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Lecture notes on risk management, public policy, and the financial system Allan M. Malz Columbia University

2018 Allan M. Malz Last updated: March 12, 2018 2 / 18 Outline

3/18 Key postwar developments in U.S. credit markets Reduced role of commercial banks as alternative forms of short-term investment and long-term borrowing grow Increase in borrowing through markets rather than banks via Issuance of corporate bonds, commercial paper Increase in foreign direct investment in U.S. (and by U.S. abroad) Securitization of loans, esp. mortgages Increased leverage by all sectors, but esp. households, financial firms

1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015 Who s borrowing in the U.S., 1947 2017 100 80 60 40 20 households state and Federal government nonfinancial business financial sector 0 60 40 20 total loans and securities ROW 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015 Outstanding amount of borrowing via loans and debt securities by sector in U.S. markets, annual. Upper panel displays the share, in percent, of each sector s borrowing in the total. Bottom panel displays the total outstanding amount of loans and debt securities, in trill of $. Source: Federal Reserve Board, Financial Accounts of the United States (Z.1), Table D.3. 4/18

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 5/18 Who s lending in the U.S., 1947 2017 100 80 long-term investors securitization public sector 60 investment funds 40 20 bank sector/capital markets 0 40 20 total loans and securities 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015 Share of each U.S. financial sector in loans and debt securities held as assets, annual, in percent. Bank sector includes finance companies, brokers and dealers. Long-term investors include insurance companies and pension funds. Public sector includes assets held by the Federal Reserve, and held or guaranteed by government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Bottom panel displays the total outstanding amount of loans and debt securities, in tril. of $ Source: Federal Reserve Board, Financial Accounts of the United States (Z.1), Tables L.208 and L.214.

6/18 In what form do nonfinancial firms borrow? 70 14 Foreign direct investment Foreign direct investment 12 60 Commercial paper Bank loans 10 Bank loans 50 Corporate bonds 8 Commercial paper 40 6 Corporate bonds 30 4 20 Other 2 10 0 1980 1990 2000 2010 0 1980 1990 2000 2010 Total liabilities of U.S. nonfarm nonfinancial corporations by type. Bank lending is comprised mostly of commercial and industrial loans (C&I loans). Other consists primarily of trade payables and mortgages. Left: $US trillions; right: shares, in percent. Quarterly, 1975 to Q2 2013. Source: Federal Reserve Board, Financial Accounts of the United States (Z.1), Table L.103.

Leverage measures U.S. debt-to-gdp ratio 1946 2016 400 300 200 Financial Households Nonfinancial business and ROW Federal, state and local govt. 100 0 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Q4 1980 Q4 2006 Q1 2016 Total 163 337 352 Financial 21 107 84 Households 47 94 79 Nonfinancial business and ROW 56 76 89 Federal, state and local govt. 39 60 101 Ratio of total debt outstanding (debt securities and loans) to gross domestic product, current dollars, percent, quarterly, Q4 1946 to Q1 2016. Source: Federal Reserve Board, Financial Accounts of the United States (Z.1), Tables D.3 and F.2. 7/18

8/18 Structure of collateralized security loan markets Repo markets

9/18 Structure of collateralized security loan markets Collateralized security loans Loans in which financial assets serve as collateral: Securities themselves serve as collateral for long positions in the securities Cash serves as collateral for short positions in the securities Predominantly bonds and equity Key mechanism by which financial system Establishes leveraged positions Supplies ( )liquidity to markets and large intermediaries Economic functions: Borrowers use collateral markets to finance long positions in securities Lenders of securities or excess cash use collateralized security loans to earn additional interest Short sellers borrow securities in collateral markets to establish positions

10/18 Structure of collateralized security loan markets Participants in collateralized security loan markets Predominantly conducted by intermediaries on both sides of transactions: market-based or short-term wholesale financing securities financing transactions Generally involving broker-dealer ( sell side ) on at least on side Often referred to as securities financing transactions (SFTs) by regulators

