Monetary Policy Rules in the Presence of an Occasionally Binding Borrowing Constraint
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1 Monetary Policy Rules in the Presence of an Occasionally Binding Borrowing Constraint Punnoose Jacob Christie Smith Fang Yao Oct 214, Wellington Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
2 Research Question How does an occasionally-binding Loan-to-Value Ratio (LVR) constraint affect the conduct of monetary policy in terms of an interest rate rule?
3 Local Context New Zealand s LVR restrictions were introduced on 1 October 213, responding to
4 Local Context New Zealand s LVR restrictions were introduced on 1 October 213, responding to Annual NZ house price inflation reached 1 percent, December 213 (16% in Auckland).
5 Local Context New Zealand s LVR restrictions were introduced on 1 October 213, responding to Annual NZ house price inflation reached 1 percent, December 213 (16% in Auckland). The proportion of high LVR lending exceeded 3% in early 213.
6 Local Context New Zealand s LVR restrictions were introduced on 1 October 213, responding to Annual NZ house price inflation reached 1 percent, December 213 (16% in Auckland). The proportion of high LVR lending exceeded 3% in early 213. Housing market led to financial stability concerns
7 Local Context New Zealand s LVR restrictions were introduced on 1 October 213, responding to Annual NZ house price inflation reached 1 percent, December 213 (16% in Auckland). The proportion of high LVR lending exceeded 3% in early 213. Housing market led to financial stability concerns Reluctance to use the interest rates: concerns about low inflation and elevated exchange rate.
8 Contribution We start from Iacoviello (25)
9 Contribution We start from Iacoviello (25) Housing market
10 Contribution We start from Iacoviello (25) Housing market Patient and impatient households
11 Contribution We start from Iacoviello (25) Housing market Patient and impatient households Borrowing constraint on loans
12 Contribution We start from Iacoviello (25) Housing market Patient and impatient households Borrowing constraint on loans Our extensions
13 Contribution We start from Iacoviello (25) Housing market Patient and impatient households Borrowing constraint on loans Our extensions Open economy DSGE model for NZ
14 Contribution We start from Iacoviello (25) Housing market Patient and impatient households Borrowing constraint on loans Our extensions Open economy DSGE model for NZ Occasionally-binding borrowing constraint
15 Contribution We start from Iacoviello (25) Housing market Patient and impatient households Borrowing constraint on loans Our extensions Open economy DSGE model for NZ Occasionally-binding borrowing constraint We study optimal monetary policy rules
16 Main Findings Imposing an occasionally-binding LVR makes the economy respond asymmetrically to positive and negative shocks.
17 Main Findings Imposing an occasionally-binding LVR makes the economy respond asymmetrically to positive and negative shocks. The LVR affects macro volatilities and hence changes monetary policy.
18 Main Findings Imposing an occasionally-binding LVR makes the economy respond asymmetrically to positive and negative shocks. The LVR affects macro volatilities and hence changes monetary policy. The optimal monetary policy rule under an LVR constraint transfers welfare from savers to borrowers.
19 Main Findings Imposing an occasionally-binding LVR makes the economy respond asymmetrically to positive and negative shocks. The LVR affects macro volatilities and hence changes monetary policy. The optimal monetary policy rule under an LVR constraint transfers welfare from savers to borrowers. Removing the LVR results in gradual adjustment.
20 THE MODEL
21 Households problem Maximise expected utility subject to 1 Budget constraint
22 Households problem Maximise expected utility subject to 1 Budget constraint 2 Collateral constraint R l,t L t [ µ E t qh,t+1 P c,t+1 h t ]
23 The Rest of the Model Banks channel savings from domestic and foreign savers to borrowers. Home good produced with capital and Labour Sold at home and abroad Foreign output, inflation and the interest rate: New Keynesian closed economy model
24 Monetary and LVR Policy Interest rate rule ( ) R rr [( ) rπ ( ) r y ] 1 rr t R = Rt 1 πc,t yt exp ω r,t R π c y t 1
25 Monetary and LVR Policy Interest rate rule ( ) R rr [( ) rπ ( ) r y ] 1 rr t R = Rt 1 πc,t yt exp ω r,t R π c y t 1 LVR policy R l,t L t [ µ LVR E t qh,t+1 P c,t+1 h t ]
26 Parameter Values Most of structural parameters are calibrated to match NZ data. The rest are estimated using Bayesian methods Sample period:1993 Q4 to 213 Q3 before the LVR restriction was introduced. The estimated model does not have the borrowing constraint. 9 data series : GDP growth, Consumption growth, Residential investment growth, Business investment growth, Housing loan growth, 9-day rate, CPI inflation, House price Inflation, Mortgage spread.
27 Occasionally-Binding Solution
28 Occasionally-binding Solution We use the "OccBin" Toolbox developed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (214) A piecewise-linear approximation of occasionally binding constraints It is able to deal with large models with many predetermined variables.
