Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the InvestEU Programme

Transcription

1 EUROPEAN COMMISSION SEC(2018) 293 REGULATORY SCRUTINY BOARD OPINION Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the InvestEU Programme {COM(2018) 439} {SWD(2018) 314}

2 IMPACT ASSESSMENT - OPINION OF THE BOARD Under 1/ is the RSB Opinion for the Evaluation of the European Fund for Strategic Investments, of the European Investment Advisory Hub, and of the European Investment Project Portal. Under 2/ is the RSB Opinion for the Impact Assessment - MFF Programme / InvestEU Fund for the period

3 Ш Rgľ. Ansaci Ö1260í 54-1 EUROPEAN COMMISSION REGULATORY SCRUTINY BOARD Chair Brussels, SG r2/mdm/rv Ares(20 i 81 Note for the attention ofmr Marco BL'TI Director General, DG ECFIN Subject: Evaluation of tbc European Fund for Strategic investments, of the European Investment Advisory Hub, and of the European Investment Project Portal Please find in annex the positive opinion of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board on the evaluation staff working document (SWT)) on the above mentioned subject. It includes recommendations on how the SWD can still be further improved, which I invite you to consider in the final version. 1 invite >ou to also briefly explain (in the Annex I of the revised SWT)) what changes have been made compared to the earlier draff, in response to the Board s recommendations. Please note that the Board's opinion should be added to the inter-service consultation (ISC) of the evaluation SWD. Once the evaluation SWD has been finalised, it will be published with the Board's opinion on the RSB s website on Europa, unless you inform us of the reasons - in accordance with Regulation 2001/ why this should not be done in this particular case. (e-signed) Amie Bucher Enel. Copies Opinion of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board C. Martinez Alberola (President's Cabinet) B. Smulders, M. Sutton, R, Maggi. M. Smit (First Vice-President's Cabinet) O. Bailly (Cabinet of Commissioner P. Moscovici) Board members M. Selmayr, P. Ahrenkilde Hansen, I. Johansone. M. Haag, J. Watson, A. Kulas, A. Cipollone, M. Gil Tertre. S. Vila Nunez. M. de Miguel Cabeza, M. Narożny (SG) И ε ícuvsiictb Commission européenne, Bruxelles / Europese Comm.ssie, B-ÌQ49 Brussel - Belgium regulatary-scrutìny-boa^d@ec. europa, eu signe vt c. :.г/с5. lây л..v' s.xerciarwe article :.«ei'«îeclrcn.c отакеав: w'íct./' SSV Ľ Ci. Cj5K iii v 0*1/į

4 rte*. / 3'53>:.^c4- ' EUROPEAN COMMISSION Regulatory Scrutiny Board Brussels. Ares(20i 8) Opinion Title: Evaluation / EFSI (version of 30 April 2018)* Overall opinion: POSITIVE (A) Context Following the Global Financial Crisis, the EU suffered from low levels of investment. One, part of the EU policy response was the 2015 Investment Plan for Europe, also known as the Juncker Plan. This established a European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI). EFSI provided EU guarantees to mobilise private investment. Working through the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group, it enabled financing for projects with higher risk profiles. EFSI originally aimed to mobilise at least EUR 315 bn of additional public and private investment by mid A 2017 Regulation extended EFSI duration to 2020 and increased its capacity to EUR 500 bn. It also sharpened the definition of additionality and strengthened support to climate projects and SMEs. The Regulation requires an evaluation ( before any new proposals for a post-2020 investment support instrument I Two other parts of the Juncker Plan were a European Investment Advisory Hub (EÍAH) and a European Investment Project Portal (E1PP). These provided technical assistance and visibility to investment projects. This report evaluates the three facilities. However, the evaluation does not deal with the. 3rd pillar of the Investment plan for Europe dedicated to the regulatory environment. The 1 report informs a proposal to establish an EU investment fund (InvestEU) for the period : The RSB has separately reviewed an Impact Assessment report on InvestEU.! (B) Main considerations } I The Board notes the good presentation of the report and the clear and informative description of the Investment Plan for Europe and the scope of the evaluation. Į 1 The Board gives a positive opinion, but considers that the report should be improved with respect to the following key aspects:: * Note that this opinion concerns a draft evaluation report which may differ from the one finalised. Commission européenne, Bruxelles - Belgium. Office: BERI 6/29. regu!atory-sorutiny-board@ec.euroda.eu

