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1 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Transport Sector Unit East Asia and Pacific Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (LOAN 34910) ONA LOAN IN THE AMOUNT OF US$15 MILLION TO THE REPUBLIC OF FIJI FOR THE SECOND ROAD UPGRADING PROJECT February 28, 2000 Report No: FIJ This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without. World Bank authorization.

2 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective 10/99) Currency Unit = Fijian Dollar F$ 1.00= US$ US$ 1.00 = F$ FISCAL YEAR January - December ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ADB DRT FJD GoF IBRD ICB ICR LCB NCB PCR PWD RCU Asian Development Bank Department of Road Transport Fijian dollar Government of Fiji International Bank for Reconstruction and Development International Competitive Bidding Implementation Completion Report (IBRD) Local Competitive Bidding (ADB) National Competitive Bidding (IBRD) Project Completion Report (ADB) Public Works Department Road Construction Unit Note: This ICR is a brief synopsis of the main Project Completion Report, December 1999, which was prepared and published by the co-financier, Asian Development Bank, under the terms of the Loan's Administration Agreement, in conjunction with IBRD. This ICR addresses primarily the special assessments required by IBRD that are not covered in the ADB PCR. As a synopsis the ICR is not complete in all respects and readers are referred to the ADB PCR for further details. Vice President: Country Manager/Director: Sector Manager/Director: Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Jean-Michel Severino Klaus Rohland Jitendra N. Bajpai William D. 0. Paterson

3 FOR OFFICLAL USE ONLY CONTENTS Page No 1. Project Data 1 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 2 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 3 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5 6. Sustainability 5 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 6 8. Lessons Learned 6 9. Partner Comments Additional Information 7 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 9 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 10 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 12 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 13 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 14 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 15 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 16 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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5 Project ID: P Project Name: ROADS UPGRADING II Team Leader: William D. 0. Paterson TL Unit: EASTR ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: February 11, Project Data Name: ROADS UPGRADING II L/C Number: Country/Department: FIJI Region: East Asia and Pacific Region Sector/subsector: TH - Highways KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 09/06/91 Effective: 08/13/93 08/13/93 Appraisal: 02/07/92 MTR: Approval: 06/18/92 Closing: 12/31/97 06/30/99 Borrower/lImplementing Agency: Other Partners: GOVT OF FIJI/Public Works Department Co-Financiers: Asian Development Bank (Loan 1164-FIJ), Japan Exim Bank. Implementing Agency: Department of Road Transport STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President: Jean-Michel Severino Gautam Kaji Country Manager: Klaus Rohland Marianne Haug Sector Manager: Jitendra N. Bajpai Anupam Khanna Team Leader at ICR. William D. 0. Paterson Sigfus Sigfusson <wpaterson ICR Primary Author: Williarn Paterson (IBRD) for ICR; Rishi R. Adhar (ADB); Colin Dale (consultant) and William Paterson for PCR (ADB). 2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: S Sustainability: L Institutional Development M Impact: Bank Performance: HS Borrower Performance: S QAG (if available) Quality at Entry: Project at Risk at Any Time: No ICR

