PART 1 OF THE AFRICAN PEACE FACILITY EVALUATION:

Transcription

1 THE EUROPEAN UNION S EDF PROGRAMME PART 1 OF THE AFRICAN PEACE FACILITY EVALUATION: REVIEWING THE PROCEDURES OF THE APF AND POSSIBILITIES OF ALTERNATIVE FUTURE SOURCES OF FUNDING LETTER OF CONTRACT N 2010/ FINAL REPORT PREPARED BY ROBIN POULTON EDUARDO TRILLO LEON KUKKUK The project is financed by the European Union The project is implemented by IBF International Consulting In collaboration with BAA (Spain)

2 Acknowledgments The experts would like to thank all those who contributed and provided information during the evaluation. Staff at beneficiary organisations, Government entities, EU Member States, other donors and individuals who have been helpful and open, and given generously of their time. The Experts appreciation also goes to the EC Service Officials, the Council and the EU Delegations staff, who assisted at all steps of the mission: providing sound advice, managing local meetings and helping in the documentation. The Experts hope that this evaluation report on APF, focused on procedures and alternative funding, shall contribute to its improvement in a relevant, effective and sustainable manner. Any mistakes or omissions remain the responsibility of the authors. The views expressed in this report are those of the experts and can in no way be taken to represent those of the European Commission. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the contractor and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union.

3 Contents Executive Summary...1 I. Background and scope...4 I.1 Rationale...4 I.2 Scope of the Evaluation...5 I.3 Evaluation phases...6 I.4 Specific Methodology...8 I.5 Expected Results...8 II. General appraisal of the APF...9 II.1 The success of the APF...9 II.2 Funding of the APF Instrument...10 II.3 APSA and the APF intervention Logic...11 II.4 APSA and APF...15 II.5 SWOT Analysis of APF...17 III. Main Findings and Recommendations on APF Decision-Making Procedures...19 III.1 Overview of the APF Decision-Making Procedures...19 III.1.1 Decision-Making Procedures applying to APF programming of the Action Plan...19 III.1.2 Decision-making Procedures applying to APF financial decisions...20 III.1.3 Contribution and Grant Agreements...24 III.1.4 Appreciation of APF decision-making and timing...27 III.2 Recommendations regarding the APF Decision Making Procedures...28 III.2.1 Regarding the APF programming of Action Plan:...28 III.2.2 Improving APF decision-making procedures in accordance with the current legal framework...29 III.2.3 Decision-making procedures in accordance with the current EDF legal framework...31 III.2.4 Decision-making procedures outside the EDF legal framework...32 III.2.5 APF aid modalities...36 III.2.6 AU/REC procedures and practice for APF requests...37 III.2.7 EU-AU/RECs structural procedures...38 IV. Main findings and recommendations on alternative funding...39 IV.1 EU funding instruments...40 IV.2 Possible AU sources of co-funding for APF-funded activities...42 IV.3 Summary of the Analysis of selected EU funding mechanisms and compatibility with APF.44 IV.4 Recommendations...44 IV.4.1 Funding Recommendations in a political context...44 IV.4.2 Short-term options for APF Funding...45 IV.4.3 Long-term options for funding APF...47 IV.4.4 African P&S funding policies and implementation...49

4 Acronyms ACCORD African Centre for the Constructive resolution of disputes ACOTA African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (USA) ACP African Caribbean Pacific states ACPP African Conflict Prevention Pool (FCO, MOD & DFID collaboration) AEC African Economic Community AFRC Africa committee of PSC in Brussels composed of EU MS ALPC Armes légères et de petit calibre (SALW) AMIB AU Mission in Burundi AMIS AU Mission in Sudan (Darfur) AMISEC African Union Mission to the Comoros AMISOM AU Mission in Somalia APF African Peace Facility APRM African Peer Review Mechanism APSA African Peace and Security Architecture APSTA African Peace Support Trainers' Association Artemis ESDP operation in eastern Congo launched 2003 ASF African Standby Forces AU African Union AUC African Union Commission AUPG African Union Partners Group AWG African Working Groups (= COAFR committee of PSC) CAAU Constitutive Act of the African Union CADSP Common African Defence and Security Policy CAR Central African Republic CD Committee for Development CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women CEEAC ECCAS CEMAC Communauté économique et monétaire de l Afrique centrale CEWARN Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism CEWS Continental Early warning System CISG Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (UN) CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CHPR Court of Human and Peoples Rights CIDO African Citizens Directorate CIS Consultation inter-services CMPD Crisis Management Planning Directorate of the EU COAFR Comité africain du COPS (see AWG) COPS Comité politique et sécuritaire (French name for PSC of the Council) CPCC Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (Consilium) CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy COMESA Common market for East and Southern Africa CSSDCA Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa DCI Development Cooperation Instrument DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration DEVCO EU s division for International Cooperation DfID Department for International Development (UK) DRC Democratic Republic of Congo EAC East African Community

5 EASBRIG East African Standby Brigade EC European Commission ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States CEEAC ECHO European Community s Humanitarian Aid Office now the EU s Department of Humanitarian Aid ECOBRIG West African ASF Brigade (also referred to as WESBRIG) ECOMOG ECOWAS monitoring group ECOSOCC Economic Social and Cultural Committee ECOWARN Early warning System of ECOWAS ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ECPR European Consortium of Political Research ECSC European Coal and Steel Community EDF European Development Fund EDSP European Defence and Security Policy now CSDP EEAS European External Action Service ENPI European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument EP European Parliament EPA Economic Partnership Agreement ESDP European Security and Defence Policy ESS European Security Strategy EU European Union EUFOR EU force in Chad and Central African Republic TCHAD/RCA EUFOR DRC EU force in DRC EUMC European Union Military Committee EUMS European Union Military Staff EU MS EU Member States EUPOL EU Police mission in Kinshasa DRC EUSEC EU SSR programme in DRC EUSR EU Special Representative EUTM EU Training Mission for Somalis EWS Early Warning System FOMAC Force Multinationale en Centrafrique / Central African Standby Force FOSDA Foundation for Security and Development in Africa, Accra (NGO) GAERC General Affairs and External Relations Council of the EU GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit HAC EU s Humanitarian Aid Commissioner IANSA International Action Network against Small Arms (INGO coalition) IfS Instrument for Stability IGAD Inter Governmental Authority on development IPSA International Political Science Association ISC Inter-Service Consultation (CIS - internal Commission comitology ) ISS Institute for Security Studies, South Africa JAES Joint Africa-EU Strategy JFA Joint Financing Arrangement MoU 2010 between AU and AUPG on financing P&S personnel JRC Joint Research Centre KAIPTC Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre MAES Mission d assistance électorale et sécuritaire aux Comores de l Union africaine / African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros MARAC Mécanisme d'alerte Rapide en Afrique Centrale (ECCAS conflict early warning system)

6 MDGs MICOPAX MONUC MSC NATO NEPAD NGO NIP OAU ODA OLAF PAP PAPS PAPS PASPA PCRD POW PSC PSC PSO PSD PSOD PSTC RCA REC RECAMP Relex RIP RRM RSS SADC SADCBRIG SALW SFPI SSR SWOT TFEU TFG UN UNAMID UNDP USAID WAANSA WACSOF WANEP WANSED WAPI WESBRIG WIPNET WWN Millennium Development Goals Mission de consolidation de la paix en République centrafricaine (ECCAS mission) UN mission in DRC Military Staff Committee (AU) North Atlantic Treaty Organisation New Economic Partnership for African Development Non Governmental Organisation National Indicative Programme Organisation of African Unity Official Development Assistance (of the EU) Office Européen de Lutte Anti-Fraude Pan African Parliament Programme d'appui en matière de Paix et Sécurité (PAPS-CEEAC) for ECCAS Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security of ECOWAS Partenariat Stratégique Pour la Paix en Afrique (NGO network) Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Panel of the Wise (AU) Political and Security Committee (COPS) of the Council AU Peace and Security Council Peace Support Operations Peace & Security Department (AU) Peace Support Operations Division (AU) Peace Support Training Centre République Centrafricaine Regional Economic Community Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities / Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix EU DG External Relations (now SFPI) Regional Indicative Programme Rapid Reaction Mechanism Réforme des secteurs de la sécurité (SSR) Southern African Development Community Southern African ASF Brigade Small arms and light weapons (ALPC) Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (ex-relex, ex-fpis) Security Sector Reform (RSS) Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats analysis Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Lisbon) Transitional Federal Government Somalia United Nations UN/AU mission to Darfur UN development programme US Agency for international development West African Action Network against Small Arms (CSO: cf IANSA & RASALAO) West African Civil Society Forum (NGO coordination network) West African Network for Peace à Accra (NGO peace network) West African Network for Security and Democratic Governance (Nigeria) West African Peace Institute (NGO) a name occasionally used for ECOBRIG Women s international peace network (NGO peace network) WANEP Women s Network (NGO peace network)

7 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY EU foreign policy towards Africa has evolved in the context of successive EDFs and the Cotonou Agreement (successor to Lomé) over more than half a century. In response to the request of the African Union (AU) in 2003, the EU created, under the 9 th EDF, a new foreign policy financial instrument, the Africa Peace Facility (APF), based on the philosophy of building a developmentsecurity nexus as sustainable economic development can only take place in conditions of peace and security. Under the 10 th EDF, the APF Action Plan includes as a general objective to contribute to the African peace and security agenda through targeted support at continental and regional levels in the areas of conflict prevention, management and resolution, and peace building. The APF addresses peace and security following the underlying principles of the Joint Africa EU strategy (JAES) 1 : ownership, partnership and solidarity. The APF specific objectives meet the three priorities of the Africa-EU partnership on Peace and Security under the First Action Plan ( ), namely: provide funding for African-led peace-keeping operations (PSOs) operationalise the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) promote a dialogue on challenges to peace and security in Africa. APSA is made up of several components and structures and includes eight African regional organisations (RECs), in particular an AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is the central AU decision-making body; a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS); a 'Panel of the Wise', with a mandate in conflict prevention and resolution, and an African Standby Force (ASF) to be deployed in peace support operations. This EU commitment was renewed at the 3rd Africa EU Summit held in Tripoli in November The present report refers to Part I of a comprehensive evaluation of the APF: policy-oriented review focusing on the procedures of the APF and possibilities of alternative future sources of funding. Part II will be a substantive evaluation of the overall implementation and results. Despite any reservations over financial procedures, the APF has transformed the way in which the AU and the EU are perceived in Africa, making them significant players in the peace and security sector. Each category of stakeholders (AU and AU MS, international and regional organisations, CSOs in Europe and Africa) speaks positively about APF and its achievements. The recent events in North Africa remind us that Europe has a direct interest in creating a strong African security infrastructure functioning all the way down from the AU Peace and Security Council in Addis, to the distant frontiers where conflicts occur. Since the creation of APF in 2003, 2 the instrument has evolved considerably, both in scope (under the JAES) and financial potential. The following table summarises the main changes in the APF between the 9 th and 10 th EDF: 1 Adopted in December For a detailed history of APF s evolution, see annex 1. Page 1 of 49

8 Main Features 1st APF (9th EDF) 2 nd APF (10th EDF) Scope PSOs and relevant capacity Africa-EU dialogue on P&S Conflict management incl. mediation Conflict prevention incl. EWS, Funding PSOs (and prevention) Operationalisation APSA Post-conflict stabilisation Beneficiaries AU and sub-regional orgs AU and sub-regional organisations Relevant institutions & national structures related to APSA CSOs Allocation Nearly 440m over 4-5 years including AVCs 3 300m for 3 years without AVCs further 300m earmarked in the Intra- ACP reserve for Flexibility Decision-making process 2-3 months More flexible, with an urgent procedure ERM can be mobilised almost immediately Co-financing NIPs % African co-financing AVCs first case of co-financing by EU MS under 9th EDF AVCs become permanent feature of APF Open to contributions from other non-eu countries or donors The undoubted APF political success does not ensure its efficiency and effectiveness, and EDF procedures are sometimes criticised for being inappropriate when dealing with PSO and early response. The creation of ERM has increased flexibility, although its scope is very limited (6-month mediation or planning missions), nevertheless, in practice, APF procedures generally work faster than many EU instruments. APF funding needs to be better targeted - possibly by using more specific earmarks for each component - to ensure that Africa s early warning, mediation and conflict management processes are able to take over a progressively stronger role in promoting peace and security. Despite its impressive record in funding PSOs, the APF might be more effective - and less controversial among EU and AU MS and CSOs - if its procedures and funding had allowed for a more complete development of the full range of APSA s ambitions. This also entails APF funding beyond the AUC and REC secretariats. A comprehensive approach to APSA must include a broadening of the implementing entities and include civil society, specialised entities, research institutes and, in a limited number of cases, AU member states. After careful analysis of the procedural and funding options (many of which contain legal obstacles caused by the EC general procedures, the military nature of PSOs or the fact that they are African-led actions), the evaluation sees several ways in which the APF s procedural and funding structures could be adjusted under the 10 th EDF to ensure greater efficiency between EU funding instruments and get the best value-for-money from APF resources and promote synergies with EU MS: The best for APF would be to continue to be funded under the EDF with procedural modifications inspired by IfS and ECHO to make it more flexible and effective. The EU should reinforce the promotion of joint management and sound administration within the AU and RECs in order to better fulfil the objectives of JAES. 3 Additional voluntary contributions of nearly 40m came from 8 EU MS Page 2 of 49

9 The principle of subsidiarity should be applied at all management levels within the EU-AU- RECs structure regarding APF activities. Re-defining the roles of NIP, RIP and APF to ensure maximum complementarity and no overlapping in EU actions on peace and security in Africa. Reintroducing the slicing mechanism (used in 1st APF) to bring funds to the APF from each NIP to increase both total available funding and African MS ownership. RIPs should take responsibility for funding RECs (except for PSOs) on peace and security activities. RIPs already include this possibility and some are currently funding complementary APF actions. One important element is to create the necessary flexibility within RIP implementing modalities to allow for high-impact support. Re-establishing a balance between the parts of APSA with specifically targeted resources for early-warning-early-intervention, Panel of the Wise and other conflict management functions which could reduce the need to fund conflict-prevention PSOs. Widening the potential range of beneficiaries beyond a narrow focus on AU and REC bureaucracies including civil society, specialised entities, research institutes and possibly AU member states dealing with relevant cross-border issues. Expanding the range of management models, implementation modalities and possibly operating smaller, targeted projects to complement the major support programmes. Page 3 of 49

