International Monetary Fund Macroeconomic Developments and Prospects in Low- Income Developing Countries ----------- The IMF and the 2030 Development Agenda Sean Nolan and Stefania Fabrizio Strategy, Policy, and Review Department February 2016
Structure of the Presentation The 2015 Low-Income Developing Countries (LIDCs) report A) Recent Macroeconomic Developments and Outlook B) Short and Longer-term Macroeconomic Vulnerabilities C) Private Capital Inflows to LIDCs The 2030 development agenda New IMF Deliverables 2
Low-income Developing Countries LIDC Sub-Groups by GNI per Capita and Population, 2014 3
Commodity-dependent exporters? Who s who? Commodity-Dependent Exporters Nigeria Uzbekistan, Sudan, Yemen Bolivia Zambia, DRC Diversified Exporters Bangladesh, Vietnam, Myanmar Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana 4
A) Macroeconomic Developments and Outlook 5
Global Growth and LIDC Performance 8 Real GDP Growth, 2010-16 (Weighted average, percent) 7 LIDC 6 5 4 3 2 WEO Oct 2014 WEO Jan 2016 WEO Oct 2014 WEO Jan 2016 World 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 6
The Game Changer: Commodity Price Movements 140 Commodity Prices, 2010-16 (Index, 2010=100) 120 Petroleum Price 100 Nonfuel Price 80 60 WEO Oct 2014 WEO Jan 2016 WEO Oct 2014 WEO Jan 2016 40 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 7
Commodity Price Declines: The Income Effect Net Impact of Commodity Prices on Income of LIDCs, 2014-15 (In percent of GDP) Diversified exporters June 2014-June 2015 June 2014-December 2015 Commodity (non-oil) exporters Oil exporters -18-15 -12-9 -6-3 0 3 8
with Oil Exporters Hardest Hit Net Impact of Commodity Prices on Income, 2014-15 (In percent of GDP) Selected Diversified Exporters Selected Oil-Exporters June 2014-June 2015 Kenya Ghana June 2014-December 2015 Ethiopia Nigeria Bangladesh Congo, Rep. Vietnam -36-32 -28-24 -20-16 -12-8 -4 0 Myanmar June 2014-June 2015 June 2014-December 2015-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 9
Commodity Price Declines: Second Round Effects Supply response: exports and employment Investment response Income distribution: locals versus foreigners 10
Divergent Growth Experience Real GDP Growth, 2014-16 (Weighted average, percent) 7 2014 2015 2016 WEO Jan 2016 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Commodity Exporters* * Excluding Yemen. Diversified Exporters 11
Fiscal Positions are Hit Government Fiscal Balance, 2014-16 (Percent of GDP; PPP-GDP weighted average) Public Debt, 2014-16 (Percent of GDP; PPP-GDP weighted average) 0 50-1 45 40 WEO Jan 2016-2 35 30-3 25-4 20 15-5 WEO Jan 2016 10 5-6 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 0 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 Commodity Exporters Diversified Exporters Commodity Exporters Diversified Exporters 12
External Positions Weaken but Drivers Vary Current Account Balance, 2014-16 (Percent of GDP; PPP-GDP weighted average) External Debt, 2014-16 (Percent of GDP; PPP-GDP weighted average) 0-1 -2-3 -4-5 -6 50 45 WEO Jan 2016 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 WEO Jan 2016 5 0 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 Commodity Exporters Diversified Exporters Commodity Exporters* Diversified Exporters * Excluding Nigeria. 13
Reserve Positions and Funding Costs 10 8 6 Medians 75th percentile Reserve Coverage, 2014-16 (Months of imports, percentiles) 1800 1500 1200 EMBIG Sovereign Spread (Basis Points, USD-denominated, as of 2/3/2016) May-Jun 2013 Average 2014 Average 2015 Average Current 4 900 2 0 25th percentile 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 600 300 Floating Fixed 0 Commodity Exporters livia Bol olia Mong Vietn nam Cote d'ivo oire ana Gh Ke enya Nige eria Mozambiq que Tanza ania 14
Currencies: Sizeable Declines, Low Pass-Through Depreciation of Currencies (Selected LIDCs, June 2014-September 2015) 0-10 -20-30 -40 15 Pa Zambia Malawi Mozambique Nigeria Mongolia Afghanistan pua New Guinea Uganda Madagascar Moldova Tanzania Ghana Commodity Exporters Diversified Exporters
Policy Messages Key commodity prices are unlikely to rebound; exporters need to recalibrate policies A reminder: countries need to build macroeconomic policy space to handle external shocks A warning: concerns about volatility of access to external capital markets are not theoretical ti 16
B) Assessing Macroeconomic Vulnerabilities 17
Vulnerability to a Growth Shock has Increased Steadily 100 Growth Decline Vulnerability Index, 2009-16 (LIDCs with low, medium and high vulnerabilities; in percent of total, unweighted) Growth Decline Vulnerability Index by Country Groups, 2016 (Share of LIDCs, in percent, unweighted) 80 60 40 20 0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 High Medium Low 18
Rising Debt Vulnerabilities: How Significant? 100 Evolution of the Risk of Debt Distress (In percent of total number of LIDCs with DSA) 90 80 44 43 44 39 34 33 28 21 21 24 70 60 50 40 31 31 29 32 32 33 35 44 45 48 30 20 10 24 26 27 29 34 33 37 35 34 28 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 High / in debt distress Moderate Low 19
