OR and Risk Management Failures: What are we doing wrong?

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OR and Risk Management Failures: What are we doing wrong? John Birge University of Chicago Booth School of Business JRBirge Omega Rho, INFORMS Austin, Nov 2010 1

Background Two implementations: NBA scheduling (Bean, JRB 1980) Michigan State Senate (JRB 1983) Lesson: Know who makes the decisions and what her/his objective is JRBirge Omega Rho, INFORMS Austin, 9 Nov 2010

3 Events 14,500.00 13,500.00 12,500.00 11,500.00 10,500.00 9,500.00 8,500.00 7,500.00 6,500.00 Oct-2007 Dec-2007 Feb-2008 Apr-2008 Jun-2008 Aug-2008 Oct-2008 Dec-2008 Feb-2009 800px-Deepwater_Horizon_offshore_drilling_unit_on_fire_2010.jpg Iceland-Volcano-Eruption-Again-on-May-11-2010.jpg Financial Crisis Oil Spill Volcanic Eruption Did risk management and OR fail in these crises? If so, why and how can we do better? JRBirge Omega Rho, INFORMS Austin, Nov 2010

Theme There is a plenty of blame to go around in each crisis OR shares some blame but... problems are mostly by viewing decisions from the wrong perspective we can improve the value of models by recognizing decision-makers self-interested behavior and designing policies with consistent incentives JRBirge Omega Rho, INFORMS Austin, Nov 2010 4

The Financial Crisis: How bad? Worst crisis since? Relative Dow Jones IA over 2 years: 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Which line is from 1929-1931 and which is from 2007-2009? JRBirge Omega Rho, INFORMS Austin, Nov 2010 5

Dow Jones path: 80 years ago and today $350.00 $300.00 $250.00 $200.00 $150.00 $100.00 $50.00 $0.00 Feb-1930 Jun-1930 Oct-1930 Feb-1931 Jun-1931 Dec-1929 Apr-1930 Aug-1930 Dec-1930 Apr-1931 Aug-1931 $16,000.00 $14,000.00 $12,000.00 $10,000.00 $8,000.00 $6,000.00 $4,000.00 $2,000.00 $0.00 Aug-2007 Dec-2007 Apr-2008 Aug-2008 Dec-2008 Jun-2007 Oct-2007 Feb-2008 Jun-2008 Oct-2008 Feb-2009 Only the losses in the Great Depression rivaled the loss in equity value during the current crisis. DJIA from 10/2007 to 3/2009: -52 % Worst all-time 17 months: (1/1931 to 6/1932): -75% Worst 17 months 1939-2008: (4/1973 to 9/1974): -34% JRBirge 6

Down Across Sectors Broad equity, Housing,Retirement Savings Total > $8 Trillion JRBirge Omega Rho, INFORMS Austin, Nov 2010 7

One Part of the Crisis: AIG AIG: Insurer that became too big to fail - Losses and connections to multiple counterparties brought the financial sector close to brink of collapse -Sophisticated risk management practices in place - What went wrong? JRBirge Omega Rho, INFORMS Austin, Nov 2010

AIG's Income Statement JRBirge http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1346552 Dallas Chapter, 12Nov09 9

CDS Insurance AIG story Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) protect against default on underlying securities AIG sold $526 billion in CDSs Many at AAA level (1 in 10,000 default odds?) Problems? Large collateral requirement changes (+$6B in one month out of $18B for all uses) JRBirge Omega Rho, INFORMS Austin, Nov 2010 10

Collateral Requirement Consider $562 billion in protected debt Chance of default each security is 1/10000 On any single security, collateral is 10 times the premium (or about 0.1% of notional amount) Total collateral required: ~$600 million If $562 billion is composed of ~3000 independent securities, chance of loss>$600 million is very small but JRBirge Omege Rho, 9 Nov 2010

Expected Loss and Collateral Changes What happens to expected loss if all the securities are actually linked (i.e., correlation from 0 to 1)? Expected Loss: <$1 million => $60 million But, AIG still has $600 million in collateral, so what is the problem? What happens to collateral if correlation is high and all downgraded (AAA to A: 0.01% to 0.1%) Collateral up 10 times: $600 million => $6 billion JRBirge Omego Rho, INFORMS Austin, November 2010

Problems for AIG Collateral requirement in the event of a downgrade can bring ruin Chance of downgrade if systemic (highly correlated) is ~ 1/10 If AIG knew this, should they have sold $562 billion in CDS s? JRBirge Omege Rho, 9 Nov 2010

+$10 Decision Tree for AIG Shares Sell more CDSs Hold CDS issues +$8 +$10 0.9 0.1 +$20 -$100 Best decision: Do not issue more CDSs Expected share value up $10 Did they just not the analysis? If not, then what could have happened? JRBirge Omege Rho, 9 Nov 2010

AIG Decision Structure Traders with bonus compensation to improve share price Relatively small movement in the share price can yield large increases in compensation Low downside risk due to severance terms JRBirge Omege Rho, 9 Nov 2010

+$185MM Decision Tree for AIG Trader Sell more CDSs +$185MM 0.9 0.1 +$200MM $50MM Hold CDS issues +$100MM Best decision: Issue more CDSs Expected comp +$85MM All the analysis could have been correct just with a different form of payoff. JRBirge Omege Rho, 9 Nov 2010

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Was the likelihood of a spill miscalculated? Was this a case of misapplied OR? JRBirge Omego Rho, INFORMS Austin, November 2010

Causes and Chances Many potential causes and missed opportunities Water depth and experience at depth may have increased chances for failures Blowout preventer (blind shear ram) installed to shear and seal pipe in event of leak One blowout preventer installed but not two a mistake in assessment? JRBirge Omege Rho, 9 Nov 2010