10 I. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE I.1 RATIONALE Conflicts in Africa continue to hamper the fight against poverty. Unless the root causes and underlining threats to security as well as active conflicts are adequately addressed, the economic, human and social development of Africa will be at risk. A comprehensive approach to peace and security in Africa requires a broad regional policy framework, covering different aspects of peace and security as well as clear and accountable role sharing between the national, sub-regional, continental and multilateral levels. When the African Union (AU) was established in 2002, its Member States entrusted the organisation with a broad political mandate in the area of conflict prevention, management, resolution and peace building. Consequently, a structural and long-term response to the African peace and security challenges was set up, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). APSA is made up of several components and structures, in particular an AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is the central AU decision-making body; a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS); a 'Panel of the Wise', with a mandate in conflict prevention and resolution, and an African Standby Force (ASF) to be deployed in peace support operations. At the same time, an Africa Peace Fund, made up of AU member state and partner contributions, was established to promote Peace and Security Department work. The African regional organisations (REC/RMs) are the pillars of the overall security architecture and regional components are key elements of the Continental Early Warning System and African Standby Force. These organisations have since committed themselves to address the challenges to peace and security through African-owned and African-led initiatives such as the AU missions in Sudan/Darfur (AMIS) and Somalia (AMISOM) and the ECCAS mission in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX). The EU, mainly since 2005, has made peace and security one of the main pillars in its comprehensive Strategy for Africa 4 and it has committed to further enhance its overall support to Africa in this area. To this end, an EU Concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts was put forward (in 2006) 5. The main objectives of the Concept include support to African capacities, policies and structures in the area of mediation, early warning, post-conflict 4 EU Council Conclusions of December th General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting, Brussels, 13 November 2006 Page 4 of 49

11 reconstruction, relevant capacities for peace operations, and the establishment of the African Stand-by Force (ASF). Moreover, the joint Africa EU strategy (JAES), adopted in December 2007, defined peace and security as one of the 8 areas for a special EU Africa partnership and dialogue including as key objective a full APSA implementation. The EU has also taken key steps to strengthen financial capacity of the African institutions to foster peace and security on the continent, with the African Peace Facility (APF), established following a request by African leaders at the AU Summit in Maputo (2003) 6 as the biggest source of funding in this field. First, under the 9 th EDF, APF channelled a total of almost 440 million, and later, under the 10 th EDF, a further 300 million were programmed for the period of This EU commitment was renewed at the 3rd Africa EU Summit held in Tripoli in November 2010, Peace and security remain a cornerstone of our cooperation. We are committed to making the African Peace and Security Architecture fully operational in close collaboration with the regional organisations. As regards AU lead Peace operations, it was agreed to work towards ensuring flexible, predictable and sustainable funding." The objectives of the APF are the following: 1. Enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security, including through systematic and regular dialogue, consultations, coordination of positions, sharing of information and analysis, joint assessment missions and exchange of experience 2. Operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), including working towards the development of a fully-fledged Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, overall strengthening of conflict prevention mechanisms and effective post-conflict reconstruction as well as operationalisation of the African Standby Force; 3. Predictable funding for Africa-led peace support operations, in particular through the establishment of an EU predictable and sustainable funding scheme, as well as through working with the international community to achieve UN mechanism to provide sustainable and predictable financial support for these operations. The APF action plan , in accordance with the underlying principles of the JAES (ownership, partnership and solidarity), the thematic scope of the APF and the priorities of the Joint Partnership specifically allocates 65 million for the operationalisation of APSA and Africa-EU dialogue; 200 million for Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and 15 million for the Early Response Mechanism (ERM). The timeframe of this action programme matches the first Joint Africa-EU Action Plan. I.2 SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION The APF evaluation is split in two parts: 1. Part I: A policy review focusing specifically on APF sources of funding and procedures 2. Part II: A substantive evaluation of the of the overall implementation of the APF and its results The present report refers to Part I of the APF evaluation, originally scheduled to take place before the second Joint Africa-EU Action Plan. 6 On the basis of the Joint Council Decision 3/2003 of 11 th December Pursuant to article 12 of Council Regulation (EC) No 617/2007 of 14 May 2007 on the implementation of the 10th EDF under the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement.. Page 5 of 49

12 In accordance with the ToR 8, and taking into consideration political opportunities and feasibility, institutional and legal constraints, implementing modalities and financial aspects, this report specifically reviews and assesses: 1. The APF decision-making procedures, which have proven to be time-consuming for the EU which can impact on the activity implementation, particularly in PSOs. This evaluation focused on reviewing the stages of the EU decision making process, assessing their relevance and suggesting ways to simplify/shorten the procedure. The evaluation is also focusing on the procedures implementation and more specifically the APF delivery approaches a well, the suitability of agreement/grant contracts for the AU/REC structures and the possibility of establishing new management bodies for channelling APF funding. In this sense, the internal AU/RECs procedures are considered in relation to APF requests without analysing the AU/RECs capacity constraints, which will be the focus of part II of the APF evaluation, in particular in the areas of administrative and financial management, operational, planning and long-term capacity building planning. 2. Possibilities of future alternative sources of funding, looking at the following questions: The relevance of the security and development nexus for the existence of APF 9. The sustainability and predictability of APF funding, particularly for PSOs, as there is an inherent unpredictability that, in the past, triggered the need for several urgent replenishments of the APF. The possibility of third country contribution to the APF and of a bigger role for the African Peace Fund is considered. The coming EU institutional and budgetary developments in the prospect of developing new financial instruments for external action beyond 2013, and in close relation with the establishment of the European External Action Service. The possible inclusion of the EDF in the EU budget could impact the regulatory, financial and management aspects of the existing APF. I.3 EVALUATION PHASES According to the ToR, this evaluation had four phases: 1) An inception phase in Brussels 2) A headquarter phase 3) A field phase 4) A synthesis phase a. Inception Phase The inception phase was devoted to structuring and preparing the evaluation approach and methodology. The team studied the intervention logic of the Commission support to APF and the development/security nexus. The inception phase included: Clarification and understanding of the objectives of the APF; Summary of the fundamental procedures concerning the identification and submission of requests, different contracting procedures, and vetting, approval and implementation of APF grants and/or contribution agreements; A Launch Note, presenting the team understanding of the ToR and the proposed general approach to the work was prepared in December 2010 and presented to the CGIS on 9th January Terms of Reference, Part 1 of the African Peace Facility Evaluation: Reviewing the Procedures of the APF and Possibilities of Alternative Future Sources of Funding. FWC Commission 2007 Lot n 4. Request for offer N 2010/ Article 11 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement 9 provides the necessary basis for establishing the APF. Page 6 of 49

13 Areas for further study and questioning were identified and presented in the Draft Inception Note; Detailed questions were refined, stakeholder groups identified, potential interviewees identified and contacted; A Draft Inception Note was presented and discussed on 17 January 2011, amended and presented on 23 January 2011 and approved by the CGIS. b. Headquarters Phase 10 The team consulted key documentation and human sources in Brussels: Examination of European Commission strategy documents and evaluations relating to selected countries/regions and procedures covered by the APF; Examination of African Union strategy documents and evaluations relating to selected countries/regions covered by the APF; Examination of funding agreements, income and expenditure and comparison with planning; Extraction of detailed procedures from documents concerning interventions under the APF; Detailed examination of procedures for request, selection, approval, implementation; Detailed examination of procedures for procurement, financial management, and audit; Examination of intervention-specific documents concerning APF; Analysis of the origins of procedures, and the nature of checks and balances; Analysis of oversight procedures, of how responsibility and authority function in the system; Interviews with EU Commission HQ staff in charge of the APF and related country desks; Interviews with Council staff; Interviews with officials of a few selected EU MS working on APF; Interviews with officials of a few selected African missions in Brussels; Interviews with selected CSOs and academics informed about APF functioning and procedures; Interviews with UN officials in New York and Africa; c. Field Phase 11 African visits in February 2011 were mandated to: 1- AU and EU offices in Addis Ababa (Mr Leon Kukkuk) and 2- ECCAS and EU offices in Libreville (Mr Eduardo Trillo). Each field visit included: Interviews with AU/REC officials; Interviews with local EU officials in office; Interviews with local and/or regional civil society specialists; Extracting procedures from documents concerning interventions under the APF; Analysis of the origins of procedures, and the nature of checks and balances; Analysis of oversight procedures and how responsibility and authority function in the system; Detailed examination of PSO request, selection and approval procedures; Detailed examination of APF intervention, management and control procedures; Detailed examination of mediation missions request, selection, approval procedures; Examination of the way in which other EU instruments are considered and used before APF is called in or used to create synergy with APF; Each field visit resulted in a debriefing in the African capital by the consultant. 10 For details see Annex 4 11 For details see Annex 4 Page 7 of 49

14 d. Synthesis Phase The Team compiled a First Draft Report during the last week of February. This report was presented and discussed on March 17th, then a Second Draft Final Report was delivered, and after the EC comments, the evaluation team submitted the Final Report. I.4 SPECIFIC METHODOLOGY The following steps were carried out for the procedure part of the evaluation: Analysis of the current decision-making procedures, taking EU and the AU/REC perspectives, EU and AU Member States and other experts ideas into account. Understand problems and successes during the 2008 to 2010 period, taking into account the legal framework, administrative practices and innovations and the conditions imposed by African security, politics and realities. Identification of possible procedural improvements within the current legal framework. Study possible changes to the legal framework. Research on new and former procedures. The following steps were carried out for the funding part of the evaluation: Analysing income and expenditure patterns in APF from the outset. Comparing income and expenditure with APF objectives and planning. Obtaining information and opinion on funding history from all stakeholders. Analysing the possible administrative changes in funding sources and application. Investigating possible new funding sources. The evaluation was conducted in a collaborative manner with high interaction between the consultants and with EC staff, who provided detailed information and a reality check concerning the institutional and political contexts. This partnership generated a learning process between the CISG and the consultants. Key issues have been identified, which now need to be considered by the appropriate stakeholders and decision-makers The evaluation included the analysis of a large range of legal and procedural documents as well as a variety of funding mechanisms. While the decisions on implementation rest with AU and EU Member States, the evaluation team believes it has cast a searchlight on the areas where positive changes may be achieved. The team has also presented Hypotheses that will be useful in the 2 nd Part of the Evaluation when analysing the impact of APF in details (in annexe). I.5 EXPECTED RESULTS The main final result is the submission of a Final Report which includes: a thorough analysis of the APF decision-making procedures as well as possible alternative sources of funding in the future, including common foreign and security policy funding, and clear, complete and specific answers to the evaluation questions. The Final Report, as requested under the ToR, is also including working hypotheses to be further analysed during phase 2 of the evaluation See annex 6 on working hypothesis for APF evaluation part II. Page 8 of 49

15 II. GENERAL APPRAISAL OF THE APF II.1 THE SUCCESS OF THE APF The APF is considered successful by most stakeholders, particularly in funding PSOs and establishing the AU as a serious player in peace and security issues. Its action is rooted in repeated joint commitments by EU and AU to work together for peace in Africa, based on a legal foundation especially Cotonou Art. 11. The APF has given the African Union political clout, with a physical and political presence in peacekeeping that could not have been imagined ten years ago. The AU is now a functioning organisation with major military operations, some additional experience in police and civilian peacekeeping and mediation, and significant budgetary experience. The APF has certainly achieved the objective of enhancing dialogue, but its achievements will be even more significant when all the pillars of APSA are fully functioning. 13 The APF start was considered with great excitement in Europe, but even more so in Africa where AU MS governments were delighted with the idea that they were contributing a slice from their National Indicative Programmes (NIP) to build the Peace and Security Architecture of AU. EU Commissioner Poul Nielsen and AU Commissioner Said Djinnit understood the political importance of the African buy-in : African ownership felt real because 50% of the 1st APF came from African states. Through the APF, the EU has taken political initiatives that were not even envisaged ten years ago. This has positioned the EU as a major actor on the peace and security fields in Africa. The EU has supplanted many of the post-colonial and bilateral processes that dominated in the 1990s, which is both appreciated by the Africans and EU MS including some of the former colonial powers who appreciate the European filter on peace and security issues. The APF has also allowed the EU to experiment foreign policy initiatives and procedural mechanisms that had never been tried before. The EEAS has the opportunity to build on this basis in Africa and elsewhere, seeking synergies within ODA 14 funding: the APF is a seminal experiment with long-term ramifications we cannot even begin to imagine. In a remarkably short period, the APF has changed the face of peace and security in Africa. APF is an instrument that provides political leverage to the AU; but some of the initial drive has diminished as procedures sometimes took precedence over political innovation. While procedures and internal controls are important, rules and regulations evolving in Brussels do not easily match with the principle of African ownership and the requirements of effective delivery and value for money. AU and REC absorptive (and management) capacities are already limited by the newness of their structures 13 In order to make the APSA work, it is crucial to elaborate a forward-looking action plan on capacity-building, including the elaboration of an innovative policy approach that looks at real African needs and provides predictable and sustainable resources. Pirozzi and Miranda 2010, p3 14 The EU s official development assistance had a total value of 49 billion in 2009, nearly 100 per citizen which is considerably more than in the US and Japan. African countries receive 15 billion annually, the main share of EU development assistance. European aid stands at 0.42% of gross national income (GNI), includes 3 of the 5 largest donors in the world (UK, France and Germany) and four of the five countries that exceed the UN target of 0.7% of GNI being given to development aid (Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, Luxembourg). However, the EU is not yet on its way to meet the 2015 ODA targets. Page 9 of 49

16 and insufficient staffing. Struggling to grasp the minutiae of EU administration and procedures is a burden that some RECs (ECCAS is one example) find almost overwhelming. The structural deficiencies of AU/RECs on financial management have made matters worse, although the AU appears to have made significant progress in this area during II.2 FUNDING OF THE APF INSTRUMENT The first APF was created with a 250 million budget. The NIP slicing mechanism was confirmed in DECISION No 3/2003 OF THE ACP-EC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS of 11 December 2003 on the use of resources from the long-term development envelope of the 9th EDF for the creation of a Peace Facility for Africa: Art 1 Para 1: A contribution of 1,5 % shall be taken from allocations that were notified to African ACP States in accordance with Article 1(b) of Annex IV to the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement. Such contribution will be taken from the uncommitted balance of the allocation referred to in Article 3(2) (b) of Annex IV to the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, the so-called B-allocation. If the uncommitted balance of the B-allocation is insufficient, the remainder will be taken from the uncommitted balance of the allocation referred to in Article 3(2) (a) of Annex IV, the so-called A-allocation. A total amount of EUR 126,4 million shall thus be transferred from the respective country allocations to the intra-acp allocation under the envelope for regional cooperation and integration and used for the creation of a Peace Facility for Africa. The slicing mechanism was not pursued in the second APF in 2007, under 10 th EDF. As a result, without slicing mechanism, the accountability between the AU MS and the AUC may have weakened. For many interlocutors, the NIP slicing mechanism offered several excellent aspects, among which building political commitment to the AU was perhaps the most important. Therefore, the evaluation sees a possible re-introduction of the NIP slicing mechanism in the future as a valuable way not only to increase funding for the 2nd APF, but also strengthen mutual links and commitments between the AU as an institution and AU Member States. Taking into account that the second APF, under the 10th EDF, budgeted 300 million (for PSOs 200m, for APSA 65m, for ERM 15m, audit M&E etc. 7m, contingencies 13m), since the establishment of the African Peace Facility (APF) in 2004, the EU has channelled 740 million through this instrument. 15 In 2007, the AU and the EU decided to broaden the scope of the African Peace Facility to cover conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation as well as to accelerate decisionmaking and coordination processes. In line with the priorities of the Partnership on Peace and Security of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, APF funds have been allocated as follows: Item in the APF budget 16 Amount and purpose under 9 th and 10 th EDF 1) Capacity Building (CB) 100 million have been allocated to the Operationalisation of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and Africa- EU dialogue. EU support aims at strengthening dialogue and the capacity and effectiveness of the various components of the APSA Additional funds are allocated to activities such as audit, monitoring, visibility, evaluation and technical assistance. Page 10 of 49

