PRACTICAL ASPECTS AND DILEMMAS OF MEDIUM TERM FISCAL PLANNING - CASE OF SLOVENIA. Copyright rests with the author. All rights reserved.

Agenda Country Overview Basic Figures Key Policy Reforms Underpinning Rebound in Economic Performance Fiscal Framework complete practical dilemmas (coverage of MTFP, binding vs. flexible) Conclusions 2

Ireland Iceland Netherlands Austria Denmark Sweden Germany Belgium Finland United Kingdom France EU-28 Italy Malta Spain Czech Republic Slovenia Cyprus Portugal Slovakia Lithuania Estonia Poland Greece Hungary Latvia Croatia Romania Bulgaria Q1-2008 Q3-2008 Q1-2009 Q3-2009 Q1-2010 Q3-2010 Q1-2011 Q3-2011 Q1-2012 Q3-2012 Q1-2013 Q3-2013 Q1-2014 Q3-2014 Q1-2015 Q3-2015 Q1-2016 Q3-2016 Q1-2017 Q3-2017 Country overview Basic figures GDP per Capita PPP* in 2016 (EU28 = 100) (1) Real GDP Growth Rate (% chg Q/Q-4) (3) 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 6 4 2 0 (2) (4) (6) (8) (10) 6 4 2 0 (2) (4) (6) (8) (10) 1. Source: Eurostat, 12.2.2018 *Purchasing Power Parity Key growth drivers: Strong exports performance and domestic demand recovery European Union - 28 Euro Area - 19 Slovenia 2. Source: SORS, Eurostat, Seasonally Adjusted Data, 12.2.2018 General Government Balance (% of GDP) (1) General Government Gross Debt (% of GDP) (1) 2 0 (2) (4) (6) (8) (10) (12) (14) (16) (1.8) (6.1) (5.6) (6.7) (4) (4) (3.4) (2.9) (1.9) (0.8) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 E2017E2018 Headline deficit in 2013 of -14.7% due to bank recapitalizations (one-offs 10.7% of GDP). Headline deficit in 2014 of -5.3% due to bank recapitalizations and -3.4% of GDP excluding one-offs. 0.4 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 80.3 82.6 78.5 75.2 70.4 53.8 46.6 38.4 34.6 21.8 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 E2017 3

Slovenia Sovereign Rating Republic of Slovenia Credit Rating Over Time (1) Aa1/AA+ Aa2/AA Aa3/AA- A1/A+ A2/A A3/A- Baa1/BBB+ Baa2/BBB Baa3/BBB- Ba1/BB+ S&P Moody' s Fitch May Dec. Sep. Nov. Nov. Mar. May May Jul. May Jun. Jul. Sept. Oct. Dec Jan. Feb. Aug. Feb. Apr. May Dec. Jan. June Sept. Jun. Sept. 1996 1999 2000 2000 2002 2003 2003 2004 2004 2006 2006 2006 2011 2011 2011 2012 2012 2012 2013 2013 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016 2017 2017 A+ (Stable Outlook) A- (Stable Outlook) Baa1 (Stable Outlook) 1. Selected drivers highlighted by agencies: S&P, Moody s and Fitch 2. Source: S&P, Fitch and Moody s, 12.2.2018 Sovereign (2) S&P Fitch Moody s Germany AAA AAA Aaa Austria AA+ AA+ Aa1 Czech Republic AA- A+ A1 Estonia AA- A+ A1 Slovakia A+ A+ A2 Ireland A+ A+ A2 Slovenia A+ A- Baa1 Latvia A- A- A3 Lithuania A- A- A3 Poland BBB+ A- A2 Spain BBB+ A- Baa2 Italy BBB BBB Baa2 Hungary BBB- BBB- Baa3 Portugal BBB- BBB Ba1 Cyprus BB+ BB Ba3 Croatia BB BB+ Ba2 Serbia BB BB Ba3 4

Key Policy Reforms Underpinning Rebound in Economic Performance 1 Pension System Reform Pension reform enhanced sustainability of public finances (2013). 2 Labour Market Reform Labour market reform streamlined employment protection, labour market flexibility, reduced labour market segmentation and equalized labour cost for young people under 30. 3 Privatization underway State Asset Management Strategy being implemented by Slovenian Sovereign Holding, to facilitate privatization. 4 Strengthened Banking System Well-capitalized banking system. Ongoing bank system consolidation and privatization. Stark reduction in non-performing loans ratio since 2013. 5 Bank Asset Management Company Bank Asset Management Company (BAMC) actively restructuring viable enterprises (2015). 6 Fiscal rule and Council in place Constitutionally mandated balanced budget (2013). Fiscal Rule Act (2015). Fiscal council (2017). Source: Ministry of Finance (MoF), Government of the Republic of Slovenia, 12.2.2018 5

