Bank Economic Capital An Australian Perspective. Bob Allen APRA Bank of Japan - Economic Capital Management Workshop 11 th July, 2007

Similar documents
FIN 683 Financial Institutions Management Capital Adequacy

2016 PILLAR 3 REPORT. Incorporating the requirements of APS 330 Third Quarter Update as at 30 June 2016

Pillar 3 report. Table of Contents. Introduction 1. Scope of Application 2. Capital 3. Credit Risk Exposures 4. Credit Provision and Losses 6

Basel II Implementation Update

2016 Pillar 3 Report. Incorporating the requirements of APS 330 First Quarter Update as at 31 December 2015

PRO-CYCLICALITY IMPLICATIONS OF IFRS9 AND THE RWA FRAMEWORK

Basel III Pillar 3. Capital adequacy and risk disclosures Quarterly Update as at 31 March 2013

Introduction... 1 Basel II... 1 Pillar 3 disclosures Consolidation basis... 3 Scope of Basel II permissions... 3

Pillar 3 report. Table of Contents. Introduction 1. Scope of Application 2. Capital 3. Credit Risk Exposures 4. Credit Provision and Losses 6

Interim financial statements (unaudited)

Box C The Regulatory Capital Framework for Residential Mortgages

Bank capital standards: the new Basel Accord

International Banking Standards and Recent Financial Reforms

Basel II Pillar 3. Capital Adequacy and Risk Disclosures. QUARTERLY UPDATE AS AT 30 September 2011

2012 Risk & Capital Report Incorporating the requirements of APS 330

Basel II Pillar years of banking on Australia s future. Capital Adequacy and risk disclosures Quarterly update as at 31 MARCH 2012

Basel III Pillar 3 disclosures 2014

Commonwealth Bank of Australia Recent Developments

Basel II Pillar 3. Capital Adequacy and Risk Disclosures QUARTERLY UPDATE As at 31 March 2011

BCBS Discussion Paper: Regulatory treatment of accounting provisions

Incorporating the requirements of APS 330 Half Year Update as at 31 March 2018

BASEL II PILLAR 3 DISCLOSURE

Basel III Pillar 3. Capital Adequacy and Risks Disclosures as at 30 September 2017

Basel III Pillar 3. Capital Adequacy and Risks Disclosures as at 31 December 2016

PILLAR3 AS AT31MARCH 2016

African Bank Holdings Limited and African Bank Limited. Annual Public Pillar III Disclosures

ANZ BANK NEW ZEALAND LIMITED REGISTERED BANK DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Demystifying the New Liquidity Requirements

Basel III, Risk Assessment and Stress Testing

Risk & Capital Report Incorporating the requirements of APS 330

What will Basel II mean for community banks? This

Commonwealth Bank of Australia ACN

PILLAR 3 REPORT WESTPAC GROUP. Incorporating the requirements of Australian Prudential Standard APS 330

2013 Risk & Capital Report

Basel III, Risk Assessment and Stress Testing. Contents are subject to change. For the latest updates visit

Managing liquidity risk in a changed and global world

Basel II: Application requirements for New Zealand banks seeking accreditation to implement the Basel II internal models approaches from January 2008

Supervisory Views on Bank Economic Capital Systems: What are Regulators Looking For?

PILLAR 3 DISCLOSURE APS 330: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

For personal use only

Capital Plan and Business Operating Plan. Enterprise-wide Stress Testing ICAAP

Westpac Pillar 3 Report September 2010

BancWest Mid-Year Dodd Frank Act Company-Run Capital Stress Test Disclosure. BancWest Corporation

PILLAR 3 Disclosures For the year ended 31 December 2011

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Consultative document. Guidelines for Computing Capital for Incremental Risk in the Trading Book

Basel III Pillar 3. Capital Adequacy and Risks Disclosures as at 31 December 2017

Assessing the modelling impacts of addressing Pillar 1 Ciclycality

Capital Management 4Q Saxo Bank A/S Saxo Bank Group

New Capital-Adequacy Rules for Banks

Westpac New Zealand Limited. Disclosure Statement

Commonwealth Bank of Australia. Recent Developments

Battle of the Balance Sheets

Westpac New Zealand Limited Disclosure Statement. For the three months ended 31 December 2016