17 Item in the APF budget 16 Amount and purpose under 9 th and 10 th EDF 2) Peace Support Operations (PSO) 600 million have been earmarked for this purpose. The funding of Peace Support Operations represents the core activity of the African Peace Facility (APF). EU support aims at providing sustainable and predictable funding to enable effective planning. 3) Early Response Mechanism (ERM): 15 million have been allocated to finance preparatory stages of Peace Support Operations or urgent funding for initial mediation processes (6 months). 4) Contingencies: 40 million are earmarked for unforeseen needs in case any of the above-mentioned budget lines is depleted. APF contracted amounts under the 9 th EDF (1 st APF) 17 1st APF PSOs AMIS Sudan > 350m FOMUC/MICOPAX CAR 53.2m AMISOM Somalia 35.5m AMISEC + MAES Comoros 5m + 3m PSO cumulated expenditure AMIS TOTAL AMIS + others Capacity Building EXPENDITURE AUC capacities 6m ASF workshops REC liaison, EWS & finance mgt 7.7m (South Africa budget line) ASF planning, EWS & finance mgt 20m II.3 APSA AND THE APF INTERVENTION LOGIC In December 2005, the EU adopted its Africa Strategy, aiming to support Africa s efforts to reach the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and make Europe's partnership with Africa more efficient. 18 EU financial support to achieving the MDGs and to the APF is channelled through the intergovernmental European Development Fund (EDF), which, as a formal EU mechanism under EU s first pillar, is managed by the European Commission. The APF is therefore a development funding directed towards creating the necessary security conditions for development in line with the spirit and legal basis of the Cotonou Agreement. The African Union and its African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) were born with the new Millennium. The following diagram displays the pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture 17 From the APF unit Page 11 of 49

18 From Vines & Middleton 2008 The institutional transformation of the OAU into the African Union offered new perspectives for Africa to take control of its future. According to all interlocutors, the EU has been the primary, most reliable and most generous funder of the APSA. The impact of the APF can be considered a huge success and a successful political risk for the EU - achieved in a remarkably short period. Designed in some aspects on the EU, 19 the AU has nevertheless taken foreign policy integration much further and much faster than the EU, at least from a theoretical perspective. The legal framework of APSA, outlined in the AU Constitutive Act, the PSC protocol and the CADSP, 20 remains the most ambitious regional security architecture in the world, giving mandate to the AUC and sub-regional organisations to intervene within the borders of the member states. Largely thanks to the APF, APSA has started to become a reality: its regional ASF brigades are almost ready for action; interventions in CAR and Comoros were successful; mediations in Niger and Guinea prevented war; the AMIS and AMISOM operations in Sudan and Somalia are huge and important; collaboration with UN and EU is creating new synergies; innovative peace management approaches like early-warning, mediation and conflict management through the Panel of the Wise are exciting (even if they have not yet moved very far). However, the limited institutional capacity of the 19 The AU has a simpler control structure than the EU, without the different pillar competencies. The Pan-African Parliament, however, has very limited powers, and is not directly elected. The PAP has existed since The 265 representatives who serve in it are elected from within the national legislatures of 53 African countries. Unlike the EU, there are no economic or financial conditions for AU membership, so the divergence in ideologies is greater. The AU agenda and origins are more political and less economic than those of the EU. 20 Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), adopted in Maputo, in July 2003 Page 12 of 49

19 AU, the relative limited focus on the strengthening of the AUC/RECs relation as a key driver of APSA, and the fragility of its political consensus keep APSA weak. Nevertheless, there is no denying its importance, or the success of its first decade. At the same time, some of Africa s regional organisations have also emerged as significant players in the field of peace and security. ECOWAS can claim success in Sierra Leone and Liberia, Niger and Guinea, and the 1998 Moratorium now the legally binding Convention - on Small Arms is a seminal African experience. The MICOPAX intervention in Central African Republic is considered an ECCAS success. APSA s success depends on the RECs and other regional structures, as well as the African Union. The notion of RECs as pillars of APSA is complicated by overlapping memberships, and differing roles in peace and security; and not all RECs are involved in the support to the African Standby Force 21. Under the JAES, APF has evolved from a fund for PSOs, into the funding partner of APSA 22 under the logic and legal backing of the 2005 amended Cotonou Agreement; while APSA itself has the legal backing of the AU Constitutive Act and the AU Peace and Security Council. 23 Subsequent to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 25 March 2005, the JAES of 2007 sets out a new relationship between Africa and Europe based on a set of eight partnerships. The first of these is the Peace and Security Partnership, under which APSA falls. APSA has ambitions that concern both conflict management and conflict prevention within and among African countries. The evaluation sees that it would be valuable to look more closely at African systems of conflict management, which are frequently discussed in the literature in connection with internal conflicts: the role of States, traditional authorities and civil society in reducing tensions and avoiding violence. Using this shorthand, APSA might be more effective and less costly, if conflict management systems were supported at the local level: Conflict prevention involving outsiders such as the REC, AU or international community would not be necessary. Such an approach, which makes sense as a complementary measure within the APF, would require that the APF and APSA be fully implemented in line with the human security doctrine 24. Concretely, this would entail that APF contracts should be signed with other parties than the AUC/RECs for such specific purposes and that a wider range of EU aid modalities are used in implementation of APF funds. APF has been fairly successful with low-cost interventions. In the conflict management area, the ERM stands out: 10 mediation missions were funded during 2010 and two additional during the first quarter of 2011, for no more than 6 months (the procedural maximum) and little cost. Using a What If hypothesis for avoiding war, it is reasonable to surmise that several millions of Euros and the lives of hundreds might have been saved through successful mediations in Guinea and Niger. Among PSO experiences, the two Comoros operations stand out as APF success stories: they were short and effective, leaving the country stabilised after elections. On the other hand, synergy has been achieved on CB between APF and RIPs, as in the case of ECCAS, which has been very valuable to improve impact and avoid overlapping. The evaluation sees that an APF information and outreach strategy, disseminating Lessons Learned, could yield similar cost-effective benefits. 21 The Arab Maghreb Union cooperating with Egypt was initially designated to act as the regional organisation which would create and support the brigade. For some time, intra-regional differences prevented any progress at all. However, a new mounting body, the North Africa Regional Capability, has now been created to take on the role of the REC for Northern Africa 22 For this evolution see tables in the Executive Summary sections 1.1 and 1.2 above. 23 APSA s structure is outlined in The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council Adopted by the 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union in Durban, 9 July The Barcelona Report A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, presented by the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, in September Page 13 of 49

20 Regarding what scholars name the conflict cycle 25, APF is open to help the AU and RECs to develop mechanisms to enable interventions at every stage of the conflict cycle in the areas of peace and security: from the moment when the EWS picks up signs of a small conflict or the event that could ignite conflict, all the way through to post-conflict peace building and sustainable development where EDF and the development-security nexus function. PSOs intervene in the middle of the conflict cycle, only if there is a failure of local authorities and CSOs, local police and mediation mechanisms, and AU MS governments own conflict prevention mechanisms working at the basis of the continental P&S infrastructure. It should be stressed that if national conflict management and prevention efforts prove successful, external intervention would become unnecessary. Consequently, a more effective coordination of all EU efforts at all levels, including RIPs and NIPs, and with other donors, is crucial for a successful APSA. On the other hand, it is logical to consider how the demand for PSO funding could be decreased if earlier and cheaper prevention interventions were privileged. Therefore, it could be also concluded that a stronger APSA conflict management might reduce future APF funding needs as a whole because costly PSOs would be less necessary. That assumption is important as, at present, APF Funding is largely consumed by PSOs not only because that is APF s primary vocation, but also because the funds are available under APF to meet the high costs of peacekeeping missions. No other EU instrument is as convenient to fund certain military costs. In every nation, an option is to mobilise troops. Recruiting magistrates and policemen and coastguards for a PSO is more complex, due to their lack of availability. 26 Soldiers on the other hand, are instantly available and always keen to take on new challenges. Human security doctrine and state sovereignty both inform the legal and political framework of APSA: the argument developed during the 1990s in West Africa, according to which conflict is a development cost and preventing or managing conflict should therefore be considered a legitimate use of development funds is not the least important. The same conclusion was reached in Europe during the May 2003 Council debate culminating in the conclusions on Countries in Conflict and in numerous other documents. 27 The European Security Strategy (ESS), which was launched in 2003, emphasised the link between security and development both in Europe and Africa. 28 The same reasoning underlies the APF, the AU-EU peace and security partnership, and the JAES. Since APF is funded under EDF, the security-development nexus is an important part of the intervention logic, supported by AU member States, and follows closely the doctrine of human security. The justification for using development funds for the prevention of conflict is both politically and legally very strong as it is fully embedded in the Cotonou Agreement that guides implementation of the EDF including the APF. The evaluation supports the underlying development-security nexus philosophy but some EU Member States and other European stakeholders including members of the 25 See annex 8 on conflict cycle. 26 The EU s comprehensive approach is supposed to ensure that the military and civilian components of overseas interventions complement each other. But struggles inside the Council Secretariat, the bureaucratic machinery used by the PSC, mean that, for now at least, the ideal of civilian-military co-operation remains just that. Korski, D & Gowan, R 2009: Can the EU rebuild failing states? A review of Europe s civilian capacities European Council on Foreign Relations, Cambridge, UK (Executive Summary) 27 For example : Conflict prevention must be incorporated in cooperation programmes, since violent conflict rarely springs out of nowhere, but is the result of a gradual deterioration. Development policy and cooperation programmes are therefore effective instruments for dealing with the root causes of conflict. Their emphasis is on reducing poverty. See also Commission Communication of 11 April 2001 on Conflict Prevention and EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts The European Security Strategy considers that security is a precondition of development : A Secure Europe in a better world European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 2. Page 14 of 49

21 European Parliament and NGOs continue to question the rationale. The use of development funds was recently justified thus by the AUC Chief of Staff 29 : Of the many challenges facing our continent, the quest for peace and security is undoubtedly the most pressing. Issues of peace and security have always been at the core of the concerns of African leaders, for this is a prerequisite for the development of our continent and its peoples. II.4 APF AND JAES PARTNERSHIPS From its creation, partnership has been one of the key principles of APF. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) is built on eight partnerships, replacing donations as the driving force of the EU s long-term commitment to Africa. The first of these partnerships is Peace & Security and directly concerns APF as the AU s primary partner for P&S. A JAES mid-term review in Addis on 14 October 2009 concluded that: JAES needs to encourage more active participation and buy-in from individual Members States and African Regional Economic Communities (RECs). It will also need to stimulate greater involvement of civil society and the private sector if the full potential of the partnership is to be realised. Likewise, attention should be paid to diversifying and expanding the resources available to the Joint Strategy in order to ensure that it has access to the funds needed to achieve its goals. APF came into the JAES P&S partnership as a flagship financial facility, but it should be assessed whether it fully responds to the needs of the JAES and the entire range of specific objectives outlined in the II Action Plan ( ). The JAES and the Paris Declaration of 2005 reinforced concepts of African ownership, which had already been introduced into the APF with the NIP slicing mechanism. Nevertheless, even without NIP co-funding in the second APF, there is still some joint AU MS ownership of APSA and all the PSOs through the AU s elected, 15-member, Peace and Security Council. Resources for the Peace and Security Partnership of the Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES) mainly come from the European Commission through the EDF. As said above, reluctance about development money funding PSOs might disappear if greater political attention was paid to the non-military aspects of PSOs and complementary actions involving conflict management and mediation actions. In part, this may also be a communication issue: APF instrument is not good in communication outreach or working with the relevant actors beyond the organisational secretariats in the AUC and RECs (inter alia civil society, specialised entities, research institutions, private sector or individual AU member states). The information contained in lengthy written reports is not easy to disseminate to stakeholders. The result is that the APF and APSA operationalisations are insufficiently understood outside the bureaucratic circles of a limited number of administrative services. In that sense, the increasing importance of ERM should be highlighted as essentially reactive. Its creation was an innovative move and it has proven a very valuable prevention tool. The weakness lies in the fact that ERM actions are not linked to any longer-term APSA capacity building or AU institutional building process, such as the Panel of the Wise. They are one-off missions and while the individual mediation mission may be a success, the process is not built into APSA and does not necessarily increase AU or REC institutional capacity for mediation. 29 Shinkaiye, Ambassador John K Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: Implementing the New Africa- EU Partnership, Chatham House Transcript, London, 27 October Page 15 of 49