6 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: Improvement in the efficiency of the land transport system, in order to assist the Government in promoting balanced economic development. For the road sub-sector to better meet growing traffic demand the project specifically aims at: (i) upgrading and improving the road network; (ii) improving road traffic safety and traffic management; (iii) strengthening the capacity of road authorities to manage the road network; and (iv) improving sector policies in the key areas of maintenance practices and funding, control of road damage by heavy vehicles, road user taxation, and increased construction efficiency through the introduction of contracting of road works to the private sector on a competitive basis. Assessment: The objectives were clear though the level of achievement was not firmly targeted. The physical scope was within the capability of the Borrower, and of high priority. However, even the modest institutional agenda proved to be too ambitious for the vehicle regulation aspects, and was achieved only partially in road safety and road maintenance. The conditionalities on maintenance funding and reporting proved to be of limited effectiveness. The incentives for institutional reform were light, with provision for substantial strengthening and support of the public agencies and for substantial procurement of equipment under a co-loan. This reflected the Borrower's priorities at the time of preparation, however the Project provisions allowed flexibility for increasing the private sector participation from 18% to about 30% of the locally-sourced works and proved to be a valuable stepping stone for encouraging more private sector participation in the future. ADB provided parallel grant funding for institutional studies on transport sector reform and road user charges, but these had only limited integration with the Project activities. The prior attention to safeguard policies proved to be inadequate, with substantial delays and difficulties occurring in land acquisition, and shortcomings in environmental management becoming a contributing cause to the landslide damage that added $3 million (4%) to the Project costs - issues that had to be addressed during supervision. 3.2 Revised Objective: None 3.3 Original Components: Rating Component Sector Cost at Appraisal (USD m) S Road Upgrading - Force Account/LCB TH 22,670, S Road Upgrading - ICB TH 18,400, S Road Safety & Vehicle Regulation TH 3,180, HS Plant & Equipment TH 7,530, HS Project Management TH 11,120, S Land Acquisition TH 1,380, S Interest During Construction TH 7,500, TOTAL 78,000,

7 This design adequately reflected the physical objectives. It included road upgrading subprojects, with fair to moderate economic returns ranging from 12 to 31%. It provided for the procurement of works to be 38% by international competition, 8% by local competition and 54% by public force account. The components omit the key institutional studies which were conducted separately under ADB grant funding. 3.4 Revised Components: Minor revisions of scope were made only in the civil works by force accountlncb component. The capacity expansion from 2- to 4-lanes on the congested Suva-Nausori Road was extended from 1.6 km back to the 6.1 km length as had been originally evaluated and recommende during feasibility studies - the Government absorbed all additional costs (F$15 million). 3.5 Quality at Entry: N.A. 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective: The key elements of the Project have achieved significanthough modest improvements in the efficiency of both the public and private sector of the road construction industry. The major upgrading subprojects (King's Road Dama section on Viti Levu) and arterials on Vanua Levu have resulted in significant growth (over double the national base growth) of both traffic and development along two key economic corridors where poor access had constrained growth, and on the King's Road Suva section has reduced congestion and improved safety in the country's worst blackspot. The outcome has been somewhat limited by the slow growth of the national economy during the Project period (under 3% p.a.). The strongest institutional outcome was the improvement in road safety - an active, broadly representative national council, and reductions of 45% in the fatality rate, 41% in the casualty rate and 10% in the accident rate during an 8-yr period when the vehicle population grew by 33%. Moderate impacts were achieved in strengthening road maintenance in the public sector but sustainability is only partially likely, dependent on a continued priority being given by Governmento sustained funding and quality standards. Achievements in other institutional areas were weak - long delays in revising vehicle regulations, load limits, and oversight - which reduced and deferred the potential benefits until beyond the Project. 4.2 Outputs by components: All the physical component outputs were fully achieved with generally satisfactory quality, but with high cost increases - 94% in force account and LCB works, and 45% in ICB works. (a) ICB Works - The King's Road (Dama-Navalou section) was completed virtually on time despite the contractor's insolvency. The IBRD-financed Nabouwalu road was completed satisfactorily after a 70% extension of time caused by contractor disputes. (b) LCB and Force account works - The execution of works, design and supervision services by national firms on 4 subprojects under LCB was successful and provided substantial stimulus to the increase of private sector participation in the sector from the existing low level. The works and engineering for 8 subprojects were undertaken through the PWD design office and Road Construction Units (RCU) that were established and equipped under the Project - these performed satisfactorily but with delays due to inadequate capacity especially in the design office. There was one exception (Transinsular Road) where inadequate attention to geotechnical risks and site management was one of the factors leading to the extensive landslide damage during Cyclone Gavin and subsequent high repair costs of F$3 million. The -3 -

