The Persian Gulf s predominance endangered? Amrita Sen, 13 November 2013
The sudden burst of shale was viewed as a key threat to OPEC US oil production North Dakota oil production 12.0 1.0 11.0 10.0 9.0 8.0 7.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 6.0 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 0.0 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 US oil production is scaling record highs, supported by shale output Bakken and Eagle Ford plays have seen their output soar and are the two most prolific plays of the US Source: EIA, Energy Aspects analysis 2 November 2013
Through higher non-opec supplies and lower demand for oil Global shale plays The growth in US shale had fuelled widespread optimism about global shale plays creating an abundance of oil and gas supplies; and resulting in widespread substitution of gas in the transportation sector, which would lower demand for oil as well Source: EIA, Energy Aspects analysis 3 November 2013
But oil prices are still above $100 OPEC basket price $/barrel Saudi crude output 120 10.4 10.0 90 9.6 9.2 8.8 60 8.4 8.0 30 08Q1 09Q1 10Q1 11Q1 12Q1 13Q1 7.6 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 Despite the growth in US tight oils output, Brent prices have averaged above $100 for the last three years And has required above 10 of production from Saudi Arabia to balance the market Source: EIA, Energy Aspects analysis 4 November 2013
And the world is still reliant on OPEC s oil Quarterly OPEC oil output IEA s call on OPEC crude 32 31.5 2010 2011 2012 31 31.0 30 30.5 29 30.0 28 29.5 27 29.0 26 07Q1 08Q1 09Q1 10Q1 11Q1 12Q1 13Q1 28.5 M1 M5 M9 M13 M17 OPEC crude has remained high by historical standards at above 30 The call on OPEC crude has been systematically underestimated by key agencies such as the IEA Source: IEA, Energy Aspects analysis 5 November 2013
Non-OPEC supplies: it is not all about shale US oil production, y/y change Rest of non-opec oil production, y/y change 2.0 1.5 1.5 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 (0.5) (0.5) (1.0) (1.0) 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 (1.5) 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 US oil production is scaling record highs, supported by shale output But the rest of non-opec production has been weak, declining sharply throughout 2011 and 2012 and into 2013 Source: EIA, Energy Aspects analysis 6 November 2013
Centres of growth in the past have started to disappoint significantly Brazilian oil production, y/y change IEA s Brazilian oil production forecasts 0.25 3.5 Forecasts made in the year: 2008 2009 2011 2013 0.15 3.1 0.05 2.7 (0.05) (0.15) 2.3 (0.25) 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 1.9 09 10 11 12 13 14 Brazilian oil production has been extremely weak, due to high declines at old oilfields Canada and Brazil, two centres of great promise, have seen their output forecasts cut sharply due to various constraints Source: ANP, Socar, Bloomberg, Kazmunaigas, Energy Aspects analysis 7 November 2013
Outside North America, crude output has fallen for the last 3 years North Sea oil production, y/y change FSU oil production, y/y change 0.2 0.0 (0.2) (0.4) 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 Kazakhstan Azerbaijan Russia (0.6) Norway (0.2) (0.8) UK 08 09 10 11 12 13 (0.4) 09 10 11 12 13 UK and Norwegian production is on double digit declines, crippled by ageing fields and infrastructure FSU output, apart from Russia, has also been affected by sharp declines and technical problems Source: ANP, Socar, Bloomberg, Kazmunaigas, Energy Aspects analysis 8 November 2013