22 A similar impression emerges from funding for EWS: APSA requires the development of a fullyfledged Continental Early Warning System (and a concomitant process for local early-intervention when an early warning is given, which should mobilise EDF support through an ERM system at regional or country level). While PSOs are well-managed, the comparative lack of long-term strategic thinking for the rest of APSA within the AUC and RECs will weaken the long-term impact of APF if it continues to be implemented with a narrow focus on intergovernmental organisations rather than a wider range of relevant stakeholders. The 2010 APSA Assessment emphasised the need to focus on APSA policies, which are covered in MoU between the AU-RECs on APSA. 30 These policies may have been underestimated to the benefit of PSOs and military build-up. AU demands presented as APSA operationalisation, tend to see APSA pillars as objectives as such, rather than instruments to enable policy implementation. Such policies or corresponding initiatives should be the object of more targeted and specific APF support through, for example, the capacity building component (CB). Beyond the capacity building component, which should be granted sufficient strategic and political prioritisation, it appears that the police and civilian PSO components and training require more attention compared to the military side. A lot has been written about the operationalisation of the African Stand-by Force 31 and comparatively little about the other APSA pillars. The AUC is one key actor responsible for building APSA, but others exist. The APF should continue the necessary funding of the AUC and RECs but also consider whether APSA can be further strengthened via complementary funding of initiatives and stakeholders beyond the AUC. PSO funding may dominate AU requests to APF simply because the AUC is understaffed notably the PSD which is very busy running PSOs, while lacking conceptual capacity. Actually, PSD is simply not able to devote the necessary management time for building APSA, and developing policies or doctrine. Nevertheless, the low absorptive capacity that limits the growth of pan-african institutions might be overcome through deeper partnership. The analysis of Jean-Marie Guéhenno - former UN Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping seems particularly pertinent: We have been used to balancing power with power, but we are ill-equipped to deal with weakness: fragile states may require military deployments of peacekeepers, but strengthening them or managing their collapse requires much more complex strategies, drawing heavily on civilian capacities. One would expect the European Union, supposedly the civilian power par excellence, to be at the forefront of this effort, and certainly well ahead of the US, which has often been criticised for a Pentagon-dominated approach. Yet the Americans are fast learning the lessons of their difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan, and energetically building their civilian capacities. The Europeans, despite having set themselves ambitious civilian headline goals in 2004, are at risk of being left behind Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation on Peace and Security between the AU and the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Addis Ababa, January The Stand-by Force suffers from a similar bias: its headquarters are dominated by military officials. Planning, training and operational exercises have demonstrated that military elements tend to be well staffed, while police and civilian elements are lagging behind. Training curricula stress the military aspects of PSOs. 32 Jean-Marie Guéhenno s Foreword to Korski & Gowan He goes on to criticise the unwieldy divide between the European Commission and the Council Secretariat in crisis situations and the damaging consequences of excessively complex institutional arrangements, and of a dogmatic conceptual distinction between security and development issues that makes no sense in the kind of crisis situations that threaten fragile states. Page 16 of 49

23 It is argued by the military bias supporters that other EU instruments can fund police, civilian or mediation activities. IfS and RIP funds may be available, and NIP funds for P&S also need to be made available at the national level, but APF was actually created as a Peace Facility intended to fund PSOs, not as a military fund. African critics of APF say that the current arrangement only treats the symptoms of African conflicts, without contributing to the resolution of the causes. 33 APF will be more effective and its funding more firmly supported by its partners and stakeholders 34 in Europe and in Africa - if APF is able to show that it is strengthening the institutional development of APSA as a whole, rather than mainly funding the AUC/RECs and PSOs. II.5 SWOT ANALYSIS OF APF Strengths Generously funded, APF has become an important player in African PS politics. This has given AU and EU significant weight in Africa s peace and security. Partnership and the JAES give APF and the EU a very strong and coherent political philosophy. African ownership is both a strong objective, and a partial reality (it needs strengthening). Good APF internal managers have developed creative ways to make inappropriate procedures work better and keep the instrument functioning. Innovative procedures in APF, IfS and ECHO have opened doors for future flexibility and efficiency. CFSP and ATHENA offer interesting possible new funding outside EDF or in complementarity with a softer AP. APF has broadened the debate and the commitment of EU MS towards P&S issues in Africa. APF has enabled AU MS to act on P&S, which encourages creative policies and instruments for supporting peace (some are still embryonic). APF s position inside EDF allows to link PSO exit strategies with peace building and development, and potentially creates pan-eu MS synergies. The full range of APSA instruments will allow EU and AU to consider alternative conflict management entry strategies, before launching costly and unpredictable PSOs. Weaknesses AUC is developing lop-sided capacities, with only PSD showing real strength through PSOs. APF-EDF procedures are not fully adequate for PSO and crisis management actions. Short-term APF funding weakens the AU edifice, undermines AU staffing, does not build capacity, and diminishes the influence of EU and EU MS. The urgent funding of PSOs and APSA pillars has overtaken APSA policies: the AUC is instrument-led. AU staffing numbers under the Maputo organisational plan are not adequate for the ambitions of the AU; while the Maputo staffing quota is not even filled. AU management systems and procedures are weak including the quality of staffing & recruitment - and APF s CB approach has not built institutional strength. Short-term contracting misleads donors and AU MS, since PSOs are mainly managed by temporary staff that cannot build solid AU foundations or lasting institutional capacities. RECs have insufficient capacity, leaving APSA with weak pillars lacking political support from AU MS. APF in Brussels is too far from the action, especially from the numerous RECs: the role of EU delegations and RIPs should therefore be increased. Civil Society has not been engaged in PS in Africa (nor in Europe) yet CSOs are vital strategic partners. 33 Similar concerns were expressed, and a number of suggestions for the future APF were jointly approved, during the APF Joint Coordination Committee held in Addis Ababa on 4 February 2008; and again at the Annual AU- RECs Consultation on 13 June 2001, with G8 and other partners - Para 13: While noting the progress made in the resolution of the conflicts facing the continent, the Consultation agreed on the need for continued and sustained efforts to consolidate peace where it has been restored, as well as prevent and resolve conflicts. 34 For example the Carlotti Report of the European Parliament expressed reservations about continued funding of APF by the EDF. Europe%20web%20site%20LOG%20BOOK/EU%20documents/Carlotti%20report%20on%20migration%20and% 20development.pdf Page 17 of 49

24 Strengths APF has links with RECs (through the AU) and provides institutional support through CB programmes. ERM facilitates rapid response mediation by AU. Opportunities The EEAS offers APF a new framework for longterm strategic thinking and planning, offsetting some of APF s weaknesses and providing new synergies. CFSP-adjusted procedures could integrate the PSO element of the APF into EEAS and create synergies with other instruments. IfS/ECHO procedures offer precedents to improve APF procedural performance and reaction times. Stronger EU Delegations and RIPs, with better P&S capacities and mandates, could take on APF support functions for RECs. APF is placed to become increasingly the major partner for APSA, able to leverage other funds for the AU, creating new partnerships with and for the AU. APF offers a fulcrum for leveraging the potential strengths of EU MS in Africa, creating synergies for P&S and sustainable development. Building APSA and building peace gives EDF more chance to help Africa to meet the MDGs If EDF fails as a funder, ATHENA could offer EU MS a creative possible alternative structure if substantially revised. CSO networks in Africa are strong and effective: their mobilisation potential is huge if APF can support or leverage APSA and RECs and NIPs in using them. Weaknesses The Panel of the Wise and palaver tree strategies have been neglected by AU and consequently by APF. Early Warning has been developed only by ECOWAS and even there it lacks a local early intervention dimension. APF has poor visibility, outreach, and communication. Threats While APF makes PSOs important, the strength of P&S could actually unbalance other JAES partnerships and the AU. 35 The European experience since 1945 has shown that permanent peace must be based on solid economic foundations, not on PSOs. The lack of funding from AU MS undermines the AU and unbalances the JAES partnership. 36 The procedural and funding dominance of preventing conflict reduces APSA creativity in managing conflict at the grassroots, borders of or inside the member states, and avoiding violence through other means. The impact of APF and its political and innovative roles as the long-term mainstay of APSA will be diminished if AU/RECs do not improve their management structures and internal procedures. EU MS political support needs to be maintained and boosted, to allow APF to consolidate APSA for long-term conflict management and peace promotion as a lynchpin of EU Africa strategy. AU MS political commitment to AU and RECs is ambivalent: the whole edifice will remain weak if AU MS support cannot be mobilised. It is in the EU s interest to push AU MS to participate more strongly, since instability in Africa is a threat to Europe. 35 EU MS representatives report that the absence of dedicated funding is repeatedly raised as a problem in meetings concerning the other seven partnerships. 36 On 17 January 2011, AUC Chairman Jean Ping made a New Year speech in which he deplored the funding arrears of AU MS and their tendency to give ever more tasks to the AUC without providing the means to execute them. Page 18 of 49

25 III. MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON APF DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES The APF follows the standard project cycle of the European Commission. For the purpose of this evaluation, special consideration is given to programming, financing and the applied aid modalities (i.e. contribution agreements, grant agreements and service contracts). The APF (funded through the 10 th EDF) is programmed in consecutive 3-year rolling programme documents. Art. 12 of the Council Regulation no 617/2007 outline the applicable procedures, task division and decision-making process. In general, this process is jointly undertaken by the African Union and the European Union. Both Commissions play a driving role but both African and, in particular, European Member States are involved. The second phase concerns the actual financing decisions taken by the European Commission. These financing decisions provide the legal basis for the funding of individual APF actions. No agreement may be concluded without prior adoption of a financing decision on the basis of an action fiche, a detailed budget and timeframe for implementation. The administrative procedure for adopting financing decisions has a paramount influence over the necessary time for completing the approval process. This phase also includes the selection of aid modalities. The actual implementation and management of individual contracts are outside the scope of this evaluation as effectiveness, results and impact are to be assessed in the second phase of the APF evaluation. The APF financing decision-making process is governed by the Regulations and internal rules of the European Commission, 10 th EDF rules and procedures, and the European Commission financing decision on the APF Action Programme (10 th EDF - Appendixes I and II). III.1 OVERVIEW OF THE APF DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES III.1.1 DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES APPLYING TO APF PROGRAMMING OF THE ACTION PLAN Article 12 of the Council Regulation No 617/2007 of 14 May 2007 covering implementation of the 10 th EDF ( ) lays down the decision-making procedures for the programming of the APF Action Plan ( ). It is specified that: Upon request from the African Union, endorsed by the ACP EC Committee of Ambassadors, an action programme shall be prepared by the Commission. This action programme shall, inter alia, specify the objectives pursued, the scope and nature of the possible interventions, the implementation arrangements, and an agreed format for background documents and requests and for reporting. An annex to the action programme shall describe the specific decision making procedures for each possible intervention according to its nature, size and urgency. Moreover, this action programme, including the annex and any changes thereto shall be discussed by the relevant preparatory Council working groups and the Political and Security Committee and approved by Coreper by qualified majority as defined in Article 8(3) of the Internal Agreement before being adopted by the Commission in accordance with the management procedure set out in Article 11(3) of the Council Regulation. The action programme, excluding the annex referred to in point (a), shall be the basis for the financing agreement to be concluded between the Commission and the African Union. Page 19 of 49

26 III.1.2 DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES APPLYING TO APF FINANCIAL DECISIONS a. Initiative and decision-making 1. AU/REC prepare and send the official financial request. 2. DEVCO prepares the informative note for the Council. 3. AWG studies the request. 4. PSC gives political appropriateness. 5. DEVCO launches the Commission Decision procedure. GENERAL PROCESS: The AU/RECs send a request. Upon reception of the request, the Commission elaborates an information note including an assessment. The Commission evaluates whether an APF intervention is urgent. The information note is circulated and discussed in the relevant Council working groups. Any request above 10m must have the approval of the PSC on political appropriateness. If a blocking minority within the Council opposes the evaluation made by the Commission on the urgency of the intervention - as defined in article 8 of the Internal Agreement, - within 5 working days in the case of a proposed standard procedure or 3 working days in the case of a proposed accelerate procedure after the distribution of the information note, the Council can propose a change in procedure. i. Standard procedure for non-urgent interventions. There is no fixed delay to obtain the approval on political appropriateness by the PSC, except for small operations (up to 10m) where the PSC has minimum 10 working days for consultation process. ii. Accelerated procedure for urgent interventions. The Commission will request the PSC to approve the political appropriateness as soon as possible. If the APF cannot be included in the PSC agenda within 5 working days after circulation of the information note, the Commission may request the PSC s political appropriateness by written procedure with a maximum deadline of 5 working days after the information note has been distributed. These two decision-making procedures apply for African-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and for actions related to the operationalisation of APSA and Africa-EU dialogue. PRACTICE 1) Preparation of the request. Each APF request must be submitted and endorsed by the AU. Unless there is a political obstacle to overcome, it takes around one month to prepare the request, including an extensive exchange between the AU/REC and DEVCO-EU concerned delegation. In order to speed up the process and improve requests, a DEVCO mission travelled twice to Africa in October 2010 to help draft the MICOPAX 1C and AMISOM V AU/REC requests for funding respectively. According to most people involved, DEVCO s early and direct involvement in the preparation of a request is essential. 2) Preparation of the information note for the Council. The information note (around 6 pages) is drafted by EEAS using the information provided by DEVCO on budget and implementation. The note states why it is advisable for the EU to support the APF action, and justifies its political appropriateness. It is sent 5 days prior to the Council meeting, so that EU Member State representatives can report to their capitals. Good coordination and communication between EEAS and DEVCO are important in producing the information note. Page 20 of 49

27 3) Political appropriateness by the Council. PSC intervention in the APF decision-making procedures is crucial and reflects its real nature: Council political views conjoin with the Commission s expertise in development and conflict management/prevention. Although EC legislation makes no reference to the intervention of AWG, this preparatory working group is also consulted so that any doubts may be discussed and resolved before the proposal reaches the PSC, at the highest diplomatic level. The AWG meeting starts with a brief presentation made by EEAS, but the presence of DEVCO is also important to provide an immediate answer to any technical question from Member States. Most frequent questions relate to technicalities such as budget lines, possible overlapping, or the future need for replenishment of APF funds. In fact, as all the issues are resolved at AWG, the APF item in PSC agenda often becomes a procedural matter, in particular when the Commission has been involved from the onset of the identification and formulation of a specific programme. Within the time period under consideration, there has never been any refusal or even problem raised at PSC level, although it occurred that PSC applied a scrutiny reserve delaying its decision, more for domestic/internal coordination reasons than for the substance of the action. Upcoming PSOs such as AMISOM V and MICOPAX 1C are backed by their respective UNSC resolutions 1964(2010) and 1923(2010). Although APF regulations establish that decisionmaking should be flexible enough to go ahead with funding while in the process of UN endorsement, in practice, this situation has never happened. The shortest time to pass through the political appropriateness requirement is 10 days, which was the time taken for AMISOM IV. 4) Preparation of the Commission Decision dossier for the APF financial decision. DEVCO prepares the dossier, a very precise document (8-10 pages) containing all the necessary documents to take an EC decision, which then goes to the Coordination Unit C3 for inter-service consultation. The dossier contains: the explanatory note that guides the readers through the dossier, a draft text for the EC decision, a memo to the College of Commissioners and an annex which contains the action fiche presenting the detailed action, modalities, budget and calendar. DEVCO financial/contracts Section C5 is consulted on the preparation of the dossier, especially to check the implementation procedure because of the 4-pillar requirements for AU/RECs. The geographical desks, now under EEAS, are also consulted to ensure that there is no overlapping with other EC actions. DEVCO officials need around 2 weeks to prepare the dossier and make great efforts to share with other services in order to prepare their colleagues and avoid problems during the inter-service consultation process. The lead department needs be careful not to launch a consultation until the file is complete and all the documents are final. Amendments after launching must be an exception. Fortunately, an Impact Assessment is not mandatory for APF. 5) Visas (signatures) before the launch. After the PSC has approved the political appropriateness, the dossier receives its first visas from DEVCO: three signatures from the operational side (C6), two from the financial/contracts section 37 (C5), and then two extra signatures from the financial section 38 dealing with decisions and global commitments. It normally (AMISOM IV) takes 10 days to obtain the 6 signatures from DEVCO sections. iii. Special procedure, Early Response Mechanism (ERM) ERM will finance APF interventions that require quick reaction such as: mediation actions by AU/RECs, preventive diplomacy, fact-finding missions for planning a PSO, and ad hoc or temporary strengthening of those bodies in charge of planning a possible PSO. 37 Gestion centralisée - Coordination financière - Autorisation financière 38 Engagements primaires et dérogations Page 21 of 49