8 repairs were complex but designed and executed exceptionally well under contract, showing a matured response by PWD. (c) Road safety and Vehicle Regulation - The institutional initiatives for road safety were completed generally successfully, resulting in the establishment of an effective National Road Safety Council, but the implementation of new enforcement measures (on vehicle inspection, driver licensing, etc.) were constrained by the delay in land transport legislation which limited their impact. The physical safety works were only about 80% completed due to a bottleneck in PWD capacity. Establishment of the Land Transport Authority only occurred in 1999 after the close of the Project, and the regulations on drivers, vehicle weights and inspection, etc. need further revision and are still not in effect. (d) Plant and equipment - All plant items were procured and delivered successfully (Japan-Exim-funded) including an additional lot made possible by low bid prices and appreciation of the Exim loan amount. By the end of the Project, 70% of items were in good running condition, 29% in fair or poor condition, and 1% written off. (e) Project management - The project management was fair initially but strengthened by mid-term to a high standard. The technical specialists provided generally adequate support, although inadequate advice and action may have contributed to the cost increases incurred due to geotechnical failures on Nadi Back Road and Transinsular Road. The maintenance strengthening unit (IBRD-funded) was very effective at the District and depot level, but less effective at the central level due to inadequate senior management response. (f) LandAcquisition - The land acquisition and compensation was conducted under GoF and ADB guidelines. The requirements (on the two ICB subprojects and Suva-Nausori road) were not large but had not been completed before mobilization of the contractors. This led to minor delays regarding access for the contractors on the two ICB subprojects, and to prolonged disputes and non-completion of the parts of work in two locations on the King's Road (Suva-Nausori) section. At the end of the Project, the land acquisition activities were concluded in accordance with ADB policies, as applied through the Administration Agreement of the Project. 4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return: The economic rates of return for the upgrading of gravel roads to paved national roads were fully achieved, with 16-28% at EOP compared with 17-31% at appraisal, despite the average 68% increase in costs. Improvement of the urban paved roads returned 37-46% compared with 21 % at appraisal, and the capacity expansion in the Suva-Nausori corridor returned a conservatively estimated 12-15% without accounting for unquantified indirect benefits from safety and time savings. Overall, the project works had a modest return with a benefit/cost ratio of 1.72, i.e., * NPV = F$77.82 million at 12% discount rate; * NPV/C = 0.72 BCR= Financial rate of return: Not assessed. Revenues from road users were not changed due to delayed legislation. 4.5 Institutional development impact: The Project's impact on the Public Works Department was supportive of technical skills through the specialists under contract, and some technology transfer is evident from the strengthening of individuals in technical middle management (engineer-level). However, staffing remains thin and highly prone to staff losses, and PWD has retained further specialists for the succeeding ADB-funded Project. The delivery of maintenance was strengthened very effectively at the local depot level, but a lack of senior management action on formally establishing the road maintenance units, actively monitoring performance, and incorporating actual needs into the programming and budgeting rendered the sustainability as only partially likely. The prospects for institutional reform of PWD into a roads department and subsequently - 4 -

