IT TAKES TWO TO TANGO: MAKING MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY DANCE

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Transcription:

IT TAKES TWO TO TANGO: MAKING MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY DANCE Eric M. Leeper Indiana University 12 November 2008

A REMARKABLE TRANSFORMATION Central banks moved from monetary mystique to culture of clarity The transformed beliefs include monetary policy should be independent of fiscal policy & political pressure clearly articulated objectives of policy monetary policy should not surprise or fool people to achieve objectives monetary authorities should communicate transparently about objectives & strategies central bankers should be held accountable RBNZ at vanguard of this movement Advocates point to two pieces of evidence that the transformation has been a big success

INFLATION SUCCESS Inflation Rates 24 JP UK 19 AU NZ 14 US 9 4-1 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

OUTPUT SUCCESS 25 20 GDP Growth hrates Includes AU, UK, US, EU 15 10 5 0 55 2 1960 3 1961 4 1962 1 1964 2 1965 3 1966 4 1967 1 1969 2 1970 3 1971 4 1972 1 1974 2 1975 3 1976 4 1977 1 1979 2 1980 3 1981 4 1982 1 1984 2 1985 3 1986 4 1987 1 1989 2 1990 3 1991 4 1992 1 1994 2 1995 3 1996 4 1997 1 1999 2 2000 3 2001 4 2002 1 2004 2 2005 3 2006 4 2007 10 15

OUTPUT SUCCESS 25 GDP Growth Rates 20 Includes AU, JP, NZ, UK, US, EU 15 10 5 0 5 2 1960 3 1961 4 1962 1 1964 2 1965 3 1966 4 1967 1 1969 2 1970 3 1971 4 1972 1 1974 2 1975 3 1976 4 1977 1 1979 2 1980 3 1981 4 1982 1 1984 2 1985 3 1986 4 1987 1 1989 2 1990 3 1991 4 1992 1 1994 2 1995 3 1996 4 1997 1 1999 2 2000 3 2001 4 2002 1 2004 2 2005 3 2006 4 2007 10 15

But what about in theory? FINE IN PRACTICE

VICTORY DECLARED Successes due to the new monetary regime delivering good policy But... this has been an especially benign period recent recessions have been mild no big & persistent adverse shocks even the higher oil prices have proven temporary Until now... the test is on-going

VICTORY DECLARED Basic economic theory tells us it is dangerous to reform one macro policy monetary while ignoring the other one fiscal policy Yet, have seen no comparable enlightenment in governments tax & spending policies fiscal policy remains nearly as opaque as ever

WHEN FISCAL POLICY RUNS AMUCK: GERMANY After World War I Versailles Treaty reparations Government spending to rebuild Weak tax base Large government budget deficits (revenues never more than 35% of expenditure) Financed by running the printing presses Outcomes inflation from July to November 1923: 560 billion % US$1 = 4.2T Marks

WHEN FISCAL POLICY RUNS AMUCK: GERMANY 1.E+15 German Price Level: 1919 1924 1.E+14 1.E+13 1.E+12 1.E+11 1.E+10 1.E+09 1.E+08 1.E+07 1.E+06 1.E+05 1.E+04 1.E+03 1.E+02

WHEN FISCAL POLICY RUNS AMUCK: UNITED STATES Ronald Reagan s tax reforms reduced personal income tax rates reduced corporate income tax rates accelerated depreciation allowances Produced record-high fiscal deficits Reversed the 30-year decline in government debt Debt-GDP ratio rose from 35% to 45% in 5 years Created massive distortions in international economy

WHEN FISCAL POLICY RUNS AMUCK: UNITED STATES 130 US Nominal & Real Exchange Rates 120 110 100 90 80 70 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

WHEN FISCAL POLICY RUNS AMUCK: UNITED STATES 1.5 US Current Account 0.5 0.5 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 10.5 1.5 % GDP 2.5 3.5 4.5 45 5.5 6.5

MONETARY & FISCAL POLICY LINKAGES Governments face budget constraints (don t tell W.) Things must add up: uses = sources Expenditures + Debt Service = Receipts + Change in Debt

DYNAMIC POLICY LINKAGES Rational investors do not want to over-accumulate assets, so government debt cannot grow too fast Produces the solvency condition Market Value of Debt = Expected Present Value of Future Net Surpluses But Net Surpluses = Total Revenues + Central Bank Profits Govt Consumption Govt Transfer Payments A huge array of possible future adjustments in policy Each adjustment has a different effect on economy