28 As ERM was included as an appendix to the current APF Action Programme adopted at the same time and is subject to the same consultations of relevant Council working groups. PSC approval on political appropriateness is required and it would have been the case even if an ERM was not included, as well as the inter-service consultation process: thereafter ERM funds are transferred to the AU, the specificity being that the exact use of these funds has not yet been decided. Once a specific action is approved, ERM funds can be released quickly because they are already in the AU bank in Addis. Decision process for every specific ERM intervention: 1. AU/REC send an ERM request. 2. DEVCO C6 evaluates the request and informs the Council. 3. DEVCO C6 authorises the use of ERM. The Commission examines and evaluates each request from the AU to use ERM: political and operational aspects including the budget. REC requests must have AU endorsement. If the Commission considers that the request is acceptable, it informs the Council and authorises AU to use the ERM fund. The individual initiatives are then decided at the level of the Authorising Officer (the ACP Director in the COM). DEVCO C6 39 states that the decision-making procedure for ERM is very peculiar because: the procedure is very fast (10 days), activities are not long (maximum 6 months) mainly for mediations, and must respond to an evolving context with a flexible budget. It is an internal decision by the DEVCO C6, with a request of political advice from EEAS (before Desks DEV) and does not require the approval of DEVCO C5 40 as it was given in advance with the original ERM funding decision. b. Inter-service consultation (ISC) and adoption by the College of Commissioners 1. DEVCO verifies the dossier and launches the decision for ISC. 2. EEAS, Legal Service, SG, DG Budget, ECHO and OLAF are consulted. 3. Translation. 4. Adoption by the College. INTER SERVICE CONSULTATION (ISC) Through the inter-service consultation, the lead department, DEVCO in this case, seeks the formal opinion of all other DG and services with a legitimate specific interest in the substance of the proposal. A high quality inter-service consultation (ISC) guarantees the transparency 41 that is essential when drawing up EC decisions, and reflects the collective responsibility of departments. Coordination must take place at the earliest possible stage to ensure that inter-service consultations and subsequent decision-making procedures run smoothly. Before DEVCO Director sends the dossier to ISC, DEVCO C3 first verifies the format and quality of the dossier. Until 2007, APF dossiers were often prepared in emergency and sometimes contained mistakes that had to be addressed at a later stage. Therefore, officials informally discuss with C3 during the dossier preparation in order to avoid mistakes. This control requires two visas by the C3 heads of section and unit, three signatures in total. It takes two days. The departments identified for APF decisions are: 39 Within DEVCO, this unit deals with AU and APF operations. 40 It deals with finance, contracts and audits for ACP countries. 41 This is the term used in the Commission. The evaluation has doubts as to whether this process actually creates transparency. Page 22 of 49

29 EEAS, because APF finances peace and security activities. The Legal service, whose agreement is required before initiating written procedures, except for decisions on standard acts to which it has already agreed in advance ( repetitive acts ). The EC Secretariat General, which may commit the EC vis-à-vis other institutions or bodies. DG budget, because APF has a direct budgetary impact. ECHO, because of the connections between APF and humanitarian actions. OLAF, which must be consulted on proposals concerning areas vulnerable to fraud. The inter-service consultations take 10 working days if the file is less than 20 pages, which is generally the case for APF, otherwise it may take 15 working days, or even three weeks. In case of obvious political urgency (and not to make up for administrative delay), EC procedures allow DEVCO either to ask the SG for permission to use the fast track procedure (consultation ending with a meeting) or launch a shorter consultation. In any case, DEVCO can always proactively contact the DGs consulted and ask them to reply quicker. The fast track procedure for inter-service consultations lasts for three days: two to revise the documents and one for a special meeting. DEVCO used this procedure for some APF interventions, such as AMISOM II, MAES and MICOPAX 1A in December 2008 and in 2007 for the adoption of the APF Action Programme After the inter-service consultation process has ended, the dossier comes back to DEVCO and is revised according to the comments made by the departments consulted. This review normally takes around four days. DEVCO has never had a negative opinion from the inter-service consultation during the period analysed in this evaluation. The evaluation recommends sparing time through a 48-hour or 72-hour no-objection process to replace the formal visa system. This would modernise and speed-up the ISC, which is mainly about information sharing. There would still be the possibility to object, and a meeting could be called in case a decision needed further debate. TRANSLATION The dossier is sent for translation into the three Commission working languages: it takes 5 to 10 working days, depending on the length of the text. The backlog of work or holiday periods may delay translation. When the translations are finished, the dossier is encoded in the system and C3 head of unit signs. Then, the dossier goes back to DEVCO, where the Assistant Director (one day) and the Director (two days) sign and send it to the College of Commissioners for adoption. ADOPTION BY THE COLLEGE OF COMMISSIONERS During the period analysed in this evaluation, APF decisions were adopted by making use of the written procedure. The Commissioner for Development receives the dossier and gives his/her agreement. As described above for other stages, C6 officials informally discuss with the cabinet in advance to prevent any unforeseen problem, which takes three days. Then, the Secretariat General has three days to check the dossier again, before launching the written procedure with the members of the College of Commissioners: they have five working days to oppose the APF decision, otherwise it is adopted. The President of the Commission may decide, for special urgent matters, to use an accelerated procedure, in which case the written procedure is limited to 1 to 3 days, but this possibility has never been used for APF decisions. The adopted APF decision goes back to DEVCO, where the contribution agreement or grant contract with AU may be signed. Page 23 of 49

30 III.1.3 CONTRIBUTION AND GRANT AGREEMENTS 1. The College of Commissioners adopts the financing decision. 2. DEVCO prepares the contract to deliver the APF funding to AU/RECs. 3. DEVCO Director signs the contract with AU/RECs. The success and failures of the APF very much depends on the structures and operational capacities of AU/RECs as these organisations have been the only beneficiaries of direct APF funding. At an overall level, the EU has attached very few conditions to the APF. As a general rule, all requests should be agreed upon by the AU for use in operations approved by the AU PSC; and all PSOs should have UN approval of some form. Later practice has shown that the EU may have underestimated administrative and managerial deficiencies within AU/RECs, and their effects on APF implementation. That said, the general EDF regulations and internal control requirements are directly applicable to AU/RECs in the context of the APF framework, and they are designed to provide reasonable assurance on the achievement of the following objectives: a) Effectiveness, efficiency and economy of operations; b) Reliability of reporting; c) Safeguarding of assets and information; d) Prevention and detection of fraud and irregularities; e) Adequate management of the risks relating to the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions, taking into account the multiannual character of programmes as well as the nature of the payments concerned. These requirements apply to the various types of aid modalities used by the Commission. According to APF regulations, APF funding is delivered through the following aid modalities: i. Contribution Agreements require that international organisations receiving finance under joint management should offer guarantees equivalent to internationally accepted standards relating to accounting, audit, internal control and procurement procedures, the so-called four-pillar requirements. A standard Contribution Agreement must be used as a model. ii. iii. Grant Contracts are implemented under the centralised management of DEVCO. A standard Grant Agreement must be used as a model. Service Contracts are used only for the implementation of the technical assistance. Once a financing decision has been adopted, the contract for the APF intervention in question can be signed and part of the funds subsequently transferred. Normally there is not much delay between the financing decision and the date of the contract: while the draft APF decision is going through the decision-making process, DEVCO, C6 and C5 prepare the contract that will follow, clarifying derogations, descriptions of actions, specific budgets, financial identification (each contract needs a different bank account: the AU must have a bank account validated by the EC and the request for payment in accordance with the contract (formal letter from AU). This process seeks to anticipate and solve all problems. The funding provided through APF to AU/RECs finances 100% of the activities that it covers: co-funding is not required. It should be noted that an APF Contribution Agreement between the Commission and AU/RECs contains general clauses applied by the Commission to every international organisation receiving funding. In Article 7, Contribution Agreements refer to other specific conditions applying to the action (derogations and other specific conditions), which are essential for the implementation of APF. These clauses are already cited in the EC decision supporting the Contribution Agreement. Page 24 of 49

31 The need to respond quickly to peace and security challenges has forced APF officials in DEVCO to find solutions to make up for lengthy decision-making procedures: retroactivity and the reallocation of funds from previous APF actions have been introduced with this objective, in line with the legal rules (article 19) of the Cotonou Agreement. PRACTICE In principle, APF regulations have a relatively flexible approach, as they do not impose the use of specific implementation modalities. The EC has to decide which aid modality is more suitable for APF action, taking into account the situation within AU/RECS. In a sense, the most realistic process would have been for all APF funding to be transferred to AU/RECs through Grant Agreements, until these institutions were ready from an operational/financial/management perspective. However, it seems that the political willingness to promote African ownership led the Commission not to insist on the need for these organisations to prove that they could meet minimum conditions regarding sound administration for implementing Contribution Agreements. This dynamic interpretation and the corresponding integrated approach to capacity development are part of the Commission s overall approach to development, including the use of EU budget support in developing countries. This approach is commended by the evaluation, as it would otherwise be difficult for African countries and organisations to ever build a sustainable capacity to deal with peace and security. That said, it is very important that the Commission fully understands and appreciates the risks involved and that appropriate risk management strategies are used including risk aversion measures such as targeted capacity building, oversight and political dialogue. Audits soon started to prove problematic, and DEVCO was laudably creative in finding solutions to keep the APF on track, without damaging expectations already created among AU and RECs concerning their ownerships. Progress has been made by the AUC in improving its internal controls and procedures; the 4-pillar standard may well be accorded in The same may not be true for every REC except COMESA. Without the active intervention of EU delegations, it seems very difficult for APF in Brussels to effectively support the RECs. So at least the monitoring of specific REC components (not PSOs) could be better managed by EU Delegations who have the necessary expertise. APF regulations demand that joint lessons learned exercises on APF implementation be held systematically 42, so that outcomes can be discussed in relevant fora, in particular at the APF Joint Coordination Committee; and recommendations followed. However, since 2007 in Djibouti, such an exercise has never taken place. According to DEVCO C5 in Brussels, this issue has been extensively discussed in every capacity-building APF steering committee meeting. This is regrettable: these formal exercises provide a good opportunity to discuss the problems related to APF implementation more deeply and in a more detailed manner. Instead, DEVCO has to deal with problems on a case-by-case basis. BUDGETS AND THEIR AMENDMENT Requests by AU/RECs to transfer a certain amount between budget headings may be acceptable, provided they do not request new activities. DEVCO analyses whether these requests are coherent, feasible and acceptable. If accepted, an addendum to the contract (grant or contribution agreement) is established and signed by both parties. As long as the modifications requested by the AU/RECs are non substantial, there is no intervention from the political side - the Council (AWG/PSC) - as the change in the contract does not affect the supporting EC decision: it is just an operational issue and shows good flexibility in EDF/APF. These riders were used for AMISOM on several occasions to 42 Three-year Action Programme for APF (10th EDF), point 6.5 on lessons learned. Page 25 of 49

32 modify, for instance, the duration contribution agreements. This element can be modified (e.g. extended) without modifying the Commission decision, as it is not considered to be a substantial modification affecting the objectives and contents of the action. If the amendment requested is considered substantial, the relevant EC decision must be modified before amending the relevant contract. Amending a contribution agreement already in force to change i.e. its overall funding would require the same time consuming decision-making procedure as when establishing a new contribution agreement, as modifying an EC decision takes as long as adopting a new one. RETRO-ACTIVITY The clause on retroactivity included in all APF agreements is very important, because of the lengthy EC decision-making process. AU/RECs can pre-finance their on-going activities related to PSOs or capacity building, provided that expenditures take place after the official request date from AU/RECS to the EU. As AU/RECs are often not able to pre-finance their APF activities with their own funds, they are forced to reallocate the budget of the previous Contribution Agreement, or make borrow-andswitch arrangements between accounts.. CONTINGENCIES As regards the use of contingencies, APF regulations clearly establish that their use is not considered as an amendment of the financing decision, as long as it does not entail a change in the nature of the activities originally proposed. Contingencies have been used as a complement to an ongoing APFfunded intervention, with a DEVCO decision following an AU/REC request. This provision has not caused any problem, but it may be quite important to take into consideration the nature of PSOs. 70% ACCOUNTABILITY One of the complaints made by AU and RECs regarding the Capacity Building Programme under the 9 th EDF APF is the EC requirement that when they have collectively spent 70% of the budget, the AUC and all (6) RECs involved must then justify expenditures (with the relevant documentation) in order to receive the remaining 30%. The evaluation considers the 70% accountability rule perfectly justified; there is no reason for the accounting departments of AU and RECs not to be able to comply with it. However, problems occurred because the rule applied to all the involved organisations, which meant that the best performers were held back by the weakest link. This caused many additional challenges for certain RECs and caused unnecessary frictions. In the future, the EU should apply the rule to individual organisations or require that the AUC does not disburse all the resources to individual RECs, but holds back a reserve that allows the good performers to move forward even if other RECs do not deliver. PERIODIC AUDITS Another important clause in APF contracts refers to the need for periodic audits, as their results have a direct impact on the ongoing funding to AU/RECs and on future contracts because of the recovery requirements. As for any other EC programme, when an audit identifies problems in the management of EC funds, the funded organisation must respond within two weeks. The experience with AU/RECs as regards audits has not always been positive: they seldom respond in time, or provide auditors with inadequate documentation. Some Commission officials report that these organisations even needed technical assistance to deal with audits. On the other hand, it is admitted that AUC has made considerable progress during 2010 in terms of financial and reporting procedures. Page 26 of 49