SUPPLY (2/8) Spending has risen but production is flat Breakdown of key E&P profitability metrics $/barrel 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 10-yr CAGR WTI 26.1 31.0 41.5 56.7 66.2 72.4 99.8 62.1 79.6 95.1 94.1 13.7% Brent 25.0 28.5 38.0 55.3 66.1 72.7 98.5 62.7 80.3 110.9 111.7 16.1% Revenue 20.6 24.3 30.0 41.1 47.9 51.8 68.0 43.1 52.9 68.2 68.0 12.7% Production Costs (3.6) (3.7) (4.2) (5.0) (6.0) (7.2) (8.3) (8.5) (8.9) (11.0) (12.0) 12.8% Exploration Expense (0.8) (0.8) (1.0) (1.1) (1.5) (1.8) (2.1) (2.1) (2.1) (2.3) (2.7) 13.4% DD&A (4.5) (4.5) (5.0) (5.7) (6.9) (8.1) (9.7) (9.8) (10.6) (10.9) (13.1) 11.3% Other (1.6) (1.6) (1.5) (2.5) (2.2) (2.6) (2.5) (2.2) (1.4) (3.5) (2.8) 5.6% Income Tax (3.2) (4.2) (6.0) (9.7) (14.2) (14.1) (19.7) (8.9) (13.0) (17.9) (20.2) 20.3% Net Income 4.6 7.4 8.9 13.1 13.5 13.2 18.4 8.1 12.9 15.6 13.5 11.5% Finding Costs 1.2 0.9 6.3 2.5 5.4 8.4 2.0 2.3 3.7 3.7 6.2 17.6% F&D Costs 7.1 6.9 19.6 17.6 18.4 26.5 10.5 11.4 23.7 22.2 30.9 15.8% Exploration Intensity 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.4 2.1 2.5 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.9 4.9 16.5% Development Intensity 5.6 6.1 6.4 8.1 10.1 11.5 14.0 13.6 15.0 18.2 22.9 15.1% Analysis of the majors indicates continuing sharp cost inflation in the upstream oil sector. Whilst Brent prices increased to $111.7 in 2012, net income per barrel actually fell y/y by 13%. The increase in costs supports longer-term oil prices around $100. Source: Company data, Energy Aspects analysis 9 November 2013
Costs of extraction and decline rates are much higher today and rising Ultra-deepwater rig day rates $000 per day US Gulf of Mexico decline rates % 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 80 60 40 20 2009 2008 2004 2000 1996 100 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Exploration and production costs have risen substantially over the past eight years Decline rates have stepped up across key basins such as North Sea, Brazil and US GoM, further adding to costs Source: Company data, MOEMRE, US Department of Interior, Energy Aspects analysis 10 November 2013
And rising exploration costs likely to support $90 floor Majors liquids output, CAPEX and income Index based on nominal dollars Net income vs oil price $/barrel 500 Liquids production 22 Net Income, LHS Oil Price, RHS 120 400 Capex 18 100 300 Net Income 14 80 60 200 10 40 100 6 20 0 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 2 02 04 06 08 10 12 0 As decline rates have stepped up and terrains have gotten more challenging, oil companies have failed to grow output Net income per barrel (11.5%) has risen by far less than oil prices (16.1%) over the last 10 years due to rising costs Source: EIA, Reuters, Energy Aspects analysis 11 November 2013
OPEC still has the lowest cost of production globally Average cost curve for the oil market $/barrel Shale plays lie at the higher end of the non-opec marginal cost curve, as infrastructure build-outs, decline rates and high levels of rig activity keep costs high Source: Energy Aspects analysis 12 November 2013
Moreover, is shale the right quality of oil? Crude oils by quality characteristics Declines at shale plays % 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 Eagle Ford Bakken 0.0 0 60 120 180 240 300 No of months The crude oil quality of shale plays is super light, with vast amounts of condensate blended in with crude Break-even prices required by producers are above $80 per barrel, in part due to extremely steep decline rates Source: EIA, Energy Aspects analysis 13 November 2013
When global refining capacity is biased towards processing heavy crudes Net refining capacity additions US refining capacity additions thousand b/d 250 2013 2014 2015 Total 175 Africa 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.19 Asia 0.84 0.44 2.44 3.71 Europe (0.45) (0.05) -- (0.50) FSU 0.16 0.05 0.16 0.37 Middle East 0.40 0.96 0.16 1.52 Latin America 0.05 0.40 0.18 0.62 North America 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.12 Global 1.10 1.87 3.05 6.03 100 25 (50) (125) (200) Distillation Upgrading Desulphurisation 2012 2013 2014 2015 Significant capacity addition in the non-oecd, all biased towards processing heavy crudes USGC refining capacity has significant upgrading capacity in an attempt to capture high light-heavy differentials Source: Energy Aspects analysis 14 November 2013