11/18 Structure of collateralized security loan markets Legal mechanics of collateralized security loans Securities are pledged used as collateral to obtain secured loans of cash or other securities Pledged assets said to be encumbered Loans collateralized by securities may look like sales but are economically loans Holder of pledged securities must remit dividend and coupon payments Voting rights a tricky issue Collateral may be rehypothecated or repledged by lender Adds to liquidity of collateral markets in normal times, can cause freezes in stress Rehypothecation risk: collateral seized by downstream lender Arrangements for netting

12/18 Structure of collateralized security loan markets Legal arrangements for holding collateral Two types of arrangement, legally distinct but economically similar Security interest in collateral transferred to lender Title transfer to lender, obligation to return equivalent collateral Both enjoy wide exemption from automatic stay in bankruptcy Cash lender can sell collateral without delay

13/18 Structure of collateralized security loan markets Major types of collateralized security loan Margin loans: loans financing security transactions in which the loan is collateralized by the security Key participants: short sellers, e.g. long-short equity HF, institutional investors Repurchase agreements or repo: matched spot sale and forward repurchase of security, at prices implying a lending rate Economically equivalent to margin loan Key participants: dealers financing inventories, MMMFs providing cash Securities lending is the loan of a security in exchange for a fee Administered on large scale by major custodians (e.g. Bank of New York, JPMorgan) Key participants: institutional investors with high-quality collateral

Structure of collateralized security loan markets Haircuts The full value of the collateral is not lent Overcollateralization the excess of the collateral value over the amount lent provides equity or buffer against price variation The haircut as a fraction of the market value of the collateral is equal to the reciprocal 1 L of the leverage in the transaction Overcollateralization expressed in two equivalent forms, depending on market conventions Margin: market value of collateral/loan par value (e.g. 105 percent) Haircut: percentage deduction of loan from the market value of collateral (e.g. 5 percent) The haircut agreed when a transaction initiated is called initial margin As collateral value fluctuates, counterparties may exchange variation margin Similar mechanism to exchange-traded and OTC derivatives markets Declines in asset values generally require borrowers to post additional collateral fire sales 14/18

15/18 Structure of collateralized security loan markets U.S. stock market margin debt 1990 2016 500 400 300 200 100 0 1990 2000 2010 Debit balances in margin accounts at New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) member firms, month-end, Dec. 1989 to May 2016, $ bill. Source: NYSE Facts & Figures, via Bloomberg ticker MARGDEBT Index.

16/18 Repo markets Types of repo Conducted bilaterally delivery-versus-payment (DVP) or through ( )tri-party repo Generally governed by standardized documentation: Master Repurchase Agreement Provides for netting of transactions Cash borrower said to have entered a repo transaction, cash lender a reverse repo transaction Dealer matched-book repo: simultaneously enter repo and reverse-repo with different customers, earn spread Dealer raises cash from reverse-repo customer and lends to repo customer And at same time, dealer rehypothecates repo customer s collateral to reverse-repo customer What makes it a secured loan rather than a purchase and sale? Seller (cash borrower) obligation to repurchase Seller bears market risk, since sale and repurchase prices determined at start

17/18 Repo markets Tri-party repo Form of repo in which each party transacts with clearing bank, responsible for Settling trades: transfers between counterparties securities and cash accounts Custody of cash securities Substitution of securities: repo purchaser (cash lender) may return equivalent securities More recently, introduction of cleared GCF Repo Service Very large market (near $2 trillion), concentration in two clearing banks, JPM, BNY Clearing banks: intraday counterparty exposure during settlement Day-long, complex settlement process: daily unwind Clearing banks provide intraday financing of dealers securities Exposure about equal to size of market May trigger default of weak dealer by declining to clear its trades May itself be weakened by default of major participant

Repo markets U.S. broker-dealer and tri-party repo 1990 2012 1200 2500 1000 broker dealer repo 800 2000 600 400 1500 200 tri party repo 1000 0 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Black plot (left axis): net liabilities under security repurchase agreements of U.S. broker-dealers, $ billions. Red plot (right axis): daily average transaction volumes in the tri-party repo market, all collateral classes, $ millions. Sources: Federal Reserve Board, Financial Accounts of the United States (Z.1), Table L.127, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 18/18