5 ! - - " ' ' ţ (1) The report downplays critical findings of the underlying external study and of earlier evaluations or reports from the European Court of Auditors. In particular, j the report s assessment of EFSI s additional impact (additionality) does not fairly I reflect the available evidence. j! (2) The report does not do enough to identity areas for improvement and draw i j operational conclusions for the new EU investment fund (InvestEU).!! fc) Further considerations and recommendations (1) Since one of the lessons drawn from the evaluation is that the future InvestEU programme should further strengthen additionality criteria, the report should clarify what the weaknesses of such criteria were in EFSI. It should discuss the problems related to the definition of additionality as provided in the Regulation. It should also explore whether the ļ existing mechanisms to assess additionality under EFSI are effective in ensuring that support goes to projects that markets would not fund. The report should clarity' the role of the Investment Committee in respecting the additionality criteria. (2) As to additionality in a broader sense and the risks of crowding out market finance, the report should provide a more balanced assessment of the evidence from the external study. ; This includes the surveys of project promoters and financial intermediaries benefitting from the Infrastructure and Investment Window, experts' reviews of 60 projects and interviews of Investment Committee members, j (3) The report should he clearer about possible tension between reaching the investment target set by the Regulation, the need to select economically viable projects with a high risk profile, and the objective of ensuring additionality'. (4) The report needs to link tire evidence available (external study, previous evaluations, European Court of Auditors) to its findings. It should clearly indicate ilte lessons titat have been fully addressed in EFSI 2.0 and those that can feed into the proposal for InvestEU. For instance, the external study includes critical elements on the role of NPIs in the implementation of EFSI (additionality and El AH) which seem to be taken on board in InvestEU but are not mentioned as shortcomings in the evaluation report. (5) The report should discuss to what extent the objectives of EFSI have become obsolete. It should clarity whether there is any mismatch between its objectives and the current needs or problems (relevance). EFSI was originally introduced to stimulate investment following the financial and economic crisis. Since then, demand has recovered. Some argue that further stimulating investment could be pro-cyclical. The report needs a more thorough discussion of remaining investment gaps, also in view of the concentration of «support in a few countries and sectors. (6) The report should explain to which extent EFSI appears to have met expectations expressed at its launch, including as regards jobs creation, the multiplier effect and the j number or SMEs supported. t j (7) Given the absence of a baseline and benchmarks, the report should explain on what j basis it has derived the evaluation results and measured the peribrmance of EFSI. It j sometimes refers to the ambitions of the investment plan and sometimes to the provisions! of the regulation..i į 2

6 ļ (8) The report should be clearer about the performance of tire European Investment Advisory Hub and of the European Investment Project Portal. The assessment should consider initiatives that may not have initially worked as intended, and explain how the * performance is evolving over time. Some more technical comments have heen transmitted directly to the author DG.' \ j (Dì RSB scrutiny process 1 The lead DG is advised to ensure that these recommendations are duly taken into account in the report prior to launching the interservice consultation. i Full title Reference number Evaluation of the European Fund for Strategic Investments, of the European Investment Advisory Hub. and of tire European Investment Project Portal Date of RSB meeting 16/05/ ;

7 Ref. Anes(2018) /04/2018 EUROPEAN COMMISSION Regulatory Scrutiny Board Brussels, Ares(2018) Opinion Title: Impact Assessment - MFF Programme / InvestEU Fund for the period Overall opinion: POSITIVE WITH RESERVATIONS (version of 5 April 2018)* (Al Context The Commission plans to propose a new multiannual financial framework (MFF) for EU spending. The MFF will set an overall budget envelope and allocate funds across main headings. The process involves important choices about implementation. MFF-related impact assessment reports should focus on those changes and policy choices that the MFF proposal leaves open. On account of proportionality, the impact assessment template has been adjusted for this purpose. The reports should explain programmes structures and priorities, and options for service delivery. The reports should draw lessons from experience to date, explain what challenges successor programmes will face, and explain how they would deliver on objectives, e.g. simplification, greater flexibility or better performance. Impact assessments should also explain how future monitoring and evaluation would work. The present impact assessment report discusses the creation of the EU investment fund - InvestEU - building on the experience with the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) and EU Financial Instruments. Companies sometimes have difficulties obtaining funding for their projects from financial markets. Reasons for this include low market liquidity, underdeveloped financial markets, risk averse private investors and information asymmetries. EU Financial Instruments and Budgetary Guarantees are financial tools to support socially desirable investment when financial markets fail to do so. Lack of market financing may slow economic growth, job creation and innovation. In some cases, public financial support may be justified. This can take the form of grants or repayable instruments. Use of financial instruments and budgetary guarantees can also increase the impact of public funds. There are currently many EU-level financial instruments and applicable rules. These reportedly do not provide for an efficient investment support framework. The Commission proposes to create a single InvestEU Fund, to simplify access to finance and boost investment in the EU. * Note that this opinion concerns a draft impact assessment report which may differ from the one adopted. Commission européenne, B-1049 Bruxelles - Belgium. Office: BERL 6/29. regulatory-scrutiny-board@ec.europa.eu