BMO Financial Corp. and. BMO Harris Bank N.A. Dodd-Frank Act Company-Run Stress Test. Supervisory Severely Adverse Scenario Results Disclosure

COMMUNIQUE. Page 1 of 13

2011 Risk & Capital. Incorporating the requirements of APS 330

Capital management. Management s Discussion and Analysis Royal Bank of Canada: Annual Report

15 billion Global Covered Bond Programme unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed as to payments of interest and principal by

2014 Pillar 3 Report. Incorporating the requirements of APS 330 Half Year Update as at 31 March 2014

The New Capital Adequacy Framework Basel II

ASX ANNOUNCEMENT. NAB 2017 Full Year Pillar 3 Report. Media. Investor Relations. Tuesday, 14 November 2017

Pillar 3 report Table of contents

Santander UK plc Additional Capital and Risk Management Disclosures

African Bank Holdings Limited and African Bank Limited

2013 Pillar 3 Report. Incorporating the requirements of APS 330 as at 30 September 2013

Pillar 3 Disclosure (UK)

Table of Contents. For further information contact: Investor Relations Warwick Bryan Phone: Facsimile: com.

For personal use only

Basel II Pillar 3 Disclosures Year ended 31 December 2009

Risk Based Capital in Banking (Basel II) APRIA Conference

Basel Committee Norms

1. Key Regulatory Metrics

Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector: the Basel proposal for an international framework for liquidity risk

BERMUDA MONETARY AUTHORITY

Pillar 2 - Supervisory Review Process

COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL. Bank executives are in a difficult position. On the one hand their shareholders require an attractive

Risk and Capital Management 2009 The Nykredit Realkredit Group

Pillar 3 report Table of contents

The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. PILLAR 3 DISCLOSURES

Basel Committee proposals for Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector

Challenger Life Company Limited Comparability of capital requirements across different regulatory regimes

TSB Banking Group plc. Significant Subsidiary Disclosures. 31 December 2015

Competitive Advantage under the Basel II New Capital Requirement Regulations

Standard Chartered Bank UAE Branches

In various tables, use of - indicates not meaningful or not applicable.

Pillar 3 report Table of contents

BERMUDA MONETARY AUTHORITY GUIDELINES ON STRESS TESTING FOR THE BERMUDA BANKING SECTOR

INDIA INTERNATIONAL BANK (MALAYSIA) BERHAD ( D)

INDIA INTERNATIONAL BANK (MALAYSIA) BERHAD ( D)

CAPITAL MANAGEMENT - THIRD QUARTER 2010

BASEL II & III IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK. Gift Chirozva Chief Bank Examiner Bank Licensing, Supervision & Surveillance Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe

Information Disclosures under Basel III Capital Requirement As of 30 June 2018

BASEL II PILLAR 3 DISCLOSURE

Basel II Pillar 3 Capital Adequacy and Risk Disclosures. Determined to be better than we ve ever been. as at 31 December 2009

FSC Newsletter. Liquidity Risk Management. Number 3 Year Background

B a s e l I I I P i l l a r III Disclosures for the year ended 31 December 2017 T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

Superseded document. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Consultative Document. The New Basel Capital Accord. Issued for comment by 31 July 2003

Basel III Pillar 3 Disclosures Report. For the Quarterly Period Ended June 30, 2016

Interim Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements

The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. PILLAR 3 DISCLOSURES

Transcription:

Bank Economic An Australian Perspective Bob Allen APRA Bank of Japan - Economic Management Workshop 11 th July, 2007 1

Outline Overview of Australian bank practice -Risk coverage - Relationship between actual capital held and economic and regulatory capital estimates Comparability of economic and Basel II regulatory capital measures Quantifying liquidity risk economic capital 2

Outline Overview of Australian bank practice -Risk coverage - Relationship between actual capital held and economic and regulatory capital estimates Comparability of economic and Basel II regulatory capital measures Quantifying liquidity risk economic capital 3

Basel II Pillar 2 Principles Principle 1: Banks should have a process for assessing their overall capital adequacy in relation to their risk profile and a strategy for maintaining their capital levels. Principle 2: Supervisors should review and evaluate banks internal capital adequacy assessments and strategies, as well as their ability to monitor and ensure their compliance with regulatory capital ratios. Supervisors should take appropriate supervisory action if they are not satisfied with the result of this process. 4