Financial Vulnerabilities: Mostly from Rapid Credit Growth and Foreign-Currency Lending Financial Vulnerability Index Ratio of foreign liabilities to domestic credit Capital adequacy ratio Return on assets 3-year growth of the credit-to to GDP ratio Ratio of bank loans to deposits Z-Score Methodology Return on Assets Growth rate of private credit to GDP Bank credit to bank deposit ratio 2010 2013 2014 Growth rate of M2 to GDP Cross border loans to GDP Cross border deposits to GDP 20
Shock-Scenario Analysis: an Illustration Shock Scenario: Impact of Financial Volatility Shock 6 5 4 Financial volatility Baseline Growth Growth and dfiscal lbalance (Cumulative deviation from baseline, three year period) 0.0-0.5 3-1.0 2-1.5 1 0 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019-2.0 20 GDP growth (in percent) Cumulative Fiscal Balance (in percent of GDP) 21
Medium-Term Vulnerabilities: LIDCs are More Exposed to Severe Natural Disasters Average Annual Number of Droughts, Floods, Storms (Per million square kilometers) 3.5 3.0 2.5 LIDC AM EM 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 1985-95 1996-2005 2006-2015 22
.and They Are at Greater Risk with Respect to Climate Change than Other Countries Climate Change Exposure Index, 2015 LIDCs (Percent share of countries with vulnerability) Rest of the World (Percent share of countries with vulnerability) 23
Key Messages Indicators point to rising macro vulnerabilities in many LIDCs, due to weaker fiscal/external positions. Financial sector risks in FMs warrant attention focused on credit growth and funding sources. What we knew : LIDCs are more exposed to natural disasters, more at risk to climate change 24
C) Private Capital Inflows to LIDCs 25
Capital Inflows to LIDCs have Grown Sharply 8 Capital Inflows to LIDCs, 2000-14 ( Percent of GDP, weighted average) 7 6 Non-FDI inflows ) ital inflows (% GDP) 5 4 3 2 Cap FDI inflows 1 0-1 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 26
Frontier LIDCs have Driven the Uptick in non-fdi Flows 7 Non-FDI Inflows ( Percent of GDP) 6 5 Emerging markets Frontier LIDCs 4 3 2 Inflows (% GDP) 1 0 Portfolio flows Other flows Portfolio flows Other flows 2004-2007 2011-2014 Notes: the bars and the dots indicate, respectively, the median and third quartile of the distribution of capital inflows 27
Frontier LIDCs have opened their capital accounts reaching emerging markets levels Total Capital Account Liberalization Index (Median) 1.0 0.8 LIDC Developing Markets EMs Frontier LIDCs 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 28
Capital Flows: Links to Investment? 29
The SDG Narrative: Public Borrowing and Investment? Sovereign Borrowing and Public Investment, 2005-14 ( In percent of GDP) Ghana Mongolia 30
Levels and Costs of Capital Flows are Responsive to Economic and Global Financial Conditions Sovereign Bond Spreads around the Tapper Tantrum in Selected frontier LIDCs ( Average) 31
The IMF and the 2030 development agenda Core Business New Commitments 32
The IMF Committed to Several FfD/SDG Initiatives Enhance access to IMF concessional facilities Increased access levels by 50% on July 1 Expand support for domestic revenue mobilization (DRM), via technical assistance (TA), new diagnostic tools, work on international tax issues - Expand scale of technical assistance (TA) on DRM - Joint IMF-WB initiative to: a) deepen dialogue with developing countries on international tax issues; b) develop a standardized tax policy diagnostic tool to help countries assess/prioritize policy reforms. 33
The IMF Committed to Several FfD/SDG Initiatives Help address efficiently large infrastructure gap -New tools to assess investment management capacity, PPP fiscal risks, analyze investmentgrowth-debt trade-offs Enhance support for Fragile States and Small Developing Countries - Emphasis on medium-term capacity-building strategies in Fragile States - New approach on macro-frameworks and policies for countries vulnerable to natural disasters 34
The IMF Committed to Several FfD/SDG Initiatives Promote the development of domestic financial markets - Focus: promoting financial market development (deepening) and inclusion (broader access) -Tools: expand TA on financial market deepening; analytical work on both deepening and inclusion. -New diagnostic tool to assess FMD challenges?? -Financial sector stability reviews. Develop policies to address equity, inclusion, and environmental sustainability -Pilot initiatives underway on inequality, gender, and energy sector issues -Expanded analytical work on jobs and growth, inequality, gender equity, financial inclusion 35
IMF Commitments in the Context of Climate Change Further analytical work Benefits of energy pricing reform Growth impact of moving to a less carbon-intensive economy TA and Policy Dialogue Technical assistance on energy and carbon price issues Integration of climate/energy issues in consultations (where macrocritical) 36
IMF Commitments in the Context of Climate Change Financial Sector (joint): disclosure requirements; stress testing for climate risks; prudential requirements in insurance; new markets/instruments Medium-term Policy Frameworks Integrate natural disaster risks and preparedness within macroeconomic frameworks. Work (joint) to incorporate adaptation policies into medium-term strategies. 37
Thank you http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2015/111915.pdf pdf http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2015/061515.pdf http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2015/112515.pdf pdf 38