Prudential Responses to Credit Growth. The case of Spain
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1 Prudential Responses to Credit Growth. The case of Spain José María Roldán General Director Banking Regulation Financial Stability, Central Banking and Supervisory Challenges September , Washington D. C.
2 Outline Motivation Supervisory concerns A prudential tool: dynamic provisioning Rationale Mechanism Simulation IAS vs US GAAP Conclusions 2
3 Motivation Banks lending mistakes are more prevalent during upturns Borrowers and lenders are overconfident about investment projects (i.e. financing NPV<0 projects) Banks over optimism implies lower credit policy standards During recessions, banks suddenly turn very conservative and tighten credit standards (well beyond NPV>0) Banks managers during booms: overweight concerns regarding type 1 lending policy errors (i.e. good borrowers not getting a loan) underweight type 2 errors (i.e. bad borrowers getting financed) The opposite happens during recessions 3
4 Motivation Main arguments to rationalise fluctuations in credit policies based on information imperfections: Disaster myopia, Guttentag and Herring (1984) Herd behaviour, Rajan (1994) Agency problems, Williamson (1963) Institutional memory hypothesis, Berger and Udell (2003) Increasing competition makes things worse Collateral might also play a role in credit cycles Loan booms are intertwined with asset booms 4
5 Credit cycles in Spain LONG-TERM BEHAVIOUR OF CREDIT CREDIT AND GDP ANNUAL REAL GROWTH RATES Bank credit to the private non-financial resident sector 10 5 GDP
6 Supervisory concerns Strong credit growth in Spain the second half of the 90s Fierce competition in bank lending lower quality of borrowers and/or risk s underpricing potential herding behaviour (even conservative managers) Loan loss provisions to total credit were decreasing since 1994 In 1999 lowest ratio across OECD countries correlation with GDP (i.e. totally backward looking) Empirical evidence that credit growth affects problem loans with a 3/4-year lag We thought that one way to address this issue was through loan loss provisions 6
7 Loan loss provision ratio, problem loans ratio and GDP growth rate LOANS LOSS PROVISION RATIO, PROBLEM LOANS RATIO AND GDP GROWTH RATE GDP GROWTH RATE (RHS) PROBLEM LOANS RATIO (LHS) LOANS LOSS PROVISION RATIO (LHS)
8 Loan loss provision ratio US vs Spain EEUU -Bancos- España -ED- 2.00% 1.80% 1.60% 1.40% 1.20% 1.00% 0.80% 0.60% 0.40% 0.20% 0.00% % 2.00% 1.50% 1.00% 0.50% 0.00% Provisiones sobre créditos Δ del PIB Provisiones sobre créditos Δ del PIB 8
9 A prudential tool We developed a new prudential provision to address the credit risk that builds up during credit boom periods That tool is a dynamic provision From July 2000-December 2004: the statistical provision Since January 2005: the new general provision It is based on the cyclical position of the economy: In good times, when problem loans and specific provisions are low, the larger the dynamic provision In bad times, when problem loans and specific provisions are high, the dynamic provision can liberate funds from the previously built reserve In boom periods the dynamic provision is positive, negative during recessions The underlying idea is quite simple: In good times banks increase embedded credit risk, thus, a higher loan loss provision is required to account for that increase in risk 9
10 Current loan loss provisions Specific: Provisioning matrix General Not EL model Incurred (and already identified in a particular loan)+ collective assessment (incurred but not yet identified) Macro motivation Only for business of Spanish banks in Spain Annex; IAS text as main text. Experience for average bank Full cycle 10
11 Mechanism Only one general fund with two components: 1) to cover the inherent loss 2) prudential and countercyclical component At an aggregate level, we will have: dot. espe t dot. gent = α Ct + ( β ) Ct C t C t is the stock of loans and Ct its variation α covers the inherent loss β is the average specific provisions for a long period of time 11
12 Mechanism The former formula is a simplified way of presenting things In fact, α and β are assigned according to the six risk buckets or six homogeneous risk categories The parameter vectors are: (0%; 0.6%; 1.5%; 1.8%; 2%; 2.5%) for α (0%; 0.11%; 0.44%; 0.65%; 1.1% y 1.64%) for β Six homogeneoud groups: 1. zero risk (cash, public sector debt) 2. home mortgages with LTV below 80%, corporates with rating A or above 3. loans with real gauarantees and home mortgages with LTV above 80% 4. rest of loans, including corporates and SMEs 5. consumer durables financing 6. credit cards and overdrafts 12
13 Mechanism The formula of the new general provision is: dot. gen t = + = + 6 dot. espeit α i Cit β i Cit α i Cit β ic i= 1 i= 1 Cit i= 1 i= 1 it dot. espe t In good times, when loan portfolios are growing rapidly and specific loan loss provisions are low, the general provision increases as the amount of the inherent risk is increasing plus the cyclical effect of low current specific provisions versus an average loss along the cycle. We have confirmed empirically, with Credit Register data, the well known fact among supervisors that lending in good times is riskier than that in bad times. Thus, the general provision takes that into account. 13
