencies in the composition of bank boards before the crisis: (i) group think among bank boards; (ii) absence of prior banking experience of board members; (iii) inability of board members to devote time to understanding the bank s business model; and (iv) inadequate emphasis on risk management. Our empirical analysis covers 97 U.S. banks over the years We find no evidence (i) of a significant difference in the proportion of directors that has turned over from bank boards since 2007 relative to boards of 1,297 firms in other industries; (ii) of greater gender or racial diversity in bank boards in the post crisis period; (iii) that bank directors have more prior banking experience or are populated by more successful leaders relative to before the crisis; (iv) that number of outside board seats of bank directors has fallen after the crisis; and (v) that bank's chairman are less likely to sit on at least one outside board relative to before the crisis. Virtually every bank now has a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) but they are unlikely to feature among the top five most compensated employees of the average bank. The number of banks that have an independent risk committee and a committee devoted to reputation management has increased since the crisis.

3 Do Hedge Funds Trade on Private Information? Evidence from Upcoming Changes in Analysts Stock Recommendations, with April Klein and Anthony Saunders Abstract: Two large financial institutions recently settled allegations of selective disclosure of private information about upcoming stock recommendation changes from supply-side analysts to hedge fund clients. This paper explores two research questions: Is the transfer of private information widespread, and do large hedge funds trade advantageously on this information? We find results consistent with large hedge funds trading profitably up to two days before analysts recommendation changes. Furthermore, individual hedge funds tend to anticipate recommendation changes from a small number of brokers only, suggesting a favored hedge fund-brokerage house relationship. We find no similar trading patterns for other financial institutions. (Presented at International Conference in Finance and at several academic workshops at various schools in the U.S.and overseas and is being prepared for submission after the job market season ends) Post-Apocalyptic: The Real Consequences of Activist Short-Selling, with Wuyang Zhao This paper examines the real effects of a recent phenomenon commonly referred to as activist shortselling, where short-sellers publicly talk down stocks to benefit their short positions. First, we show that after firms are targeted by activist short-sellers, their investing, financing, and paying-out activities on average drop by 7.2%, 24.5%, and 7.6%, respectively. Using a battery of empirical tests, we find that our results are unlikely driven by the activists ability to select declining firms. Second, we provide evidence of three different channels through which activist short-selling leads to real changes in the firm: increased cost of capital, more monitoring, and feedback from stock prices. Third, we find that firms that are more vulnerable to short and distort suffer from more drastic declines in real activities. Fourth, our evidence indicates that on average, firms targeted by activist short-sellers experience improvement in real efficiency. This study contributes to the literature on activist investors and on short-selling, and sheds light on the policy debate over regulations on activist short-selling. Work in Progress A New Cost of Disclosure with Alon Kalay and Rodrigo Verdi Abstract: When the Securities Exchange Commission passed Rule 12g3-2(b) in 2008, it indirectly allowed U.S. depository banks to create involuntary (unsponsored) OTC cross-listings that foreign firms cannot easily avoid or reverse. We examine whether depository banks target firms with better accounting. If so, improving disclosure could be costly, since it exposes the non-us firms to unsponsored cross listing in the US (proved to be costly in Iliev (2013)). After controlling for known determinants for being targeted, we find that depository banks target firms that have more US-comparable financial statements. Interestingly, earnings qualities (such as proxies for earnings management) appear to be unrelated to the depository banks targeting decision. Teaching Experience University of Southern California, Los Angeles, United States 2018 Spring BUAD 280 Introduction to Financial Accounting 2017 Spring BUAD 280 Introduction to Financial Accounting Columbia University, New York, United States 2012 Spring Financial Accounting, MBA (Professor Alon Kalay) 2012 Fall Earnings Quality & Fundamental Analysis, MBA (Professor Gil Sadka)mai 2013 Fall Financial Accounting, MBA (Professor Alon Kalay) Financial Statement Analysis and Valuation, MBA (Professor Stephen Penman)

4 University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia 2010 Fall Business Process Analysis, Undergraduate 2011 Fall Accounting Reports and Analysis, Undergraduate Other Academic Appointments Journal of Banking and Finance, Ad Hoc Reviewer, 2017 Management Science, Ad Hoc Reviewer, 2016 and 2017 American Accounting Association Annual Meeting, Financial Accounting Reporting Section Midyear Meeting, Ad Hoc Reviewer, 2016 and 2017 Conference Presentations American Accounting Association Annual Meeting, August 2017 Conference on Textual Analysis in Accounting and Finance - with Application to China, June 2017 American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, May 2017 London Business School Trans-Atlantic Doctoral Conference, May 2014 and 2015 MIT China International Conference in Finance (CICF), July 2014 Professor Lucian Bebchuk s class at Harvard Law School, November 2014 AAA Northeast Region Meeting, October 2013 Awards Alex Woo MBA 1984 Doctoral Fellowship, Columbia University, 2015 Deloitte Foundation Doctoral Fellowship in Accounting, Deloitte, 2014 AAA/Deloitte/J. Michael Cook Doctoral Consortium Fellow in Accounting, Deloitte University, 2014 Department of Commerce and Economic Honours Scholarship, University of Melbourne, 2009 Commercial Travellers Association Exhibition for Marketing, University of Melbourne, 2008 Western Australia Tertiary Examination Excellence Award, Curriculum Council, 2004 Other Experience PricewaterhouseCoopers, Hong Kong, 2011 Jan. March Assurance Associate Crowe Horwath CPA Limited, Hong Kong, 2010 Summer Audit Intern Cheung & Yip, Solicitors, Hong Kong, 2009 Summer Legal Intern Moreland Legal Community Centre, Melbourne, Australia, Legal Clerk Professional Memberships Practicing Solicitor, Legal Service Board of Victoria (since 2011) CPA Associate, CPA Australia (since 2010)

5 References Fabrizio Ferri (Chair) Trevor Harris Regina Pitaro Associate Professor of Business Arthur J. Samberg Professor of Professional Practice Phone: Phone: April Klein Shivaram Rajgopal Professor of Accounting Roy Bernard Kester and T.W. Byrnes Professor of Leonard N. Stern School of Business Accounting and Auditing Phone: Phone: Anthony Saunders John M. Schiff Professorship in Finance Leonard N. Stern School of Business Phone: