Lecture 25 Unemployment Financial Crisis. Noah Williams

Transcription

1 Lecture 25 Unemployment Financial Crisis Noah Williams University of Wisconsin - Madison Economics 702

2 Changes in the Unemployment Rate What raises the unemployment rate? Anything raising reservation wage: higher unemployment benefits b, best jobs pay very high wages, workers are more patient β. Jobs are harder to find p (despite lower reservation wage). Separations are more s frequent (despite lower reservation wage).

3 Figure An Increase in the Unemployment Insurance Benefit b Copyright 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

4 Figure An Increase in the Job Offer Rate p Copyright 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

5 Cyclical and Cross-Sectional Unemployment If the job finding rate falls: Workers become less choosy: the reservation wage falls. Direct effect: fewer unemployed workers find jobs. Direct effect dominates, so unemployment rate rises and unemployment spells get longer. This seems to characterize the recent recessions. If unemployment benefits increase: Workers become more choosy: the reservation wage increases. No direct effect on separations or job finding rates. Unemployment rate rises and spells get longer. This seems to characterize differences between US and Europe.

6 Comparing the US and Europe The following are facts about unemployment outcomes in the two continents: 1 In the 1950s and 1960s, unemployment rates were persistently lower in Europe than in the U.S. The difference was accounted for by a higher inflow rate into unemployment in the U.S. 2 After the 1970s, unemployment became persistently higher in Europe 3 Inflow rates into unemployment were roughly constant across periods within both Europe and U.S. 4 In Europe, average durations of unemployment were low in the 1950s and 1960s, but became high after the 1970s. Average duration in the U.S. stayed low. 5 In Europe, since the 1970s, hazard rates of leaving unemployment fall with increases in the duration of unemployment.

7 Comparing the US and Europe There were two key differences in labor market policies: 1 In both periods, government supplied unemployment insurance were generous with long durations in Europe, but they were stingy with short durations in the U.S. - US: unemployment insurance ends after 26 weeks. Extended to 39 weeks by federal government during recessions. Additional extensions up to 99 weeks in most recent recession. Replacement rate capped at 40% (in Wisconsin) - France: The duration of benefit payments depends on job and age. The minimum period is 122 days. Maximum period is 730 days for private-sector employees under 50, and 1,095 days for employees over 50. Minimum replacement rate: 57.4 % 2 Government mandated employment protection (rules and regulations for firing and layoffs, firing taxes) was stronger in Europe throughout both periods.

8 Using these Facts in Our Model We can use a search model of the labor market to analyze the differences between the US and Europe. The relevant facts (for recent years) are: 1 The job finding rate p is higher in the US 2 The separation rate s from jobs is higher in the US 3 Unemployment benefits b are higher in Europe 4 There is more wage dispersion (more spread in the distribution of wages) in the US.

9 Impacts of these Facts on Reservation Wages What will be the impact of these four facts (separately) on his reservation wage (relative to an American in the same situation)? 1 A lower job finding rate in Europe will reduce, 2 A lower separation rate in Europe will raise, 3 Higher unemployment benefits in Europe will raise, 4 A lower wage dispersion in Europe will lower the reservation wage of European workers (relative to their US counterparts).

10 Impacts of these Facts on Unemployment Rates What will be the impact of these four facts (separately) on the steady state unemployment rate in Europe (relative to the US)? 1 A lower job finding rate in Europe will raise, 2 A lower separation rate in Europe will reduce, 3 Higher unemployment benefits in Europe will raise, 4 A lower wage dispersion in Europe will reduce the European unemployment rate (relative to the US).

11 Search and Matching So far we have considered only the worker s problem, taking the wage distribution as given. But firms also need to search to hire workers. This gives rise to a matching problem, which was studied by Pissarides (1985) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). This now serves as the benchmark model for studying unemployment.

12 Background on Financial Crisis: Growth of Credit Brunnermeier (2009) Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch , Journal of Economic Perspectives Over past several years there was an unprecedented growth in credit. Increases in securitization meant that banks originating loans were able to package and sell off loans, so that they did not bear the risk of the loans. Prime Example: Pooling groups of mortgages, ranking them based on perceived risk, then selling off in tranches as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Highest tranches believed to have very little risk (AAA). Investors also able to buy credit default swaps: pay a fee in exchange for payment in event of default. Counterparty risk perceived to be small. At same time, interest rates remained low for prolonged time, providing cheap access to funds.

13 Some Sources of the Problems While securitization reduced risk of individual loans for the banks, it also reduced incentives for prudent lending. This led to vast expansion of credit, in particular the growth of the subprime mortgage sector. The expansion of credit helped to fuel rapid growth in housing prices. Pricing models for mortgages and related mortgage-backed securities based on historical data. Post-WWII US had not experienced nationwide decline in housing prices. Previous housing downturns had been regional, so pooling mortgages across regions was believed to reduce default risk.

14 Beginning of the Financial Crisis Trigger was an increase in subprime mortgage defaults, starting in Feb This led to large increase in the cost of credit default swaps. Throughout summer of 2007 a number of hedge funds announce large losses, rating agencies downgraded CDOs. Concerns about liquidity of banks, uncertainty about how to price assets led to a huge reduction in volume of lending in short-term money markets, such as asset-backed commercial paper. Also drove up costs of bank lending, as seen in spread between interbank unsecured loan rate (LIBOR) and US T-bill rate, known as the TED Spread.

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17 The Crisis Broadens Throughout fall of 2007 banks continued writedowns, realizing losses. These proved to be broader than anticipated. By early 2008, losses had spread to insurance companies, government sponsored agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac) who securitized the loans, investment banks (Bear Stearns). A major accelerating factor was the failure of Lehman Brothers in September This lead to further declines in commercial paper market, increases in spreads, further decline in stock market prices. All of this further reduced lending, accelerating the broader overall slowdown in housing market, and led to the reductions in overall economic activity.

18 Dow Jones Industrial Index, 2/07-4/09

19 How to Think About the Crisis: Liquidity Why did the market for mortgage-backed securities dry up when only a small portion of mortgages (subprime) were initially affected by defaults? Similarly, why did the market for commercial paper dry up when only a fraction of firms in this market faced losses from housing sector? Problem: Asymmetric information on locations of risks. Market participants did not know which securities were affected by default risk, which firms held bad loans. Classic model to illustrate these effects due to Akerlof (1970).

20 The Lemons Model Akerlof s example was the market for lemons : poor quality cars. Assumed sellers know quality, buyers don t. Sellers: have N cars of varying quality x, uniformly distributed on [0, 2]. Consume y of other goods, have preferences over cars and goods, where n is car sales: N u(y, n) = y + x(t)dt n = y + N n2 N using x(t) = 2t N and integrating. Note that sellers sell off lowest quality first, retain highest.

21 Distribution of Quality

22 Supply of Lemons Sellers income y = pn, so given p choose n: max pn + N n2 n N First order condition: p = 2n N. Solve for supply curve: S(p) = min Average quality supplied at price p: { pn 2, N }. µ(p) = pn 2 0 x(t)dt pn 2 = p 2 If p > 2 then S(p) = N and µ(p) = 1.

23 Supply Curve

24 Buyers Buyers have no cars, income m. Place greater utility weight on cars: Buyers problem: U (y, n) = y n 0 x(t)dt = y µn max y + 3 µ(p)n s.t. y + pn = m n 2 Linear indifference curves (perfect substitutes), so demand curve is: [ 0, ] p > 3/2µ D(p) = 0, m p, p = 3 2 µ (1) m p, p < 3 2 µ

25 Demand Curve

26 Breakdown of the Market Note that we have: µ(p) = p 2 < 2 3 p So there is no p such that p 3 2 µ and thus demand is zero for all p > 0. The market breaks down even though at any given price between 0 and 3 there are sellers who are willing to sell their cars at a price which buyers are willing to pay. The asymmetric information leads to a market breakdown. Any price which is attractive to sellers of good cars is even more attractive to sellers of lemons. So cars on market are biased toward low quality adverse selection. The uncertainty about the locations of risks, both of individual mortgages in the securitized assets and of individual firms in the commercial paper market, may have contributed to the liquidity problems.

27 Demand Curve

28 How to Think About the Crisis: Bank Runs Why did Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers suddenly collapse, when their positions were not noticeably worse than any investment banks which survived? Perhaps this was due to self-fulfilling beliefs. Investors became concerned that they would fail, and so withdrew assets (or were reluctant to lend). This in turn caused the banks to sell off assets at a loss to meet funding needs, which exacerbated the troubles and led the beliefs to come true. Basic model of this: Diamond-Dybvig (1983) bank run model.

29 Diamond-Dybvig Model Three periods: 0, 1, 2. Large number N consumers, each endowed with 1 unit of good in period 0. Production technology converts 1 unit of good at 0 into 1 + r at date 2. If technology interrupted at date 1, only returns 1 and nothing is produced at date 2. Two types of consumers: early (want to consume in period 1) and late (consume in period 2). At date 0 agents don t know their type, only know that there is probability t they will be early consumer. Expected utility = tu (c 1 ) + (1 t)u (c 2 ).

30 Role of Banks If no banks: all agents invest, then if early consumer c 1 = 1, if late c 2 = 1 + r. Banks: agents deposit at 0, receive c 1 at 1 or c 2 at 2. If agent withdraws, randomly allocated to place in line, whether early or late consumer. Free entry in banking means in equilibrium banks earn zero profits. The banks set deposit contract to maximize depositor utility. If only early consumers withdraw at 1, bank must interrupt a fraction x of projects, where: Ntc 1 = Nx. This leaves remaining fraction to pay out to late consumers at 2: N (1 t)c 2 = (1 x)n (1 + r). Eliminate x and rearrange: c 2 = 1 + r 1 t t(1 + r) c 1 1 t

31 Deposit Contract Note c 1 = c 2 is feasible. Here: MRS = tu (c 1 ) (1 t)u (c 2 ) = t 1 t But for optimal contract, bank chooses: max tu (c 1 ) + (1 t)u (c 2 ) s.t. c 2 = 1 + r c 1,c 2 1 t At optimum: MRS = So U (c 1 ) > U (c 2 ) c 1 < c 2. tu (c 1 ) t(1 + r) (1 t)u = > t (c 2 ) 1 t 1 t t(1 + r) c 1 1 t

32 Figure 15.8 The Equilibrium Deposit Contract Offered by the Diamond Dybvig Bank Copyright 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

33 Deposit Contract Equilibria The no-bank allocation c 1 = 1, c 2 = 1 + r is also feasible. Assume U (1) > U (1 + r)(1 + r). Then at no-bank allocation: tu (1) (1 t)u (1 + r) > tu (1 + r)(1 + r) t(1 + r) (1 t)u = = (1 + r) 1 t So c 1 > 1, c 2 < 1 + r. Deposit contract provides more consumption smoothing than no-bank allocation. tu (c 1 ) (1 t)u (c 2 ) There is a good equilibrium where early consumers withdraw at 1, consume c 1 > 1. Late consumers withdraw at 2, consume 1 < c 2 < 1 + r. Late consumer has no incentive to withdraw early.

34 Bank Run Equilibria However suppose that a late consumer believes that all other late consumers will withdraw at 1. If bank liquidates all of its assets it gets N, cannot meet withdrawal demands (N 1)c 1 > N. (Since N large, c 1 > 1.) So each late consumer has the options: - Go to bank at 1, hope to be at start of line and get c 1. - Wait until period 2, get zero. So anticipating that all other late consumers will withdraw at 1 makes it optimal for any individual late consumer to also withdraw at 1. The bank run is an equilibrium. Belief that others will withdraw is self-fulfilling, leading to bank failure. There is FDIC insurance for deposits at deposit banks, but no insurance at investment banks and investment funds.

35 Background: Role of Financial Intermediation Defining Properties of Assets Rate of return Risk Maturity Liquidity Characteristics of Financial Intermediaries Borrow from one group of economic agents and lend to another. Well-diversified with respect to both assets and liabilities. Transform assets. Process information.

36 Basic Model of Financial Intermediation Banks: take deposits from lenders, paying interest rate r 1. Make loans to borrowers at interest rate r 2. Some borrowers will default on loans. Fraction a of borrowers are good, will repay loans. Fraction 1 a are bad, receive no future income, will default. Asymmetric Information: Banks can observe borrowers income realizations, but can t distinguish good and bad borrowers when they apply for loans. Good borrowers are identical, facing interest rate r 2 choose loan amount L. Bad borrowers want imitate good borrowers (would like to borrow more, but would reveal type). So they also choose to borrow L.

37 Valuation of Banks Banks lend to large number of borrowers, so fraction of loans defaulted on is 1 a. Bank profit: π = L L + al(1 + r 2) (1 a)0 + L(1 + r 1) 1 + r r r 1 (1 + r 1 )π = al(1 + r 2 ) L(1 + r 1 ) = L[a(1 + r 2 ) (1 + r 1 )] There is free entry among banks, so in equilibrium π = 0. Therefore: r 2 = 1 + r 1 1 > r 1 a Borrowers must pay a risk premium due to the chance of default. If a = 1, r 2 = r 1. If a r 2.

38 Figure 9.3 Asymmetric Information in the Credit Market and the Effect of a Decrease in Creditworthy Borrowers 2011 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 9-10

39 Reduction in Creditworthiness of Borrowers With a fall in a, we ve seen that r 2 increases. Default premium increases: even good borrowers face higher loan rates. Budget constraint shifts in. Consumption falls for all borrowers. Matches observations from the current financial crisis increase in credit market uncertainty, reduction in lending, decrease in consumption expenditures.

40 Spread on Corporate Bonds: AAA minus BAA Figure 9.4 Interest Rate Spread 2011 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 9-12

41 Limited Commitment and the Role of Collateral Borrowers need incentives not to default on their debts. These incentives typically provided by collateral requirements. This is due to limited commitment: borrowers cannot commit to repay loans. Even if they can afford repayment in future, may choose not to repay. Strategic default. Examples: House is collateral for a mortgage loan, car is collateral for a car loan. Collateral can also support borrowing for other purposes, such as home equity lines for consumption purchases. A fall in the value of the collateral can lead to a large reduction in borrowing, consumption.

42 Consumption-Savings with Collateral Constraint Assume housing is illiquid: can t be sold in the current period. However, it is possible to borrow against housing wealth, with a collateral constraint. H =quantity of housing owned by consumer. p=price of housing. Lifetime budget constraint: Collateral constraint: c + c 1 + r = y t + y t + ph 1 + r s(1 + r) ph Borrowing today restricted by value of collateral.

43 Effects of Collateral Constraints Figure 9.5 Limited Commitment with a Collateral Constraint 2011 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 9-16

44 Effects of Collateral Constraints Collateral constraint implies a bound on current consumption: c y t + ph 1 + r For constrained consumers, fall in value of collateral will lead to one-for-one reduction in consumption: c = y t + ph 1 + r So reduction in price of housing p can lead to fall in consumption. Here we take p as exogenous, but fall in p can have an amplifier effect in equilibrium. Initial fall leads to less consumption, less borrowing. Reduces demand for housing, which can further drive down house prices. Again this parallels what we ve seen in the financial crisis and recession.

45 Relative Price of Housing Figure 9.6 The Relative Price of Housing in the United States 2011 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 9-17

46 Aggregate Consumption Figure 9.7 Percentage Deviations from Trend in Aggregate Consumption 2011 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 9-18

47 Looking Back Topics we ve addressed: Labor Markets General Equilibrium Saving and Investment Economic Growth Business Cycles Money International Trade

48 Some applications we ve looked at Changes in labor over time Social Security Government taxes and spending Wealth of nations: over time and around the world Depressions Monetary and fiscal policy Financial crisis Overall: Development of dynamic macroeconomic models, how to use the models to think about current issues.

49 Looking Forward FINAL EXAM Room 5206 Social Science Building, May 8, 10:00 AM - 12:00 PM 2 hour exam. No books or notes. Comprehensive, slightly weighted toward more recent topics.