9 independent authority (set out through the ADB-funded TA on transport sector reform) were stalled during but appear to be reviving in In respect of the Department of Road Traffic (DRT), the Project came far short of its goals but laid the foundation for the Land Transport Authority which is now being established and has the potential for improving the efficiency of road transport. Some of the resource allocation and performance optimization issues will be addressed through the establishment of a Transport Planning Unit under an IDF grant (TF ) due to close in December Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency. Pressure on budgets arising from the National Bank bankruptcy constrained Project spending to FJD 25 million p.a. and caused the Project period to be extended in order to absorb the increased costs. 5.2 Factors generally subject to government control: Road maintenance budgets met targets in the first two years but declined subsequently despite warnings from the Banks. Legislation for amending the traffic acts was not given priority. 5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control: Strong Project management and PWD senior management support were responsible for the generally successful implementation of force account works and improved efficiency of PWD units. Cyclone Gavin in 1997 caused critical conditions and heavy damage to the Transinsular Road subproject before completion, but much of the damage could have been reduced had the preventive measures been implemented on time and with stronger supervision. In DRT, there was little progress on the critical regulation and training issues due to weak leadership. 5.4 Costs andfinancing: Construction costs increased by 94% on the locally-contracted and force account works, due to under-estimation at the time of appraisal (25-40%), increase in scope (Suva-Nausori corridor (350%), Nadi-Lautoka corridor) and major repairs (Transinsular Road, 100%). Costs increased by 45% on the internationally-contracted works, due mainly to under-estimation at appraisal and higher bid prices. On the equipment component, competitive pricing and exchange rate movements allowed additional inventory to be procured under the proceeds of the co-loan (Japan ExIm). The overall Project cost increased by 47% from US$ 78 million to US$ million, due almost entirely to the increased cost of works. The Government absorbed all the additional costs. 6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating. The benefit of the civil works is expected to extend to at least 80% of their expected life given the strengthening of maintenance at the local level and on-going support of a follow-on project. The PWD has been actively pursuing reform in the water sector and is likely to make some progress on the road sector during the next two years, though this is highly dependent on the evolving policies of the new Government which until recently had opposed reforms. Progress is slow in the road transport subsector, but additional impetus is being provided by the establishment of a Transport Planning Unit under IDF funding due to be fully operational by end of The overall assessment of sustainability is likely, subject to continued progress in sectoral reform and sustained budget support until effective road user-based financing is in place. 6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations: - 5 -

10 The recently established construction and maintenance units continue to operate in PWD, and contracting procedures have been facilitated by the follow-on project. Improved planning and programming for road maintenance is also being developed under the subsequent Project, which should strengthen the central management of resources. ADB are overseeing continuation of the institutional reform agenda through the subsequent project. 7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7. 1 Lending: Satisfactory. 7.2 Supervision. Highly satisfactory. ADB conducted two supervision missions per year and reported regularly, maintaining an excellent working relationship with the Borrower and with IBRD. IBRD participated in more than 50% of the missions providing specialist technical input as well as administration, and through emphasis on preventive measures helped to reduce the risk of damage to the Project assets. 7.3 Overall Bank performance: Highly satisfactory. Borrower 7.4 Preparation: Generally satisfactory, with a good start to implementation but inadequate assistance and guidance on cost estimation. 7.5 Government implementation performance: Generally satisfactory, satisfying most conditionalities and providing good assistance to supervision missions, but weak in support for the institutional agenda, particularly road transport regulation, and for road maintenance budget allocations. 7.6 Implementing Agency. PWD performance was satisfactory, with generally responsive management. Initial problems over the allocation of management responsibilities between line staff and Project staff reflected on the performance and recurred occasionally. DRT performance was satisfactory regarding the road safety aspects but generally weak in managing the road transport component. 7.7 Overall Borrower performance: Satisfactory. 8. Lessons Learned (a) Stronger attention needs to be given to cost estimation and economic evaluation during project preparation in the Pacific through - (i) better preliminary engineering and geotechnical studies, detailed engineering and quantity estimates; (ii) better use of regional comparators in addition to local estimates, and (iii) the use of more advanced economic evaluation tools than used for the Project. These are necessary to achieve more realistic assessments of the costs, viability and priorities of Project proposals. (b) Land acquisition arrangements should be completed prior to the implementation of a subproject, should be largely completed before Project appraisal to avoid delays, and should be administered under stronger safeguard policies. -6 -

