( ) = R + ª. Similarly, for any set endowed with a preference relation º, we can think of the upper contour set as a correspondance  : defined as

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6 Lecture 6 6.1 Continuity of Correspondances So far we have dealt only with functions. It is going to be useful at a later stage to start thinking about correspondances. A correspondance is just a set-valued function: a correspondance from to is a map that takes every element in and maps it to a non-empty subset of (note that a correspondance is therefore also a function if we define the range correctly, yes?). If Γ is a correspondance from to we write Γ :. Note that we have (formally or informally) come across a number of correspondances in economics. For example, in a world with commodities and a fixed income level, wecanthinkofa budget set as a correspondance : R + R + defined as ( ) = R + ª Similarly, for any set endowed with a preference relation º, we can think of the upper contour set as a correspondance  : defined as  ( ) ={  } As with functions, it is going to be useful to think oftheconceptofcontinuitywithregardto correspondances: Definition 26 A correspondance Γ : is upper-hemicontinuous at if for every open subset with Γ( ) there exists a 0 such that Γ( ( )) It is lower-hemi-continuous at if, for every open set in such that Γ( ) 6= then there exists a such that Γ( 0 ) 6= 0 ( ) It is continuous if it is both upper and lower hemicontinuous 31

We will draw graphs to demonstrate these properties in class. As with continuous functions, there is a sequential characterization of both upper and lower hemicontinuity, that we will state but not prove: Lemma 13 A correspondance Γ : is lower hemicontinuous at if and only if, for any seqeunce in, andany Γ( ), thereexistsasequence such that Γ( ) In order to state a similar result for upper-hemi continuity, we need to define the concept of a compact-valued correspondance Definition 27 A correspondance Γ : is compact valued if, for every, Γ( ) is compact The concepts of closed-valued and convex-valued are defined analogously So, what about UHC correspondances? Lemma 14 Let Γ : be a correspondance. If, for every in, and Γ( ) there exists a subsequence of that converges to a point in Γ( ), thenγ isupperhemicontinuous. If Γ is also compact valued, then the converse is also true. One other useful property of UHC and compact valued correspondances is the following: Proposition 4 Let Γ : be an upper hemi-continuous and compact valued correspondance. Then Γ( ) is compact in for any compact subset of 5 6.2 Applications We are now going to make use of some of the machinery that we have developed in order to prove some genuinely useful results. In fact, another title for this section could have been Some Reasons 5 Note that we define Γ( ) as follows: Γ( ) := Γ( ) NOT as {Γ( ) }. I.e.itisasubsetof, not a collection of sets in. 32

Why we Care About the Rest of this Chapter. We are basically going to show some things that are true about compact and complete sets that are going to be genuinely useful, even outside this course. Gasp! In particular, we will show the following 1. Any continuous real valued function obtains a maximum and minimum value when evaluated on a compact metric space (Weierstarss s theorem) 2. A certain class of functions is going to have a fixed point on a complete space (Banach Fixed Point Theorem) 3. The Theorem of the Maximum So here we go Theorem 11 (Weierstrass) Let be a compact metric space and : R be continuous, then attains its max and min in Proof. This theorem states that there exists such that ( )=sup ( ) =max ( ), and the same for the minimim. We will prove it for the maximum - an equivalent method will work for the minimum. By theorem 10 we know that ( ) is compact, and so (as ( ) R) closed and bounded. But this means that sup ( ) +. Also, as sup ( ) is a closure point of ( ), then sup ( ) ( ). This implies their exists some such that ( )=sup ( ) = max ( ) Given the machinery that we have built, this is a very simple result, but one that is very useful - it gives you a condition under which optimization problems will actually have solutions! Next we are going to move on to Banach Fixed Point theorem. In general, fixed point theorems are very useful classes of result that give us conditions under which for some function : we can find a value such that ( ) =. These results are incredibly useful when it comes to proving the existence of various types of equilibria. There are lots of different fixed point theorems, that provide different conditions under which fixed points exist. We will hopefully get to some others later in the course. In order to state Banach, we are going to have to introduce some preliminaries. 33