33 APF MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTING In 2005, when APF started, it was assessed that AU/RECs met the four-pillar requirement to sign contribution agreements with the Commission. Later audits, on AMIS and MICOPAX first mission, disclosed a serious lack of sound management in both operations. As a solution, DEVCO Director General and AUC Deputy Chairperson reached an agreement in August 2009 on measures to strengthen AUC financial management, including precautionary measure to ensure tighter financial control over expenditures to keep on funding AMISOM. In the case of MICOPAX, even before ECCAS has undergone such an institutional assessments, the French military accepted to assume financial management of the operation through a special body in the field (CAF), and APF funding started to come through a Grant Agreement. Currently, an institutional assessment of AU is still going on and its official results have not yet been made public. In 2011, ECCAS will also undergo an institutional assessment of its standards in accounting, audit, control and procurement procedures. To the Commission, it is clear that the African organisations should comply with the minimum conditions for implementing contribution agreements, as they are bound to the financing regulations of the EDF and good international practices. According to DEVCO, over the past few years, the discussion on how to address the transition - the necessary time for the AUC to pass a positive 4-pillar review, foreseen for 2011 was that, as a general rule, no new contribution agreement in joint management could be signed, except for AMISOM (currently IV and V) and, possibly, the APSA support ( 40m, currently in the decision-making circuit). For AMISOM this is justified by the fact that the AUC accepted to incorporate into the contribution agreement, precautionary measures from the aide-memoire on measures to strengthen AUC financial management + on the basis of a financial management risk analysis conducted by DEVCO and approved by the Director General (based on constant financial monitoring and positive audit results). In this sense, it should be noted that AMISOM V clearly states that: "the management system set up by the African Union Commission (AUC) for the management of EU funds does not fully comply at the moment with all the conditions set out in Article 29 of the Financial Regulation applicable to the 10th EDF. The Commission considers however that a contribution agreement in joint management may still be established under the strict conditions agreed in the joint European Commission/African Union Commission Aide-Memoire to strengthen AU financial management signed on 27 August 2009 and its revisions. These conditions were integrated in the contribution agreement". III.1.4 APPRECIATION OF APF DECISION-MAKING AND TIMING APF decisions do not take longer than any other EC EDF decisions, although the current APF decision-making procedures are quite lengthy. At best, it takes around two months to obtain an EC decision (AMISOM IV). These procedures are not well adapted to the needs of AUC/RECs support for maintaining peace and security in Africa. In peace operations, decisions often need to be fast and effective both from the managerial and financial perspectives; lives may be in danger, many risks are at stake. Nevertheless, APF decision-making procedures are not an exception within the EC legal framework. Other EC financial instruments also have to go through the same general procedures, despite their possible urgency: except for the ECHO and IfS procedures, discussed below. IMPORTANCE OF STAFF COMMITMENT Nevertheless, as APF actions are often urgent and because so many visas are required for a decision to be adopted, DEVCO officials have to maintain a very active, informal, personal approach to their relations with other units, at every stage of the procedure, in order for their funding requests to proceed rapidly through the EC bureaucracy. This permanent, personal approach is demanding as well as time consuming and may not be sustainable. The fact is that the success of APF depends on the current hard working C6 and C5 staff, committed to the ideals of African peace and personally Page 27 of 49

34 involved in avoiding the fatal consequences of any delay in the field. Such staff dedication cannot be permanently guaranteed and does not constitute a sound basis in a long-term management perspective. The situation is of course different when APF decisions refer to CB, where there is less urgency. Furthermore, the time spent preparing the official APF request by AU/RECs has to be added to the two months minimum required for the EC decision-making procedures. In the case of AMISOM IV or MICOPAX 1C, it took from three to four weeks to complete the necessary informal dialogue with all the partners and estimate a reliable budget in accordance with APF requirements. In the case of an APF request from a REC e.g. the ECCAS request for APF funding for MICOPAX 1C - we should add the time from when the request is sent to AU for endorsement. Although there has never been an AU refusal, it always takes time: in the case of MICOPAX 1C, it took eleven days. AU endorsement is almost automatic: three days would be a more reasonable period for the AU, since the political decision has presumably already been taken. In the case of MICOPAX, those eleven days for the official AU endorsement were used by DEVCO C6 to prepare all the necessary documents for AWG at the Council. Peacekeeping missions are complex and their military component makes them quite particular in terms of budgeting and programming. The preparation of all the APF documentation necessary for the decision-making process, at the Council and in relation with the other Commission departments involved, is difficult and time consuming. This particularity of APF action requires military expertise. For the time being, C6 is fortunate to have a military officer working with them, seconded by France, whose work and contribution at every stage is essential, both for the preparation of the AU/RECs request and for passing through the APF decision-making procedure. The following example does highlight the heaviness of Commission decision-making procedures and their unforeseeable effects: two AU/REC requests for PSOs were presented in December 2010: at end of February 2011, AMISOM V and MICOPAX 1C financing decisions were still going through inter-service consultation (AMISOM V is going faster than MICOPAX 1C). According to DEVCO C6, the main reason for the delay is the very long list of people that have to approve and append their visas to the dossier. APF is not helped by the fact that it is poorly understood by Commission services. APF is considered peculiar. As compared to 2010 requests, the current APF requests contain higher budgets and a new line for capacity building. On the other hand, C6 officials did not receive any request for clarification related to these requests that would explain the delays, nor have they been informed of any problem raised by other Commission services. III.2 RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE APF DECISION MAKING PROCEDURES III.2.1 REGARDING THE APF PROGRAMMING OF ACTION PLAN: The Action Programme thus established the framework for the financing agreement and individual contracts or agreements (i.e. contribution agreements, grant agreements or services contracts). Flexibility and adaptability to allow effective implementation, value for money and sustainable results are important aspects. In other words, the Three Year Action Programme of the African Peace Facility sets out the overall framework the European Commission must comply when preparing, adopting and implementing the various components of the APF (PSO, Capacity Building, ERM etc.). As has been pointed out above: First, as suggested above, if the APF is to be a financing facility that can finance all three objectives of the JAES PS Action Plan ( ) i.e. political dialogue on peace and security, APSA and PSOs, then it will be necessary to have a standing reserve which can be activated to deliver quick-wins and flagship initiatives of the EU and AU/RECs. Page 28 of 49

35 Second, the main APF programmes (on PSOs, capacity building and ERM) should be complemented by specific interventions reflecting the evolving peace and security partnership as well as allow for direct financing of stakeholders outside the AUC and REC secretariats. Third, the EU should adopt 6-year Action Plans that correspond to the entire period of the corresponding financial perspective as of 2013 when the 10 th EDF runs out. Peace and security in Africa is a long-term process where windows of opportunities provide specific possibilities for supporting leaps forward. The recent experience in North Africa is just one illustrative example. The APF thus needs a long-term support programme within which structural support and capacity building as well as targeted and specific initiatives is provided to PSOs that can move APSA and the wider Africa EU partnership on peace and security forward. III.2.2 IMPROVING APF DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK The question now is whether it would be possible to introduce improvements that might accelerate the current process while using the current EC legal framework applicable to APF decisions. As a general comment, it appears that, within the current legal framework, changing the requirement for a separate individual decision for every APF intervention is not possible, even though a global financial decision exists for the APF programme It seems unfortunate that to continue an activity a full new approval process is required, when the sole change is a time- and a budget extension. This is certainly one area in which procedures could be made easier and swifter, in line with the practices of many other donor organisations. As regards the preparation of the APF request by AU/REC, this first stage comes under AU/RECs that use their own procedures. Here, EC involvement is unofficial, but decisive in practice in order to obtain an adequate request document prepared with minimum delay. For AMISOM V and MICOPAX 1C, DEVCO C6 officials and the military advisor travelled to Africa, directly participated in the drafting of the requests and provided crucial assistance. This suggests that EC involvement is necessary at the formulation level and should be formalised as one part of the APF procedure. Another question is whether this EC involvement is needed because of the complexity of EU procedures, or because of managerial deficiencies within AU/RECs. If EU support is required at this stage, should it be provided by DEVCO from Brussels or by EU Delegation staff who work closely with these organisations in their headquarters? In any case, for both proposals, the presence of peacekeeping expertise seems a very significant advantage. The political appropriateness requirement is a logical consequence of the peace and security related nature of the APF - maintaining peace and security in Africa is part of the European Foreign and Security Policy, in line with the legal basis of the Lisbon Treaty. PSOs are politically sensitive, and EU MS will not relinquish their right to control the political use of military force. This step in the approval process is unavoidable when it comes to PSOs. However, there appears to be scope for providing the EAAS and the Commission with the possibility to take decisions regarding the other components of the APF such as Capacity Building and ERM. Such programmes should not necessarily require prior PSC approval. Nevertheless, within the Council, two bodies are usually involved, Africa Working Group (AWG) and Political and Security Committee (PSC). According to the current APF regulation, the PSC has the formal authority to approve the political appropriateness of APF decisions. The justification for consultation with AWG is to discuss any technical doubt at a lower diplomatic level and recommend to the PSC the agreement on political appropriateness without any difficulty. If the PSC were to delegate political approval to the AWG, only one EU MS body would be involved in examining the APF Page 29 of 49

36 information note and approving political appropriateness. However, according to EC legal services, this delegation of powers from PSC to AWG would not be legally possible even through a Council decision. The latest APF decisions (AMISOM V and MICOPAX 1C) involve no special political sensitivity in comparison to AMISOM IV and MICOPAX 1B, nor any aspect which would justify double-checking at a higher diplomatic level; although AMISOM V entailed a mission reinforcement from 8,000 to 12,000 peacekeepers and the approval to use UN allowances for peace keepers, which, according to DEVCO C6, can be considered politically sensitive. While the evaluation encourages delegation of implementation powers (such as the norm under the EU s deconcentration policy) to Addis and/or regional EU delegations, it seems that EU MS are unlikely to agree to delegate political appropriateness decisions (i.e. financing decisions) outside Brussels. In other words, centralised decision-making related to the political appropriateness and overall financing decisions should be kept in Brussels. However, the implementing powers for the individual contracts and contribution agreements, in particular for the APF components dealing with ERM, capacity building and service contracts should be deconcentrated to the respective EU delegations. The preparation of the information note and the dossier for each APF decision is currently done by DEVCO C6, which works together with DEVCO C5 on the financial aspects. They actually work very efficiently, taking advantage of the assistance provided by the military expert. Involving EU delegations at AU/REC level at this stage would be realistic only if their PSO experts staff would be available. Their closeness to AU/RECs would indeed help to collect better information for the documents and develop a better partnership EU-AU/RECs as regards APF. Concerning the required signatures for APF decision on a PSO, the evaluators consider that the two extra signatures from the financial section 43 dealing with decisions and global commitments do not add value and might be replaced by a Commission Secretary General decision. The four eyes principle is a good one, but when three or four visas are required from the same unit, the evaluation doubts whether they add any value. The process before the inter-service consultation to adopt an APF decision is blamed for being too long. Five departments are targeted: Legal service, SG, ECHO, DG budget and OLAF. It seems reasonable to consult with all of them in order to provide transparency and collective responsibility. Nevertheless, a good solution would be that the inter-service consultation fast track procedure be normally used with a special meeting involving all departments. However, this particular procedure is only allowed when the concerned department asks a special permission to the SG in case of a manifest political urgency. In this regard it should be noted that, for the two APF decisions currently going through inter-service consultation - AMISOM V and MICOPAX 1C, DEVCO did not request this procedure despite the relative urgency of these funds for the field. It is true that it is very difficult to justify urgency for every APF decision. An example of the lack of flexibility in the EC legal framework is the only current exception to the generalised procedure: the aid provided by the Commission through a special fund for the Haitian government after the January 2010 earthquake. All financial decisions 44 related to this fund had a special five-day inter-service consultation, following a decision taken by SG last year. The SG decision explicitly states that, It is essential that these decisions are treated in the best delays, not only to face our political commitments but also to make our support start as soon as possible. Consequently, 43 "Engagements primaires et dérogations". 44 Faced to this disaster, the European Commission set up a fund that aimed at helping the recovery of Haiti. One amount of 100m was approved for short-term support. For the medium and long term, a 200m fund was approved to respond to the requests by the Haiti state. Page 30 of 49

37 aiming at allowing a fast and effective response to this matter, I ask your approval for a systematic reduction to 5 working days of delay for the inter-service consultation, for all the decisions regarding the help to the Haitian state. Regarding the communication system within ISC, all documents for the ISC are loaded in an on-line system called CIS-NET and an directly linked to the ISC is automatically sent to relevant services. EC officers comment and directly send the revised versions of the documents on-line. All the documents are available 24/7 in the system, including supporting information and details of everyone involved in the exercise. Meetings are held only for fast-track ISC, when there is no time to exchange comments in writing and wait for the answers. Regarding adoption by the College of Commissioners, apart from the written procedure used for APF decisions, EC legislation also provides for: The empowerment procedure: one of the Commissioners is empowered by the College to adopt an individual decision (but the ACP envelope within EDF is not covered by this procedure); The sub-delegation procedure: the Commissioner delegates authority to the Director General concerned. A change from the general written procedure to the empowerment or sub-delegation procedures (the latter may only be used for decisions under 10m) would require an internal decision of the College of Commissioners. For APF, special competence would concern the Commissioner for Development or DEVCO Director General. In any case, on November 21 st 2010, the College took the decision to apply the empowerment procedure as a general rule, unless decided otherwise. This also means that no translation is needed and the procedure should save 5 working days: it should be applied to APF from now on. The evaluation commends this decision. ERM Every single APF contract (no matter how short) requires an EC financing decision, which normally requires a full clearance and approval process with 30 signatures. The evaluation considers this complexity might be reduced, and the ERM shows that this is possible, but it would require amendment to the current legal framework. The ERM can obtain clearance in 2 weeks, a remarkable improvement (but limited to small mediation-type missions not exceeding 6 months). According to most interlocutors, ERM has been innovative, and provides hope for further flexibility in EDF procedures. The evaluation considers that the accelerated ERM procedures work well for the purpose, as they are quite fast and flexible. III.2.3 DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CURRENT EDF LEGAL FRAMEWORK EC-AU JOINT FORMULATION APF experience has shown that EC involvement with AU and RECs, including PSO expertise in military, policy and civilian interventions is needed at the request formulation level and should be formalised as part of the APF procedure. Page 31 of 49