11 (c) Road management by PWD would be improved by (i) regular monitoring of the network to identify problem areas; (ii) basing periodic maintenance assessment on regular network-wide surveys; (iii) providing incentives for efficiency beyond target output levels; (iv) inclusion of a specific allocation for emergency works; and (v) improving contract documents and procedures to enhance out-sourcing of works. (d) Environmental management needs to be greatly strengthened in future PWD and IFI-financed works, especially ensuring that environmental, geotechnical and slope failure mitigation measures are adequately addressed at the design stage of subprojects. The Codes of Environmental Practice introduced by IBRD in Fiji in 1998 have proved effective and warrant wider implementation and application in other agencies. (e) The achievement of progress on land transport policy development and reforms - on enforcement of axle load limits, adequate maintenance programs, adequate maintenance funding, revision of traffic regulations, restructuring of road user charges, efficient plant hire and replacement policies - requires a stronger framework of commitment than is given by loan provisions alone. (f Private sector participation in local works and services proved effective, and PWD should be encouraged to expand the level of outsourcing because its capacity for implementing civil works and services was inadequate for the pace of program under the Project. (g) The parallel co-financing relationship, with ADB in the administrative capacity, worked well in this instance for the preparation and the implementation period. Through the adoption of ADB procedures for all procurement, disbursement and reporting for the implementation, there was an absence of several controls in procurement, of stronger control over the timing and conduct of land acquisition, and of the emphasis on sustainable development, local participation and outcomes that are inherent in IBRD procedures. However, these procedural differences are changing with time and are unlikely to have substantially affected the outcome of the Project. The Borrower has expressed strong preference for uniform implementation procedures as a pre-condition of co-financing which makes subsequent co-financing opportunities unlikely. 9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/implementing agency: The Government's requests for approvals were handled promptly and the banks were helpful in providing assistance, through staff consultants, to resolve technical issues such as slope stability, environment and road safety. The staff of PWD and Government received training in ADB's disbursement, project administration and implementation procedures. Specific comments on the PCR included the following: * The degree of non- and partial compliance with the loan covenants is noted and PWD believes that whilst there were some particular issues, generally the loan covenants have been complied with. * The issue of inadequate maintenance funds is being addressed by the Government with a proposed increase of $8 million to the current annual maintenance budget in the year 2000 budget. * Enforcement of overloaded axles is to be addressed by the Land Transport Authority (LTA) through the enforcement of the new changes of the Traffic regulations. (b) Cofinanciers: The delays in loan signing at the start of the Project were due to coordination difficulties of the Government rather than a specific failure in the performance of the banks. The banks reviewed the Project twice a year until its completion. There has been excellent coordination between ADB and IBRD with jointly conducted review missions and a high level of professional input to the Project. While prior invitation was extended - 7 -

12 to Exim Bank it was not able to participate in any review mission. (c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector): N.A. 10. Additional Information - 8 -

13 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix Outcome / Impact Indicators: Road user costs in project area reduced 20% 23 to 530/o Rate of road accidents and fatalities per <0 % -10% and -45% respectively vehicle travel declining by end of Project NPV of subprojects are positive at EOP. > 82% of subprojects posit0ve at 12% discount rate, I100% positive at 10 h discount rate. Output Indicators: End of project 9-

14 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing Project Cost by Corn onent (in US$ million euivalent) A. Force Account Roads B. ICB Roads C. Road Safety& Vehicle Regulation D. Plant and Equipment E. Project Management F. Land Acquisition G. Interest During Construction Total Baseline Cost Total Project Costs Total Financing Required Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) 1. Works (6.28) (0.00) (3.84) (14.46) (24.58) 2. Goods (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (6.50) (6.50) 3. Services (0.00) (0.00) (4.28) (3.54) (7.82) 4. Miscellaneous (0.00) (0.00) (0.60) (0.00) (0.60) 5. Miscellaneous (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 6. Miscellaneous (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Total (6.28) (0.00) (8.72) (24.50) (39.50)