Definition 28 Let be a metric space, and :. We will say that is a contraction if there exists some 0 1 such that ( ( ) ( )) ( ) The inf of such s is called the contraction coefficient So a contraction is a function that maps to itself (also called a self map) such that the function spits out items that are closer together than what you put into it. The most obvious contraction is the function : R R such that ( ) = for 1 1 Why do we care about contractions? The reason is, because of Banach, we know that contractions on complete metric spaces have a fixed point, and as I have already discussed, fixed points arenicethings. Theorem 12 (Banach Fixed Point Theorem) Let be a complete metric space, and be a contraction on. Then there exists a unique such that ( )= Proof. We first show the existence of some such that ( )=.Picksome 0 and define a sequence recursively such that +1 = ( ). The sequence { } =1 is a Cauchy To see this, let be the contraction coefficient of, and note that ( 2 1 ) = ( ( 1 ) ( 0 )) ( 1 0 ) ( 3 2 ) = ( ( 2 ) ( 1 )) ( 2 1 ) 2 ( 1 0 ) More generally, ( +1 ) ( 1 0 ) Thus, for any, +1 we have ( ) ( 1 )+ ( 1 2 )+ + ( +1 ) ( 1 + 2 + + ) ( 1 0 ) = (1 ) ( 1 0 ) 1 so ( ) 1 ( 1 0 ) implying that the sequence is cauchy. As iscomplete,itmustbethecasethat{ } =1 converges to some point. Therefore, 34

for any 0, thereexistssome such that ( ) 2.Thus ( ( ) ) ( ( ) +1 )+ ( +1 ) = ( ( ) ( )) + ( +1 ) ( )+ ( +1 ) 2 + 2 = This is true for all 0, soitmustbethat ( ( ) )=0,andso ( )=.Thus, is a fixed point. To prove uniqueness, note that, if was another fixed point of, we would have ( )= ( ( ) ( )), a contradiction, as ( ( ) ( )) ( ) for some 1. 35

7 Lecture 7 Finally we move on to the theorem of the maximum. This is going to be a very useful theorem, and it is designed to answer the following questions: Example 13 Let R + be a vector of prices, be income, and consider an agent who choses bundles R + to maximize a utility function : R + R subject to the budget constraint ( ) = R + ª Let ( ) be the demand function, so that ( ) = arg max R ( ) And ( ) be the derived utility, so that ( ) =max R ( ) Can we say anything about the properties of and? In other words, do we know anything about how demand and derived utility change with the parameters of the problem? This is exactly what the theorem of the maximum tells us (under certain assumptions). In order to define these properties, we need to define the concept of the graph of a correspondance : Definition 29 The graph of a correspondance Γ : is the set of pairs { } such that is in the correspondance evaluated at Γ = {{ } Γ( )} Theorem 13 (The Theorem of the Maximum) Let and be metric spaces ( will be the set of things that are chosen, the set of parameters) Γ : be compact valued and continuous (this is the constraint set defined by the parameters) 36

: R be continuous, (this is the utility function) Now define : as the set of maximizers of given parameters ( ) = arg max ( ) Γ( ) and define : as the maximized value of for given parameters ( ) = max ( ) Γ( ) Then 1. is upper hemi-continuous and compact valued 2. is continuous Translating into the language of the example is the set of price vectors and income is the commodity space Γ is the budget correspondance is the utility function (note that we do not let utility depend directly on prices, but we could if we wanted to) is the demand function is the derived utility This is a really cool result. With relatively few assumptions, we are able to guarantee some neat properties of things we really care about. The proof is somewhat cumbersome, so we will sketch it here. Proof. We will prove this as a set of claims: Claim 1: has a closed graph. Let ( ) be a closure point of. We need to show that this is in. First, we show that is feasible at, then we show that it maximizes at 37

Note that, if ( ) is a closure point of, then we can construct a sequence ( ) ( ) such that ( ). This implies that ( ). This in turn implies that Γ( ). AsΓ is UHC and compact valued, then must have a subsequences that converges to some 0 Γ( ), but as, itmustbethat Γ( ), so is feasible at Now assume that ( ), then there must be some Γ( ) such that ( ) ( ). By LHC,theremustbesomesequence such that Γ( ). By the continuity of, we know that lim ( ) = ( ) lim ( ) = ( ) But, as ( ), this implies that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) A contradiction (check) Claim 2 is UHC and compact valued. As ( ) is closed (by the above result) and ( ) Γ( ) compact, it must be the case that ( ) is compact, and so is compact valued.. Let ( ) be a sequence such that and ( ) Γ( ) By the UHC and compact valuedness of Γ, we know that there is a subsequence that converges to some Γ( ). The closed graph property tells us that, as ( ),then( ),andso ( ), implying that is UHC Claim 3 is continuous. Let. We need to show that ( ) ( ). Weknow that there is a subsequence ( ) lim sup ( ).Pickasequence ( ),so ( )= ( ( )) = ( ) Because is compact valued and UHC, there is a subsequence ( ). By the continuity of, the fact that and implies that ( ) = ( ) ( ) 38

. but as ( ), ( ) = ( ), so ( ) is the lim sup of ( ). A similar argument proves that ( ) is also the lim inf of ( ), so we are done. 39