Default Reference Price Reports / Buyer-Side Mitigation Processes (other than SCRs)

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Default Reference Price Reports / Buyer-Side Mitigation Processes (other than SCRs) Dave Lawrence Manager, Auxiliary Market Products Esat Serhat Guney Senior Economist, Market Analysis and Mitigation New York Independent System Operator Installed Capacity Working Group February 12, 2010

Default Reference Price SCR Figures Several Market Participants have noted differences between the SCR MW reported on the NYISO s Default Reference Price webpage and the SCR MW on the monthly SCR registration reports. For example, figures for the February auction period were 585.6 MW as reported on the Default Reference Price page and 367.9 MW shown in the monthly SCR registration report. The SCR MW contained in the monthly SCR registration report are the number of SCR MW registered for the period covered by the report. 2

Default Reference Price SCR Figures The ICAP AMS currently uses the same data representation for SCRs and UDRs. The totals reported on the default reference price webpage under the heading NYC SCR UCAP are consistent with this modeling. As part of the March ICAP AMS software deployment, SCR and UDR data modeling will no longer be linked. Beginning with the April default reference level calculation: the SCR totals on both the default reference price webpage and the SCR monthly report will reflect only SCRs, and all other UCAP totals will appear on the default reference price page under the column labeled NYC Gen UCAP. The calculation of the default reference price has been and will be unaffected by the change in database modeling. 3

Buyer-Side Mitigation Summary (not SCRs) Buyer-side mitigation consists of an Offer Floor on the Spot Market Auction offer price for all new supply entry into NYC. The default Offer Floor is set to 75% of the Net Cost of New Entry, or Net CONE, of the NYC demand curve. The Offer Floor applies to offers for: (a) each of the six Capability Periods starting with Initial Capability Period, or (b) the period of years if longer determined by Initial DMNC value of the ICAP Supplier + Surplus Capacity at the time of Initial Capability Period divided by the average annual growth in MW of Locational Minimum ICAP requirement for the NYC over the six Capability Periods preceding the Initial Capability Period. Att. H Section 4.5(g) 4

Buyer-Side Mitigation Summary (cont d) The buyer-side mitigation rule requires that new capacity subject to an Offer Floor can only be offered into the Spot Auction. (That is, it cannot be sold in any other auction, self supplied, or certified in a bilateral transaction.) This requirement is to ensure capacity is not sold below the Offer Floor. There are two ways in which an Installed Capacity Supplier can be exempt from the Offer Floor, and one by which the Offer Floor would be reduced. 5

Two Ways to be Exempt Section 4.5(g)(ii), Attachment H: An Installed Capacity Supplier shall be exempt from an Offer Floor if (a) any ICAP Spot Market Auction price for the two Capability Periods beginning with the first Capability Period for any part of which the Installed Capacity Supplier is reasonably anticipated to offer to supply UCAP (the Starting Capability Period ) is projected by the ISO to be higher, with the inclusion of the Installed Capacity Supplier, than the highest Offer Floor based on Net CONE that would be applicable to such supplier in such Capability Periods, or (b) the average of the ICAP Spot Market Auction prices in the six Capability Periods beginning with the Starting Capability Period is projected by the ISO to be higher, with the inclusion of the Installed Capacity Supplier, than the reasonably anticipated Unit Net CONE of the Installed Capacity Supplier. That is, exemption is granted if: (a) Any Spot price for the two Capability Periods projected to be > the Offer Floor (= 0.75 x Net CONE), or (b) Average of the Spot prices for the six Capability Periods projected to be > reasonably anticipated Unit Net CONE. 6

Exemption Calculation The Offer Floor exemption calculation in 4.5 g(ii) is based on: (a) NYC ICAP Spot market price forecasts for which the ISO will use the demand curve prices, factoring in planned generator retirements and additions (including the resource for which the exemption analysis is being performed) using reliable information available at the time of the analysis including but not limited to the NYISO Gold Book, the interconnection queue, SCR forecasts, and load forecasts, and (b) the determination of the Unit Net CONE from the characteristics of the new unit under consideration and the information provided by the Developer or Interconnection Customer, which include data pertaining to: Unit technology Primary/secondary fuel Emissions control equipment Labor costs for routine operations and maintenance Materials and contract services Administrative and general expenses Avoidable pollution control costs not already incurred 7

Exemption Calculation (cont d) The inputs used to calculate the ICAP Spot Market Auction price in 4.5g(ii)(a) and (b) include: Demand-side inputs Source NYC load forecast Gold Book, table 1-2a, w/ conservation or final ICAP forecast as presented to the Load Forecast Task Force NYC locality requirement Locational Minimum Installed Capacity Requirements Report NYC demand curve Net CONE ( Reference Point ) MST Sec. 5.14.1(b) ICAP/UCAP translation factor Capability Period average EFORd Demand curve zero crossing MST Sec. 5.14.1(b) Supply-side inputs Existing capacity Capacity additions Expected new entrant Other expected additions Capacity retirements Seasonal average of SCR UCAP available Gold Book, table III-3a Gold Book tables IV-1 and VII-1, or more recent information Gold Book tables IV-1 and VII-1, or more recent information Gold Book table IV-3, or more recent information Special Case Resource Monthly Report on NYISO website 8

Exemption Calculation (cont d) Offer Floor based on Unit Net CONE: 4.5(g)(ii)(b) Unit Net CONE is net of likely projected annual Energy and Ancillary Services revenues, as determined by the ISO, translated into a seasonally adjusted monthly UCAP value using an appropriate class outage rate. If an Installed Capacity Supplier demonstrates to the NYISO that its Unit Net CONE is less than any Offer Floor that would otherwise be applicable to the Installed Capacity Supplier, then its Offer Floor will be reduced to its Unit Net CONE. 9

Recognizing Seasonal Capacity Impact For the default Offer Floor (0.75*Net CONE, Att. H Section 4.5g(ii)(a)), the summer and winter adjustment is computed as: For summer, the default Offer Floor is 0.75*the UCAP equivalent of the values contained in Section 5.14.1(b) of the Market Services Tariff. For winter, the default Offer Floor is equal to the summer default Floor price * K: K = (1 (W/S ratio 1)/(DC length 1)), where W/S ratio = NYC capacity winter-to-summer ratio as determined by the most recent NYCA Load and Capacity Data Report, including SCRs DC length = Zero-crossing point of the NYC demand curve, expressed in percent (currently 118%) 10

Recognizing Seasonal Capacity Impact (cont d) In comparing Unit Net CONE to the average of the ICAP Spot Market Auction prices in the six Capability Periods beginning with the Starting Capability Period (Att. H, Sec. 4.5g(ii)(b)), the winter-tosummer adjustment calculation included in Section 5.4 of the ICAP Manual is used: 11

The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) is a not-for for-profit corporation that began operations in 1999. The NYISO operates New w York s s bulk electricity grid, administers the state s s wholesale electricity markets, and provides comprehensive reliability planning for the state s s bulk electricity system. www.nyiso.com