15 Project Costs by Procureme Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) f EWenditure.goiy :: Procurement: Meth : Tdt ,.,,.....,..... t. r, N. F,. T dw. Co...st.. 1. Works (6.20) (0.00) (4.70) (16.06) (26.96) 2. Goods (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (7.55) (7.55) 3. Services (0.00) (0.00) (3.77) (1.94) (5.71) 4. Miscellaneous (0.00) (0.00) (0. 19) (0.00) (0. 19) 5. Miscellaneous (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 6. Miscellaneous (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Total (6.20) (0.00) (8.66) (25.55) (40.41) "Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies 2 Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project fumds to local government units. Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Percentage of Appraisal Component Ap raisal Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate Pcaop i Bank Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF. A. Force Account Roads B. ICB Roads C. Road Safety & Vehicle Regulation D. Plant and Equipment E. Project Management F. Land Acquisition G. IDC TOTAL

16 Annex 3: Economic Costs and Benefits Summary of Economic Re-evaluation, with and without Passenger Time Saving VITI LEVU VANUALEVU TOTAL Suva-Nausori road Cunning Dama Princes to Daniva to Khalsa Lomotomo Nadi Viseisci Nabou Trans- Wainikoro. -ham Navolau Daniva Wainibuku Road Duplication Back Bypass -walu insular Road Road Road (4-Lanes) (3-Lanes) Road Road road Length (Km) Upgraded Reduction Economic Construction Cost (F$ million) Traflic in Opening 2, ,912 6,982 2,077 5,760 3,491 6, ,180 2,418 Year (AADT) With Passenger Time Net Present Value (FS milioiin) I EIRR 1 Without Passenger Time Net Present (0.07) (0.59) I Value (FS million) EIRR % j NPV/C (0.08) (0.16)

17 Annex 4. Bank Inputs (a) Missions: Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating (e.g. 2 Economists, I FMS, etc.) Implementation Development Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective Identification/Preparation 2 Highway Engineer (HE) 05/91 Economist (Ec) Appraisal/Negotiation 05/92 2 HE Legal Counsel Supervision 08/31/92 I Ec S S 05/15/93 1 HE S S 04/15/94 1 HE S S 04/13/95 1 HE S S 05/03/96 1 HE S S 05/02/97 1 HE S S 11/18/97 1 HE S S 05/09/98 1 HE S S 12/10/98 1 HE S S ICR 05/18/99 3 HE, PIO, Ec S S Note: ADB had administrative responsibility for supervision. They fielded 1 person (Engineer/Implementation Officer) twice a year from 1993 to 1998, and once in 1999, including an additional person (Economist) on the 05/03/96 mission. (b) Staff: r- Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate No. Staff weeks US$ (,00O) Identification/Preparation na na Appraisal/Negotiation na na Supervision ,000 ICR ,785 Total

18 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable) Rating El Macro policies F Sector Policies O H OSUOM ON ONA Physical OH OSUOM ON ONA Financtal OH OSUOM ON ONA Institutional Development 0 H O SU * M 0 N 0 NA Z Environmental O H OSUOM O N O NA Social Z Poverty Reduction O H OSUOM O N O NA 2 Gender O H OSUOM O N * NA E Other (Please specify) F Private sector development 0 H O SU * M 0 N 0 NA I Public sector management 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA a Other (Please specify)

19 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory) 6.1 Bank performance Rating 0 Lending OHS OS OU OHU 2 Supervision *HS OS OU OHU K Overall OHS OS OU O HU 6.2 Borrowerperformance Rating? Preparation OHS IDS O U O HU X Government implementation performance O HS O S 0 U 0 HU? Implementation agency performance O HS O S O U 0 HU 2 Overall OHS OS O U O HU Note: The Government's implementation performance was marginally satisfactory due to low achievement of sectoral policy and institutional outputs. PWD's implementation performance was fully satisfactory. DRT's performance was marginally unsatisfactory due to the low achievement of road transport initiatives and related legislation, but strong achievement on road safety

20 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents List of Supporting Documents Project Completion Report on The Second Road Upgrading Project. Report PCR: FIJ Asian Development Bank, 29 December, 1999 (incorporating Borrower's Comments) Project Supervision Report - Implementation Completion review Mission, May EASTR, IBRD Loan FIJ, June 28,