DYNAMIC POLICY LINKAGES If the government is solvent, then the solvency condition holds Market Value of Debt = Expected Present Value of Future Net Surpluses This is a debt valuation relation: value of debt rises (more debt issued, higher price of debt, lower price level) higher debt service requires higher future surpluses higher expected surpluses can support higher debt service allows high value of debt

MONETARY & FISCAL POLICY PARALLELS 1. Macroeconomic impacts Both influence real economic activity Either can target inflation 2. Ensuring government solvency 3. Most effective when transparent & credible

MONETARY & FISCAL POLICY PARALLELS 4. Operate strongly through expectations Effective monetary policy manages expectations of future interest rates & inflation True of fiscal policy in spades some taxes e.g., on saving operate entirely through expectations firms production decisions depend on anticipated payroll and profits taxes Turn to an example of how expectations of policy adjustments can matter for a practical policy action

DEBT-FINANCED FISCAL STIMULI Governments around the world are increasing spending and decreasing taxes in effort to stimulate economies Fiscal expansions financed by selling debt to public Central banks are building these stimuli into their decisions and even relying on fiscal stimulus Will the policies actually stimulate the economies? Maybe... The answer depends on how future policies are expected to adjust

1% GOVERNMENT SPENDING INCREASE Transfers adjust 0.27 Output 0.26 Transfers 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.2 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

1% GOVERNMENT SPENDING INCREASE Transfers adjust 0.27 Output 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.23 Transfers No Empirical Support 0.22 0.21 0.2 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

1% GOVERNMENT SPENDING INCREASE Transfers or labor taxes adjust 0.3 Output 0.2 0.1 Transfers 0 0.1 Labor Taxes 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

1% GOVERNMENT SPENDING INCREASE Transfers, labor or capital taxes adjust 0.4 Output 0.2 0 Transfers Labor Taxes 0.2 0.4 0.6 Capital Taxes 0.8 1 1.2 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

1% GOVERNMENT SPENDING INCREASE Transfers, labor or capital taxes adjust 0.4 Output 0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 Transfers Some Empirical Support Labor Taxes Capital Taxes 0.8 1 1.2 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

WILL THE FISCAL STIMULI STIMULATE? Only some beliefs about future policy adjustments are consistent with desired outcomes Success of fiscal initiatives hinges on guiding people s expectations about future policy adjustments This is why fiscal policy is most effective when it s transparent & credible

WHERE ARE GOVERNMENT DEBT POSITIONS NOW? Fiscal consolidations & reforms have improved conditions in a number of countries This is a good thing because the future looks pretty grim short-run worries: current financial crisis & fiscal responses will rapidly worsen fiscal positions long-run worries: aging populations imply massive unfunded liabilities

GOVERNMENT DEBT POSITIONS IMPROVING 70 60 Government Debt as Share of GDP NZ 50 US 40 30 20 AU 10 0

EXCEPT JAPAN 180 Government Debt as Share of GDP 160 140 JP 120 100 80 60 NZ 40 20 0 US AU

BUT WHERE ARE WE HEADED? UNITED STATES 250 US Government Debt: Optimistic Projection 200 150 % GDP 100 50 0 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080

BUT WHERE ARE WE HEADED? UNITED STATES 800 US Government Debt: Pessimistic i i Projection 700 600 500 % GDP 400 300 200 100 0 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080

BUT WHERE ARE WE HEADED? NEW ZEALAND NZ Gross Sovereign-Issued Debt 110 100 90 80 70 % of GDP 60 50 40 30 20 10 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

WHAT SHOULD WE MAKE OF LONG-TERM PROJECTIONS? Clearly, exploding long-run debt projections won t happen To an economist, they make no sense either the future liabilities are actually expected to be funded in some manner or they aren t really liabilities because the government will renege on its promises To households and firms making economic plans, it matters a great deal how policies will adjust in future

THE PINK ELEPHANT The world economy is facing serious financial threats How is any of this relevant? Two major reactions to the crisis are fiscal: fiscal stimulus (in US: 1 plan done; another on the way?) debt-financed recapitalizations & bailouts (banks & others) $700B is 5% of US GDP; add to this fiscal stimulus packages and US deficit could top 12% of GDP No government has coupled its fiscal actions with any discussion of how resulting debt expansions will be financed Long-run consequences will be primarily fiscal need for fiscal transparency urgent

WHAT IS FISCAL TRANSPARENCY? In monetary policy, several central banks have taken transparency to the next level by announcing a forward track for policy interest rate it s understood this is not a commitment it s understood this does not bind future decisions Apply this to fiscal policy: fiscal authority reveals as much as possible about future policy Fiscal policy is more complex many more instruments many more decision makers; governments come & go

WHAT IS FISCAL TRANSPARENCY? But people are going to form expectations about paths of tax rates & and components of expenditures government can help or hinder expectations formation How do countries fiscal frameworks fare in light of this?

