Assessing the modelling impacts of addressing Pillar 1 Ciclycality

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pwc.com/it Assessing the modelling impacts of addressing Pillar 1 Ciclycality London, 18 February 2011

Agenda Overview of the new CRD reforms to reduce pro-cyclicality Procyclicality and impact on modelling practices Credit Risk Market Risk Counterparty risk Concluding remarks Slide 2

Overview of the new CRD reforms to reduce pro-cyclicality Slide 3

Overview of the new CRD reforms to reduce procyclicality (1/6) Role of procyclicality of banking and accounting regulation on exacerbating the recent financial crisis: Financial Stability Board (2009): The present crisis has demonstrated the disruptive effects of procyclicality mutually reinforcing interactions between the financial and real sectors of the economy that tend to amplify business cycle fluctuations and cause or exacerbate financial instability. Addressing procyclicality in the financial system is an essential component of strengthening the macroprudential orientation of regulatory and supervisory frameworks Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010): One of the most destabilizing elements of the crisis has been the procyclical amplification of financial shocks throughout the banking system, financial markets and the broader economy. The tendency of market participants to behave in a procyclical manner has been amplified through a variety of channels, including through accounting standards for both mark-to-market assets and held-to-maturity loans, margining practices, and through the build up and release of leverage among financial institutions, firms, and consumers Slide 4

Overview of the new CRD reforms to reduce procyclicality (2/6) Basel III regulation introduces several measure to address pro-cyclicality and raise the resilience of the banking sector. These measures will help ensure that the banking sector serves as a shock absorber, instead of a transmitter of risk to the financial system and broader economy. 1. Minimum capital requirement BASEL 2 regulations: pro-cyclical BASEL 3 regulations: address procyclicality 2. Forward looking provision 3. Capital conservation buffer 4. Avoid excessive credit growth Slide 5

Overview of the new CRD reforms to reduce procyclicality (3/6) 1. Cyclicality of the minimum requirement In Basel 2 trade off between risk sensitivity and stability of minimum requirements: the Basel II framework has increased the risk sensitivity and coverage of the regulatory capital requirement on the other hand a greater risk sensitivity has generated pro-cyclical effects by means of risk parameters (PDs) which might be affected by the general state of the economy: risk weights increase in downturns, reflecting the deterioration of ratings, and decrease during expansions, causing a consequent reduction or increase in bank lending. As a result, the new framework has reviewed a number of additional measures which will impact modelling practices, in particular for banks which use internal model and banks witch adopt more point in time rating system, whose risk parameters estimates could be more affected by the business cycle (see next slides). Slide 6

Overview of the new CRD reforms to reduce procyclicality (4/6) 2. Forward looking provisioning Banks are required to implement stronger provisioning practices: in this regard, the Basel Committee has defined methodologies consistent with the ones developed by the IASB (International Accounting Standard Board ), as it works on the replacement of IAS39: it advocates a change of accounting standards towards an Expected Loss approach it considers Expected Loss approach to be less procyclical than the current incurred loss approach and to capture actual losses more transparently. Slide 7

Overview of the new CRD reforms to reduce procyclicality (5/6) 3. Capital Conservation Buffer On the procyclicality aspect, Basel III promotes the build-up of buffers in good times that can be drawn down in periods of stress. First, the new Common Equity requirement is 7%. This new higher level includes the Capital Conservation Buffer of 2.5%, and will ensure that banks maintain a buffer of capital that can be used to absorb losses during periods of stress without going below the minimum capital requirements. This will reduce the possibility of a self-reinforcing adverse cycle of losses and credit cutbacks as compared with previous arrangements. In addition, capital distribution constraints are imposed on the bank when capital levels fall within a specified range above minimum requirements, with the constraints increasing the closer a bank s capital levels get to the minimum. Slide 8