14 Mechanism The new general fund is bounded upward and downward The maximum is relatively low: 1.5% of total loans The minimum amount is more flexible: 0.4% In fact, the limits are set at +25% and -66% of the inherent loss for each bank The general provision is set aside until the bank reaches the former (exceptfortheincreasein thelimit) If the general provision is negative, the general fund can be depleted only until it reaches 0.4% (the inherent risk does not dissapear in recessions) 14
15 A simulation exercise Initial expansionary phase (first 2 years) Slowdown (from year 3 on) Recession (around year 7) Economic growth resumes again (from year 8 onwards) Traditional provisioning system: specific plus general procyclical, dominated by specific provisions New provisioning system: Specific plus new general (i.e. including dynamic component) Still procyclical, but much less as the general fund is used during the slowdown When we had the statistical provision, total loan loss provisions were flat along the cycle 15
16 Provisions (left) new general fund (right). % loans CIRCULAR 4/2004 CIRCULAR 4/ % 1.6 % y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 y8 y9 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 y8 y9 y10 y11 y12 y13 y14 y15 16
17 Rationale for the statistical provision 1) To acknowledge the inherent or latent loss as a cost better risk management and prudent accounting 2) To counterbalance the excessive procyclical behavior of the existing LLP 3) To correct the excessive cyclical bias in profits: Low (high) LLP in the upturn (downturn) may overstate (understate) profits Bank profitability and solvency could be distorted: overvaluation of dividends, erosion of capital A second instrument to maintain systemic financial stability, with countercyclical characteristics to check bank lending (Goodhart)......in the sense that the incoming inherent risk is properly accounted for through this general provision 17
18 Transparency Banks are required to disclose yearly the amount of the dynamic provision, apart from the specific provision Thus, users of accounting statements can unwind or undo the impact of the statistical provision on the P&L Transparency and prudential regulation complement each other 18
19 IAS Accountants never liked the total smoothing effect along the cycle of the former statistical provision IAS are being applied in the EU since the beginning of 2005 The new loan loss provision (i.e. new specific and new general) we have developed: It is IAS compatible LLP are not completely smooth out along the business cycle Although total LLP are high in boom periods, the maximum is reached around the recession, when impaired assets are also at their maximum 19
20 IAS IAS do not mean low level of provisions IAS considers two types of provisions for incurred and already identified losses on an individual loan for homogeneous groups of risk, for incurred and not yet individually identified losses Trigger events: Not only default, also significant financial difficulties, adverse changes in the environment (i.e. increase in unemployment rate, decrease in property prices, industry conditions worsen ) or in the personal situation of the borrower; US GAAP also allow for generous collective provisions 20
21 IAS vs US GAAP Loan impairment IASB Standards: IAS 39 Incurred loss model Impairment: Individually evaluated for impairment Collectively evaluated for impairment: incurred but cannot be individually identified yet Groups of small balance items Loans assessed individually and not found to be impaired US GAAP Standards: FAS 5 & 114 Incurred loss model Impairment: Individually evaluated for impairment Collectively evaluated for impairment: incurred but cannot be individually identified yet Large groups of smaller-balance homogeneous loans (excluded from individually evaluation) Loan that are not identified for evaluation Loans that are evaluated but are not individually considered impaired 21
22 IAS vs US GAAP Loan impairment IASB Collective evaluation US GAAP Collective evaluation Loans grouped on the basis of similar credit risk characteristics Formula approaches or statistical methods may be used Factors to consider: Historical loss experience or peer group Current observable data Portfolio delinquency rates... Loans grouped on the basis of similar characteristics Formula approach based on various factors: Past loss experience or peer group Recent economic events and current conditions Portfolio delinquency rates. 22
23 Conclusions: Dynamic provisioning and financial stability The Spanish statistical provision is a tool that helps to improve financial stability Provisioning of inherent credit risk Fosters better risk management Smooths excessive procyclicality of specific provisions Prudent accounting valuation Increases resilience of individual banks as well as the whole financial system during recessions Macro prudential instrument Improves medium term bank solvency 23
24 JOSE MARIA ROLDAN THANK YOU FOR YOUR INTEREST 24
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