The Pensions Regulator Guidance on transfer incentives Response from The Pensions Management Institute
- 2 - Guidance on transfer incentives Introduction The Pensions Management Institute (PMI) is the professional body for people working in the pensions sector. The PMI s members (currently over 4,200) work as pensions managers, consultants and technical specialists in consultancies and insurance companies. Many are also actuaries, pensions lawyers or company secretaries. Their experience is therefore wide ranging and has contributed to the thinking expressed in this response. Background In January 2007, the Pensions Regulator issued guidance to trustees on dealing with what were then described as inducement offers. These are attempts made by employers to persuade deferred pensioners of Defined Benefit pension schemes to transfer their benefits to another registered pension scheme. Their motive for doing this is to reduce the value of the scheme s liabilities. To motivate members to transfer, a financial incentive is offered in the form of an enhancement to the cash equivalent transfer value, a cash payment to the member, or a combination of the two. For such programmes to succeed, the co-operation of the scheme s trustees is required. In issuing revised guidance in July 2010, the Regulator has restated its position that such exercises should be assumed by trustees not to serve the best interests of members and advises trustees to treat such offers with caution. Its revised guidance provides in some detail the issues that trustees should address and the procedures that should be followed when enhanced transfer values are offered to members. The PMI s response PMI recognises that Enhanced Transfer Values (ETVs) and the Regulator s guidance concerning them have become controversial topics. In view of this, PMI s External Affairs Committee thought it would be appropriate to base its response on a survey of its membership. A survey also provided an opportunity to seek the views of a range of professionals working within the industry: as has been noted above, PMI s members include actuaries, pension managers, consultants, solicitors and administrators. Many are also trustees. The survey was conducted over August and July 2010. It received 169 responses, and the views expressed form the basis of PMI s response.
- 3 - We began by asking our members if they believed it was appropriate for the Regulator to issue guidance on this topic. The response was: Yes 74% No 26% Many respondents commented that the subject required clear guidance as there was concern that members focused on the incentive to transfer rather than on the value of their benefits. One response noted: There appears to be a wide range in practice adopted by Trustees/ Employers and a common & consistent code would help to protect members and ensure they were making an informed decision. However, there was a strong minority view that transfers were already over-regulated and that additional guidance would not be helpful. We then asked if respondents agreed with the Regulator s suggestion that trustees should assume that any ETV exercise is not in members best interests. The response was: Yes 38% No 62% One respondent noted: It is clearly wrong. For individual members, an ETV may be very financially beneficial - eg single members or those with shortened life expectancy. However, I think it is fair to say that Trustees should start from a position of scepticism about the balance between the benefit to the company and the benefit to the members. Another noted: This is too simplistic a position for tpr to take, particularly given any uncertainty that may exist regarding the strength of the sponsoring employer's covenant. It is also naive to assume that the PPF will be available to provide a guaranteed safety net for those members who are unfortunate to suffer from a collapse in their employer's pension scheme. However, some respondents shared the Regulator s concerns. One said: Employers only embark on this type of exercise if the likely outcome is in their favour. That must be balanced elsewhere by a potential loss, which will be to the member.
- 4 - Consultation Questions 1. Do you agree that the principles-based approach adopted in this guidance is the right approach to take to protect members benefits? We asked respondents to rank, on a scale of 1 to 10, the extent to which you believe the five principles adequately address the issues affecting ETVs. They responded as follows: Completely inadequate Completely adequate 1 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1% 0% 1% 1% 4% 5% 11% 36% 21% 20% One respondent commented: These are all sensible points. If followed, then there should be no impediment to carry out an exercise of this nature. Another said: All of the principles are valid. NO ETV exercise should be run without these being complied with. Trustees should be kept fully informed of the offer and the process, however, as the offer is made by the Company, the amount of influence from the Trustees on the outcome should be minimal. However, there were also some criticisms: The regulator should come off the fence in terms of independent financial advice. What does it mean to say such advice "should be made accessible"? If the regulator thinks that the employer should pay for it, it should say so in terms. Whilst the employer should make independent financial advice available and promote this to members, it is ultimately up to the individual member whether he/she seeks advice before making a decision. Members are not forced to take advice when considering whether to take a tax free cash sum for example. 2. Do you think the guidance will fulfil the purpose of ensuring that offers are made with full appreciation of the risks being taken by all parties, and with the utmost regard for member outcomes? Which of the following statements most closely reflects your views? Responses were as follows:
- 5 - In issuing this Guidance, the Regulator has ensured that ETV offers are made in a manner that will best protect members interests. 29% The Regulator should prohibit all ETV exercises 2% The Regulator s Guidance will be partially effective in ensuring that members best interests are respected when ETV offers are made 48% The Regulator s Guidance is of little or no value. 4% The Regulator s Guidance is potentially harmful 17% Additional comments included the following: The principles are all fine. However, some parts of the draft guidance are so negative that there is a risk that some will regard them as unreasoned and not pay sufficient attention to them. In addition, the detailed list of the information that must be provided is inappropriate and will obscure the principle of clear communication. The guidance helps to make it clear that any ETV exercise needs to be communicated in an open and honest manner and does not hide any of the facts. 3. Are there any additional messages for trustees and/or employers that you would like to see in the guidance? What additional aspects of ETV offers should the Regulator s Guidance address or address in more detail? Tick all that apply. The following percentages agreed with the following: Paying for members financial advice 54% Ensuring that advisers will not benefit financially from recommending a transfer 62% Ensuring members personal data is protected 21% Ensuring that professional advisers involved in the project are appointed by the employer or the trustees (but not both) 28% Spelling out the benefits to the Employer of running the exercise 31% Additional comments included the following:
- 6 - An acknowledgement that there are occasions when it may be in members' interests to consider an offer to accept an enhanced transfer - together with guidance of where the regulator considers this to be the case. In addition, some further guidance on the proportion/amount of cash that tpr considers will unduly influence the members' decision (even where the enhanced TV amount is sufficient to meet the critical yield that an adviser would use in determining whether or not the TV was adequate). And The guidance from the Regulator is of little use to individuals. Clear and sensible guidance or regulation from the FSA on transfers would be more useful. Respected advisers already run exercises using the guidance in place for their employer clients. Further guidance will not help individuals. And Why should trustees assume a normal low transfer value is fine and needs no particular risk warning, but a much higher enhanced transfer value is bad and requires lots of warnings? 4. Does this section clearly outline the area that this guidance covers, to whom it is intended to apply, and the scope of regulator s expectations with respect to those operating or involved in this area? Does this section clearly outline the area that the Guidance covers? Yes 87% No 13% Is it clear to whom this section is intended to apply? Yes 86% No 14%
- 7 - Is the scope of the Regulator s expectations of those involved in ETV exercises sufficiently clear? Yes 76% No 24% 5. Do you think the principles outlined in the guidance are comprehensive, and encompass what should be considered best practice? Are the five principles (described in detail on pages 12 to 13) sufficiently comprehensive? Yes 81% No 19% And: Do they encompass that which should be considered best practice? Yes 71% No 29% 6. Does this section achieve its intentions? Section 3 of the Guidance (page 14) seeks to address the problems that members may encounter arising from an ETV exercise. To what extent is it successful? Completely successful 2% Mainly successful 60% Partially successful 33% Not successful at all 5% Additional comments included:
- 8 - Too much jargon - lay members won't understand (which is the main problem within pensions and financial matters) Members decide whether to accept or reject ETVs based on their own perception of the value to them the exercise. It might eg be better for a member to take an ETV to a personal pension where their benefits can be triggered at 55 whereas the pension in the scheme might not be available before age 60, or might suffer a large early retirement reduction. It seems clear that IFA advice will be in the context of the pension decision in isolation and will not consider all the other circumstances of the member - this could be flagged. The section makes no reference to the issue of how cash options within the enhancement should be considered. 7. Are there any points from a member s perspective that need emphasising? From a member s perspective, what issues require particular emphasis? (tick all that apply) The following percentages of members agreed with the following: Members circumstances will vary on a case-by-case basis 84% Members may be inappropriately influenced by short-term requirements when making a decision 81% Advisers may have a vested interest in recommending a particular outcome 59% Some benefits foregone following transfer may not have been of value to the member Benefits retained in the scheme might subsequently be reduced were the scheme to fall into the PPF 59% 69% It was also suggested that the strength of the employer covenant was an important consideration; in some circumstances, a transfer would be the best protection for a member s benefits. 8. Are there any other key considerations that you feel should be included in the guidance? Responses included the following:
- 9 - The practicalities of the situation. ETV exercises are usually carried out responsibly and offer considerable benefits to some members. Advice is the most important aspect. Many employers pay for this or provide it and this is the only necessary addition to best practice in this area. Trustees' cannot effectively oversee these exercises on behalf of TPR which is what the guidance seems to be moving towards. And: These exercises need to be considered in the context of the broader position of the sponsoring employer and the scheme as they may be part of a package of measures to enable the employer to continue to support DB pension provision. And: Companies taking responsibility for pension obligations in a very difficult climate should be entitled to more support from the Regulator. Just as trustees are expected to represent all concerned parties so should the Regulator. The continued use of the Regulator's cynical view of an employer's motives is not helpful. Why cannot objective criteria be specified and a judgement made? Conclusion Given the broad nature of the membership of the PMI, perhaps not unexpectedly our survey shows a variety of views. However, we can conclude that: There is general acceptance for guidance in the sort of form proposed by the Regulator. There is a concern that the tone of the guidance is unduly negative with regard to enhanced transfer values. The guidance should acknowledge that there are circumstances in which an enhanced transfer value will be in the interests of members or a sub-group of members, and that the intention of the guidance is to make sure members are able to make an informed decision on such a transfer (or other benefit conversion). Guidance should seek to ensure that members are not overwhelmed by information, and members should have access to advice that is appropriate to the offer being made and provided on an impartial basis. **** **** ****