Overview of the new CRD reforms to reduce procyclicality (6/6) 4. Excessive Credit Growth A key element of the Basel III rules to limit procyclicality will be the countercyclical capital buffer, which has been calibrated in a range of 0 2.5%. The aim is preserve the banking from risks related to excessive credit growth: the countercyclical buffer would build up during periods of rapid aggregate credit growth if, in the judgment of national authorities, this growth is aggravating systemwide risk conversely, the capital held in this buffer could be released in the downturn of the cycle this will help to mitigate procyclicality and attenuate the impact of the ups and downs of the financial cycle. Slide 9

Procyclicality and modelling impacts: Credit Risk Slide 10

Procyclicality and modelling impacts: Credit Risk (1/3) First, we examine credit risk, likely a more important source of pro-cyclicality than either counterparty or market risk PIT System: borrower s migration from lower risk to higher risk classes TTC system: changes in grade PDs Changes in Portfolio PDs (average grade PDs weighted by number of obligors) Volatility in capital requirements New measures to contain fluctuations of the minimum requirement Slide 11

Procyclicality and modelling impacts: Credit Risk (2/3) Basel II framework had already introduced a number of safeguards to address excess cyclicality of the minimum requirement: Measures to address pro-cyclicality under Basel 2 Requirement to use long term data horizons to estimate risk parameters Use of through-the-cycle calibrations: while both Point-in-Time and Through-the-Cycle models are acceptable under Basel, the accord specifies that grade PDs should be long-run averages Introduction of so called downturn loss-given-default (LGD) estimates Use of appropriate calibration of the risk functions, which convert loss estimates into regulatory capital requirements Stress testing techniques that consider the downward migration of credit exposures through rating classes during recessions. Slide 12

Procyclicality and modelling impacts: Credit Risk (3/3) Possible measures, which have been considered by the Basel Committee to achieve a better balance between risk sensitivity and the stability of capital, have been suggested by: Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS - countercyclical capital buffer, July 2009) Position paper on a UK Financial Services Authority (FSA - Variable Scalar Approaches to Estimating Through the cycle PDs, February 2009). CEBS FSA Mechanisms that rescale probabilities of default (PDs) estimated by banks, in order to incorporate recessionary conditions Capital buffers under Pillar II to address cyclicality in model PDs Scaling factor to convert the output PDs model into through the cycle estimates Use of non-cyclical PDs in IRB requirements Slide 13

Procyclicality and modelling impacts: Credit Risk CEBS proposal (1/6) CEBS methodology is based on the application of an adjustments which reflects the difference between current PDs and downturn PDs: by construction, the size of the adjustment decreases in a recession and increases in expansionary phases any adjustment should be bank-specific. Capital needs commensurate to adjusted PDs would serve as a benchmark for supervisors when assessing the adequacy of Pillar 2 capital buffers. Two options have been proposed for the calculation of adjusted PDs and the implementation of the Capital buffer: Portfolio level option Rating grade option 1. PD Scaling Factor 2. Time Varying Confidence Interval 1. One-Step PD Scaling Factor 2. Two-Step PD Scaling Factor Slide 14

Procyclicality and modelling impacts: Credit Risk CEBS proposal (2/6) Portfolio Level Option PD scaling factor The PD of the portfolio (current PD) is calculated as the average of grade PDs weighted by the number of counterparties in each grade. Current PD of portfolio will change through the business cycle both in PIT system and TTC system. PD Scaling Factor for the portfolio: ratio between recessionary PD (highest PD) and current PD : is close to 1 in a recession assumes values higher than 1 in expansionary phases P Scaling Factor = PD PD P downturn P current Grade-PDs would be rescaled using the scaling factor for the whole portfolio. Slide 15

Procyclicality and modelling impacts: Credit Risk CEBS proposal (3/6) Portfolio Level Option PD scaling factor Evolution of Pillar2 Buffer 5,0% 4,5% 4,0% 3,5% 3,0% 2,5% 2,0% 1,5% 1,0% 0,5% 0,0% Under both systems, a bank would accumulate capital over time and release it during recession but more-pit banks would need higher buffers 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 TTC system PIT system Slide 16

