EBA/GL/2014/10 Appendix 1 22 December 2014 Updated 06.12.2017 EBA/GL/2014/10 Appendix 1 Compliance Table - Guidelines Based on information supplied by them, the following competent authorities comply or intend to comply with: EBA Guidelines EBA/GL/2014/10 on criteria for the assessment of O-SIIS, published on 16 th December 2014.
BE Belgium National Bank of Belgium BG Bulgaria Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank) CZ Czech Republic Česká Národni Banka (Czech National Bank) DK Denmark Finanstilsynet (Danish Financial Supervisory DE Germany Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsa ufsicht (Federal Financial Supervisory EE Estonia Finantsinspektsioon (Financial Supervision No Following the EBA 2017 Peer Review report, it has been concluded that the Estonian authorities were not observing the prescribed methodology laid down in the EBA Guidelines in what regards the identification of O-SIIs. IE Ireland Central Bank of Ireland EL Greece Τράπεζα της Ελλάδος (Bank of Greece) HR Croatia Hrvatska narodna banka 2
(Croatian National Bank) ES Spain Banco de España (Bank of Spain) FR France Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution (Prudential Supervisory & Resolution IT Italy Banca d'italia (Bank of Italy) CY Cyprus Κεντρική Τράπεζα της Κύπρου (Central Bank of Cyprus) LV Latvia Finanšu un Kapitāla tirgus Komisija (Financial and Capital Market Commission) No Updated 04.11.2016: we intend to comply with the Guidelines in the future for the purpose of O-SII identification. The board of the FCMC revised the list of identified O-SIIs on 25.10.2016 and the revision was done strictly according to the Guidelines LT Lithuania Lietuvos Bankas (Bank of Lithuania) LU Luxembourg Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (Commission for the Supervision of Financial Sector) 3
HU Hungary Magyar Nemzeti Bank (National Bank of Hungary) MT Malta Malta Financial Services Authority No 19/2/15 This is a summary of Malta s reasoning excluding its proposed methodology and selection of indicators criterion: The Joint Financial Stability Board between the CBM and MFSA (the authorities) has reviewed the EBA methodology (the EBA/GL/2014/10 Guidelines which specify the criteria for determining the conditions of the application of Article 131(3) of Directive 2013/36/EU in relation to the assessment of O-SIIs) and considered the specificities of the domestic banking sector and based on the outcome has deemed it appropriate that the domestic methodology for O-SII Identification should incorporate indicators of relevance to the domestic economy. Indicators relating to size and cross-border activity are however still considered relevant given that these, in particular the latter, tend to exacerbate risk posed by banks exhibiting links both cross-border and with the domestic economy and may act as a channel of systemic risk originating from abroad. The internal methodology developed by the authorities is thus more domestically-oriented than the EBA methodology, and takes into consideration the relevance of the four criteria proposed in the CRD IV Framework. It is also builds on the ESRB Instruments Working Group (IWG) proposals and is in compliance with the ESRB Recommendation. Furthermore, in reaching their decision the authorities also noted that the BCBS framework which specifies twelve principles related to the assessment of D-SIBs and the resulting higher loss absorbency 1, cannot be ignored. Principle 1 of the BCBS Guidelines states that National authorities should establish a methodology for assessing the degree to which banks are systemically important in a domestic context. NL Netherlands De Nederlandsche Bank (National Bank of Netherlands) 1 BCBS (October 2012) A Framework for dealing with Domestically Systemically Important Banks (D-SIBs). 4
AT Austria Finanzmarktaufsicht (Financial Market PL Poland Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego (Polish Financial Supervision 17/2/15 - The PFSA intends to follow the rules stipulated in the guidelines. It should however be noted that due to the lack of full implementation of the CRDIV and lack of designation of any macroprudential the practical utilisation of the guidelines will be limited for a period of time. PT Portugal Banco de Portugal (Bank of Portugal) RO Romania Banca Naţională a României (National Bank of Romania) SI Slovenia Banka Slovenije (Bank of Slovenia) No As per this publication -- Publication of 2017 identification process Main reason for our decision to be partially compliant with the EBA's methodology is the belief that the result obtained when performing calculations following Guidelines on the criteria to determine the conditions of application of Article 131(3} of Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD) in relation to the assessment of other systemically important institutions (0-Slls) should be balanced against the principles of proportionality and level playing field. Slovenian banks that would be identified as O-Slls under the EBA Guidelines permitted range of thresholds are comparatively very small in terms of total assets and the share of total assets in GDP and consequently face capital and other regulatory burden that is in EU terms disproportionally high for banks of such size. Majority of Slovenian banks' competitors of this size in the European market is not subject to such requirements. We are not compliant with the 9 th guideline which stipulates that the relevant may raise threshold from 350 basis points up to 425 basis points as a maximum to take into account the specificities of the 's banking sector and the resulting statistical distribution of the scores, thereby ensuring the homogeneity of the group of O-Slls designated in this way based on 5