38 DIFFERENTIATION OF POLITICAL APPROPRIATENESS WITHIN THE APF Political appropriateness from the Council (PSC) is understandably required for APF financing of PSOs. However, such prior approval of funding within the two other APF components, namely ERM and Capacity Building, is not needed. Information and explanation of Commission/EAAS decisions within the relevant preparatory working group (AWG) after formal approval should be sufficient. Such a change would allow the Commission/EAAS to respond more timely, more effectively and in a more result-oriented fashion to the needs, throughout Africa. ACCELERATE INTER-SERVICE CONSULTATION PROCEDURE AND TRANSLATION The inter-service consultation fast track procedure should be adopted to create the necessary speed and flexibility within the EC. This particular procedure normally requires individual exception and special permission from the SG, in case of a manifest political urgency. If legally possible, by SG decision, the fast track procedure should be used for every urgent decision on PSOs when the Director of DEVCO so requests. At very least, PSO decisions should enjoy the same treatment allowed by SG to ECHO to help the Haitian state, a systematic reduction to 5 working days of delay for inter-service consultation, which also includes an informal accelerated procedure for the translation of these decisions. ADOPTION BY THE COLLEGE OF COMMISSIONERS THROUGH SUB-DELEGATION PROCEDURE The new general empowerment procedure 45 should be adopted, empowering the Commissioner for Development to adopt APF decisions, although the sub-delegation procedure may normally only be used for decisions regarding less than 10 million Euros. This change would require an internal decision of the College of Commissioners and would imply a special competence to DEVCO Director General. AUC COULD TAKE DECISIONS ON ERM MEDIATION AND FACT-FINDING MISSIONS Since the ERM funding has already been pre-approved by the EU PSC, the evaluation recommends that ownership of ERM mediation decisions - and political appropriateness for mediation/fact-finding and the subsequent release of funds should go to the AUC, subject to an exchange of information ( s) with the EU delegation in Addis and the establishment of an AU ERM technical assistance unit to improve management. We consider that the EU Delegation in Addis may be better placed than DEVCO in Brussels to identify ERM needs. The EU Delegation would officially inform APF and PSC in Brussels of the AU decision. This way, AU would be fully responsible for ERM decisions and their implementation and the African ownership of APF actions would be improved. III.2.4 DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES OUTSIDE THE EDF LEGAL FRAMEWORK a. New procedures for APF would open new opportunities When analysing other EC financial instruments and decision-making procedures, we should bear in mind that APF was not created at random. The EU wanted to help AU/RECs to develop their own continental system for peace and security and it was decided that long-term capacity building for APSA including support to African led PSO was in line with the security-development nexus in the Cotonou Agreement and thus funding from the EDFs. This coherent decision relates to the importance of linking peace and sustainable development. EDF is linked to the 2000 Cotonou agreement, which is financed by EU Member States outside the regular budget of the EU. As an intergovernmental 45 On November 21 st 2010 the College already decided to have the empowerment procedure as a general rule unless decided otherwise. Page 32 of 49

39 mechanism, EDF has its own decision-making procedures, which exclude intervention of the European Parliament and ensures that EU member states have more direct influence over the use of resources than with the regular EU budget. The current APF legal framework will be in force until 2013 when the 10 th EDF ends - although Cotonou continues until The EDF might be integrated into the EU budget. APF might be left out of this framework and a decision will be taken on whether the APF can be managed through the Commission and/or through the European External Action Service. The changed legal framework of the Lisbon Treaty means that new procedures and internal EU task division is required if the EDF is budgeted. Therefore, it is important to observe what procedural characteristics from other EU financial instruments might be incorporated into the APF legal framework. New procedures should naturally improve and shorten the current APF decision-making procedures. Moreover, if more relevant procedures are available within other EU instruments, the latter could also be applied to the future APF even if the EDF is not budgeted. INSTRUMENT FOR STABILITY IfS can provide inter alia technical and financial assistance to support efforts by international and regional organisations to promote confidence building, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis. In stable conditions for cooperation, IfS can also provide technical and financial assistance, pre- and post-conflict long-term capacity building support for international and regional organisations, to help promoting early warning and mediation. These latter measures may include know-how transfer, exchange of information, risk/threat assessment, research and analysis, early warning systems and training. In this sense, we could say that IfS might fund certain activities now being funded by APF under ERM. However, IfS cannot finance military operations, even if they have a peacekeeping purpose, as this would contradict EU Treaties on the competence of the Commission. IfS intervenes with exceptional assistance measures and interim response programmes adopted following the general EC decision-making procedures (inter-service consultation, College of Commissioners). However, contrary to what is required for APF, the Commission does not request the approval of the PSC, it simply informs the PSC of the measures they are planning to take, and have 48 hours to object. Nevertheless, the Commission meets with the PSC once a month to discuss the measures they are planning. Two days before the meeting they send PSC a note ( IfS monthly note ) outlining the content of these measures (a very broad outline, roughly 3 or 4 paragraphs per measure). This note is discussed during the PSC meeting. If the measure costs more than 20m, a special Council committee must be consulted, made up of EU MS representatives. 46 A negative opinion obliges the Commission to delay adoption for up to three months. IfS managers say they have reduced the burden of comitology from 12 months to two months in the best conditions, although they can send mediation missions in a matter of days using a pre-approved Standing Facility (the Georgia Observer Mission was on the ground within 3 weeks). An average of 2 months is necessary, more or less the same as for the quickest APF decisions. IfS only intervene when other instruments are not available. The EC officers in charge have to constantly assess the international situation and carry out programme identification in cooperation with EU delegations. In theory, even if Member states disagreed with IfS measures, the Commission could still go ahead with them. In practice, if a proposal raises concerns amongst MS, the Commission takes a second look. This only happened once, out of a total of some 140 measures proposed to date, because a lot of political coordination takes place upstream, both with PSC Delegations and with MS embassies in the country concerned. IfS is normally pretty sure when proposing a particular measure, that it will not raise difficulties in the PSC. 46 EU Member States representatives have 48 hours to oppose. Page 33 of 49

40 Despite all the possibilities of IfS, the Council has proved unwilling to enlarge the scope of IfS activities to include military actions. While both APF and IfS decision-making procedures are centralised in Brussels, IfS management is sub-delegated to EU Delegations, also involved in programme identification. This facilitates the coordination of all EU activities (including RIPs and NIPs), and coordination with other donors, reducing the risk of overlapping. For APF, centralised in Brussels, coordination is more difficult to achieve because delegations are not normally involved in APF activities - although the EU Delegation in Addis is involved in the monitoring of APF through one full time contract agent working with APF and in daily contact with Brussels. ECHO FINANCING DECISIONS Jointly with APF, ECHO activities often take place in conflict or post-conflict situations and eligibility is quite strict. DG ECHO s mandate is implemented through financing decisions that follow EC administrative procedures, but with some particularities. In emergency situations, ECHO may request primary and not primary financing decisions. In the first case, the Director-General of ECHO (sub-delegation procedure) may adopt decisions under 3m without inter-service consultation or consultation with the European Parliament or the Humanitarian Aid Commissioner. In the second not primary case, the Director General ECHO may adopt decisions without inter-service consultation or consultation with EO and HAC when the cost is below 5m. Between 5 and 10m, the decision is adopted under the same conditions by the Commissioner (empowerment procedure). In all these cases, the financing decision may be adopted within ten working days, two weeks. These are the fastest decisions within the EC framework. The evaluation recommends that ECHO primary procedures should be adapted and adopted for AU execution of mediation and emergency responses (related to ERM, early warning and early intervention, and activation of the Panel of the Wise). This differentiation, depending on the emergency and the amount, might be useful as a reference for possible amendments in the APF decision-making procedures. However, the military character of most APF activities clearly hampers the analogy, taking into account the special eligibility (not humanitarian aid as for ECHO) and the actors involved (not NGOs) in APF interventions. ATHENA DECISION Athena is an EU MS instrument outside the competence of the Commission. Following similar principles of individual state contributions as for EDF or EIB, under Article 41.2 of the Treaty of the European Union, MS 47 contributions to ATHENA are based on the Gross National Income scale. This instrument is presented in Annex 3.5. As compared with APF, there are many other differences: ATHENA is managed by an administrator, the commander of each operation and an accounting officer, under the authority of a Special Committee composed of representatives of the MS contributing to the financing of each operation; The expenditure section for an operation in any draft budget, is drawn up on the basis of a proposal made by its operation commander; All 26 EU MS agree to pay their assessed share when they approve an operation, and there are heavy interest charges for late-payers, which ensures good cash-flow; 47 Only 26 MS contribute since Denmark does not participate in EU decisions with defence implications, it does not contribute to ATHENA Page 34 of 49

41 The costs covered by ATHENA include the maintenance of the operational headquarters, investments in the infrastructure made to support the operation, medical services, as well as Nation Borne Costs which include lodging, fuel, and similar expenses linked to the mobilisation of national contingents. All the other costs related to deployed personnel (allowances, salaries...) are borne individually by the State contributing to the operation in question. ATHENA does not intervene in the way each contributing State manages its operational costs. Nevertheless, the Special Committee may decide that the administrative management of certain expenditures, while remaining the responsibility of the Member State concerned, should be entrusted to ATHENA; ATHENA has shown flexibility, in that the mechanism has evolved over time: originally medical costs, transport etc. were not covered; ATHENA has been designed to become a very flexible, effective and efficient instrument for military operations in the field. It has the necessary legal identity to hold a bank account or property, to sign contracts and to be a party to legal proceedings. It is not profit making. Any payment from ATHENA s account only requires the joint signatures of the administrator and the accounting officer; Any joint action by which the Council decides that the EU will conduct a military operation, and any joint action or decision by which the Council decides to extend a EU operation, shall contain a reference amount for the common costs of this operation. The administrator shall evaluate this amount for the planned period meaning that budgets are determined annually, which is not a definition of long-term predictable funding as compared to the current objectives of the APF; ATHENA allows the EU MS to conclude ad hoc administrative arrangements with third States indicated by the Council as potential contributors to a specific EU operation, or as contributors to EU operations in general. This financial mechanism was established for military operations, inspired by NATO procedures, for European-led PSOs. Because of these features, ATHENA might be an inspiration to make APF a more effective and faster instrument to support PSOs. APF financial decisions might be taken more quickly. However, for Athena to serve as an operational model in Africa, substantial modifications would be needed to the original Decision. It should be also recalled that the APF has a limited budget for PSOs and that an Athena-Africa mechanism might be needed to replace APF PSO support, when or if, funding runs out. That said, it is questionable whether the EU member states have the political and financial interest to create such an additional mechanism. An oversight committee could be created for Athena-Africa (or Athena-APF), made up of AU/RECs together with the EU and which would respect principles of African ownership and Africa-EU partnership. However, these changes would not solve one of the main problems for APF: the fact that most African armies lack sound administrative management systems. When efficient management systems must interact with other inefficient management systems, the interaction becomes inefficient. b. Differentiate between the various APF Components: The EU should separate the three APF components: PSOs, capacity building and ERM, to set up the best decision-making procedures for each of them. IFS INFORMATION PROCEDURE In case the Commission retains its competence on APF, the evaluation recommends introducing the IfS information procedure using written information notes from DEVCO to inform the PSC in Brussels and just give MS 48 hours to object, but without requiring written approval or any formal meeting of Council committees or groups. This procedure is particularly relevant for the non-pso funding of the APF. Page 35 of 49

42 ENCOURAGING TRANSPARENCY AND RESPONSIBILITY New procedures for APF should address the problem of the lengthy administrative procedures inside the Commission. The evaluation finds that too many signatures are required for each APF financing decision, leading to confusion and lengthiness. While the four eyes principle is relevant, six or eight eyes constitute a waste of resources. Departmental Directors should not have to sign a document that has already been signed by a deputy. Through committees, transparency becomes opacity through dilution of responsibility. It is said that multiple signatures and multiple committees have become protection mechanisms, to avoid that any individual or department be ever held responsible for anything that goes wrong. This is perfectly plausible, but the system should be challenged. The evaluation recommends that Directors and departments - and EU Ambassadors and Delegations - should be held responsible for errors or failures, just as they should get credit for success. ATHENA-AFRICA TO SUBSTITUTE APF PSO FUNDING DEPENDING ON SCALE AND SCOPE OF CRISIS The APF only has limited resources for PSOs. Moreover, major PSOs require specialised military capabilities and expertise. The PSOs risk diverting prioritisation and commitments to the other important objectives of the EU Africa Partnership, namely political dialogue and APSA. The EU should therefore consider whether creating an Athena-Africa mechanism that, if need be, could take over APF PSO support is politically and financially acceptable. III.2.5 APF AID MODALITIES PROMOTION OF JOINT MANAGEMENT AND SOUND ADMINISTRATION Joint management is the best way for APF mechanism to provide ownership by the African organisations. Training of AU/REC staff on sound management procedures, in accordance with EC procedures, is essential for these organisations to pass the four-pillar requirements and qualify to run APF contribution agreements. This can best be done in-house, as part of a process to bring the APF and AU closer together, through adequate technical assistance to develop their own procedures, and through staff exchanges and joint staff training so that these organisations also become able to train themselves. AMENDING CONTRIBUTION AGREEMENTS Current EC regulations follow the principle that every financing decision must have a legal basis: as a consequence, amendments require a new EC financing decision. But, if new APF procedures are adopted outside EDF regulations, the evaluation recommends that an accelerated amendment procedure be created, taking into consideration the specific needs of APF and the AU/RECs, 48 provided that only the amount of money and the duration are changed, while other political and procedural conditions remain the same as in the original approval. DO NOT LIMIT THE POSSIBILITY OF AID MODALITIES It appears unnecessary to limit the range of possible aid modalities. Obviously, the Contribution Agreements are the most appropriate, comprehensive aid modalities for APF support to the AUC and RECs. However, other aid modalities are needed as alternative implementation arrangements for 48 The Commission recognises that international organisations complying with international standards are different than other entities (e.g. NGOs) and hence, in view of such differences, a different type of agreement recognising their specificities may be used (cf. agreements concluded between the Commission and international organisations, treatment of international organisations in the Financial Regulations -EC Budget and EDF-, etc). However, the application of this possibility must be made public (in the relevant Guidelines). p113 of 127 Page 36 of 49