29 % from S.S. Asymmetric IRFs: Monetary Policy Shock Contractionary 2 9 Day Rate 1 House Price Loan O utput CPI Inflation q 8q 2 4q 8q 3 4q 8q 2 4q 8q 1 4q 8q Occasionally binding P erpetually binding
30 % from S.S. % from S.S. Asymmetric IRFs: Monetary Policy Shock Contractionary 2 9 Day Rate 1 House Price Loan O utput CPI Inflation q 8q 2 4q 8q 3 4q 8q 2 4q 8q 1 4q 8q Occasionally binding Perpetually binding Expansionary 1 9 Day Rate 2 House Price 3 Loan 2 O utput 1 CPI Inflation q 8q 1 4q 8q 4q 8q 4q 8q 4q 8q
31 Stochastic Simulation
32 Stochastic Simulation
33 Stochastic Simulation Comparing Moments from the Perpetually- and Occasionally-binding Models Binding Frequency Output S.D. (%) CPI Inflation S.D. (%) LVR Occasional Perpetual Occasional Perpetual Occasional Perpetual.9 1.4% 1% % 1%
34 Optimal Policy
35 Optimal Monetary Policy Rules Taylor Rules Estimated: ˆR t =.8 ˆR t (1.89 ˆπ c,t +.32 ŷ t ) Occ.binding optimal: ˆR t =.8 ˆR t (1.1 ˆπ c,t ŷ t ) Always binding optimal: ˆR t =.8 ˆR t (3 ˆπ c,t ŷ t )
36 Optimal Monetary Policy Rules Taylor Rules Estimated: ˆR t =.8 ˆR t (1.89 ˆπ c,t +.32 ŷ t ) Occ.binding optimal: ˆR t =.8 ˆR t (1.1 ˆπ c,t ŷ t ) Always binding optimal: ˆR t =.8 ˆR t (3 ˆπ c,t ŷ t ) Extend Taylor rule to include house price inflation and credit growth
37 Welfare Evaluation Welfare Level (Gain in terms of consumption) Taylor Rules Saver Borrower Social Estimated: Occ.binding: ( 1.4%) (.71%) (.2%) Always binding: (9.8%) ( 11.6%) -2.1 (.2%)
38 Level Temporary LVR Tightening Loan to Value Ratio Occasionally binding Perpetually binding q 16q 24q 32q 4q 48q
39 % from S.S. Annualised % Annualised Level in % Level % from S.S. % from S.S. Temporary LVR Tightening.92 Loan to Value Ratio 1 Loans.1 House Price q 16q 24q 32q 4q 48q 1 8q 16q 24q 32q 4q 48q.3 8q 16q 24q 32q 4q 48q.5 Output.3 Inflation 5.4 Policy rate Occasionally binding Perpetually binding 1 8q 16q 24q 32q 4q 48q.1 8q 16q 24q 32q 4q 48q q 16q 24q 32q 4q 48q
40 Conclusion We study macro dynamics under an occasionally-binding LVR. The LVR makes the economy respond asymmetrically to positive and negative shocks and hence changes macro volatilities and monetary policy. Future Research: Extend monetary policy rule to include house price inflation and credit growth Endogenise LVR policy Open economy dimensions
41 Bank s problem Bank dividend Budget constraint max E t β τ λ t+τ D b,t+τ (j) b (1) τ= λ t P c,t+τ D b,t (j) P c,t S t (j) P c,t + R t 1S t 1 (j) P c,t + S t (j) e t P c,t + R l,t 1L t 1 (j) P c,t + Φ t 1R t 1 S t 1 (j) e t P c,t + L t (j) P c,t The bank is subject to a capital requirement constraint L t (j) S t (j) St (j)/e t = 1 µ L t (j) b,t ( ) bl where : µ b,t = µ b (1 b b Lt b ) b,t 1, b P d,t y l >, b b [, 1) d,t <
42 % from S.S. % from S.S. % from S.S. IRFs to Monetary Policy Shock Shock Process Policy R ate C P I Inflation O utput % ile.2 Median 2.5% ile q 8q 12q 16q 2q 4q 8q 12q 16q 2q 4q 8q 12q 16q 2q 4q 8q 12q 16q 2q C ons. Saver C ons. Borrower H ousing Inv. H ouse Price q 8q 12q 16q 2q 4q 8q 12q 16q 2q 4q 8q 12q 16q 2q 4q 8q 12q 16q 2q Loans Lending Spread Business Inv. RER q 8q 12q 16q 2q 4q 8q 12q 16q 2q 1.5 4q 8q 12q 16q 2q 4q 8q 12q 16q 2q
43 Optimal Monetary Policy Rules under LVR We evaluate Taylor type operational rules based on unconditional expectations of social welfare. Due to the occasionally binding constraint, we apply a simulation-based welfare measure. We simulate the model based on estimated parameters and driving forces for 5 periods, repeating it for 2 times. Averaging across 2 replications yields a sample approximation to the expected values of variables for the welfare measure. We repeat this exercise for each candidate policy rule on a grid of Taylor rule coeffi cients.
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