Regulatory and Economic Comparison Hypothetical Bank PLC Basel II Regulatory Economic Economic minus Basel II Regulatory Pillar 1 Risks Credit Risk $5,000 $3,500 -$1,500 Market Risk $500 $650 $150 Operational Risk $1,250 $1,500 $250 Total Pillar 1 $6,750 $5,650 -$1,100 Pillar 2 Risks $0 $1,100 $1,100 Total $6,750 $6,750 $0 5

Different Perspectives Regulatory Depositor protection and system stability Economic Maximisation of stockholders wealth 6

Definitions Economic Required economic capital can be thought of as the maximum amount of unexpected losses potentially arising from all sources that could be absorbed while remaining solvent, with a given level of confidence over a given time horizon. Regulatory Required regulatory capital can be thought of as the maximum amount of unexpected losses that could be absorbed without any loss to depositors (or their insurer), for a given level of confidence over a given time horizon. 7

Potential Differences Between (BASEL II) Regulatory and Economic Measures Conceptual Differences Relevant Business Entities Confidence Levels Time Horizons Treatment of Expected Loss Allowable Instruments Deductions Risk Type Coverage Risk Type Definitions Scaling Factors Cross-risk Diversification 8

Relevant Business Entities Regulatory The individual licensed entity Economic The entire business group perhaps including multiple licensed and unregulated entities. 9

Confidence Levels Regulatory Probability that the bank will survive and thereby avoid potential systemic disruption Probability that depositors (or their insurer) will not lose any money even if the bank actually fails. The confidence level implicitly reflects society s tolerance for the risk of depositor loss and systemic disruption arising from bank failure. It may not be explicitly specified, however 10

Confidence Levels Economic Probability that the bank will survive. Conceptually the chosen confidence level should represent the point at which the marginal benefit, in terms of lower funding costs and access to business for which higher credit ratings (confidence levels) are a necessary condition, is estimated to exactly offset the marginal cost of raising and servicing additional equity. Unlike regulatory capital, the economic capital confidence level is not influenced by potential systemic costs of bank failure, for which the bank s stockholders are not liable. 11

Confidence Levels Profit & Loss Probability Distribution Potential Losses Zero Profit Expected Profit Probability -30-25 -20-15 -10-5 0 5 10 15 20 Profit or Loss 99.95% (AA) Confidence 99.90% (BBB) Confidence Required 12

Time Horizons For a given amount of capital, the longer the time horizon the lower the confidence level. Regulatory Time needed for supervisors to identify and intervene if necessary to address potentially life threatening problems Time needed to recapitalise after incurrence of serious losses Normal supervisory review cycles Economic Time needed to close out losing risk positions or businesses Time needed to recapitalise after incurrence of serious losses Normal business planning and performance review and reporting cycles 13

Treatment of Expected Loss Regulatory (Basel II) Provision or capital required for expected as well as unexpected losses Asymmetry of treatment of expected loss and expected income At variance with IFRS (actual impairment only, not expected future impairment) Economic Unexpected losses only? No provision or capital required for expected loss? Symmetry of treatment of expected loss and expected income? 14

Allowable Instruments Regulatory Shareholders funds Fundamental Tier 1 Hybrid debt/equity Innovative Tier 1 Subordinated debt Tier 2 Economic Shareholders funds only 15

Allowable Tier 1 and Tier 2 Profit & Loss Probability Distribution Potential Losses Zero Profit Expected Profit Probability -30-25 -20-15 -10-5 0 5 10 15 20 Profit or Loss Total - 99.90% Confidence BBB Tier 1 (50%) - 98.58% Confidence BB 16 Required

Regulatory Deductions Regulatory Implicitly assumes deducted items have 100% probability of zero value in liquidation. Intangibles. Investments in insurance, certain other financial business and non-financial business subsidiaries. Economic 100% probability of zero value unlikely for all deducted assets in combination. No outright deductions. Model potential reductions in the value of these assets using the same time horizons and confidence levels as for all other potential sources of unexpected loss, taking correlations into account. 17

Allowing for Regulatory Deductions Profit & Loss Probability Distribution Potential Losses Zero Profit Expected Profit Probability -30-25 -20-15 -10-5 0 5 10 15 20 Profit or Loss Tier 1 + Reg Deductions: Pillar 1 99.41% Confidence Required Net Tier 1: Pillar 1 98.58% Confidence 18