Procyclicality and modelling impacts: Credit Risk CEBS proposal (4/6) Portfolio Level Option Time Varying Confidence Interval The buffer is determined by making the confidence level of the risk-weight function timevarying. The idea is to compute the IRB capital charge in a bad year (economic downturn) and to adjust the confidence level of the IRB risk weight function upwards in a good year (economic upswing) so as to achieve the same level of capital. RW99.9% (PD max, t ) = RW α(t) (PD t ) IRB Capital Minimun Requirment Highest PD during recession Confidence level Afterwards, the adjusted confidence level would replace the 99.9% level for the calculation of banks capital requirements of each rating-grade. Slide 17

Procyclicality and modelling impacts: Credit Risk CEBS proposal (5/6) Rating grade option One-Step PD Scaling Factor Current PD for each rating class is defined as the long-run average 1- year default rate in that class at time T Downturn PD is highest PD observed for a rating grade over a predetermined time frame PD Scaling Factor for the portfolio: ratio between downturn PDs and current PD, which decreases in a recession and increases in expansionary phases : g Scaling Factor = g downturn g current This approach is non-neutral with respect of rating philosophy: the scaling factor approaches 1 during recession the closer the rating system is to the PIT rating philosophy (since changes in the economic cycle are captured by borrowers migrating among rating classes through the cycle while grade-pds remain, by construction, constant over time. PD PD Slide 18

Procyclicality and modelling impacts: Credit Risk CEBS proposal (6/6) Rating grade option Two-Steps PD Scaling Factor This procedure takes into account rating grade migration. In the first step, introduce rating migration by utilizing modified PDs instead of current PDs, calculated as follow: modpd g t = (1 g g - α - β )PD + αpd + β PD t t g t modified PD share of counterparts that migrated to higher rating class share of counterparts that migrated to lower rating class Under PIT systems the modified PD is driven by changes in α and β, under TTC system the modified PD is driven by changes in grade PDs, as α and β are close to zero. Downturn PDs are then based on modified PDs and a scaling factor is determined (as in the previous method). Slide 19

Procyclicality and modelling impacts: Credit Risk FSA proposal FSA approach is based on the transformation of the output of Point-in-Time PD models to produce final estimates for IRB purposes which are based on portfolio long-run average default rates. 1- Segment the portfolio using non cyclicalfactors Firms incorporate all non-cyclical drivers of risk within portfolio segmentation Drivers should capture both borrowers willingness and ability to pay The drivers must reflect the firm s risk processes and lending policy and not selected purely based on statistical criteria 2- Determine scaling factors for each segment Scalar calculation is based on the relationship between long-term and current default rates for each portfolio 3 - Adjust PD for each obligor using scaling factor for segment If current average portfolio default rate is lower than the long run average each PIT PD would be scaled up In a recession, where the current default rate higher than the long term average, the PIT PDs would be scaled down Slide 20

Procyclicality and modelling impacts: Credit Risk BIS quantitative impact study (1/2) The Committee has proposed to use a downturn Probability of Default in the capital calculation; it has been conducting an impact study in 2010 on two specific proposals: 1. Option A: based on the use of an average of historic PD estimates for each exposure class 2. Option B: based on the use of highest average PD estimate applied by a bank historically to each of its exposure classes as a proxy for a downturn PD The simulation consist on the computation of a Scaling Factor as difference between current PDs and PDs calculated under option A or option B 1. Option A: the scaling factor varies between -1 and +1 2. Option B: the scaling factor is always greater than 1, but in recession The Scaling factor is applied to each rating class to adjust current PDs Open proposal Capital Buffer = difference between minimun capital requirement calculated using current PDs and minimun capital requirement calculated using optiona or option B PDs Slide 21

Procyclicality and modelling impacts: Credit Risk BIS quantitative impact study (2/2) The buffer increases during expansions and reduces in downturns, following PD dynamics: 1. Under Option A, portfolio PD (estimated with PIT rating systems) is transformed in a Through the Cycle PD 2. Under Option B portfolio PD is transformed into a downturn PD. DPD -MCR TTC PD -MCR B2 - MCR Slide 22