$0.9075B Decision Tree for BP Install 2 BOPs Install 1 BOP $0.9075B 0.1 0.9 +$0.093B -$3.55B 0.1 0.1 +$0.544B 0.9 0.9 JRBirge Omege Rho, 9 Nov 2010 $0.998B $0.999B 0.01 0.99 -$40B $0.498B -$40B $0.499B

BP Analysis Decision tree appears to indicate it is best for BP to install 2 BOPs Did BP just get the probabilities wrong? Again, what is decisions are in the interest of the managing executives? What is their decision tree? JRBirge Omege Rho, 9 Nov 2010

$141.5MM Decision Tree for BP Exec Install 2 BOPs $94.97MM 0.1 0.9 $49.7MM 0.99 $100MM 0.01 Install 1 $65MM BOP 0.1 0.1 $141.5MM 0.9 $20MM $50MM $20MM 0.9 JRBirge Omege Rho, 9 Nov 2010 $150MM $70MM

Effect of Different Perspective Exec s losses are again limited on the downside Early completion as well as revenues leads to early share improvement and bonus compensation Even with best knowledge of probabilities, decisions might have been the same JRBirge Omego Rho, INFORMS Austin, November 2010

Eyjafjallajökull Volcano European airspace closed for 6 days Losses focused on airlines - estimated at $2 billion Did the EU properly assess the total risk cost? JRBirge Omege Rho, 9 Nov 2010

-$0.01B Open airspace Close airspace Decision Tree for EU -$0.01B 0.999 0.001 +$0 -$10B Best decision: Leave airspace open? -$2B Right problem? JRBirge Omege Rho, 9 Nov 2010

Decision Tree for EU Transport +$0 Open airspace Close airspace Commissioner -$2K $0B 0.999 0.001 +$0 -$2MM Best decision: Close airspace (even with very low probabilities) Right problem? JRBirge Omege Rho, 9 Nov 2010

Problems with Original Analysis Focus on the overall organization or broad constituency Actual decision-makers may have much narrower interest Misalignment of incentives can lead to very different results even if all the analysis is correct JRBirge Omege Rho, 9 Nov 2010

What s an OR analyst to do? Recognize the situation Model the decision-maker s self interest Show how to construct systems that align incentives at the outset (form of mechanism design) Combine incentive design with analysis of alternatives JRBirge Omege Rho, 9 Nov 2010

Examples for Crises AIG Trader: Align compensation with the effect on shareholders Delay compensation until outcomes of decisions are known (e.g., maturity of CDSs) Include claw-back types of provisions JRBirge Omego Rho, INFORMS Austin, November 2010

+$100MM AIG Decision Tree - Adjusted Sell more CDSs +$98MM 0.9 0.1 +$110MM -$10MM Hold CDS issues +$100MM Best decision: Hold on CDSs Expected comp +$100MM JRBirge Omege Rho, 9 Nov 2010

Oil Spill and Volcano BP Compensation Align with value of project Defer compensation Claw-back if unreasonable risk EU Transport Align with value to industry Penalty for losses? JRBirge Dallas Chapter, 12Nov09 30

Other Contexts Are managers ordering decisions always in best interest of the firm? Are hospital inefficiencies due to inadequate capabilities (or deliberate)? Why are many risky investment decisions taken? Why are many risk investment decisions not taken? JRBirge Omege Rho, 9 Nov 2010

General Risk Management Solutions Alternatives (AIG): Economic capital: - Capital retained to cover losses - Similar to the collateral they were obligated - Effect in risk management? (No) Modified payoff (as in decision tree) - Can make firm-optimal individually rational (and incentive compatible) - Idea: design payoffs to provide incentives for effective risk management throughout organization JRBirge Omego Rho, INFORMS Austin, November 2010

Change of Paradigm Old Paradigm: Choose Capital C, decisions u (states x) to: Maximize E(f(x,u)) (-Risk-adjusted, sequential: x=(x 1,,x T ), u=(u 1,,u T )) s.t. Risk(x,u)- C <= 0 New Paradigm: Choose payoffs P, managers pick u to: Maximize E(f(x*,u*)) s.t. E(g(x*,u*,P)) E(g(x,u,P)); E(g(x*,u*,P)) 0 JRBirge IR Omege Rho, 9 Nov 2010 IC

Shift of Viewpoint Single objective dynamic optimization to dynamic mechanism design Challenges: - Computational (problems already hard) - Ensuring incentive compatibility and individual rationality - Enforceability JRBirge Omege Rho, 9 Nov 2010

Other Contexts Are managers ordering decisions always in best interest of the firm? Are (e.g., health care, government) inefficiencies due to inadequate capabilities (or deliberate)? Why are many risky investment decisions taken? Why are many risk investment decisions not taken? JRBirge Omege Rho, 9 Nov 2010

Change of View If systems do not work as we feel they should, perhaps decision-makers are just using a different objective? We can use OR to find the objective that decision-makers actually use and not just to tell them what they are doing wrong Once we understand their objectives, then we can try to design policies to align with overall goals JRBirge Omego Rho, INFORMS Austin, November 2010

Conclusions Recent crises and reactions to them may not have been examples of improper analysis Decisions may have been rational consequences of self-interested behavior We should model (and accept) such behavior but also design better systems to make that behavior align with overall goals for firms and society Need to change to consider all agent reactions requires better models, analysis, implementation, and continuous learning We can all contribute to this and use ORMS to avoid the next great crisis or recover more effectively from it JRBirge Omega Rho, Nov 2010 37

Thank you! Questions? JRBirge Omega Rho, Nov 2010 38