Δ debt $Bn With growth in shale supported by rising debt Continental Resources, balance sheet output vs debt Cumulative debt vs production 35 US independent companies 40 Production, thousand b/d, LHS 4 15 Debt Production 1.25 30 LT Debt, $ bn, RHS 3 10 1.00 0.75 20 2 5 0.50 0.25 10 1 0 0 0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 0 (5) 09 10 11 12 (0.25) Companies have been able to growth production only with huge debts. This is unsustainable in a rising interest rate environment. For instance, Continental was borrowing $840 million as of February 2013, meaning a 1% increase in interest rates would result in increased annual interest expense of approximately $8.4 million and a $5.2 million decrease annual net income. Source: Company reports, Energy Aspects analysis 15 November 2013
And OPEC outside the GCC also under significant pressure Libyan oil production Nigerian oil production 2.0 Arab Spring 2.3 Shell force majeures in 2011 from hacksaw cuts, leaks and fires on its pipelines 1.6 1.2 Overthrow of Gaddafi 2.2 2.1 Oil theft at three year high, leading to various FMs 0.8 2.0 Protests on the rise 0.4 0.0 2010 2011 2012 2013 1.9 1.8 Declaration of Amnesty by the government and ceasefire by MEND Floods and Increase in oil thefts 2010 2011 2012 2013 Ongoing unrest is significantly curtailing Libyan production While increasing oil theft is capping Nigerian output Source: MEES, Energy Aspects analysis 16 November 2013
As a result of which Saudi Arabia has had to fill the gap Iranian oil production OPEC output ex Saudi Arabia 3.7 Production capacity Actual output 22.5 3.5 22.0 3.3 21.5 3.1 21.0 2.9 20.5 2.7 20.0 2.5 Jan-12 Jul-12 Jan-13 Jul-13 19.5 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 There are various political and technical obstacles to the return of Iranian production to pre-sanction levels OPEC output from North African nations and from Iran and Iraq have been mired by problems Source: IEA, Energy Aspects analysis 17 November 2013
OPEC production marred by geopolitical risks and high declines The geopolitical backdrop of several key Middle Eastern countries remains extremely fragile. Syria remains unresolved and worsening, Libya s political backdrop remains extremely fragile and Iraq is getting worse with problems between Baghdad and Kurdistan and sectarian violence at the highest levels in five years, partly due to spillover from Syria Source: EIA, Energy Aspects analysis 18 November 2013
Saudi Arabia is the only country with meaningful spare capacity Global spare capacity Saudi Libya Iraq Iran Nigeria UAE Qatar Algeria Angola No spare capacity Spare capacity including Iran (est.) Ecuador Kuwait Venezuela October 2013 September 2013 3.57 3.67 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 Spare capacities in Libya, Iran and Nigeria are not available to the market as they are dependent on the political stability of the countries. Saudi Arabia continues to act as the primary swing producer in the market at times of market tightness. Source: Energy Aspects analysis 19 November 2013
But there are two headaches for Saudi Arabia: Iraq and domestic demand Iraqi production forecast Iraq and Saudi OSPs to Asia $/barrel 7 6 5 Other fields Adhab Badra 5 4 2 4 3 Gharraf Kirkuk 1 2 1 0 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Missan cluster Halfaya Zubair (1) (3) (4) Iraq - Basrah light 09 10 11 12 13 Saudi - Arab Light Iraqi production has struggled to grow lately and although challenges remain, growth can pick up substantially But discounted Iraqi crude could lead to the loss of market share, a problem in the longer run Source: Energy Aspects analysis 20 November 2013
Saudi domestic demand is soaring, potentially eating into exports Saudi crude burn Saudi crude exports 1.2 8.0 1.0 0.8 7.5 0.6 7.0 0.4 6.5 0.2 0.0 Middle East Saudi Arabia 09 10 11 12 13 6.0 2011 2012 2013 5-yr avg Jan March May July Sep Nov Rising domestic consumption has meant higher crude, diesel and fuel oil burn in the summer As a result, crude exports tend to take a dip over the summer, a trend that can continue through to 2020 Source: Energy Aspects analysis 21 November 2013