8 (B) Main considerations The Board understands that the policy intention is to bring under a single programme the EFSI and other centrally managed financial instruments. The Board takes note of additional information on e.g. the funding baseline and priorities of the future InvestEU Fund that will be added to the report. However, the report still contains significant shortcomings that need to be addressed. As a result, the Board expresses reservations and gives a positive opinion only on the understanding that the report shall be adjusted in order to integrate the Board's recommendations on the following key aspects: (1) The report does not sufficiently explain how InvestEU will avoid financing overlaps. These can be either internal, among its thematic windows, or external, with instruments funded directly by the Member States under European structural and investment funds (ESIF). (2) The report does not elaborate on the choice of the envisaged complex governance structure of the Fund. It does not sufficiently explain the functioning of the new structure and to what extent this would constitute an improvement, as compared to the current situation. (3) In view of the envisaged increased use of financial instruments with lower provisioning rates, the report does not provide sufficient assurances that a robust risk assessment function will be put in place to ensure that the EU budget would not bear undue risks. (C) Further considerations and adjustment requirements (1) The EC A audit of the EFSI concluded that there were overlaps and crowding out of investment between EFSI and ESIF. Avoiding these overlaps, achieving synergies and simplifying access to financing were the main ideas behind creating the InvestEU Fund. The report should provide a more elaborate analysis of how the InvestEU governance model would avoid financing overlaps, both internally among the thematic windows of the Fund and externally between the Fund and structural funds. The report should indicate what procedures would be put in place to ensure that separate decisions on financial instruments funded under InvestEU and similar instruments or blending grants funded under ESIF will not lead to overfinancing of individual projects, or crowding out of private sector or Member States' financing. (2) In addition, past EFSI evaluations have also stressed the need to improve the geographical distribution in finance provisioning. Building on the experience with EFSI, the report should better explain how the Fund would deal with geographical distribution, given the overall bottom-up approach to financing projects. It should also thoroughly describe the mitigating measures that the proposal envisages to put in place. (3) The report should further explain the structure and the functioning of the proposed complex governance structure for the InvestEU Fund. It should provide the rationale for adopting such structure and clarify whether this would be an improvement, as compared to the current governance structures for EFSI and other centrally managed financial instruments. The report should also indicate what, apart from the formal approval of the EU guarantee, would be the actual contribution of the Investment Committees, since the investment guidelines, the design of the financial products, the structuring of the

9 operations, their quality check and the assessment of their risk profile seems to be outside of their remit. Finally, the report should clarify what would be the added value of the quality check to be performed by the project risk teams, if the necessary banking and investment expertise would be provided by the implementing partners that would have structured the projects in the first place. (4) The report should elaborate on possible higher risk-taking by the EU budget related to the increased use of financial instruments and the lower provisioning rates implied by the recourse to a global guarantee. The report should describe how the risk assessment function would be organised within the governance structure of InvestEU. It should explain how this would effectively protect the interests of the EU budget from undue or excessive risk-taking. To assess the overall risk to the established budget guarantee, the report should clarify the issue of assessing individual provisioning rates, the ensuing overall provisioning rate for the Fund and risk sharing and its rationale between the EU budget and the implementing partners. Moreover, it should provide more details on the allocation of the budget guarantee across thematic windows and sectors. (5) The report should explain how the success of the Fund would be defined and how it could be measured. Success criteria should closely link to the objectives of the Fund. It should establish benchmarks based e.g. on the amount of investment mobilised in thematic windows under the various current MFF programmes and/or targets based on the identified investment gaps. The Board notes that this impact assessment will eventually be complemented with specific budgetary arrangements and may be substantially amended in line with the final policy choices of the Commission s MFF proposal. Some more technical comments have been transmitted directly to the author DG. FD) RSB scrutiny process Without prejudice to the complements and amendments to the report to be introduced as a result of the policy choices of the MFF proposal, the lead DG shall ensure that the report is adjusted in accordance with the recommendations of the Board prior to launching the interservice consultation. Full title Reference number InvestEU Fund MFF Date of RSB meeting 25/04/2018 3