the 0-Slls' systemic importance. Slovenia carefully applies all mandatory criteria from the EBA Guidelines. However, Slovenian banks operate in the common European market, where they face potential or actual competition from other European banks (of similar or, more probably, bigger size). Banks of the same absolute size (or even relative size defined as total assets over GDP) as Slovenian banks normally do not have to fulfill the buffers for systemic importance, which creates an impediment for a small Slovenian O-Sll that operates in the common market. O-Sll capital buffer also represents an additional burden for small banks, violating the principle of proportionality. This can even lead to additional fragmentation of the European banking market, which should not be the consequence of any macroprudential policy. We believe that the balance between the criterion of relative systemic importance and the principles of level playing field and proportionality would be restored by increasing the threshold. The share of Slovenian smallest O-Sll's total assets in GDP (end-2016 data) under the new threshold is equal to only 4.57%. [ ] We believe that the Guidelines are not "one size fits all" product (which is already embedded in the possibility to adjust the threshold between 275 and 425 basis points) and they have to be further attuned to successfully cover also atypical banking systems, such as Slovenian. We decided for the change in the threshold (and not for any other change in the methodology), as we believe that the conduct of macroprudential policy in the banking system must be transparent, predictable and without any unintended market distortion.4 Banks should be clearly aware why and when they fall into the category of 0-Slls. In our opinion, the alternation of the threshold represents the simplest and smallest possible adjustment of the EBA methodology. Any other change - of the weights for criteria or indicators, the definitions of indicators, the use of additional indicators or exceptions for individual banks - are less transparent and increase uncertainty for the banks. By raising the threshold to 500 bps, we are able to achieve both, the minimum adjustment of the EBA methodology and the highest level of transparency for the national banking system. 6
SK Slovakia Národná Banka Slovenska (National Bank of Slovakia) FI Finland Finanssivalvonta (Finnish Financial Supervisory SE Sweden Finansinspektionen (Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority Prudential Regulation Authority (Bank of England) 19/2/15 these comments though not noted within the notification, were noted within the email: The PRA with the Guidelines, however IS UNLIKELY to meet 16 June deadline in order to align the O-SII framework with the UK s medium-term capital framework including the calibration of capital buffers. We intend to comply with the Guidelines once this work has been completed and are happy to discuss timing with the EBA. UK United Kingdom Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) N/A According to article 3, the EBA/GL/2014/10 applies to authorities designated by s pursuant to Article 131(3) of Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD). In the UK, the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) has been appointed as the designated responsible for identifying O-SIIs under regulation 29 of the Capital Requirements (Capital Buffers and Macro-prudential Measures) Regulations 2014 (http://www.legislation.gov.uk.uksi/2014/894/part/5/made) (regulation 29), but not the FCA. Therefore given that the FCA is not a designated in the UK for the O-SII, we consider that the EBA/GL/2014/10 is not applicable to this. Financial Services Commission (Gibraltar) EEA-EFTA State 7
IS Iceland Fjármálaeftirlitið (Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority - FME) LI Liechtenstein Finanzmarktaufsicht - FMA (Financial Market The Financial Market Authority Liechtenstein (FMA) as the competent in charge of the national implementation of financial market related regulations acknowledges the publication of these Guidelines (EBA/GL/2014/10). Currently, Liechtenstein is only admitted to the Board of Supervisors as observer and is not vested with any voting rights under the EBA Regulation No. 1093/2010. Nevertheless, the FMA will comply with these Guidelines (EBA/GL/2014/10) considering transitional arrangements of the CRD IV/CRR legislation in Liechtenstein. The Norwegian Ministry of Finance adopted a regulation on the identification of systemically important financial institutions in Norway in May 2014. NO Norway Finanstilsynet (Norwegian Financial Supervisory Authority Partial The regulation prescribes the FSA to give an annual advice to The Ministry of Finance on which financial institutions are to be identified as systemically important in Norway. The FSA must use the two main criteria listed in the Regulation as the basis for identification. As a general rule, an institution shall be designated as systemically important if it has total assets corresponding to at least 10 per cent of Mainland Norway's GDP, or a share of the Norwegian lending market of at least 5 per cent. These criteria are listed as optional indicators in Annex 2 of the EBA Guidelines. In addition to the two main criteria, the Regulation says that the FSA's advice also shall be based on an assessment of the institution's size, the institution's importance in Norway and other countries, the institution's complexity, the institution's role in the financial system infrastructure and to which degree the institution is interconnected with the rest of the financial system. To enlighten these criteria, the FSA will use the methodology in the EBA Guidelines. EU Institutions - Agencies ECB ECB ECB 8
Notes Article 16(3) of the EBA Regulation requires national competent authorities to inform us whether they comply or intend to comply with each guideline or recommendation we issue. If a competent does not comply or does not intend to comply it must inform us of the reasons. We decide on a case by case basis whether to publish reasons. The EBA endeavours to ensure the accuracy of this document, however, the information is provided by the competent authorities and, as such, the EBA cannot accept responsibility for its contents or any reliance placed on it. For further information on the current position of any competent, please contact that competent. Contact details can be obtained from our website (www.eba.europa.eu). 9
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