FISCAL TRANSPARENCY & PREDICTABILITY: THE EURO WAY Stability & Growth Pact: about sustainability In the face of violations by France, Germany & Greece, pact was reformed seriously weakened the constraints on large budget deficits in EU countries will reformed rules be any better enforced? Not about transparency

FISCAL TRANSPARENCY & PREDICTABILITY: THE SWEDISH WAY Fiscal Policy Council Designed to combat deficit bias and ensure sustainability Asserts moral suasion no authority to change policy Not about transparency

FISCAL TRANSPARENCY & PREDICTABILITY: THE UK WAY Code for Financial Stability About sustainability Encourages the golden rule to separate government investment from consumption Not about transparency

FISCAL TRANSPARENCY & PREDICTABILITY: THE AMERICAN WAY

FISCAL TRANSPARENCY & PREDICTABILITY: THE AMERICAN WAY Macro Volatility p. 3/25

FISCAL TRANSPARENCY & PREDICTABILITY: THE KIWI WAY Spirit of NZ s Fiscal Responsibility Act reduce to & maintain debt at prudent levels seeks to enhance predictability of tax rates a kind of golden rule Sort of a debt target (20% of GDP) But it s not clear whether a government that violates the spirit of the Act will bear obvious costs Also no requirement that government must announce explicitly how any change in debt will be financed Not about transparency

A STUNNING FACT Countries are super vague about goals of fiscal policy maximize growth; build infrastructure; offset business cycles; encourage work effort; equalize income distribution; help the disadvantaged; eliminate inefficiencies; reduce emissions; provide national defense; reduce smoking; help farmers & ranchers; minimize deadweight loses; maximize revenues; ensure re-election; ensure election; reduce global poverty; support monetary policy all of the above in absence of goals, fiscal decisions are totally political Some countries break goals into short-run, medium-run, long-run no discussion of whether they are mutually consistent no discussion of relative weights

A STUNNING FACT In contrast, monetary policy goals are quite specific: target inflation; stabilize output; ensure value of currency Countries seem to set the bar for fiscal policy rather low Achieving a prudent level of debt (NZ FRA) fiscal policy is not utterly incompetent A CEO whose sole goal was to avoid bankruptcy would soon be fired we can ask for more from our elected officials

STEPS TOWARD TRANSPARENCY 1. Agree on broad principles; for example taxes should raise revenues in least inefficient way use spending programs rather than taxes to achieve social goals fiscal policy should (or should not) include countercyclical components fiscal policy should aim to be as transparent as monetary policy

STEPS TOWARD TRANSPARENCY 2. Reach consensus on rules to determine government spending & taxation decisions rules should be reasonably stable but not immutable 3. Design polices to be consistent with principles 4. Communicate how policy choices are consistent with principles communicate about current and future policies Treasury projections must make sense (don t explode)

MONETARY-FISCAL FRAMEWORK Industrialized countries entering a prolonged period of fiscal stress short-run problems associated with The Pink Elephant long-run problems associated with aging populations and rising health costs I am NOT calling for de-democratizing fiscal decisions

MONETARY-FISCAL FRAMEWORK I am highlighting three things 1. importance of establishing principles to guide fiscal policy 2. need to dramatically improve transparency of fiscal decisions by discussing future policies 3. the need to think about a joint monetary-fiscal framework

NATTERING NABOBS OF NEGATIVISM

NATTERING NABOBS OF NEGATIVISM MADE POSITIVE Society can never agree on principles to guide fiscal policy managed to do it for monetary policy Government cannot credibly announce future policies central banks do it Fiscal policy complex; communication difficult same for monetary policy All these arguments were made about monetary policy objections were overcome by professional & political consensuses Can we transform fiscal policy making? Yes, we can. At least we oughta be able to.