Fiscal Framework is Complete (Fiscal Rule Act, Operational Fiscal Council, transposition of 2011/85/EU Directive) In May 2013, MPs supported constitutional change by a large majority: 79 out of 90 Votes Exceptions to the balanced budget rule only under two conditions: Constitutional Change vote in May 2013 Extraordinary circumstances that are set down in the implementing law 79 For In special cases such as natural disasters and periods of significant economic contraction. 11 Against In 2015 62 out of 90 MPs supported implementation Fiscal Rule Act In line with the EU Fiscal compact the adopted Fiscal Rule defines the following: Implementation Fiscal Rule Act ote in July 2015 Allows for a maximum structural deficit of 0.5% of GDP only when the economy faces adverse economic conditions (negative output gap), A structurally balanced budget position during times of a positive output gap to compensate for eventual fiscal stimulus, 62 7 For Against Demands structurally balanced position over the medium term and as such is more stringent than EU Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in EMU, Legal basis for establisment of fiscal council. Fiscal Council is fully operational since mid 2017. Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks transposed in Public Finance Act in Feb 2018. Source: Ministry of Finance, Government of the Republic of Slovenia, 12.2.2018 6

Policy measures & priorities Public sector wage bill restrain. Level in 2016 below peak in 2011 by 1.9 % Rationalization of benefits and reimbursements to employees in public sector Cuts of benefits of labour market, social and family policies Increased VAT rates (general rate 22 % (+2 p.p.), reduced rate 9.5 % (+1 p.p)) Gradual phase-out of crisis-related temporary restraining measures until 2020 Active and prudent debt management operations Implementation of fiscal rule and elimination of structural deficit Enhancing fiscal framework and tax collection Improving effectiveness and efficiency of government expenditure 7

Fiscal Framework #2* 2018 2019 2020 Institutional unit / year Expenditure ceiling (mio EUR) Target balance (% GDP) Expenditure ceiling (mio EUR) Target balance (% GDP) Expenditure ceiling (mio EUR) Target balance (% GDP) (ESA) S.13 19.290 0,4 19.512 0,2 19.952 0,4 (cash flow) State budget 9.625 0,1 9.697 0,6 9.942-0,6 Local authorities 2.174 0,1 2.174 0,1 2.219 0,1 Pension fund 5.381 0,0 5.600 0,0 5.842 0,0 Health fund 2.847 0,0 2.944 0,0 3.087 0,0 *(1st in 2016), a new one due next month (2019-2021)

Trajectory of fiscal frameworks Comparison of 2016 and 2017 fiscal frameworks 20000 0.5 19800 19600 0 19400 19200-0.5 19000 18800-1 18600 18400-1.5 18200 18000 2017 2018 2019 2020-2 GG balance april 16 in % GDP (right axis) max expenditure, april 16 in mio EUR GG balance april 17 in % GDP (rigt axis) max expenditure, april 17 in mio EUR 9

Trajectory of fiscal frameworks (spring 17 vs autumn 17) KEEP IT CLEAR & SIMPLE on medium term (MT) 10

Fiscal framework coverage General Goverment (S.13) NET lending (+) / NET borrowing ( - ) / B.9 CONSOLIDATED PUBLIC FUNDS - expenditures Total entral level units (S.1311) STATE BUDGET (37%) Public entities on central level (12%) 53% ocal level units (S.1313) 50 MUNICIPALIES BUGETS (8%) 50 HEALTH FUND (11%) deficit - 326 mio surplus 27 mio balanced - Public funds central level ( 0,4%) Budget.funds (0,4%) Agencies (0,3%) SOE s (2,4%) 16% Social security funds (S.1314) PENSION FUND (21%) balanced - Public entities on local level (8%) Public funds local level (0,1%) companies ( 0, 0 %) agencies (0,0%) KAD (0,3%) 32% 76% CONSOLIDATION 24% TOTAL 100,0% Consolidation 11

Coverage of MTBF state budget contingent liabilities not included in MTBF, but managed as fiscal risks from practical point of view, earmarked revenues / expenditures are the first candidate to be left out (but unjust!) EU funds and over-committments (how do YOU deal with them?) idea of ex defence minister: defence expenditure to be left out (unjust!) 12

Coverage of MTBF other units of general government Detailed overview of state budget, health & pension funds and local authorities, much less of other units of GG Problem of legal basis: public finance vs. SOE s How do you handle a major SOE investment (necessary for SOE, but a problem for PF consolidation). Nevertheless, multi-annual ceilings should be all-inclusive 13

Binding vs. flexible MTBF In theory - binding, leaving room for flexibility for times of unusual circumstances (Fiscal rule act: in April must, in Sept if changed circumstances) In practise still realeasing savings measures from previous crisis and b/c economy is growing, we use some fiscal space for extra expenditure (not unusual circumstances) while we should be generating buffers. BUT we are consolidating at the same time. Aspect of policy mix: social, inclusive, smart growth but what comes first, consolidated PF or higher potential (as well as actual) GDP? Learning by doing (hands on experience, literally) More questions than answers (time to adjust) And that is leaving aside all questions regarding EC methodology Role of IFI s new fiscal responsibility, old formulas (S1, S2, MTO) focus on debt 14

Conclusion MTBF pre-requisite for sound fiscal planning European semester & TSCG good basis Homework for MS s: own fiscal discipline Practical dilemmas when formulating MTBF Happy to hear examples of good peer practise Thank you. 15