43 RECs that might not qualify or for other actors that can add value to APSA or even other objectives within the Africa-EU partnership on Peace and Security. BE RESULT-ORIENTED RATHER THAN ACTOR-ORIENTED The result is what matters so APF strategic focus must be on the three objectives of the Africa-EU Partnership, namely political dialogue, operationalisation of APSA and PSOs. The AU and RECs are important actors in this context and the majority of funding should target these intergovernmental organisations. However, the AU and RECs are not the only stakeholders or drivers behind politics, APSA and PSOs. Many other actors, such as individual African member states, but also civil society groups, research and training centres, specialised entities, private sector and other international organisations should be eligible for funding. A MANUAL OF APF PROCEDURES IS NEEDED The evaluation recommends the elaboration of a specific, multilingual manual for all those involved in APF, containing the objectives, actors, rights, duties and controls related to APF activities. It should be easy to read for everyone and explain in detail how APF works with regard to AU/RECs. This manual should be a useful tool to facilitate initiatives, implementation and auditing and improve efficiencies and mutual understandings between EU and AU/RECs. Nevertheless, the mutual absorbing of institutional cultures is equally important to build partnerships as well as an understanding of why procedures exist and how they work. III.2.6 AU/REC PROCEDURES AND PRACTICE FOR APF REQUESTS According to the evaluation ToR, AU/REC capacity constraints at all levels will be a focus of APF evaluation Part 2, in particular in the areas of administrative and financial management, operational, planning and long-term capacity building planning. Nevertheless, it is necessary at this stage to make an assessment of the current AU/REC procedures and practices pertaining to APF requests. The political legitimacy of APF-funded activities in Africa comes from the AU, and for PSOs it also comes from the UN. The AU has the very important Peace and Security Council, composed of fifteen elected MS, and their decisions bear both legal and political weight. Supporting the PSC and increasing its profile will benefit the institutional capacity of AU both from a management point of view (to make the PSC function efficiently) and politically because AU MS political will and support for APSA is not guaranteed, although necessary for APSA success. Political approval of APF requests comes from the PSC. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, in less politically sensitive matters, such as CB or ERM, approval could be delivered by the AUC, including political approval for REC requests. The evaluation considers this AU endorsement to be a valuable step, since it reinforces both the institutional architecture of APSA and the necessary hierarchy to pancontinental institutions. In practice there is little or no delay caused by political approval, since the practical administrative work takes place in parallel inside APF. The P&S policy should be under the overall guidance of AU, from where doctrine should emerge. The principle of subsidiarity would reduce the risk of centralised AUC decision-making hampering APF implementation. This would require that the management of P&S be the responsibility of RECs, following doctrine established by the AU. Certain RECs will always be stronger than others (or even than the AU in some fields), but a common doctrine will bring them together politically and philosophically. Decisions of the PSC are executed by the AUC, and in particular the PSD. The PSOD coordinates and manages PSOs. The PSD should also be providing the overall leadership and doctrine to RECs Page 37 of 49

44 concerning P&S strategy. In the latter area, PSD has not been able to dedicate much time or energy, since PSOs take up most of the Director s attention. Devolution of APF management to EU delegations might allow faster decisions in accordance with the situation at field level: for instance, when extra funding is needed in a crisis situation. Currently, all EC- AU communications are made through the EU delegation in Addis, but there is no real involvement from the Delegations in the daily management of APF contracts. According to ECCAS officers involved in APF, this means RECs wait longer without appropriate backstopping, and in most APF actions they consider that, for operational/financial management issues, it would be better to have a more efficient connection with the EC. Because of the support that can be provided by EU delegations on the ground, the evaluation concludes that generally speaking, RECs would be best funded from RIPs, except for PSOs. EU delegations helping and funding RECs, would need some form of P&S military or security expertise. This can often be found inside the embassies of EU MS who have military and/or police attachés and some formal or informal arrangements might be found for EU delegations to benefit from their advice. III.2.7 EU-AU/RECS STRUCTURAL PROCEDURES PROMOTION OF SUBSIDIARITY 49 WITHIN AU/RECS The EU should promote the principle of subsidiarity in the implementation of APF activities. In the case of CB and ERM under APF, RECs should have the administrative management of these activities at regional level in order to improve the African efficiency and effectiveness, in accordance with the general directives and common strategy decided at AU level. EU DELEGATIONS WORKING WITH APF In practice, EU delegations participate pretty well when they have adequate RIP funds to create synergy with APF, but more can and should be done to adjust procedures in favour of subsidiarity. The evaluators, in line with the APSA Road Map (Dec 2010), recommend the following in order to offer APF new opportunities for flexibility and enhanced value for money: Implementation of EU support to the REC APSA mechanisms and/or APSA related policies should be deconcentrated to the EU Delegations rather than centrally managed. That will require P&S expertise within the EU delegation in Addis for AU (and others for the RECs) and also a substantial change in the communication and outreach strategies of APF. Financial checks and monitoring should be managed by the EU Delegation close to AU/RECs. RECs (ECCAS and others) feel insufficiently supported by AU. For most APF operational and financial management issues, a direct connection with EU through the EU Delegation would improve performance. 49 The subsidiarity principle is one of the central principles in the EU context, laying down that political decisions in the EU must always be taken at the lowest possible administrative and political levels, and as close to the citizens as possible. Beyond the areas where the EU has exclusive competence, this means that the EU can only act if it is better to implement the legislation at stake at EU rather than national, regional or local level. Page 38 of 49

45 IV. MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON ALTERNATIVE FUNDING Stakeholders almost everywhere in the world describe the APF as an appropriate and effective instrument. Although concerns about limitations, constraints and shortcomings are raised, APF is almost invariably qualified as the best existing instrument for continental and regional peace building in Africa. The APF should therefore be seen as the best available instrument, but also as a tool that can be further improved. A closer alignment of the funding instrument with political will and policy priorities may make it a more nimble funder, more often reflecting the reality behind the three objectives of the African EU Partnership on Peace and Security (i.e. the II Action Plan, ) and encouraging a more reasonable division of labour between AU/EU, their respective MS and other relevant stakeholders. It is important not to see the APF as an isolated instrument, but to keep it at the heart of the full Africa- EU relationship. Likewise, it seems necessary to engage a broader range of relevant stakeholders and better link political decision making with quick delivery of specific initiatives. In a sense, EU member states may be reluctant to re-open the debate on APF funding at this stage. However, the world changes and the EU has a different legal and institutional set-up, which requires some adaptation. More flexibility, more predictability, more differentiation among APF components, implementation modalities and direct beneficiaries as well as more fluid procedures, adapted to military-type operational funding (including the possibility to fund a wider range of military costs) would increase effectiveness, results and value for money. To make meaningful recommendations on how improvements can be achieved, the nature and scope of funding sources must be critically evaluated. Links need to be made between what should be funded and the availability/suitability of future funding sources, by examining whether the right activities are properly funded. Although the scope of this evaluation does not include a detailed analysis, AMISOM does provide an example of a funding instrument intended for initiatives whose political dynamics is largely determined by other actors than the funding countries. A lack of constructive strategic discussion and political decision-making (for example, between UNSC, IGAD and countries with a stake in the future of the region) leaves the EU and AU with a blurred political situation. This makes sensible funding decisions and planning for the best use of available funds very difficult. This example also reminds political decision-makers and technical staff of the risks involved in peace and security interventions as well as the requirement to use integrated risk management strategies, including mitigating measures. The recommendations below are largely based on financial information and compliance with expected outputs as well as interviews achieved during the evaluation. The phase II of the evaluation will provide an adequate and comprehensive picture of the APF, performance of the respective organisations, or ability to create and sustain value. Page 39 of 49

46 IV.1 EU FUNDING INSTRUMENTS Funding Instruments in the EU are numerous and varied. An analysis of the advantages and disadvantages to fund APF from other sources are considered below. Each instrument is summarised in Annex 2. A detailed summary of available EU funding instruments highlighting advantages and disadvantages for the APF is given in Annex 3. Several possibilities for the APF were considered: THE STATUS QUO: The status quo: 100% funding by EDF under the Cotonou Agreement Art. 11 and taking full advantage of the development-security nexus is analysed in Annex 3.2. The evaluation team considers this the best option until the end of 2013 when the 10th EDF comes to an end, and probably also beyond that date. A higher degree of creativity may be possible after this date, to make EU funding better fitted to the needs of African-led PSOs. THE NEW EEAS AND THE CFSP/ESDP BUDGET The new EEAS and the CFSP/ESDP budget might not replace or offer substantial funding to APF in the short run due to legal and other obstacles (such as African ownership, financial capacity, political willingness,). Apart from the APF, only CFSP provides an opportunity of EU funding to certain military costs. This highlights the originality of APF. Annex 3.3. provides detailed analysis. It is too early to know how EU foreign policy will evolve, but APF should certainly become a part of EEAS policy-making in Africa as soon as the new service shows clear added value. The EEAS may slowly move the ideas of MS in the direction of a CFSP modification that removes (substantial) PSO funding from the APF. In exchange for a less direct influence over the use of short-term funds, Council could approve longer-term funding in order to generate higher impact and better results in support to clear strategic objectives; and this could be part of a process for bringing Council and Commission planning systems into harmony. Funding African PSOs under the CFSP budget is possible, but it would require substantial modifications. One operational advantage emerges from this option: in theory at least, it may be easier to create synergies if all the EU instruments and budgets are brought into a single policy-making structure. However, officials admit that systemic synergies are unlikely to emerge even within the EEAS: cooperation and synergy inside the EU system are achieved through individual efforts and initiatives as well as goodwill of colleagues working with other instruments. Many of the opportunities for synergy are created at the regional or country levels (sometimes when officials from Brussels are visiting EU Delegations in Africa or vice versa); others emerge in Brussels, but most often when the same Division manages different instruments. The EEAS should bring greater coherence to the overall structure of foreign and CFSP policies. OTHER PARTS OF EU BUDGET: Other parts of EU budget, including DCI and IfS (and even ENPI in North Africa), could contribute small amounts of funding in specific cases, but none of these instruments is designed for a continental or regional programme in Africa, nor for African ownership and Africa-led military operations. They are discussed in Annex 3.6. Both the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and the CFSP are fairly modest in size compared to the EDF. Even though the CFSP has more than doubled in size in the past five years, its current levels of funding would not enable to handle an instrument such as APF in terms of size. Even the larger IfS is only one tenth of EDF size and suffers from a number of legal constraints. The Cotonou Agreement and intergovernmental structure of the European Development Fund appear to involve a series of advantages. Page 40 of 49

47 At first sight, the Instrument for Stability seems to be a potential partner for APF. Yet, the analysis reveals too many legal and procedural discrepancies to make this feasible. IfS has grown to be more valuable, moving from the small, six-month Rapid Reaction Mechanism to a substantial instrument with crisis response capacity and 18-month (extendable) interventions. But the restrictions on time, its global mandate and the impossibility to fund anything but military actions give the IfS a profile that is very different from the long-term, sustainable, pan-africanist APSA and PSO-oriented APF. However, procedural innovations are developed by IfS, which, if applied to APF, would make it a more flexible and efficient instrument. These are explained in more detail in Annex 3.4. THE ATHENA DECISION, The ATHENA Decision presented in Annex 3.5, offers EU MS an innovative military funding mechanism outside the EU budget. It could possibly be adapted to create an Athena mechanism for Africa. However, significant changes to the existing model would be necessary to ensure predictable funding (Athena is funded annually on a needs-basis) and allow for African leadership. The Athena Decision is the odd-one-out in the list, used by EU MS to create a mechanism outside the EU budget, for European-led military operation funding on an annual budget basis. Its potential magnitude, flexibility and military components make it an attractive option to fund or replace APF funding of PSOs, but it may be difficult to adapt it to African use because AU administrative management and control procedures are still weak. However, the Athena Decision demonstrates EU MS creativity in responding to security needs. VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS FROM EU MS Under annex II of the APF regulations, when one PSO requests additional APF funds, the EC can ask Member States for additional voluntary contributions. This has been done in the past, as an innovation under the 9 th EDF (when eight MS contributed to AMIS). By their very nature, however, AVCs cannot be considered as predictable and sustainable funding. The fact that several EU MS have established their own P&S funds (Italy, Spain, Denmark) points to the political nature of support to African Peace and Security efforts as well as a certain reluctance among certain EU member states to put all of their eggs in one basket. Coherence and synergy should start within the EU. The existence of small, rival, bilateral APFs seems inconsistent, now that the EEAS has been set in motion to bring coherence to EU foreign policy in Africa. This is discussed in Annex 3.7. MIXED OPTIONS: It would be possible to cobble together a combination of EDF financing of soft elements (i.e. nonmilitary expenses) if EU MS decided to abandon the development-security nexus and refuse EDF funds for PSOs. In this case, some ad hoc CFSP funding (for military hardware and/or big PSOs) might be possible. However, no EU funding instrument, apart from APF, would include African ownership and African leadership in military peace operations. THE DCI BUDGET The DCI Budget of 16.9 billion for the period , is more substantial than other CFSP or IfS budgets. The APF could be included if the rules allowed DCI to fund APF activities and APSA. Yet, the PSO part cannot be covered under DCI rules. Actions such as capacity building (non-military), mediation, Early Response Mechanism, early warning, conflict management and the Panel of the Wise could possibly be funded under DCI, which can offer assistance in post-crisis situations and to fragile States and fund international organisations. It is unlikely that such a change would add any significant added value, however Annex 3.6. provides a detailed summary of the possibilities for DCI and Mixed Options. Page 41 of 49

48 CREATING A NEW APF, EU MS OR MULTI-NATION PARTNERSHIP INSTRUMENT This is another option for post-2013 funding if EU MS decided to take APF out of the 11 th EDF Annex 3.7. considers the advantages and disadvantages of creating a new EU instrument. IV.2 POSSIBLE AU SOURCES OF CO-FUNDING FOR APF-FUNDED ACTIVITIES Locating the APF within the African Union and possible funding sources from AU pillars (EDF and non-edf possibilities) AU Peace and security APF Capacity Building Institutional strengthening Capacity development Economic Development Common Defense and Security Policy Governance Gender Shared values Figure 1 ADDITIONAL AU FUNDING Theoretically, the EU (whether through APF or not) might co-finance APSA and PSOs where the main funding would originate in a Peace Facility of the AU. The latter might be made up of the African Peace Fund, AU PS budget, special contributions from AU MS, or a supplementary basket of AU funds by third-country funders such as Japan, China, India, Brazil and Turkey or certain Arab States. The AU currently hasn t such funds at its disposal, and the evaluation sees no realistic likelihood of their significant emergence in the foreseeable future. 50 However, there may be a benefit in placing the issue on the agenda of the JCC, in the context of the continuing EU-AU Political Dialogue, to study what measures the EU or APF might be able to take to facilitate the creation of a viable peace facility or strengthen the Peace Fund - within the AU. The subject of sustainable funding beyond APF has been extensively discussed between AU and donor partners (see for example the Annual Consultation of June 2008 text box below). The UNmandated Prodi Panel considered a number of funding options, without reaching a definitive conclusion. A number of potential funders are looking at complementary peace facilities. 50 In January 2011, China announced that it would give $30m to the AU, for AMISOM. This fairly modest sum should be seen in the 2011 context of the EU allocating an additional 300m to the APF. Page 42 of 49