PRICES Price forecasts Energy Aspects Brent price forecasts (2013-2015) $/barrel Brent WTI differential Q1 actual 118.4 103.0 15.4 Q2 actual 108.8 93.4 15.4 Q3 actual 109.4 92.2 17.2 Q4 actual 110.1 88.2 21.9 2012 actual 111.7 94.2 17.5 Q1 actual 112.6 94.4 18.2 Q2 actual 103.3 94.1 9.2 Q3 actual 109.7 105.8 3.9 Q4 forecast 108 99 9 2013 forecast 108 98 10 2014 forecast 105 100 5 2015 forecast 108 101 7 Upside risk Supply outages spanning both OPEC and non-opec countries; shale disappointing Geopolitical risks surrounding Iraq, Nigeria, Syria and Libya all pose significant upside risks Demand recovery in the OECD being currently underestimated Downside risk Renewed weakness in Europe; US government default Derailment of Chinese recovery Long-term expectations A fairly well balanced market persists for now, but only while demand growth remains weak. Prices remain high as the cost of exploration has increased substantially. If supply shortfalls mount as demand picks up, prices have substantial room to rise in the medium-term Source: Bloomberg (actuals), Energy Aspects analysis; long term forecasts are in real terms 22 November 2013
DISCLAIMER Analyst Certification I, Amrita Sen, hereby certify: 1. that the views expressed in this research report accurately reflect my personal views about any or all of the subject securities or issuers referred to in this research report and; 2. no part of my compensation was, is or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this research report Disclaimer This publication has been prepared by Energy Aspects Ltd ( Energy Aspects ). It is provided to our clients for information purposes only, and Energy Aspects makes no express or implied warranties as to the merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose or use with respect to any data included in this publication Prices shown are indicative and Energy Aspects is not offering to buy or sell or soliciting offers to buy or sell any financial instrument Without limiting any of the foregoing and to the extent permitted by law, in no event shall Energy Aspects, nor any of their respective officers, directors, or employees have any liability for (a) any special, punitive, indirect, or consequential damages; or (b) any lost profits, lost revenue, loss of anticipated savings or loss of opportunity or other financial loss, even if notified of the possibility of such damages, arising from any use of this publication or its contents Other than disclosures relating to Energy Aspects, the information contained in this publication has been obtained from sources that Energy Aspects believes to be reliable, but Energy Aspects does not represent or warrant that it is accurate or complete. Energy Aspects is not responsible for, and makes no warranties whatsoever as to, the content of any third-party web site accessed via a hyperlink in this publication and such information is not incorporated by reference The views in this publication are those of the author(s) and are subject to change, and Energy Aspects has no obligation to update its opinions or the information in this publication. The analyst recommendations in this publication reflect solely and exclusively those of the author(s), and such opinions were prepared independently of any other interests, including those of Energy Aspects and/or its affiliates. This publication does not constitute personal investment advice or take into account the individual financial circumstances or objectives of the clients who receive it. The securities discussed herein may not be suitable for all investors. Energy Aspects recommends that investors independently evaluate each issuer, security or instrument discussed herein and consult any independent advisors they believe necessary. The value of and income from any investment may fluctuate from day to day as a result of changes in relevant economic markets (including changes in market liquidity). The information herein is not intended to predict actual results, which may differ substantially from those reflected. Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results This communication is directed at, and therefore should only be relied upon by, persons who have professional experience in matters relating to investments Copyright Energy Aspects Ltd (2013). All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any manner without the prior written permission of Energy Aspects Energy Aspects Ltd is registered in England No. 08165711. Registered office: 48 St. Olav s Court, Lower Road, London SE16 2XB 24 November 2013