Risk Type Coverage and Definitions (Basel II) Regulatory Economic Pillar 1 Risks Credit (excluding concentration) Credit (including concentration) (Trading) Market Risk (Trading) Market Risk Operational Risk Operational Risk Scaling Factor Pillar 1 Total $xxxxxxx Pillar 2 Risks Non-Traded Interest Rate Risk Liquidity Risk Strategic Risk Other Risks less Diversification Benefit Pillar 1 + Pillar 2 Total $xxxxxxx $xxxxxxx 19

Scaling Factors Regulatory (Basel II) 1.06 x modelled credit risk capital figure Calibrating factor intended to generate approximately the same number as Basel I Provides a buffer for model risk and other (Pillar 2) risks Economic No scaling factors as such Model risk or All Other Risk additions may achieve the same purpose 20

Cross-Risk Diversification Regulatory (Basel II) No explicit recognition Implies perfect correlation Correlations unstable Cushion for other risks Economic Recognises less than perfect correlations across risks Need to reflect stressed rather than normal correlations Potentially significant reduction in overall risk 21

Credit Risk Model Specific Differences Probabilities of Default (PDs) Recoveries (LGDs) Outstanding Exposures (EADs) Maturities Correlations 22

PDs and LGDs Through the Cycle (TTC) Estimates more stable less pro-cyclical Point in Time (PIT) Estimates more volatile more procyclical 23

Credit Portfolio Correlation Assumptions Basel II IRB Economic Comparison 24

Summary Comparison of Economic and Basel II Regulatory Operational Risk (99.9% confidence) Traded Market Risk Basel II Regulatory 1.06x Scaling Factor Credit Risk Excluding Concentration Risk (99.9% confidence) Economic 25

Summary Comparison of Economic and Basel II Regulatory Operational Risk (99.9% confidence) Traded Market Risk Basel II Regulatory 1.06x Scaling Factor Credit Risk Excluding Concentration Risk (99.9% confidence) Economic Operational Risk (99.95% confidence) Traded Market Risk Including Concentration Risk Credit Risk (99.95% confidence) 26

Summary Comparison of Economic and Basel II Regulatory Operational Risk (99.9% confidence) Traded Market Risk Basel II Regulatory 1.06x Scaling Factor Credit Risk Excluding Concentration Risk (99.9% confidence) Strategic, Liquidity & Other Risks Non-Traded Market Risk Economic Operational Risk (99.95% confidence) Traded Market Risk Including Concentration Risk Credit Risk (99.95% confidence) 27

Summary Comparison of Economic and Basel II Regulatory Operational Risk (99.9% confidence) Traded Market Risk Basel II Regulatory 1.06x Scaling Factor Credit Risk Excluding Concentration Risk (99.9% confidence) 50% Net Tier 1 Strategic, Liquidity & Other Risks Non-Traded Market Risk Economic Operational Risk (99.95% confidence) Traded Market Risk Including Concentration Risk Credit Risk (99.95% confidence) 28

Summary Comparison of Economic and Basel II Regulatory Operational Risk (99.9% confidence) Traded Market Risk Basel II Regulatory 1.06x Scaling Factor Credit Risk Excluding Concentration Risk (99.9% confidence) 50% Net Tier 1 Strategic, Liquidity & Other Risks Cross-Risk Diversification Benefit Non-Traded Market Risk Economic Operational Risk (99.95% confidence) Traded Market Risk Including Concentration Risk Credit Risk (99.95% confidence) 29

Summary Comparison of Economic and Basel II Regulatory Operational Risk (99.9% confidence) Basel II Regulatory Traded Market Risk 1.06x Scaling Factor Credit Risk Excluding Concentration Risk (99.9% confidence) 50% Net Tier 1 Regulatory Asset Deductions Strategic, Liquidity & Other Risks Cross-Risk Diversification Benefit Non-Traded Market Risk Economic Operational Risk (99.95% confidence) Traded Market Risk Including Concentration Risk Credit Risk (99.95% confidence) 30

Summary Comparison of Economic and Basel II Regulatory Operational Risk (99.9% confidence) Basel II Regulatory Traded Market Risk 1.06x Scaling Factor Credit Risk Excluding Concentration Risk (99.9% confidence) 50% Net Tier 1 Regulatory Asset Deductions Gross Tier 1 Regulatory (Required Shareholders Equity) Strategic, Liquidity & Other Risks Cross-Risk Diversification Benefit Non-Traded Market Risk Economic Operational Risk (99.95% confidence) Traded Market Risk Including Concentration Risk Economic (Required Shareholders Equity) Credit Risk (99.95% confidence) 31

Summary Comparison of Economic and Basel II Regulatory Basel II Regulatory Economic Conceptual differences Risk coverage & definitions Time horizons Confidence levels Treatment of expected loss Specific risk model differences PDs, LGDs, EADs Correlations Gross Tier 1 Regulatory (Required Shareholders Equity) Economic (Required Shareholders Equity) 32

Outline Overview of Australian bank practice -Risk coverage - Relationship between actual capital held and economic and regulatory capital estimates Comparability of economic and Basel II regulatory capital measures Quantifying liquidity risk economic capital 33

IIF Principles of Liquidity Risk Management Given the practical, conceptual, and policy challenges, we believe that the industry s resources would be better spent improving capital measures related to other, more material risks and on strengthening liquidity risk management. Pursuing a costly solution to an immaterial problem is inconsistent with risk-based regulation. 34

Economic Unexpected Loss From All Sources Profit & Loss Probability Distribution Potential Losses Zero Profit Expected Profit Probability -30-25 -20-15 -10-5 0 5 10 15 20 Profit or Loss 99.95% (AA) Confidence 99.90% (BBB) Confidence Required 35

Contributors to Potential Unexpected Loss borrower default (credit) risk in lending activities? counterparty default (credit) risk in trading activities? interest rate risk in intermediation activities? market price risk in trading activities? operational risk? regulatory compliance risk? reputational risk? strategic and business risk? liquidity risk why not?? 36

Example Actual Bank - Economic Model Risk Contributions Pillar 1 Credit 59.1% Traded Market 0.9% Operational 10.5% Pillar 1 Total 70.5% Pillar 2 IRRBB 0.5% Liquidity 3.7% Business/Strategic 17.0% Insurance Risk 2.4% Equity Risk 1.3% Model Risk 4.7% Pillar 2 Total 29.5% Total before Cross-Risk Diversification Benefit 100.0% Diversification Benefit -18.6% Total after Cross-Risk Diversification Benefit 81.4% 37

Liquidity Risk From an economic capital perspective, liquidity risk can be viewed as the risk that a bank will incur unexpected costs or losses in meeting its financial obligations when they fall due because of the mismatch between the maturities of its current and contingent financial assets and liabilities. 38

Liquidity Risk Institution-specific risk events Credit losses Trading losses Operational foul-ups Compliance failures Strategic failures leads to Reputational damage Rating downgrade results in Deposit run-off and reduced availability and higher cost of replacement funding 39

Liquidity Risk Systemic (non-institution-specific) risk events Increased risk aversion across-the-board means renewal/replacement/incremental funding becomes more expensive. Reduced availability and higher cost of credit across-the-board means borrowers draw-down against existing lower priced commitments, increasing the liquidity shortfall. Across-the-board reduction in market makers willingness to take on market risk positions means wider trading spreads and progressively lower realised prices on asset sales as the cash requirement is increased. 40

Linkage of Funding and Asset Liquidity Risk Funding Liquidity Risk Asset Liquidity Risk Unexpectedly need cash? Borrow? Potential cost? Liquidate assets? Potential cost? Which is cheaper? Unexpected Loss 41

Credit, Market, Operational, etc. Risk Exposure Economic Environment Current Profit & Loss Probability Distribution Size of Liquidity Mismatch Probability -30-25 -20-15 -10-5 0 5 10 15 Profit or Loss Funding Supply Surface Bid-Offer Spread Surface 4000 4000 Risk Premium - Basis Points 3000 2000 1000 0 1 2 3 4 5 A Credit Quality Bid-Offer Spread- Basis Points 3000 2000 1000 0 1 2 3 4 5 A D Market Condition Funding Required $ Units Transaction Size $ Units Unexpected Loss from Liquidity Risk 42

Outline Overview of Australian bank practice -Risk coverage - Relationship between actual capital held and economic and regulatory capital estimates Comparability of economic and Basel II regulatory capital measures Quantifying liquidity risk economic capital 43